

-4-

5. Security of Army Supplies

- The unanticipated need in Iraq to secure supply lines against *Fedayeen* attacks necessitated a short operational pause. It also reinforced the need for all units to be capable of combat, and highlighted the fact that many forces may be needed to secure the supply lines. Supply problems emerged in Iraq during major combat operations because of insufficient trucks. Problems for spares were exacerbated by a lack of mobile satellite communications systems. Although these problems increased the risk, they fell short of impeding the operation.
 - For the future, the Army needs to address the fundamental question of what limits will be imposed on its concepts for simultaneous and extended maneuver operations by the need to provide security for logistics operations as well as the constraints (both financial and those imposed by enemy attacks) that continue to limit the amount of intratheater airlift capacity that can be brought to bear.

6. Exploitation of Sensitive WMD Sites

- The exploitation of sensitive WMD sites in Iraq was unique for the breadth of the target set and the scope of the effort. Although no weapons or materials were found, the lesson from Iraq is that tensions will arise between operational military imperatives and the requirements of an exploitation mission. In allocating sensor coverage in Iraq, hunting for WMD was given priority over providing information to tactical commanders. But in the military operations themselves, a rapid drive to Baghdad was given priority, not securing the sensitive sites or protecting the exploitation team members. The resulting extensive looting at many sites made it difficult to ascertain whether weapons, materials, critical computer files, or documents had been removed or destroyed. When the exploitation task evolved from discovering caches of weapons to detective work in trying to find evidence of weapons, the teams lacked experts in conducting investigations as well as a mandate to collect human intelligence. The primary casualty of checking every site was the availability of time at any one site to search for evidence, making it even more difficult to answer the questions as to how the programs were set up, what had been accomplished since the UNSCOM inspectors left, and who were the key individuals in the programs.
 - In future military operations the need to exploit sensitive sites is likely to arise, whether it is in the form of hunting for terrorists (as in Afghanistan) or WMD (as in Iraq). Civilian and military staffs in the DoD need to introduce requirements for site exploitation missions early into the military campaign planning, so that the tensions can be understood in advance and the explicit tradeoffs made. Building on the experiences of the innovative Sensitive Site Exploitation headquarters in Iraq, it would make sense to create in the Army a permanent small cadre of specialists, technical experts, and MPs who plan and train for these missions, notwithstanding the additional costs.

Tab A

-5-

6. *Information Operations*

- An important tool of Sadaam Hussein in both controlling his own population and manipulating perceptions internationally was his broadcast capabilities, particularly through access to satellite television. Broadcast capabilities comprise a difficult target set because they are redundant, dispersed, mobile, easily repaired and replaced, and often located with the high potential for collateral damage. But the lesson from Iraq is that one aspect of information operations deserves greater attention and particular emphasis, and that is fighting the enemy's public information campaign.
 - For the future, new concepts need to be considered to take on this task, perhaps to include stand-in jammers, high-powered microwave weapons, and proliferated jamming transmitters to disrupt/defeat the regime's propaganda.

6. *Bomb Damage Assessment*

- The process for assessing the effects of air attacks in Iraq fell behind early, despite the best efforts of the analysts. Many factors contributed, including bad weather, inadequate reporting from operators, and a scarcity of sensor systems and analytical resources. Turnaround times were measured in days instead of hours. The uncertainties arising from these delays resulted in air forces restriking targets unnecessarily and ground forces having scant knowledge of the condition of enemy forces along the route of advance. Without such information, it was also not possible credibly to refute enemy claims about civilian damage caused by coalition bombing.

For the future, the military services jointly should take steps to improve the bomb damage assessment process through changes in joint tactics, techniques, and procedures. A premium should be placed on quickly providing these assessments not only to military commanders but also to political leaders. More specifically, the Army should find ways to ensure that ground force assessment processes adequately address the concerns of ground force commanders and to integrate the products of damage assessment analysts with order-of-battle analysts, who have training in this task as well. Another step for improving bomb damage assessment would be to develop automated tools for generating and managing the flow of tactical reporting and to introduce joint training exercises. Finally, it should be possible to modify air-delivered missiles and bombs so that they report their location via a burst radio transmission just prior to detonation.

Tab A

9. *Planning and Resourcing Post Conflict Activities*

- Planning for military combat and postwar operations in Iraq lacked the flexibility necessary to enable the U.S. military to respond to the situation that emerged after the defeat of the Saddam Hussein regime. Post conflict stabilization and reconstruction were addressed only very generally, largely because of the prevailing view that the task would not be difficult. What emerged was a general set of tasks that were not prioritized or resourced. The possibility that these activities might require more resources, or a different mix of resources, than the earlier military operations was not contemplated.
 - For future intervention scenarios, the likelihood that the United States and its allies will quickly defeat outmatched opponents and then spend months or years winning the peace argues for an "inverted planning process," i.e., that the military and civilian resources required for securing the peace and reconstruction be given *primary* focus in the plan and priority in resources. Some process for exposing senior officials to possibilities other than those being assumed in their planning also needs to be introduced.

9. *Stability Operations and the Role of the Military*

- No planning was undertaken to provide for the security of the Iraqi people in the post conflict environment, given the expectations that the Iraqi government would remain largely intact; the Iraqi people would welcome the American presence; and local militia, police, and the regular military would be capable of providing law and order. By not including civil police in its nation-building operations, the burden for handling public security in Iraq fell upon coalition military forces, which were ill prepared. Iraq demonstrates that the military mission of providing security in the post conflict environment is just as important to achieving a strategic victory, if not more important, than the military mission of winning decisive combat operations.
 - For the future, the U.S. military cannot assume that some other organization, either within the U.S. government or in the host country, will take responsibility for providing law, order, and security through the transition period from the end of conventional military operations until a generally secure environment has been established. Until civilian agencies can operate in a secure environment, military personnel will need to be trained and prepared to assume responsibility for public security—including overseeing local police activities, providing short-term training, and directly suppressing criminal activity.

-7-

II. Lessons for responding to insurgencies

1. Counterinsurgency Operations

- Iraq underscores first the overwhelming organizational tendency within the U.S. military not to absorb historical lessons when planning and conducting counterinsurgency operations. Missing in Iraq was the recognition of how critical political-military coordination is in waging an effective counterinsurgency as well as the essential element of actionable intelligence on the insurgents. But problems also arose because of a failure to understand how this Iraqi insurgency differs from past wars of national liberation and a "classical guerrilla-type campaign." Iraqi insurgents are groups of disparate opposition elements with no center of gravity, no clear leader, no aim to seize and hold territory, and no single, defined, or unifying ideology. The Iraq insurgency demonstrates the closest manifestation yet of "net war," which is characterized by flatter, more linear networks rather than the pyramidal hierarchies and command and control systems of traditional insurgent organizations.
 - In the future, U.S. military forces engaged in counterinsurgency operations must be composed of personnel with training and skills similar to special operations forces, i.e., the language and culture of the country, and in the critically important political, economic, intelligence, organizational, and psychological dimensions of counterinsurgency warfare. Serious attention should also be given to creating in the Army a dedicated cadre of counterinsurgency specialists and a program to produce such experts.
- 2. *Role of Special Operations Forces In Building Indigenous Security Forces*
 - Special operations forces in Iraq have been used predominantly in what is known as their direct action mission, that is, as a "high-value target" posse deployed on successive special mission task forces. They have been notably absent, for example, from the training and advising of indigenous Iraqi military and security forces, or accompanying them in counterinsurgency operations.
 - In the future, U.S. special operations forces need to be at the core of any successful counterterrorist and/or counterinsurgency strategy. In this respect, they can bring a distinct and advantageous "force-multiplying" capability to bear through their language proficiency and intercultural communications skills. They are also expert in training indigenous forces about how to win the trust of their fellow citizens and how to protect those citizens from insurgent attack and reprisals, as well as in organizing indigenous populations for their own self-defense, thereby giving them a stake in the outcome of their government's success. Because of their intimate understanding of unconventional environments, they can play a pivotal role in promoting sound civil-military relations.

Tab A

-8-

- In this context, special operations forces can also perform a critical "combat advisor" role, as they did in northern Iraq with the Kurds. Not only would they train Iraqi forces, but they would also have the flexibility to accompany these forces on counterterrorism and/or counterinsurgency operations to follow through on the training received, and coach and mentor them on how such missions can be most effectively and successfully executed. Performing this advisory role would also place them in a position to synchronize U.S. intelligence, operations, and logistical support and in turn help ensure that U.S.-provided resources are being properly used and that rapport and trust is developed and maintained.

3. Air Force and Army Supply Operations

- As military operations in Iraq continued beyond major combat, the system for distributing spares and other on-demand items remained relatively slow for many months. Distribution problems resulted from a misalignment between the packaging and configuration of loads in the United States and the handling and distribution capabilities in the theater, and also from delays in increasing the capacity of U.S. distribution centers (i.e., warehouse and load consolidation centers). As very high demands continued, the system began to experience high backorders as national inventories, which had significant war reserve shortfalls, were drained. An industrial base surge was delayed by slow budget approval to place orders for quantities of spares above baseline demand levels. In supplying Air Force units, problems arose in coordinating the strategic and theater movements systems, in ensuring in-transit visibility, and in paying for the shipments. As a result, cargo built up at transshipment points for Air Force supplies. In contrast, distribution delays did not generally occur at transshipment points for Army supplies.
- A common commodity supply chain guiding vision or model setting our basic operating principles needs to be adopted by all supply chain organizations, including the Services, joint logistics commands, government agencies, and their commercial partners. The joint and service planning and assessment processes, doctrine, organization, training, and information systems then need to be modified for consistency with the model and to ensure that the assumptions of the organizations in the supply chains are consistent with the capabilities of their suppliers and customers. The goal is for the supply chains to be optimized as a whole rather than having each process optimized in and of itself. Ensuring that the system stays aligned with the model once a contingency begins then calls for the adoption of improved monitoring and control capabilities for logistics situational awareness so as to provide near-real-time feedback when problems begin to arise.
- The processes for planning and executing the airlift of supplies need to focus on outcomes, with a cadre of permanent staff in all operational theaters. The changes made during the course of operations in Iraq in how Army materiel is packaged for shipment should be embedded in joint policy and integrated into

Tab A

-9-

processes better designed to quickly make transitions to new locations as contingencies develop.

- Finally, there is the need throughout DoD to appreciate better the long lead times involved in providing parts for many critical weapon systems. These lead-times call for an improved ability to quickly forecast contingency requirements; for a more rapid pre-contingency approval of contract authority for additional orders; for reducing the time needed to approve an increase in the Defense Logistics Agency workforce so as to expand the capacity of its distribution centers; for alerting senior policymakers to the risks when a given concept of operations must be adjusted for lack of logistics resources; and for changing the ways the Army computes and resources war reserve inventory levels, given that some critical items with long lead times can only be supported in this way. The long-term effects of even small shortfalls in national supply and distribution capacity can be dramatic.

III. Lessons for designing the NSC and DoD

1. NSC Processes for Post-Conflict Planning and

- Historically, administrations have struggled to find ways to integrate military and civilian planning and activities for the period when major combat operations come to an end. The Iraqi experience was no different, with frustrations recorded among both military and civilian organizations. The NSC coordinating effort for Iraq focused largely on military operations and plans for providing humanitarian assistance, not post-conflict activities. Responsibility for such operations was given to DoD, but separate from the military command. approach worked poorly, because DoD lacked the experience, expertise, authority, local knowledge, and established contacts with other potential organizations needed to establish, staff, support, and oversee a large multi-civilian mission.
 - Unity of command and broad participation are both important to the success of stabilization and reconstruction operations. There is a case to be made that such responsibility reside with a senior State Department official, who would be appointed as a special Presidential envoy with authority to convene an NSC interagency planning group. But who is given such responsibility is not as important as the requirement that the planning and operations be based on a full understanding of the operational military plan and that it involve both civilians and military officers with expertise in security and law enforcement, in various reconstruction operations, and critically in the culture of the region of the conflict. For this to happen, the Secretary of Defense will need personally to support a civilian-led planning effort and most importantly direct such sharing of operational military information. An active NSC interagency process will also be necessary to ensure that the State and Defense Departments are acting off the same sheet of paper and to bring forward

Tab A

-10-

debate of alternative views and subsequent decisionmaking on important issues. Policy differences need to be expressed and adjudicated, if necessary by the President, as the planning process goes forward.

2 DoD Process for Force Deployments and Mobilization of Reserves

- Within DoD, the principal organizational lessons from Iraq concern the militarily important and politically sensitive process of force deployments and mobilization of the reserves. In Iraq, the deployment of forces was accomplished through a procedure of separate requests from the commander for each force component. This had the advantage of tailoring the forces to the diplomatic and military situation, but it led to high-level micromanagement, delay, and disruptions. Because alert times were then compressed, most units received less than 30 days of mobilization notice. Extensive small, sequential requirements also led to readiness problems within units and administrative burdens. The Iraq experience also showed that the Army mobilization system is fragmented in terms of responsibilities, with no single organization responsible for monitoring performance or synchronizing the activities with others in DoD. This led to surprises, frictions, and false starts. The Army's outdated and inadequate information systems exacerbated these problems.
 - For the future, the processes of deploying forces and mobilizing reserves within DoD need to be fundamentally redesigned to reflect the high political stakes as well as the critical military requirements in future military operations. A single Army officer needs to be accountable for redesigning the Army's reserve mobilization system and for how it performs. The system should involve the application of metrics for performance, such as meeting the commander's requirements, minimizing reserve soldier time on active duty, and providing predictability throughout the mobilization process. New information systems also need to be introduced to help integrate all these activities.

February 2005

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/47372

UNCLASSIFIED

TAB B

COORDINATION

USCENTCOM	COL Jayne	22 Mar 05
USJFCOM	COL Holm	24 Mar 05
USSOCOM	COL Colon	17 Mar 05
USA	COL Howle	22 Mar 05
USN	CAPT Goldacker	10 Mar 05
USMC	Col Van Dyke	11 Mar 05
USAF	Col Ball	23 Mar 05

11-L-0559/OSD/47373

UNCLASSIFIED

Tab B

January 18, 2005

032

TO: Larry Di Rita

CC: Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DL*

SUBJECT: Gen ~~Myers~~ Response to Ike Skelton

I want to see the final answer from Myers to Skelton in English.

Thanks.

Attach.
 12/15/04 SecDef Memo to Larry Di Rita

DHR:ss
011805-11

.....

Please respond by 1/27/05

18 Jan 05



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CM-2336-05-0 PM 2:26
8 February 2005

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBMY/17*

SUBJECT: Response to Representative Ike Skelton

- In response to your request (TAB A), attached (TAB B) is a copy of my response to Mr. Skelton regarding the use of M-113 armored personnel carriers (APCs) in Iraq. Mr. Skelton requested feedback on the potential use of APCs in Kuwait to augment the **USCENTCOM** armored wheeled vehicle fleet.
- Mr. Skelton referenced dated information regarding the number of APCs in the Army pre-positioned stocks in Kuwait. Army and **USCENTCOM** confirmed that there are now less than 50 APCs remaining in Kuwait.
- The **Army** recently initiated a program to add armor kits to 734 **APCs** that are currently operating in units in Iraq. The Army anticipates starting kit production in February and completing the program by August.

COORDINATION: TAB C

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: Lieutenant General D. J. McNabb, USAF; Director, J-4; (b)(6)

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

OSD 02713-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47375

8 Feb 05
18 Jan 05

TAB A

~~FOUO~~

January 18, 2005

TO: Larry Di Rita
CC: Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Gen Myers Response to Ike Skelton

I want to see the final answer from Myers to Skelton in English.

Thanks.

Attach.

12/15/04 SecDef Memo to Larry Di Rita

DHR:ss
011805-11

.....
Please respond by 1/27/05

~~FOUO~~

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/47376



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

8 February 2005

The Honorable Ike Skelton
Ranking Member
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-6035

Dear Mr. Skelton,

I share your concern about the need for timely delivery of force protection equipment to forward deployed forces, and, as you suggest, the use of armored vehicles has proven to be an essential part of the equation. In response to USCENTCOM requirements, the Department of Defense has worked closely with Congress and industry to rapidly increase industrial capacity and production of up-armored high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles and vehicle add-on armor. The industrial base has increased production by more than 300 percent since May 2003, and every known source to increase armament production capacity is being pursued.

M-113 armored personnel carriers (APCs) are playing a vital role in the protection of troops. Currently, there are less than 50 APCs in Kuwait; however, there are 734 APCs in Iraq. The Army has initiated a program to apply additional armor to those vehicles and anticipates starting kit production in February 2005 and completing the process by August 2005.

By mid-February, the goal that no troops will transit outside forward operating bases without armored vehicles should be reached. Other mitigation techniques are being integrated including maximizing the use of intra-theater airlift to reduce exposure to hazardous ground routes and the rapid development and infusion of new technologies to detect and defeat improvised explosive devices.

There is nothing more important than protecting the brave Americans who defend our national interests. Thank you for the continued strong support of and concern for our men and women in uniform.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Richard E. Myers", written over a horizontal line.

RICHARD E. MYERS

Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

11-L-0559/OSD/47377

TAB C

COORDINATION

Unit	Name	Date
USA	Colonel Howle	20 December 2004
USCENTCOM	Colonel Kanewske	22 December 2004

~~FOUO~~

Cont XTPA

ES-2245
05/001888
February 7, 2005

1426
2/7

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
Richard Lawless

SUBJECT: Visit of the Governor of Okinawa

The Governor of Okinawa is going to come to Washington. He wants to meet with the President. In my view, he definitely should not meet with the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State or the National Security Adviser. He was insulting when I was in Okinawa.

The highest people he should meet with should be the Deputy Secretary of Defense and, if necessary, the Deputy Secretary of State.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
020705-2

.....
Please respond by

2/17/05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 02829-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47379

FEB 17 2005

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2005 FEB 18 PM 4: 54

INFO MEMO

DepSecDef _____

USD(P) _____

I-05/002280-AP

ES-2245

Copy provided to 4/12/05

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Peter W. Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) *PR* 18 FEB 2005

SUBJECT: Visit of the Governor of Okinawa

- Your memo (TAB 1) states that the Okinawa Governor should be received at a level no higher than the Deputy Secretary of Defense and, if necessary, Deputy Secretary of State.
- We have discussed this visit with staff at the National Security Council, Office of the Vice President, and State Department. **All** share **your** views regarding **handling** the visit.
- Within DOD we anticipate the highest level of meetings we will consider are:
 - USD(P)
 - Joint Staff J-5
 - Commandant of the Marine Corps

COORDINATION: None

Attachments:

As stated

PDASD/ISA *AS*

DUSD/AP *16.2.05*

PDIR/AP *A 16 Feb 05*

Prepared by: Maj Jason Perry, ISA/AP, (b)(6)

Japan

18 Feb 05

17 Feb 05

1100

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

FEB 17 2005

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2/23

2005 FEB 18 PM 4: 54

INFO MEMO

DepSecDef _____

USD(P) _____

I-05/002280-AP

ES-2245

Copy provided
2/18/05

Paul Butler
2/22
pub

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Peter W. Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)

18 FEB 2005

SUBJECT: Visit of the Governor of Okinawa

- **Your** memo (TAB 1) states that the Okinawa Governor should be received at a level no higher than the Deputy Secretary of Defense **and**, if necessary, Deputy Secretary of State.
- We have discussed **this** visit with staff at the National Security Council, Office of the Vice President, and State Department. All share your Views regarding handling the visit.
- Within DOD we anticipate the highest level of meetings we will consider are:

~~USD(P)~~

- Joint Staff J-5
- Commandant of the Marine Corps

COORDINATION: None

Attachments:
As stated

PDASD/ISA

AS

DUSD/AP

1/16.2.05

PDIR/AP

16 Feb 05

Prepared by: Maj Jason Perry, ISA/AP, (b)(6)

MA SD	SMA DSD	<i>2/22</i>	
TSA SD	SA DSD	<i>2/22</i>	
EXEC SEC	<i>M2/22</i>		
ESR MA	<i>KSD</i>	<i>2-22-05</i>	

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

OSD 02829-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47381

18-02-05 10:02 IN

~~FOUO~~

Policy Executive Secretariat Note

February 8, 2005
I-05/001888

Reference: 020705-2, Visit of the Governor of Okinawa

Captain Marriott,

USDP Special Assistant relayed message to
Steve Hadley's Executive Assistant yesterday, February 7.


June Bartlett
Deputy Director
Policy Executive Secretariat

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/47382

OSD 02829-05

~~FOUO~~

ES-2245
05/001888

**OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
The Military Assistant**

07 February 2005 - 1620

MEMORANDUM FOR USD(P)


Subject: Visit of the Governor of Okinawa

Sir,

DSD requests you provide "Way Ahead" for attached SD snowflake.

Please provide a copy of this tasker with your response.

Very Respectfully,



Sean E. O'Connor
Captain, USN
Military Assistant to the
Deputy Secretary of Defense

SUSPENSE: 17Feb05
ATTACHMENT: As Stated

~~FOUO~~

OSD 02829-05

07-02-05 09:15 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/47383

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT

TO:

Mr. Haynes

Paul Butler

2/9

OSD 02848-05 gms

11-L-0559/OSD/47384

~~FOUO~~

February 9, 2005

TO: COL Steve Bucci
CC: Cathy Mainardi
FROM Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Meet w/ Schwarzenegger

I talked to Congressman Lewis yesterday. He asked me to meet with Gov. Schwarzenegger on February 17 -- the date I have two hearings. I have agreed to do so. We will have to find a room there, maybe have a sandwich and a coke between hearings, or meet him before or after the hearings.

Thanks.

DER:as
020905-1

.....
Please respond by _____

~~FOUO~~

OSD 02848-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47385

COMPLETED

FEB 05 2005

TO: Cables (ESO)
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: E-Mail to Howard Baker

Howard,

Thanks ~~for~~ your note about Blackman. He is a fine officer and we will certainly keep that idea in mind.

Warm regards,

Attach.
2/2/05 Amb Baker e-mail to SecDef

DHR:ss
020405-16

.....
Please respond by _____

DISTRIBUTION				
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DEPOB	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SPL ASST	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DEPOB	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> USDP	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> C&D	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CCD	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CABLE CH	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> FILE	

000-92

5 FEB 05

Westerhof, Andrea L, LT, OSD

From: Baker, Howard H (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, February 02, 2005 3:22 AM
To: 'cableseso@osd.pentagon.mil'
Subject: PLEASE PASS MESSAGE TO SECRETARY RUMSFELD FROM AMBASSADOR HOWARD BAKER, JR.

2/2 PM 2/3

importance: High

SIR —
From Howard
Baker via
email.
via Jim



Amb E-Mail to WH
Chief of Staff...

Dear Don:

As a way of thanking our troops for their tremendous tsunami relief effort and to generate more publicity about U.S. contributions, I suggested to Andy Card that the President meet in the Oval Office with Lieutenant General Robert R. Blackman, Jr., who commanded the relief effort from his headquarters at Utapao Royal Thai Air Force Base.

Rusty Blackman and his troops -- from all services -- have done a simply superb job that needs greater recognition, especially internationally. I think a White House greeting would re-focus media attention on American relief efforts. It would also be a tribute to our men and women in uniform. After General Blackman's return to his "day job" as Commander of Marine Forces in Japan, my Press Office, working with U.S. Forces Japan, would arrange follow-up media events, aimed in particular at the Japanese media.

I've attached my message to Andy. I hope you will support it.

Best regards,

Howard

<<Amb E-Mail to WH Chief of Staff Andy Card - 020205.doc>>

11- L-0559/OSD/47387

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION DISTRIBUTION					
SECDEF	DEFSEC	NSA/ASST	DOCS/SEC	USDP	
X					
USDI	CAB	OC	CABLE/CS	PRR	

Dear Andy:

I have been thinking about ways to get some attention for the terrific effort put forth by the U.S. military in providing relief to the countries hit by the tsunami in Southeast Asia. I wanted to share an idea with you. I recommend you consider having the President meet in the Oval Office with Lieutenant General Robert R. Blackman, Jr., who commanded the U.S. military's relief effort throughout the region.

We in Japan know "Rusty" Blackman as the Commanding General of the III Marine Expeditionary Force, based at several bases in Okinawa and at Iwakuni on the Japanese mainland. General Blackman is the senior Marine *Corps* officer here. As you know, his troops--a Marine division and a Marine air wing--are the largest component of U.S. Forces, Japan (USFJ), itself commanded by Lt Gen Tom Waskow, USAF. USFJ's Army, Air Force, Navy, Coast Guard, and Marine Corps assets not only defend Japan and ensure peace and stability throughout the Far East, but they provide disaster relief and humanitarian assistance.

When the tsunami struck, USFJ formed Combined Service Force 536, under LtGen Blackman's command, and deployed many thousands of troops, dozens of ships, and more than a hundred aircraft to the relief effort. Headquartered at Utapao Royal Thai Air Force Base, and assisted by some forces deployed from CONUS, Combined Service Force 536 performed brilliantly at funneling aid and assistance throughout the afflicted region. Indeed the operation is still going on, though it is winding down. General Blackman expected to depart Thailand on February 14. Separately, I'll forward to you an email from our Tom Reich, our Consul General in Naha, who went to Thailand as General Blackman's Political Advisor. Tom's email gives a vivid account of the U.S. military's substantial achievements.

Alas, especially in the relief effort's early days, some did not adequately appreciate American contributions. By publicly thanking General Blackman, as a representative of all the U.S. Forces who participated in the relief effort, we would call attention to American relief efforts. We would also have an opportunity to thank our allies in Asia (prominently, Japan and Australia). We could emphasize the importance of having forces forward deployed in Asia and how valuable those forces can be in non-combat roles. Lastly, thanking General Blackman in the Oval Office would likely generate another round of media stories about the American relief effort.

Andy, I hope you see as much merit in this idea as I do.

Best regards,

Howard

Westerhof, Andrea L, LT, OSD

From: Adanza, Nelia G (b)(6) on behalf of Baker, Howard H (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, February 09, 2005 8:38 PM
To: 'SecDef Cables ESO'
Subject: RE: PLEASE PASS MESSAGE TO SECRETARY RUMSFELD FROM AMBASSADOR HOWARD BAKER, JR.

I received the document. Thanks.

-----Original Message-----

From: Plunkett, Lynn L, Capt, OSD [mailto:CablesESOBosd.mil]
Sent: Wednesday, February 09, 2005 9:31 PM
To: (b)(6)
Cc: SecDef Cables ESO
Subject: FW: PLEASE PASS MESSAGE TO SECRETARY RUMSFELD FROM AMBASSADOR HOWARD BAKER, JR.

Sir,
I am just confirming you received the document attached.

V/R
Capt Plunkett
(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: MacNeil, Kevin, CPT, OSD On Behalf Of SecDef Cables ESO
Sent: Saturday, February 05, 2005 10:31 AM
To: 'Baker, Howard H'
Subject: RE: PLEASE PASS MESSAGE TO SECRETARY RUMSFELD FROM AMBASSADOR HOWARD BAKER, JR.

Sir,
Secretary Rumsfeld's response is attached.

Please reply with confirmation of receipt. Thank you.
-CPT M@c
--

Kevin M. MacNeil
CPT, U.S. Army
OSD Cables

-----Original Message-----

From: Baker, Howard H [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Wednesday, February 02, 2005 3:22 AM
To: 'cableseso@osd.pentagon.mil'
Subject: PLEASE PASS MESSAGE TO SECRETARY RUMSFELD FROM AMBASSADOR HOWARD BAKER, JR.
Importance: High

Dear Don:

As a way of thanking our troops for their tremendous tsunami relief effort and to generate more publicity about U.S. contributions, I suggested to Andy Card that the President meet in the Oval Office with Lieutenant General Robert R. Blackman, Jr., who commanded the relief effort from his headquarters at Utapao Royal Thai Air Force Base.

Rusty Blackman and his troops -- from all services -- have done a simply superb job that needs greater recognition, especially internationally. I think a White House greeting would re-focus media attention on American relief efforts. It would also be a tribute to our men and women in uniform. After General Blackman's return to his "day job" as Commander of Marine Forces in Japan, my Press Office, working with U.S. Forces Japan, would arrange follow-up media events, aimed in particular at the Japanese media.

I've attached my message to Andy. I hope you will support it.

Best regards,

Howard

<<Amb E-Mail to WH Chief of Staff Reply Card - 02020.doc>>

A

~~FOUO~~

12.19 December 12, 2005

TO: Dan Stanley

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld. *DA*

SUBJECT: Amendment

We certainly ought to be opposing the amendment that would prevent anybody from the military from being number two at CIA or NDI.

Thanks

DHR:s
12/19/05

.....

Please Respond By: 12.19/05

~~FOUO~~



LEGISLATIVE
AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

13

February 21, 2005, 12:05 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Robert Wilkie, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense-;
for Legislative Affairs (b)(6)

Robert Wilkie

SUBJECT: Response to SECDEF Snowflake Regarding Exclusion of Military Officers
from CIA Leadership Positions

- The FY06 Senate Intelligence Bill contained a provision that the CIA Director and Deputy Director must be appointed from civilian life.
- You and the DNI strongly appealed this provision in letters to Congress, claiming this provision materially interferes with the President's prerogatives.
- For unrelated reasons, this bill was never voted out of the full Senate. Therefore, we do not have, nor do we expect, an intelligence bill for FY06. As a result, the offensive provision has not been enacted into law.
- Your staff will work to ensure both intelligence committees are aware of the administration's objection to any such provision in future bills.

Coordination: *Laxone 107 2.22.06*
USD (Intelligence)

Attachment:

SECDEF Snowflake 121205-04, 12Dec 05
Appeal Letters to the Senate from DoD and DNI

11-L-0559/OSD/47392

OSD 02881-06

A

~~FOUO~~
CONFIDENTIAL

2005 DEC 18 6:18 December 12, 2005

TO: Dan Stanley

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Amendment

We certainly ought to be opposing the amendment that would prevent anybody from the military from being number two at CIA or NDI.

Thanks.

DIR
12/12/05-14



Please Respond By 12.19/05

~~FOUO~~

B



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

DEC 7 2005

The Honorable Pat Roberts
Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510-6575

Dear Mr. Chairman:

There are three provisions in the Senate's Fiscal Year 2006 intelligence authorization bill that are of particular concern to the Department of Defense, and that - if enacted - would affect the Department's ability to properly perform its missions and impact on our national security.

Section 421 would require that the Director and Deputy Director of the CIA be appointed "from civilian life." Past Presidents have appointed serving military officers as Director or Deputy Director of Central Intelligence. These officers have provided outstanding service to the nation, and it is likely that future Presidents may also determine that appointment of a serving military officer to one of these positions would be appropriate. Section 421 materially interferes with the President's prerogatives to organize the nation's intelligence organizations to meet future needs.

Section 435 would include the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), the National Security Agency (NSA), and the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) as "designated federal entities" under the Inspector General Act of 1978. The first three of these are combat support agencies (CSAs). All four are within the Department of Defense, and their IGs operate under the supervision of the Department's Inspector General. The Department has ample authority to ensure full cooperation by any element of the Department with the IGs of the four agencies. Enactment of this provision would interfere with the statutory lines of authority governing the operations of the Department of Defense related to this important function.



Section **436** would require that the Directors of **NSA, NGA, and NRO** be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. **Under the** recently enacted Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention **Act of 2004**, these Directors are appointed by the Secretary of Defense with the concurrence of the DNI. This proposal would only serve to inhibit the timely staffing of these important positions.

I strongly urge the intelligence authorization conferees to reject these three provisions. I have sent a similar letter to the Committee's Vice **Chairman, The** Honorable **John D. Rockefeller IV**.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Daniel A. Gold". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large initial "D" and a long horizontal stroke.

DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, DC 20511

December 1, 2005

The Honorable Pat Roberts
Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

The Honorable John Rockefeller
Vice Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman and Senator Rockefeller:

This letter presents the views of the Administration, regarding S. 1803, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, as reported by Committee. We appreciate [the Committee's inclusion in its bill of many of the provisions contained in the Administration's draft bill and thank you for your efforts on our behalf. Although we generally are in accord with the bill, there are several provisions in the bill and the classified annex that cause us some concern, and for the reasons set forth below, we cannot support the bill in its entirety. Our concerns with the classified annex are addressed in a separate, classified submission. However, we caution that should the final intelligence authorization bill not address certain concerns identified in the classified letter from the Director of National Intelligence, the President's senior advisors will recommend that he veto the bill.

In the remarks that follow, provisions we support are discussed first, followed by provisions that cause us concern. For these we have offered several recommendations. Provisions that we oppose are discussed last. We look forward to working with the Committee to resolve these issues.

Provisions Supported

The Administration appreciates and supports sections 101, 104, 201, 301, **302, 303**, 304, 308, 309, 402, 404, 405, 412, 413, 414, 415, 417, 422, 423, 424, 425, 432, 443, 444, and the provisions highlighted in the following paragraphs. We also appreciate and have no issues with the technical amendments in Title V of the bill.

Section **305. Modification of availability of funds for different intelligence activities.** The Administration strongly supports section 305, which would bring the section's substantive criteria **under 504(a)(3)(B) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, into conformity with the substantive criteria under section 102A(d)(5)(A) of that Act, as amended by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA).** The new language would enhance the

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flexibility and capability of intelligence agencies to reprogram funds to meet higher-priority mission needs.

Section 306. **Retention and use of amounts paid as debts to elements of the intelligence community.** We strongly support this provision, which would allow elements of the Intelligence Community (IC) to accept, retain, and - for certain purposes - use funds received from private parties for debts owed. However, we recommend that section 306(c) be amended to read as follows:

"(c) AVAILABILITY OF AMOUNTS.--Amounts credited to an appropriation or account under subsection (h) with respect to a debt owned to an element of the intelligence community shall be available to the head of such element, for such time as is applicable to amounts in such appropriation or account or such longer time as may be provided by law, for purposes as follows. . ."

Section 401. **Additional authorities of the Director of National Intelligence on intelligence information sharing.** We strongly support this provision. The development and deployment of systems of common concern designed to enhance the collection, processing, analysis, exploitation, and dissemination of national intelligence will greatly benefit the Intelligence Community. Intelligence information sharing systems need to be interconnected, interoperable, secure, and available, and permitting the DNI to help fund such systems will help ensure their development. Moreover, establishing standards for the utilization and operation of such systems is consistent with DNI authorities set forth in the IRTPA, including section 1018.

Section 411. **Eligibility for incentive awards of personnel assigned to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.** The Administration supports the extension of incentive awards authority for military personnel to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. We understand that in the past there has been some difficulty in processing similar awards; thus, we would strongly support additional language that would urge expeditious processing of such awards.

Section 416. **Applicability of the Privacy Act to the Director of National Intelligence and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.** The Administration supports this provision, which would provide the DNI with authority, similar to that currently available to the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), to exempt systems of records from certain requirements of the Privacy Act.

Section 426. **Modification of exclusion of military officer serving as Associate Director of the Central Intelligence Agency for Military Support Prom officer strength and distribution-in-grade limitations.** The Administration supports this section. We understand that a provision that is substantively the same as section 426 of S. 1803 has been added by amendment to S. 1042, the Senate's FY 2006 National Defense Authorization bill.

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Section 433. Codification of authorities of National Security Agency protective personnel. We support this section but recommend that the title be changed to "Additional functions and authorities for protective personnel of the National Security Agency." to parallel the title of section 425, "Additional functions and authorities for protective personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency."

Provisions of Concern

The following sections cause us some concern, and so we offer several recommendations:

Section 102. Classified schedule of authorizations. We support section 102. However, for reasons set forth in the "Provisions Opposed" section of this letter, we strongly object to section 103, and therefore recommend that the phrase incorporating section 103 that appears at the end of section 102(a) be deleted so that the end of the last sentence in subsection 102(a) reads as follows:

"[A]re those specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany the conference report on the bill _____ of the One Hundred Ninth Congress and in the Classified Annex to such report ~~or incorporated in this Act under section 103.~~"

Section 105. Intelligence Community Management Account. Section 105(d) contains a provision found in prior intelligence authorization acts that limits nonreimbursable details to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence to a period of less than one year. We believe that the ODNI as well as the detailing agencies would benefit from arrangements for details of longer duration and should not be subject to the one-year limitation. Removing the current limitation would be consistent with the spirit of the IRTPA to ensure that quality personnel are assigned to the ODNI. Because there is no comparable government-wide statutory prohibition, we believe removal of this specific prohibition would enhance the ODNI's personnel flexibility to function consistent with applicable government-wide requirements. We will develop appropriate guidelines for managing nonreimbursable details as part of our overall efforts to improve the management of the Intelligence Community's human capital.

Section 106. Incorporation of Reporting Requirements. Section 106 of the bill purports to incorporate by reference certain items set forth in a classified annex to the bill and in a yet to be written joint explanatory statement to accompany a conference report on the bill or in the yet to be written classified annex to the Act. As we explain in our objections to section 103, the Executive Branch continues to discourage the practice of enacting secret laws, and encourages instead appropriate uses of non-statutory classified schedules of authorizations, classified annexes to committee reports, and joint statements of managers that accompany the final legislation.

Section 307. Pilot program on disclosure of records under the Privacy Act relating to certain intelligence activities. The Administration strongly supports this provision because it would facilitate the type of information sharing mandated by the IRTPA, consistent with the

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need to protect privacy and civil liberties. However, we have some concerns with specific provisions in this section.

1. We firmly believe that the program described in section 307 requires four years to collect the data necessary to produce meaningful analysis and reporting.
2. However, we also believe that section 307 contains too many reporting requirements, including a report by the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, and so we recommend a revised reporting schedule that is synchronized with the DNI's preparation of its annual authorization package, and still meets congressional requirements.

First, we suggest replacement of the annual reports (three in all) with one report to be delivered to Congress on December 1, 2007. Because this interim report would cover approximately 20 months of administration information, it would provide more comprehensive data regarding the administration of the amendments made by this section. A single interim report also would ease the administrative burden on the ODNI, thereby enabling the production of a more complete product.

A final report, capturing approximately 12 months of administration experience, would be delivered to Congress on December 1, 2008, so that it could be included in the DNI's FY 2010 authorization package. This report would be delivered in time to support a decision on the December 31, 2009, sunset provision. A decision regarding the sunset provision then could be included in the FY 2010 package that would become law on October 1, 2009, prior to the sunset date.

3. In subsection 307(a), the word "and" at the end of subsection (a)(B)(i) and before subsection (B)(ii) should be changed to "or". The "and" between (B)(i) and (B)(ii) unnecessarily limits the potential donor agencies that are capable of making determinations that records may be relevant under this section. Alternatively, and the preferable solution would be, to delete subsection (B)(i) in its entirety. Absent (B)(i), the decision of the agency head is consistent with the law enforcement disclosure exemption authority and the current national security imperatives relating to protecting the homeland.

4. Subsection 307(b) should be revised to add the underlined phrase so that the subsection reads as follows:

"EXEMPTION FROM CERTAIN PRIVACY ACT REQUIREMENTS FOR RECORD ACCESS AND ACCOUNTING FOR DISCLOSURES.-- Elements of the intelligence community set forth in or designated under section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401(a)(4)) receiving a disclosure under subsection (b)(13) of section 552a of title 5, United States Code, and the agency that maintains and discloses such records pursuant to subsection (b)(13), shall not be required to comply with subsection (c)(3), (c)(4), or (d) of such section 552a with respect to such disclosure..."

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This language would provide the disclosing agency that maintains the system of records with exemptions from subsections (c)(3), (c)(4), and (d) of the Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. 552a) with regard to records provided under the authority in proposed subsection (b)(13) of that Act. Those exemptions must apply to both the disclosing and the receiving agencies, in order to provide the full protection that would be appropriate under the new authority.

5. In addition, at the end of the proposed new subsection (b) above, we recommend changing the words "shall not be required to comply with" to "shall be exempt from" to track existing language utilized in section 552a when a section is not applicable.

6. We do not see a need for the provision in section 307(c) to include the Attorney General (AG) as one of the statutory authorities who may make a determination as to whether a record constitutes "terrorism information," as defined in section 1016(a)(4) of the IRTPA, or "information concerning the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction." It is unnecessary to include the AG as a statutory authority for this purpose.

The President has designated the Program Manager for the Information Sharing Environment (PM), and all resources assigned to the PM, as part of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Consequently, questions arising from the implementation of section 1016 should be addressed to the DNI. This would not, of course, preclude the DNI from seeking legal guidance from the AC, and it would keep section 307 consistent with the provisions in section 1016 of the IRTPA.

7. We advise that the words "or records" should be added after the word "record" as it appears throughout section 307 to make clear that the authority permits the disclosure of multiple records, or portions of record systems, pursuant to subsection (b)(13), as opposed to single record-by-record requests.

8. We support the information sharing provisions of the pilot program, but we see a need to expand the permitted scope of information sharing to expressly permit non-intelligence agencies to share information with the Intelligence Community.

Section 421. **Director and Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.** We support the establishment of a statutory Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (DD/CIA) with the following revisions:

We firmly object to the requirement that the DD/CIA position be filled by a Presidential appointee confirmed by the Senate (that is, a 'PAS' position). Rather we strongly recommend that section 421 be amended to provide for the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (D/CIA) to appoint the DD/CIA, thereby reducing the number of PAS positions in the Executive Branch and the Intelligence Community.

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Alternatively, if the DD/CIA position is established as a PAS position, then we recommend that the D/CIA, rather than the **DNI**, be the official to recommend DD/CIA nominees to the President, **and** that the DNI be consulted with the recommendation.

In addition, we recommend revision of section 421 to provide that the officer currently engaged in the administrative performance of the duties of the DD/CIA, until that officer is replaced or otherwise ceases to carry out those duties, legally may act for, and exercise all of the powers of the D/CIA in the absence or disability of the D/CIA or during a vacancy in the D/CIA position.

We oppose [the requirement in section 421 that the D/CIA and the DD/CIA must be appointed **from** civilian life. Such a provision may limit the authority and flexibility to fill those positions with the best-qualified individuals. In the course of a military career, a **military** officer may *become exceptionally well* qualified to serve in these leadership positions, and coordination of CIA activities with the Department of Defense (DoD) intelligence activities remains **critically** important. We believe that Congress should not **seek** to constrain the Executive's flexibility and discretion in the appointment of individuals determined to be most qualified to serve in key Executive Branch **positions**.

Finally, we support revision of section **421** to provide that a commissioned officer holding the D/CIA or DD/CIA position shall hold the **rank of flag** or general officer. We understand that an amendment has been included in S. 1042, the Senate's FY 2006 National Defense Authorization bill, which provides that officers serving in these positions shall not count against the otherwise applicable number and percentage limitations under title 10 of the U.S. Code, while so serving. This change would help to ensure that the positions could be filled with highly qualified officers of significant attainment and stature.

Section **434**. Protection of operational files of the Defense Intelligence Agency. We support this provision as reported by the SSCI, which would exempt specific files from the search, review, disclosure, and publication requirements of the Freedom of Information Act, similar to the exemptions currently authorized for the CIA, National Security Agency (NSA), National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), and National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (**NGA**). **ODNI** understands that the Senate Armed Services Committee replaced the current language with text from section **922** of S. 1042. ODNI is prepared to accept this replacement if and only if the following additional amendments are made:

Amendment 1: In subparagraph (c)(3), add the following new subparagraph:

"(F) the Office of the Director of National Intelligence"

And then renumber the current subparagraphs (F) and (G) as (G) and (H), respectively.

Amendment 2: After subparagraph (d)(4), insert the following new paragraph:

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"(e) SUPERSEDURE OF **OTHER LAWS**. The provisions of subsection (a) shall not be superseded except by a provision of law which is enacted **after** the date of the enactment of this section and that specifically cites and repeals or modifies such provisions."

Section **441. Department of Justice Intelligence Matters**. We have serious concerns about the way this section is drafted. Section 441 contemplates a National Security Division that is inconsistent with such an organization's appropriate role within the Department of Justice (**DOJ**) and the Executive Branch. By codifying this aspect of DOJ's internal structure, we are concerned that section 441 would compromise DOJ's flexibility to respond to a changing threat environment. In the end, meaningful collaboration between the **DOJ** and ODNI can be achieved without including the new National Security Division in the Intelligence Community.

We would support the DNI's 'consultation' rather than 'concurrence' in the appointment of the Assistant Attorney General, if sections 441 (d) and (e) were stricken so that the new National Security Division was neither an element of the Intelligence Community, nor funded in the National Intelligence Program.

Section **442. Foreign language incentive for certain non-special agent employees of the Federal Bureau of Investigation**. We support this section, however, we are concerned that the restriction in subparagraph 442(b)(1) would make this section exceedingly difficult to implement because it is not possible to isolate Language support to a specific subject matter. Therefore we recommend that this section be modified to strike the phrase "to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities" so that it reads as follows:

(b) ... (1) who uses foreign language skills in support of the analyses, investigations, or Operations of the Bureau (or maintains foreign language skills for purposes of such support), and ...

Provisions Opposed

The Administration opposes the following provisions for the reasons set forth in the paragraphs below.

Section 103. Incorporation of classified annex. Section 103 of the Senate bill would incorporate into law the entire classified annex to the Report on the bill. Past practice has been to incorporate only the classified schedule of authorizations into law. We oppose section 103 and also recommend that subsection 102(a) be edited to delete the reference to section 103.

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (the Committee) has explained that it took the step of incorporating the classified annex, "[B]ecause the Executive Branch has refused to treat with equal weight the language in the classified annexes and the text of recent authorization acts and their accompanying classified schedules of authorizations." The Administration respectfully disagrees with the Committee's assessment.

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Although the report language is not law, the Administration considers language in the conference report accompanying the Intelligence Authorization Act, and non-conflicting language in the reports accompanying the House and Senate versions of the authorization bill, as direction from the Congress. The Executive Branch makes every effort to comply with this direction.

In addition, formal incorporation of the report language into law would raise serious issues:

First, this provision would constrain the flexibility that has existed, and the accommodation process that has occurred, between the elements of the Intelligence Community and the intelligence committees, in adjusting to changed world events or circumstances. Section 103 would preclude terms, conditions, limitations, restrictions, and requirements in the classified annex from being modified or reconsidered by the congressional committees themselves, unless and until they were changed by the enactment of new law. This could lead to delays or lost opportunities in addressing exigent intelligence needs arising from unanticipated or sudden developments. The Intelligence Community and the committees that oversee it have worked together over the course of many years to resolve committee concerns, without incorporation into law of the classified annex. The Administration feels it would be preferable to continue that cooperative approach.

Second, as a general proposition, the Administration opposes "secret law", as set out in its Statement of Administration Policy to H.R. 2863 - Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, FY 2006:

The Administration continues to discourage my efforts, such as section 8081, to enact secret laws as part of defense funding legislation and encourages instead appropriate use of classified annexes to committee reports and joint statements of managers that accompany the final legislation.

Section 107. Response of Intelligence Community to requests from Congress for intelligence documents and information. The Administration strongly opposes this section. The DNT is committed to fulfilling current legal obligations, including keeping Congress fully and currently informed consistent with Title V of the National Security Act and other applicable law. To require a claim of constitutional privilege for any delay over 15 days in providing any information or material -- regardless of the complexity of the request or the sensitivity or volume of information that might be responsive -- would be inappropriate and unrealistic. Although the sectional analysis indicates the section does not apply to a request to create new intelligence products, the statute does not contain that exception but instead applies to requests for the provision of any "information."

In addition, any effort to require intelligence agencies to provide requested material to "any other committee of Congress [besides the intelligence committees] with jurisdiction over the subject matter," strikes us as contrary to the rationale and carefully crafted accommodation between the political branches that created the intelligence committees, and may, among other

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things, require a review with the Congress of the procedures for handling of classified information.

We also object to section 107's authorization to the Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence or the Ranking Member of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence to make requests that trigger the provision's requirement to "produce or assert privilege within 15 days." Such an authorization would be inconsistent with the longstanding practice that the authority to make an oversight request on behalf of a committee has generally been confined to the committee's chairman. Moreover, section 107 works against the recommendations of the WMD Commission to Congress to look for ways to reduce the cost of oversight and streamline interactions with the Intelligence Community.

Finally, we object to the requirement that the Executive Branch provide requested information unless the President asserts a constitutional privilege, as some materials and information are deniable for statutory or other reasons. Requests from Congress for such materials are handled on the basis of comity and mutual understandings, so that a requirement to certify there is a constitutional basis for withholding denies statutory and constitutional processes the opportunity to run their natural course.

Section 403. Authority of the Director of National Intelligence to manage access to human intelligence information. The Administration finds this provision unnecessary because the IRTPA and the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, already provide the access described in this section. In addition, this provision as drafted applies only to HUMINT, hence it could be interpreted as limiting the scope of Section 102A of the National Security Act, which we oppose.

Section 406. Additional duties of the Director of Science and Technology of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Section 406 is premature and we recommend a more systematic review of the issues at a later time to determine whether additional legislation is necessary.

Section 406(b) is of particular concern. It would expand the role of the Director of Science and Technology (D/S&T) into areas that the Director of National Intelligence and Congress already have entrusted to other Deputy Directors of National Intelligence or the Chief Information Officer (CIO) or Program Manager for the Information Sharing Environment (PM). As a result, it could become an impediment to our joint efforts to improve community management and establish clear lines of accountability.

For example, section 406(b) would require the D/S&T to establish "goals to meet the technology needs of the intelligence community." The term, "technology needs" is a very broad term that could encroach on the duties of the CIO, the PM, the Deputy Directors of National Intelligence, and the technical staffs in the ODM and the IC. Instead, we recommend that the D/S&T play a supporting role in "establishing engineering standards and specifications applicable to each acquisition of a major system," but not the lead role envisioned in the Senate

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language. Moreover, we suggest that the D/S&T not be responsible for ensuring compliance with these standards during the acquisition process because these responsibilities have been assigned to others.

Section 407. Appointment and title of Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community. The Administration firmly believes that the Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community (IC CIO) should be appointed by the President, but not confirmed by the Senate. Therefore, we oppose the portion of this section that would eliminate the Presidential appointment requirement, and we support the portion of this section that would eliminate the Senate confirmation requirement. As we have stated, as a general proposition, we believe that there should be fewer rather than more positions in the Office of the DNI that require Presidential appointment/Senate confirmation (PAS). Nonetheless, we support retaining the IC CIO as a Presidential appointment position because we believe that such status would enhance the ability of the IC CIO to carry out responsibilities across multiple agencies at a time when information systems and sharing are critical.

Additional Comment. Notwithstanding our comments on section 407, as a general matter, we oppose adding or retaining positions that require Presidential appointment and Senate confirmation. For this reason we continue to support the removal of the requirement for confirmation of the CIA's General Counsel as proposed in the Administration's bill.

Section 408. Inspector General of the Intelligence Community. We strongly oppose this provision. Section 1078 of the IRTPA amended the Inspector General Act of 1978 (the IG Act), to authorize the DNI to establish an Inspector General, with any of the duties, responsibilities, and authorities set forth in the IG Act. The DNI has established the position of Inspector General of the ODNI and the ODNI Office of Inspector General (OIG). As provided by an ODNI Instruction, the ODNI inspector General is charged with providing policy direction for, and planning, conducting, supervising, and coordinating inspections, audits, investigations, and other inquiries relating to the program and operations of the ODNI and the authorities and responsibilities of the DNI (emphasis added). These include the DNI's Intelligence Community authorities and responsibilities. An Inspector General has been appointed and has been on the job for three months. He already is exercising the authorities of his office, hiring staff, performing inspections and investigations, chairing the Intelligence Community Inspectors General Forum, and leading cross-agency audits. He has received full cooperation from the other IC inspectors general and their respective agencies.

Accordingly, section 408 is unnecessary in light of the establishment and empowerment of the ODNI Inspector General pursuant to the express grant of legal authority contained in the IRTPA. We recommend that Congress allow the existing ODNI OIG to grow and function for a reasonable period before considering whether further legislative changes are needed.

Section 409. Leadership and location of the National Counter Proliferation Center. We oppose this provision as unnecessary. The DNI has established a National Counter

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Proliferation Center (NCPC) in the Office of the DNI and has named a Director for the Center pursuant to section 19A of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended (50 U.S.C. 4040-1).

Section 410. Operational **files** in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. We oppose the section as drafted. The Committee has adopted some, but not all, of the Administration's proposal to grant operational files in the ODNI certain exemptions from the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The Administration's **proposal would** exempt two broad classes of information: operational files created within the ODNI and information from exempted operational files created by other elements of the IC which are provided to the ODNI and which **is** not further disseminated outside of the ODNI. The Committee's provision does not address the first class of information and thus **would** not grant protection to DNI-created records comparable to those categories of information that already are protected at CM, NSA, NRO, and NGA; specifically, information that documents HUMINT operations, technical collection operations, and certain security files. Certain files created by the NCTC, in particular, will represent a centralized compilation and repository of some of the most sensitive information regarding counterterrorism and non-proliferation analysis that should not be subject to the search, review, publication, or disclosure requirements of the FOIA when the files and information are work product not disseminated as intelligence product.

Instead, the Administration recommends the following text replace the current section 401's **proposed** section 700(a)(1) through (2) as follows:

"Section 700. (a) Exemption of Certain Files From Search, Review, Publication, Disclosure.--Operational Files of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, which includes the National Intelligence Centers, may be exempted by the Director of National Intelligence from the provisions of section 552 of title 5, United States Code (Freedom of Information Act), which requires publication or disclosure, or search or review in connection therewith.

(b) For the purposes of this section, the Director of National Intelligence may designate the following categories of information as "operational files of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence"—

(1) files of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence which document the conduct of foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, or counterterrorism operations or intelligence or security liaison arrangements or information exchanges with foreign governments or their intelligence or security services;

(2) files of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence which document the means by which foreign intelligence or counterintelligence is collected through scientific and technical systems and which document research or development proposals or programs for such systems; and

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(3) files of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence which document investigations conducted to determine the suitability of potential foreign intelligence or counterintelligence sources.

(c) Information disseminated to an element of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence from an operational file of an element of the intelligence community that has been exempted from search, review, publication, or disclosure in accordance with any other provision of law, and the operational file from which such information was so disseminated, shall remain exempt from search, review, publication, or disclosure under section 552 of title 5, United States Code, or other applicable law.

(d) Any information from a file described in section (b) or section (c) above that is incorporated into a predecisional file or record created by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence shall be exempt from search, review, publication, or disclosure under section 552 of title 5, United States Code, or other applicable law."

In addition, we recommend that the bill include the language found in section 701(f) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, which addresses operational files of the CIA and judicial review.


Section 436. Confirmation of appointment of heads of certain components of the intelligence community. We oppose as unnecessary the provision(s) to require Senate confirmation of the Directors of the NGA, NRO, and NSA. As noted above, we generally oppose provisions that would increase the number of Presidentially appointed, Senate confirmed positions, and we do not believe that section 436 would improve the ability of the individuals placed in those positions to carry out their assigned duties. We do support the Senate Armed Services Committee's recommended clarification that the three positions indicated may be filled with active duty military officers.

Section 437. Security Clearances in the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. We do not support this provision as written, but we welcome the opportunity to work with the Congress, DoD, and NGA to resolve any security clearance issues that NGA identifies.

The Honorable Pat Roberts
The Honorable John Rockefeller

Thank you for the opportunity to present our **views** or **behalf** of the Intelligence Community. Please do not hesitate to call upon us if **we** may be of additional assistance. The Office of Management and Budget **advises** that from *the* standpoint of the Administration's Program, **there** is no objection to the submission of this letter.

Sincerely,



John D. Negroponte

~~FOUO~~

ES-2169
05/001416

January 28, 2005

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Gen Dick Myers

SUBJECT: Troops

Is there any way we can get more of our troops out of Bosnia and Kosovo, given the stress from Iraq?

Thanks.

DHR:ss
012705-16

.....
Please respond by 1/24/05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 02882-05

23-01-05 17:44:13 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/47409

~~FOUO~~


Policy Executive Secretariat Note

February 9, 2005
1-05/001416/ES-2 169

Reference: 012705-16, Troops

Captain Marriott,

Mira Ricardel will prepare points for SecDef use at the Nice Defense Ministerial that urges Allies to move forward with operational restructure of KFOR to develop a lighter, more mobile force with reduced troops levels.

JA.

Jane Bartlett
Deputy Director
Policy Executive Secretariat

~~FOUO~~

3/21
1530



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-4000

SECRET
2005 MAR 18 PM 5:46

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

ACTION MEMO

March 18, 2005 - 1:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DEPSEC Action _____
FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD (P&R)
SUBJECT: Personal Letter on Enlistment Policy for Home-Schooled Youth

- You received a letter from Mr. R. L. Stephens (TAB B) expressing concern about the Department's enlistment priority for home-schooled youth.
- The response at TAB A explains the policy and potential source of confusion. It reassures Mr. Stephens that current policy encourages the enlistment of qualified home-schooled applicants.
- We have spoken with the Recruiting Station Commander, who remembers Mr. Koopman. He believes Mr. Koopman was quite happy with his assignment. He reports neither Mr. Koopman nor his parents complained about his assignment during the (brief) period he was waiting to enter active duty.

RECOMMENDATION: Secretary of Defense sign correspondence at TAB A.

COORDINATION: None

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared by: Captain Christopher Arendt, (b)(6)

MA SD	SMA DSD		
TSA SD	SA DSD	3/22	
EXEC SEC	M 3/21	M 3/21	
ESR MA			



OSD 02911-05



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

Mr. R. L. Stephens

(b)(6)

Dear Ron:

Thanks for bringing your concerns with home schooling recruiting to my attention.

I believe two issues became confused in David Koopman's case: How his high school credential is viewed by the military, and what skill areas were available at the time of his enlistment.

On the first issue: We welcome home-schooled candidates, and are taking proactive steps to recruit more. We do know from several years experience that home-schooled candidates are less likely to complete their first two years of service than those completing a diploma program (60% vs. 80%), but more likely than those who drop out and earn an alternative credential. Therefore, in January we directed the Services to give home-schooled youth enlistment priority over those without diplomas. As with any guidance of this nature, it will take a little time to be implemented properly.

On the second issue: There is no Army policy that would limit the availability of any career field to home-schooled graduates. But an applicant may be qualified for and interested in a skill that, at a particular point in time, does not have vacancies. In all circumstances, our recruiters **work** hard to find an opening acceptable to the individual.

Home-schooled youth tend to be bright, patriotic individuals who should be afforded every opportunity to enlist. I appreciate your interest in this matter. We shall be watching the implementation of policy carefully to be sure it carries out our intent, which is consistent with your expectations.

Sincerely,



11-L-0559/OSD/47412



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

Mr. R. L. Stephens

(b)(6)

Dear Mr. Stephens:

Thanks for bringing your concerns with home schooling recruiting to my attention.

I believe two issues became confused in David Koopman's case: How his high school credential is viewed by the military, and what skill areas were available at the time of his enlistment.

On the first issue: We welcome home-schooled candidates, and are taking proactive steps to recruit more. We do know from several years experience that home-schooled candidates are less likely to complete their first two years of service than those completing a diploma program (60% vs. 80%), but more likely than those who drop out and earn an alternative Credential. Therefore, in January we directed the Services to give home-schooled youth enlistment priority over those without diplomas. As with any guidance of this nature, it will take a little time to be implemented properly.

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Home-schooled youth tend to be bright, patriotic individuals who should be afforded every opportunity to enlist. I appreciate your interest in this matter. We shall be watching the implementation of policy carefully to be sure it carries out our intent, which is consistent with your expectations.

Sincerely,



11-L-0559/OSD/47413

February 28, 2005

2005 FEB -1 10 5: 53

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Home Schooling

Attached is a letter from a friend of mine about discrimination with respect to those who have been home-educated.

Please look into that and get back to me with an explanation of what is going on. Draft an appropriate response from you to him, and let me see it before it goes.

Thanks.

Attach.
Undated letter from Stephens to SecDef [OSD 02911-05]

DHR:dh
022805-8

.....
Please respond by 3/24/05

346

28 Feb

10 Feb 05

R. L. Stephens

(b)(6)

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301-1000

Don
Dear ~~Donald~~,

I've just become aware of an unconscionable situation that I wanted to place on your radar screen. It involves the manner in which all branches of the Armed Forces process enlistees who have been home educated. "Discrimination" would be too mild of a descriptor for what is apparently going on.

This matter was brought to my attention by my good friends, Ann and Roger Koopman. Roger is a member of the Montana State Legislature. He and Ann both worked on the Washington staffs of Steve Symms and Ron Paul. They have home educated all four of their children, three of whom have now graduated with honors from top private colleges. The fourth - David Douglas Koopman - recently enlisted in the Army, after receiving his homeschool high school diploma.

Not only were David's college entrance exam results quite high, but so was his ASVAB score, qualifying him, he was told, for approximately **45** different job options. However, because he was home educated, David was informed that the "official policy" was to regard him as a high school drop-out. He was offered only **3** job choices, none of which particularly interested him, and all of which (to his parents' consternation) involved significantly high risk. He is now in basic training at Fort Sill, and will eventually receive advanced training to be a forward observer in the Field Artillery.

According to Ann and Roger, this inexplicable policy toward home schoolers had been wisely suspended during a two-year trial period, but was re-instated, they believe, on October **1, 2004**. Obviously, they are hopeful in the son's case, that this can be reversed, so he may still be offered a full range of job options from which to choose, prior to the start of advanced training. But as a broader policy matter, Don, I would strongly recommend that you consider ending this unwarranted discrimination. As a group, the home education community are among our finest citizens - typically, very patriotic, God-fearing and self disciplined. Any policy that discourages these young men and women from enlisting is detrimental to the Armed Forces and to the best interests of our nation.

Saying you are a "busy man" is an understatement, so trust me - I wouldn't be putting this on your desk unless I felt it was quite important. Anything you can do would be much appreciated. Keep up the great work. I'm truly proud of you.

As always,

3
Ron
Ron Stephens

11-L-0559/OSD/47415

OSD 02911-05

P.S.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

together:

Congratulations to you and Joyce on your 50 years

R. L. Stephens

(b)(6)

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301-1000

Don
Dear Donald,

I've just become aware of an unconscionable situation that I wanted to place on your radar screen. It involves the manner in which all branches of the Armed Forces process enlistees who have been home educated. "Discrimination" would be too mild of a descriptor for what is apparently going on.

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Saying you are a "busy man" is an understatement, so trust me - I wouldn't be putting this on your desk unless I felt it was quite important. Anything you can do would be much appreciated. Keep up the great work. I'm truly proud of you.

As always,

Ron
Ron Stephens

OSD 02911-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47417

P.S.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Congratulations to you and Joyce on your 50 years

together!





PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

APR 20 2005



2005 APR 21 AM 11:

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

340

Mr. R. L. Stephens

(b)(6)

Dear Mr. Stephens:

Thank you for your letter to the Secretary of Defense concerning the Department's treatment of home schooled youth. He has asked me to respond.

I believe two issues became confused in David Koopman's case: How his high school credential is viewed by the military, and what skill areas were available at the time of his enlistment.

On the first issue: We welcome home-schooled candidates, and are taking proactive steps to recruit more. We do know from several years experience that home-schooled candidates are less likely to complete their first two years of service than those completing a diploma program, but more likely than those who drop out and earn an alternative credential. Therefore, in January we directed the Services to give home-schooled youth enlistment priority over those without diplomas. As with any guidance of this nature, it will take a little time to be implemented properly.

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Home-schooled youth tend to be bright, patriotic individuals who should be afforded every opportunity to enlist. I appreciate your interest in this matter. We shall be monitoring the implementation of policy carefully to be sure it carries out our intent, which is consistent with your expectations.

Sincerely,

David S. C. Chu

(10 FEB 05)



11-L-0559/OSD/47419

OSD 02911-05



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

FEB 28 2005

340

Mr. Ron L. Stephens

(b)(6)

Dear Ron,

Thanks so much for your note. I'll see that it is put
in the hands of the right people.

With my best regards,

Sincerely,

28 FEB 05

OSD 02911-05

10 FEB 05

~~FOUO~~

January 14, 2005

ORO Army

TO: Fran Harvey

CC: Powell Moore
Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Paper on Handling of Harvey Nomination

010705-6
 14 JAN 2005
 14 JAN 2005

I do need a piece of paper **taking** Senator Reed's handling of the Fran **Harvey** nomination, and taking all the **things** he said that **are** inaccurate, and **putting down** the accurate **answer**.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
010705-6

.....
 Please respond by 2/3/05

~~FOUO~~

14 Jan 05

OSD 02942-05



SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON

INFO MEMO

February 16, 2005 10:00 a.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action _____

FROM: Francis J. Harvey

SUBJECT: Snowflake - Secretary of the Army Confirmation Hearing

- The purpose of this memorandum is to respond to your request for information on Senator Reed's handling of my nomination to Secretary of the Army. In your request, you specifically asked me to comment on any inaccurate things he said, and to provide you with an accurate answer.
- In my courtesy call office visit with Senator Reed prior to my confirmation hearing (October 6, 2004), and during the Senate debate prior to my confirmation vote (November 16), he focused the bulk of his comments on the following areas of concern.
 - End-Strength: Senator Reed maintained that the Army should permanently increase its active duty end-strength, and dedicate funding for this increase through the regular budgetary process and not through emergency supplemental procedures.
 - Recapitalization: Senator Reed stated that the Army is sustaining significant equipment battle losses that will require in excess of \$7 billion in repair/replacement costs. In addition, he voiced concerns that the Army National Guard and the US Army Reserves were deploying their equipment stocks and compromising their ability to meet their homeland security mission.
- Senator Reed's comments were largely based on his personal observations, experiences, and perspective. I cannot specifically cite any inaccuracies in his remarks to me or during the Senate debate. He stated during the debate on the Senate floor prior to the vote on my nomination that he and I disagreed on the end-strength issue and that he was disappointed by that.
- I have recently met with Senator Reed to discuss these and other matters. I am confident that we are fostering the beginnings of a sound professional working relationship that will provide him with a better understanding of our Army's policies, objectives, and strategies.

RECOMMENDATION: NONE

COORDINATION: NONE

Prepared By: COL Joseph Anderson, (b)(6)

TAB

A

January 14, 2005

TO: Fran Harvey
CC: Powell Moore
Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Paper on Handling of ~~Security~~ Nomination

I do need a piece of paper detailing Senator Reed's handling of the Fran Harvey nomination, and taking out the things he said that are inaccurate, and putting down the accurate answer.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
010705-6

.....
~~Security~~ respond by 2/3/05

~~FOUO~~

JAN 3 I 2005

322

TO: Fran Harvey
 GEN Pete Schoomaker

CC: Gen **Dick** Myers
 David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Combat Units **and** Combat Support

I do not understand why **we** separate combat units from combat **support** and combat service **support**. We know we can't use combat units without combat **support** and combat service **support**. Nor can we use combat **support** and combat service **support** without combat units. The idea that they should be kept totally separate and handled separately, rather than being part of a combat unit, strikes me as an industrial age approach. What are you doing **to fix** it?

Thanks.

DHR:ss
012805-8

.....
 Please respond by 3/17/05

~~FOUO~~

31 Jan 05

OSD 02944-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47425



SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON
INFO MEMO

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2005 APR 22 PM 5:46

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action: _____

FROM: Francis J. Harvey, Secretary of the Army
GEN Peter J. Schoomaker, Chief of Staff, Army

2005-03-14 10:07:06
CSA HAS SEEN

SUBJECT: Snowflake – Combat Units and Combat Support

- This memo responds to **your** letter of January 31, 2005 in which you asked why the **Army** keeps separate and handles separately combat units from combat support and combat service support units, and what the Army is doing to fix it. **As** discussed below, in the new **Brigade Combat Team** Unit of Action, combat arms, combat support and combat service support functions are combined into one organization.
- The **Army** has grouped officers and enlisted Military Occupational Specialties into groups, or branches, of similar functions. These groupings are strictly for management purposes and provides for the development of doctrine, training, and leader development. Joint Pub 1-02, DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms defines the groups as:
 - **Combat Arms:** Units and Soldiers who close with and destroy enemy forces or provide firepower and destructive capability on the battlefield. The included branches are Infantry, Armor, Field Artillery, Air Defense Artillery, Aviation, Special Forces, and Engineer. (There are statutory and regulatory gender restrictions in combat arms.)
 - **Combat Support:** Those units or organizations whose primary mission is to furnish operational assistance for the combat elements. The included branches are Signal, Military Police, Military Intelligence, Civil Affairs, and Chemical.
 - **Combat Service Support:** The essential capabilities, functions, activities, and tasks necessary to sustain all elements of operating forces in theater at all levels of war. The included branches are Adjutant General, Finance, Transportation, Ordnance, and Quartermaster.
- Under the old force design, the **Army** often had to disassemble division and corps structures to create purpose-built task forces that contain the required combat arms, combat support, and combat service support capabilities. The modular design significantly changes this approach.
- The Army Modular Force initiative transforms operational forces into more powerful, flexible, and rapidly deployable combat formations centered on the Brigade Combat Team. These Brigade Combat Teams are organized the way they will fight and contain embedded combat support and combat service support functions during both peace and war. Additionally, modular support brigades will link theater-level supply and service activities with the Brigade Combat Teams' organic sustainment capability when deployed.

COORDINATION: NONE

Prepared By: LTC Ed Palekas, (b)(6)

OSD 02944-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47426

DEC 20 2004

701

TO: Gen Dick Myers

CC: Fran Harvey
Gordon England
Jim Roche

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Team to Monitor Troops

I think we ought to put together a team to see that the Services take care of their troops after they're wounded, and when they return home and are discharged. We need to **see that** it happens.

The only way we are going to know it happens, is if we put together a team of people to monitor it, require reports, develop metrics, **fashion an ombudsman** system, and possibly develop a buddy system, **as** you suggested.

Please get back to me.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
121304-31

.....
Please respond by 1/6/05

OSD 02949-05

20 Dec 04



SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON

INFO MEMO

January 6, 2005, 10:00 a.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Francis J. Harvey, Secretary of the Army

SUBJECT: Team to Monitor Troops

OBE
not signed

701

- The Army established the Disabled Soldier Support System (DS3) Program in April 2003 to provide its severely disabled Soldiers and their families with a system of advocacy, follow-up, and personal support to assist in their return to duty or transition from the military service to the civilian community. The DS3 budget increased from \$1.3M in FY04 to \$8.3M in FY05.

• **Key Points:**

- o Casualties are tracked from theater to the CONUS military treatment facilities. After the Soldier's condition is stabilized, a DS3 case manager meets with the Soldier and family to discuss the program and identify any immediate concerns. As rehabilitation progresses, DS3 personnel facilitate and coordinate Soldier/family desired outcomes with proper agencies.
- o DS3 ensures coordination between military treatment facilities and the Department of Veterans Affairs for follow-on care. If transition to civilian employment is desired, available job opportunities in the federal government or corporate world are explored.
- o November 1, 2004: DS3 Liaison Office opened at Walter Reed Medical Center between Wards 57 and 58 for access to Soldiers and families.
- o November 3, 2004: DS3 staff increase from 6 to 47 personnel approved, with essential personnel to arrive by January 31, 2005.
- o December 5, 2004: At your direction, DS3 program personnel began working with your staff and the other Services through Mr. John Molino, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Military Community and Family Policy).
- o Army G-1 established liaison with the Defense and Accounting System (DFAS) to develop extraordinary pay procedures to handle DS3 Soldier pay issues.

COORDINATION: F. L. HAGENBECK, LTG, G-1

Prepared By: COL Jacqueline E. Cumbo, Chief, DS3 Program, (b)(6)

6 Jan 05

20 Dec 04

OSD 02949-05

~~FOUO~~

JAN 3 1 2005

320.2

TO: David Chu

CC: Gen **Dick** Myers
 Fran Harvey
 Gordon England
 Pete Teets

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: **Stress** on the Force

2005
 JAN 1 11 50 AM
 012805-19

I want a briefing on **Stress on the Force**. You will recall my memo that had 35 different **ways** to do it. I have never been briefed on what we **have** done on each one. I need an update.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
 012805-19

.....
 Please respond by 2/24/05

~~FOUO~~

31 Jan 05

February 2, 2005

TO: Paul Butler

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Corporations Helping Military Families

We ought to give some kind of award **or** certificate of some kind to the corporations that are helping military families. Why don't you find out who they are, and what **you think** we ought to do.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
020205-5

.....
Please respond by 2/24/05

200.6

2 Feb 05

UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-4000

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2005 MAR 15 AM 9:20



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

INFO MEMO

March 15, 2005, 8:32AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DEPSEC Action _____

FROM: David S. C. Chu, D (PERSONNEL & READINESS)

David S. C. Chu 15 March 05

SUBJECT: Corporations Helping Military Families--SNOWFLAKE

- In your memorandum of February 2nd (Tab A) you asked about giving awards or certificates to corporations that help military families.
- We have legal authority to use limited appropriated funds to recognize contributions to families of Service members.
- Such recognition could include a letter or a certificate expressing the gratitude of the military community for their contribution.
- The certificate could be awarded under the aegis of "America Supports You."
- We are polling the Military Departments for names of corporations and other nongovernmental organizations that have supported military families.

RECOMMENDATION: None. For information only.

COORDINATION: Tab B

ATTACHMENTS:

As stated

PREPARED BY: George Schaefer, ODUSD(MC&FP), (b)(6)

MA SD	SMA DSD		
TSA SD	SA DSD		
EXEC SEC	<i>M. 3/15</i>		
ESR MA	<i>3/15</i>		

0 SD 03053 -05



~~FOUO~~

February 2, 2005

TO: Paul Butler
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Corporations Helping Military Families

We ought to give some kind of award or certificate of some kind to the corporations that are helping military families. Why don't you find out who they are, and what you think we ought to do.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
020205-5

.....
Please respond by 2/24/05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 03053-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47432

COORDINATION

Corporations Helping Military Families

PDUSD(P&R)

Charles Abell

Call 3-9-05

SOCO

Steve Epstein

February 16, 2005



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

INFO MEMO

2005 MAR 15 11:08 AM

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

March 15, 2005, 8:32AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DEPSEC Action _____

FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD (PERSONNEL & READINESS)

David S. C. Chu 15 March 05

SUBJECT: Corporations Helping Military Families--SNOWFLAKE

- In your memorandum of February 2nd (Tab A) you asked about giving awards or certificates to corporations that help military families.
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- We are polling the Military Departments for names of corporations and other nongovernmental organizations that have supported military families.

RECOMMENDATION: None. For information only.

COORDINATION: Tab B

ATTACHMENTS:

As stated

PREPARED BY: George Schaefer, ODUSD(MC&FP), (b)(6)

2005

15 MAR 05

2 FEB 05



OSD 03053-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47434

A

~~FOUO~~

February 2, 2005

TO: Paul Butler
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Corporations Helping Military Families

We ought to give some kind of award or certificate of some kind to the corporations that are helping military families. Why don't you find out who they are, and what you think we ought to do.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
02020s-s

.....
Please respond by 2/24/05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 03053-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47436

COORDINATION

Corporations Helping Military Families

PDUSD(P&R)

Charles Abell

Call 3-9-05

SOCO

Steve Epstein

February 16, 2005

~~FOUO~~

FEB 14 2005

TO: Gen Dick Myers
Gen Pete Pace
GEN John Abizaid

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Training in Iraq

IRAQ

During one of my conversations in Iraq, the idea came up of possibly having one unit be responsible for the bulk of the effort on the embedded trainers with the Iraqi Security Forces, rather than using a pick-up team composed of people drawn from all around the Army. The idea might have some merit. Please give me your thoughts soon, so there will be time to implement it, if it makes any sense.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
021105-3S

.....
Please respond by 2/28/05

14 Feb 05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 03083-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47439

FEB 14 2005

TO: GEN John Abizaid
GEN George Casey

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Gen Dick Myers
Gen Pete Pace
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Prisons in Iraq

383.6

We have to figure out a way to get out of the Iraqi detainee business. Iraq is a sovereign state, with an elected government, and must get arranged to take on the responsibility of holding, interrogating, and trying their prisoners with relatively few exceptions.

Please give me a plan by March 10 that sets out a path for significantly reducing the U.S. held detainee population.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
021105-5S


.....
Please respond by 3/10/05

14 Feb 05

FEB 14 2005

TO: GEN John Abizaid
GEN George Casey

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Gen Dick Myers
Gen Pete Pace
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Prisons in Iraq

We have to figure out a way to get out of the Iraqi detainee business. Iraq is a sovereign state, with **an** elected government, and must get arranged to take on the responsibility of holding, interrogating, and trying their prisoners with relatively few exceptions.

Please give me a plan by March 10 that sets out a path for significantly reducing the U.S. held detainee population.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
021105-5s

.....
Please respond by 3/10/05

FEB 14 2005

IRAQ

TO: GEN John Abizaid
 GEN George Casey

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
 Gen Dick Myers
 Gen Pete Pace
 Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Personal Security Detachments

We have to get our special operations folks out of these missions. Given the various rounds of Iraqi government changes over the coming year or so, we can't keep our folks tied down in this kind of tasking.

Please show me a plan that gets us out of such work by June 1.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
 021105-6S

.....
 Please respond by 3/1/05

14 Feb 05

~~FOUO~~

FEB 14 2005

TO: GEN John Abizaid
GEN George Casey

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Gen Dick Myers
Gen Pete Pace
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Personal Security Detachments

We have to get our special operations folks out of these missions. Given the various rounds of Iraqi government changes over the coming year or so, we can't keep our folks tied down in this kind of tasking.

Please show me a plan that gets us out of such work by June 1.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
021105-6S

.....
Please respond by 3/1/05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 03085-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47443



REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

HEADQUARTERS
MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE - IRAQ
BAGHDAD, IRAQ
APO AE 09342-1400

MNFI-CG

4 March 2005

MEMORANDUM FOR Secretary of Defense, 1000 Defense Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-1000

SUBJECT: Personal Security Detachments (PSD)

MR. Secretary,

1. In response to your request to show you a plan to get us out of PSD work by 01 June, there are two options we can take.

a. The first option is to transition as soon as possible to a contract solution. The earliest that this could now occur is 15 May. The contract would be valid for six months, and cost approximately \$100M. We would get the contract security teams in place while training the new Iraqis; then hand them off after training.

b. The second option is to tell the new Iraqi PSD that we will train them for 90 days and they will then assume the mission.

2. If you want to be out of the mission by 01 June, I recommend COA 1. I am not comfortable with training to time and not to standard at this critical juncture. I recommend we not rush this, but that we bite the bullet and keep the Seal Teams on for six months until the Iraqi team can be fully trained. I also recommend that we inform the Iraqis - in writing - that this will be the last group we will do this for and that we'll support a train - the trainer program to prepare Iraqi teams for the next government.

3. Finally, if PM Allawi is not part of the new government and stays in country, I recommend that we continue to provide a PSD for him if he desires it. He has been such a key element of successful U.S. policy here and is so closely associated with the U.S. that he will continue to be a target of our enemies. His death would be a serious blow to our mission and our efforts to ensure a unified Iraq.

VR,
George M. Casey, Jr.
GEORGE M. CASEY, JR.
General, USA
Commanding

CF:
General John P. Abizaid, Commander, U.S. Central Command, MacDill AFB, Florida 33621-5101

11-L-0559/OSD/47444

OSD 03085-05

February 14, 2005

TO: Stephen J. Hadley
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Ideas for the NSC Process

Steve,

We might want to consider some different approaches for the NSC process to make it somewhat more efficient.

First, it seems to me we could **get** more **out** of **the** Deputies Committee meetings if the Deputies actually attended. Between Paul Wolfowitz, Bob Zoellick, and J. D. Crouch, the Deputies have real intellectual firepower and experience. Why not take advantage of that and have the Deputies actually populate the Deputies Committee, and you should chair it.

Second, consider having no more than one Principals Committee meeting a week. We can use our morning phone calls and the weekly lunch with the Vice President to deal with many matters. We have worked together for four years now, so it is not as though we need to get acquainted. If more than one PC per week is needed it can be done by SVTC and I can save an hour of travel time.

Finally, **try** to schedule only one NSC meeting a week. We can have more if it is needed. By properly using the Deputies and Principals Committees as suggested above, we should be able to get down to a single NSC most weeks, absent emergencies.

Let me know what you think.

DHR:ss
021105-8S

33421C

14 Feb 05

~~FOUO~~

FEB 15 2005

TO: GEN George Casey
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Iraqi Election Ballot

Dear George,

Thanks so much for the Iraqi ballots. I will see that they are put in the hands of people who will most appreciate them.

Regards,

DIR:ss
021405-20

.....
Please respond by _____

~~FOUO~~

OSD 03160-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47446

15140

15140

~~FOUO~~

FEB 15 2005

TO: Stephen J. Hadley
CC: The Honorable Dr. Condoleezza Rice
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Commando Solo

When should we discontinue Commando Solo out of Florida? I think now. There ought to be alternative ways to do what is needed.

DHR:ss
021405-12

~~FOUO~~

OSD 03161-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47447

~~FOUO~~

FEB 15 2005

TO: Stephen J. Hadley
CC: The Honorable Dr. Condoleezza Rice
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Commando Solo

When should we discontinue Commando Solo out of Florida? I **think** now. There ought to be alternative ways to do what is needed.

DHR:ss
021405-12

~~FOUO~~

OSD 03161-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47448

~~FOUO~~

FEB 15 2005

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Iraqi Election Ballot

Mr. Vice President,

Attached is one of the ballots from the Iraqi elections. I thought you might like to have it, given all you have done to make it possible.

Attach.
Iraqi Election Ballot

DHR:ss
021405-13

Ira 9

15 Feb 05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 03162-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47449

كوميسیونی بالای سہریہ خوی ہہ لہزاردنہ کان لہ عیراقد

المفوضية العليا المستقلة للانتخابات في العراق

هہ لہزاردن بۆ ئه نجومه نی نیشتمانی

الانتخابات للجمعية الوطنية الانتقالية

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165	جبهة العمل المشترك الديمقراطية
166	الجبهة الوطنية لوحدہ العراق
167	المهندس علي مسلم جار الله علي البيضاني
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170	التجمع من أجل الديمقراطية العراقي
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197	القائمة الرسالية الوطنية
201	تجمع وطني
204	المخدين الوطنية
208	السيد د. طه أحمد ياسين محمود
209	حزب البناء الديمقراطي
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220	حركة الضباط والمندوبين الأحرار
222	منظمة نال الله الاسلامية المقر العام في العراق
223	حزب الاتحاد الديمقراطي الكلداني
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228	الحركة الايزيدية من أجل الإصلاح والتقدم
230	حزب الشعب العراقي الديمقراطي

102	عبد الستار جبر كلطع العبودي
103	التيار العراقي الديمقراطي
107	حركة المجتمع الديمقراطي - حمد
110	فلاح حسن عبد الأمير العارضي
111	منظمة العمل الاسلامي في العراق - القيادة المركزية
112	الاتحاد العام لشباب العراق
115	تجمع العراق الديمقراطي
120	مالك عزيز - حنين غفوري
121	محمد عبد عواد النليمي
124	التيار الاسلامي الديمقراطي
126	المعوية - قائمة لمرحلة ما بعد الامم المتحدة المستقلة
127	التجمع الوطني
130	قائمة التحالف الكردي لسبي هاروبهاني كوردلان
133	التجمع الملكي العراقي الهادي
134	حزب الاخاء الوطني العراقي
135	السيد كاظم جاسم علي الفاضلي الحيدري
139	التجمع الوطني الاشوري
140	ابراهيم خليل سعيد العيسوي
144	حزب الوحدة الاسلامية في العراق
145	تجمع أحفاد ثورة العشرين
146	تجمع الوحدة الوطنية العراقي
148	ائتلاف الرافدين الديمقراطي
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151	المؤتمر الاسلامي لعشائر العراق
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155	التجمع الوطني لتيار الوسط
156	عباس علي زكي حسون المياح
158	تجمع الديمقراطيين المستقلين

ضع إشارة ✓ في المربع المقابل للكيان السياسي الذي تختاره / ولا تضع إشارة في أكثر من مربع واحد -

نشانهای بهرامبر نهو كيانه سياسيي ههلی ده بزیت تو مارکە / تهنه یهك خانه دهست نشان بهك



لكيان السياسي الذي تختاره
نهو كيانه سياسيي كه ههلی ده بزیت



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May - XDR

0940
12/20

~~FOUO~~

December 19, 2005

TO: Gordon England
CC: Gen Pete Pace
Michael Wynne
Gen Mike Moseley
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.A.*

413.77

SUBJECT: Civilianizing Air Force GPS Activities

I like the idea of civilianizing the Air Force GPS activities where they train young military persons and rotate them in two years. We should look at using civilians to get greater stability.

Thanks.

DHR,dh
121905-34

.....
Please Respond By 02/02/06

19 Dec 5

OSD 03164-06

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/47452

FEB 22 2006

To: SECDEF
Fr: Gordon England
Subj: Civilianizing Air Force GPS Activities

413,77

The October 5 Defense Science Board report also made this recommendation. The Air Force concurs and has already outsourced nearly 50% of GPS operations.

Of 395 personnel in Operations, 42% are contractor, 34% active duty Air Force, 18% are reservists and 6% are government civilians. Some of this mission is indeed inherently military, and, in addition, the Air Force does need to develop military personnel who can plan and execute space power at the tactical and operational levels of war.

The contractor percentage is expected to grow somewhat, but, at nearly 50% of the total operation, it appears about right to provide stability of operations.

Gordon England
2-22-06

22 Feb 06

19 Dec 05

OSD 03164-06

31 0630

~~FOUO~~

February 28, 2005

TO: Paul Butler
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Letter to Mr. Bortz

001/SD

Please have someone write a letter to Walter Bortz regretting my participation in this invitation at Hampden-Sydney College.

Thanks.

Attach.
2/1/05 Bortz ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh
022805-4

.....
Please respond by 3/3/05

28 FEB 05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 03210-05

1 FEB 05


HAMPDEN-SYDNEY COLLEGE

HAMPDEN-SYDNEY, VIRGINIA

Regrets
called 2.9

T-MAR 15

February 1, 2005



The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
1000 Defense
The Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld:

~~Saturday, March 12, 2005~~ a very special date for Hampden-Sydney College. That night, we will honor a genuine American hero who has also played a key role in the long history of the College. Lieutenant General Samuel V. Wilson, my predecessor and the President Emeritus of Hampden-Sydney will receive the Keating Medallion in recognition of his extraordinary leadership. The medallion will be presented at a black tie dinner beginning at 6:30 p.m. at the Willard Hotel in Washington

Your presence at the dinner would make this night ever more special. In addition to key supporters of Hampden-Sydney College, other invited guests include former U.S. President George H.W. Bush, Senators John Warner and George Allen, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and Army Chief of Staff General Peter Schoomaker.

I hope you can join us. Please have your secretary contact mine (Karen Montgomery) at (b)(6) to let me know.

Thank you for your consideration

Sincerely,

Walter M. Bortz III



HAMPDEN-
SYDNEY
COLLEGE




M A K I N G A G I F T

Monday, March 07, 2005

MAKING A GIFT**SOCIETY OF FOUNDERS**

Annual Funds
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Funds
Endowment Funds
Planned Giving
Corp. & Foundation
Relations
How To Give
Society of Founders
Alumni Involvement
Senior Campaign
The Staff
"We Are H-SC"
Young Alumni



The SOCIETY of FOUNDERS

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Calendar
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Visiting HSC
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The Society of Founders is not named lightly. With your gift, you sign the charter of Hampden-Sydney College, alongside Patrick Henry and James Madison. You offer, as they did, your resources as a foundation for the College's enduring mission.

Membership in the Society of Founders is an investment in the continuing independence of Hampden-Sydney and in the high quality of education it offers.

Annual memberships in the Society of Founders provide invaluable income—money urgently needed to maintain the educational standards of the College in an increasingly competitive environment.

All Founders receive a Football parking pass, an invitation to the annual Founders dinner, and free admission to selected alumni events.

"The involvement for Founders, as for others who give of their time and talent, is much more than an impersonal and non-committal relationship. It is akin to being a member of a family --- an ever-growing family that is committed to making Hampden-Sydney College great!"

Founders Events**Founders Dinner**

March 19, 2005
Hotel Willard
Washington, DC

[Photo Gallery](#)

Richmond Founders
Christmas Party - December 8, 2004


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John C. Ellis, Jr. '70
Chairman of the Society

The Society of Founders welcomes alumni, parents, and friends of Hampden-Sydney College. Your annual gift is a vote of confidence in the future of the College.

There are six levels of annual membership:**Slate Hill Society (\$25,000 or more)**


Benefits: All privileges below, plus a special invitation to Middlecourt for dinner with the President.

**Cushing Society (\$12,500 - \$24,999)**

Benefits: All privileges below, plus special invitations to College functions and an invitation to dine with the President during Founders Weekend.

**Venable Society (\$6,250 - \$12,499)**

Benefits: All privileges below, plus free admission to selected alumni club events.

**Atkinson Society (\$3,125 - \$6,249)**

Benefits: All privileges below, plus a basketball parking pass and the opportunity to be a member of the new fitness center on campus (please call for further details).

**Cabell Society (\$1,250 - \$3,124)**

Benefits: A football parking pass, an invitation to Founders Weekend, and free admission to selected regional events.

**Gammon Society (\$625 - \$1,249 for graduates 10 years out or less)**

For alumni who have not yet celebrated their tenth reunion.

Benefits: A football parking pass, an invitation to Founders Weekend, and free admission to selected regional events.

[H-SC](#) | [Admissions](#) | [Academics](#) | [Athletics](#) | [Alumni](#) | [Bookstore](#) | [Calendar](#) | [Library](#) | [Student Life](#) | [News](#) | [Site Index](#)

HAMPDEN-SYDNEY COLLEGE

HAMPDEN-SYDNEY, VIRGINIA

February 1, 2005

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
1000 Defense
~~The Pentagon~~
Washington, DC 20301

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld:


Saturday, March 19, 2005...a very special date for Hampden-Sydney College. That night, we will honor a genuine American hero who has also played a key role in the long history of the College. Lieutenant General Samuel V. Wilson, my predecessor and the President *Emeritus* of Hampden-Sydney, will receive the Keating Medallion in recognition of his extraordinary leadership. The medallion will be presented at a black tie dinner beginning at 6:30 p.m. at the Willard Hotel in Washington.

Your presence at the dinner would make this night ever more special. In addition to key supporters of Hampden-Sydney College, other invited guests include former U.S. President George H.W. Bush, Senators John Warner and George Allen, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and Army Chief of Staff General Peter Schoomaker.

I hope you can **join** us. Please have your secretary contact mine (Karen Montgomery) at (b)(6) to let me know.

Thank you for your consideration.

Sincerely,



Walter M. Bortz III

11-L-0559/OSD/47458

OSD 03210-05



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

FEB 28 2005

001153

Lieutenant General Samuel V. Wilson, U.S. Army (Ret)
President *Emeritus*
Hampden-Sydney College
Hampden-Sydney, VA 23943-0128

Dear Sam,

I'm not intimately familiar with the Keating
Medallion but, whatever it is, you deserve it and more!

I received a notice that the event was to be held
March 19. I wish it were possible for me to be there, but
I'm afraid it is not.

Know that I'll be thinking of you with continuing
great respect and appreciation.


Sincerely,

28 FEB 05

OSD 03210-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47459

1 FEB 05



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

MAR 9 2005

001150

Mr. Walter M. Bortz III
President
Hampden-Sydney College
Box 128, Atkinson Hall
Hampden-Sydney, VA 23943

Dear Mr. Bortz,

Thank you for inviting me to the Founders Dinner on March 19th. I am sorry to say I will not be able to make it, but I do hope the night is a success.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

My best to Sam Wilson
He is a STAR!

9 MAR 2005

15005

OSD 03210-05

Mr. Walter M. Bortz III
President
Hampden-Sydney College
Box 128, Atkinson Hall
Hampden-Sydney, VA 23943

Dear Mr. Bortz,

Thank you for inviting me to the Founders Dinner on March 19th. I am sorry to say I will not be able to make it, but I do hope the night is a success.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

*Send in for
secret signature*
Paul Butler
3/1

FOUO

ES-2221
05/001734

February 3, 2005

TO: Doug Feith

SUBJECT: Response to NATO SecGen

Please get back to me with a proposal on how we respond to the attached letter from the Secretary General.

Thanks.

Attach.

- 2/03/05 Email from Fran Russell
- 1/28/05 Letter from NATO SecGen to SecDef

DHR:ss
020305-11

.....
Please respond by 2/17/05

ITag

3 Feb 05

FOUO

OSD 03212-05

03-02-05 P06:18 OUT



SECRETARY GENERAL
LE SECRÉTAIRE GENERAL
Jaap de Hoop Scheffer

SECRETARY GENERAL
205 FEB 15 PM 1:23

SG(2005)0075

28 January 2005

NATO Training Mission - Iraq: Travel and Subsistence Trust Fund


As part of our effort to fully implement the decision of NATO Heads of State and Government taken at Istanbul to offer assistance to the government of Iraq with the training of its security forces, NATO is setting up a range of courses at Training and Education Facilities outside of Iraq.

The funding arrangements agreed for the mission foresee that the costs of providing this training will be absorbed by NATO's common-funded programmes but that trainee travel and subsistence and course fees will be covered by a trust fund (unless such costs are covered by a sponsoring nation).

Given the necessary assurances of success, it would be my intention to arrange a meeting at NATO HQ in the near future, preferably before the 22 February NATO Summit, to set up this "Travel and Subsistence Trust Fund" and to hear from nations what they are in a position to contribute. Further explanations on the scope of the fund, on the payment and reimbursement mechanisms put in place, and on the courses currently planned are provided at Annex. As you can see, the aim is to establish a fund in an amount of several million Euros.

-1-

I am bringing this issue to your attention to urge your government to join in this common effort. The training of Iraqi Security Forces is indeed a key element of Iraq's efforts to establish its governmental structures and our support to this work is essential. I am also writing to Foreign Ministers in this regard, and am raising with the Iraqi Government how it could contribute to this effort.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Jaap de Hoop Scheffer'. The signature is written in a cursive style with a large, sweeping initial 'J'.

Jaap de Hoop Scheffer

The Honorable
Mr Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense of the United States of America
Washington
United States of America

NATO TRAINING MISSION IRAQ (NTM-I)

TRUST FUND TO COVER TRAVEL AND SUBSISTENCE OF IRAQI SECURITY FORCES TRAINING AT NATO TRAINING AND EDUCATIONAL FACILITIES

Background

1. At the Istanbul Summit, NATO Heads of State and Government offered assistance to the government of Iraq with the training and equipping of its security forces. One important element of this assistance is the provision of training to Iraqi Security Forces at NATO Training and Educational Facilities outside Iraq.
2. The funding arrangements agreed for the NTM-I¹ follow the general principle that nations (including non-NATO participants) will absorb any and all costs associated with their participation in the provision of training assistance to Iraq. This general principle specifically applies to nationally provided training, whether inside or outside Iraq.
3. The costs of training Iraqi Security Forces at NATO Training and Educational Facilities (NTEF) **will** be incorporated into the budgets of the entities involved. This does not, however, include trainee travel and subsistence, nor the payment of course fees (where this is applicable). The NTM-I funding arrangements foresee that these costs, unless covered by a sponsoring nation, will be covered by a trust fund to be managed by the Joint Force Command Naples Financial Controller.

Scope of the trust fund

4. Unless covered by a sponsoring nation, the "Travel and Subsistence" Trust Fund will cover:
 - (a) travel and subsistence of Iraqi Security Forces trained at NATO and other facilities outside of Iraq;
 - (b) course fees and other appropriate expenses incurred in training Iraqi Security Forces outside of Iraq.

Payment and reimbursement mechanisms

5. Detailed mechanisms for payment and reimbursement of training at NATO facilities will be developed by ACO/ACT in conjunction with the administrator of the trust fund (the Joint Force Command Naples Financial Controller) on the basis of the guidance on travel and per diem parameters provided by the Military Budget Committee*. Every effort will be made to accommodate the Iraqi Security Force (ISF) personnel in NATO facilities in order to keep costs low.

¹ SRB-N(2004)0046-REV9

² OCB(2004)0179-REV2

6. Transportation of **ISF** personnel from Bagdad to Rhein-Main or Ramstein will be provided by USTransCom. Germany has agreed to transport trainees from there to the NATO Training and Educational Facilities free of charge (four flights per month).

Courses

7. On current planning, about 560 trainees will be accommodated in various courses during 2005 as follows:

- (a) NATO Defense College: some 180 trainees (senior ranks) spread over 13 different courses (mostly 1-2 weeks each) covering politico-military issues, good governance, and defence policy and defence reform.
- (b) NATO School Oberammergau: some 300 trainees (various ranks) spread over 16 courses (1-3 weeks each) covering operational, crisis management issues, and civil/military cooperation issues.
- (c) Joint Warfare Centre: some 60 trainees at 2 specially tailored key-leader courses.
- (d) Communication School Latina: some 20 trainees at a 2 week communications course.

8. Additional course requirements (also including at the Joint Forces Training Centre) will be developed based on further Iraqi Interim Government and NTECG inputs and taking into account lessons learned from earlier courses.

Resource estimates

9. The aim is to establish a trust fund amounting to several million Euros. This would cover currently planned courses (including linguistic support) and provide some growth capacity and/or extension into 2006.



SECRETARY GENERAL
LE SECRÉTAIRE GÉNÉRAL
Jaap de Hoop Scheffer

314 - 1077-11
205 777 15 PM 1-23

SG(2005)0075

28 January 2005

NATO Training Mission – Iraq: Travel and Subsistence Trust Fund


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Secretary of Defense of the United States of America
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Resource estimates

9. The aim is to establish a trust fund amounting to several million Euros. This would cover currently planned courses (including linguistic support) and provide some growth capacity and/or extension into 2006.

February 15, 2005

TO: Gen Mike Hagee
Gen Doug Brown

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: MEU SOC

Should a MEU SOC be created and chopped to SOCOM?

Thanks.

DHR:ss
021405-46

.....
Please respond by _____

SOCOM

15 Feb 05

~~FOUO~~

November 28, 2005

334

TO: Gordon England
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Defense Business Board Report

Please **take** a look at this report from the Defense Business Board, and **tell me** what you think we ought to do about it.

I **am** tilting towards agreeing to a second Deputy along the lines suggested, but fashioning it in a way **that** there is **total** flexibility to fit **the** personalities and **the** backgrounds of the people serving as the **Secretary and** the principal Deputy.

Thanks.

Attach: May, 2005 DBB Final Report

DHR:ss
112805-33

.....
Please Respond By 12/15/05

28 NOV 05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/47472

D3241-06

TS

~~FOUO~~



November 23, 2005

032

TO: Robert Rangel

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Congressional Relations Plan from ~~Dan~~ Stanley

~~Dan~~ Stanley is going to give me a Congressional Relations plan to include:

- People to invite to the holiday party at my house
- People to invite to the holiday party at the office
- List of Members to call
- List of Members to write thanking them for what they've done in connection with the legislation

DHR:ss
112305-02



*- closed with attached memo from
Dan Stanley.*

R.
Robert Rangel
12/13

03 NOV 05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/47473

03261-06

~~FOUO~~

293

November 03, 2005

TO: Robert Rangel
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Letter to Admiral Gonzalez

Please draft an appropriate letter to Admiral Gonzalez thanking him for the assistance they have provided.

Thanks.

Anach 9/5/05 Letter from Admiral Gonzalez to SecDef

DHR:ss
110205-14

.....
Please Respond By 11/10/05

3 NOV 05

*Ed W
3/10*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/47474 *03267-06*

~~FOUO~~

NOV 08 2005

687

TO: Steve Bucci
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Arlington Cemetery

Please make a note that the next time I am at Arlington Cemetery I want to stop by Section 60, plot 8008, the grave of SPC Bradley Beard.

Thanks.

Attach.
10/26/05 Beard ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh
110705-27

8 NOV 05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/47475

03268-06

NOV 08 2005

Kjs

11/10
0831

~~FOUO~~

November 09, 2005

TO: Steve Bucci
CC: Robert Rangel
Cathy Mainardi
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Choosing a Convenient Time for **Kristin** Devold on January 30

Adriana

Let's make **sure** we pick a time that is convenient for **Kristin** Devold on **January 30** to give her the award -- maybe have her in for lunch that day. **You** don't **need** to tell her we're giving her **an** award.

Thanks.

Attach E-Mail Correspondence ~~from~~ **Kristin** Devold

DHR:es
110905-14

.....

9 NOV 05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/47476 032 77-04



Sherrod, Jimmy, CIV, WHS/ESD

From: Boykin, Jason CIV WHS/ESD
Sent: Wednesday, November 09, 2005 7:19 AM
To: Sherrod, Jimmy, CIV, WHS/ESD
Subject: Fw: Letter from Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld

OFFICE OF THE
SECY OF DEFENSE
2005 NOV -9 AM 10: 56

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----

From: 'Kristin Devold' (b)(6)
To: Boykin, Jason CIV WHS/ESD <jason.boykin@whs.mil>
Sent: Wed Nov 09 06:44:21 2005
Subject: **RE:** Letter from Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld

Dear Mr Boykin,

i would be delighted if you could pass on my answer to Sec Rumsfeld, to his letter of Oct^{24th}

Thank you for your help, best wishes Kristin K Devold.

To Sec Rumsfeld:

Oslo November 9 2005

Dear Don,

thank you very much for your kind invitation to the Alfalfa Club Annual Dinner om Saturday evening, January **28**. I will certainly accept your invitation, and look forward to see both Joyce and you again.

I will stay at at Kirsti Schjervens house, the representaive of the norwegian MOD in Washington, for the weekend.

I'll also be delighted to meet you in Pentagon on Monday January the 30, whenever it fits your schedule. Please let me now what you would consider a convenient time. I will stay i Washington both Monday 30 and Tuesday 31 for some business-meetings with norwegian companies planning to expand their maritime activity in US, and I'll coordinate **our** schedules.

I really look forward to seeing you. Thank you for your kindness.

Sincerely

Kristin Krohn Devold

>From: "Boykin, Jason CIV WHS/ESD" <jason.boykin@whs.mil>
>To: (b)(6)
>Subject: Letter from Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld
>Date: Mon, 24 Oct 2005 15:21:32 -0000

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

OCT 24 2005

The Honorable Kristin Krohn-Devold

(b)(6)

Dear Kristin,

As we discussed on the telephone, I would like to invite you to the Alfalfa Club Annual Dinner on Saturday evening, January 28. The organization has no purpose but to hold this once-a-year event. The evening is humorous, patriotic, and always enjoyable. It is black tie. The attendees generally are the President, the Cabinet, Supreme Court justices, Members of Congress, and people from the U.S. business community.

I think you will enjoy attending. The dinner will be at the Capitol Hilton Hotel in Washington, D.C. Please let me know if you think you will be able to attend. If you have any questions, give me a call.

I also hope that I'll have a chance to see you on Monday, January 30, at my office, if you can arrange your schedule to come in. Please let my office know about Monday, so we can set a convenient time.

Joyce and I look forward to seeing you. Thanks so much.

Sincerely,



OSD 20368-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47478

001

84 OCT 05

~~FOUO~~

November 10, 2005

TO: Eric Edelman
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Pascual's Replacement at State

040STATE

I like some of these names -- Monty Meigs is certainly good; Ray DuBois would be terrific; I don't know some of the other people. I don't think Craig Fields is the right person for it, and I don't know Nash. Kicklighter might be a possibility.

Why don't you push those?

Thanks.

Attach.

11/7/05 USD(P) memo to SD re: Pascual's Move to Brookings [OSD21974-05]

DHR.dh
111005-04

.....
Please Respond By December 01, 2005

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/47479 03279-06

AD NOVOS
mk

~~FOUO~~



November 10, 2005

704

TO: Dan Stanley
CC: Gen Pete Pacc
GEN Pete Schoomaker
Robert Rangel

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*

SUBJECT: Senator DeWine and Casualty Affairs

I would like a report back from you after somebody has talked to Mike DeWine about casualty affairs.

Thanks.

DHR.dh
111005-09



Please Respond By 11/23/05

*Sir,
Response attached.*

*JK
Lt Col Lengyel*

NOV 22 2005

10 NOV 05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/47480

03280-06

~~FOUO~~



IRAQ

November 28, 2005

TO: GEN George Casey

CC: GEN John Abizaid
Gen Pete Pace

FROM Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*

SUBJECT: Predicting how quickly ISF can take over

Is there some way we can begin predicting how fast the Iraqi Security Forces will be able to take over specific pieces of real estate, bases and responsibilities?

Thanks.

DHR.ss
11280547

.....
Please Respond By 12/20/05

Sir,

*add
12/19*

Response attached.

*v/r
Lt Col Lengyel*

DEC 05 2005

28 NOV 05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/47481

03291-06



REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

HEADQUARTERS
MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE - IRAQ
BAGHDAD, IRAQ
APO AE 08342-1400

208
12/19

04 DEC 2005

MNF-I-CG

MEMORANDUM FOR Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1000 Defense Pentagon, Washington, DC
20301-1000

SUBJECT: Predicting how quickly ISF can take over (I 12805-47)

MASS SECRETARY

1. You asked, "Is there some way we can begin projecting how fast the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) will be able to take over specific pieces of real estate, bases and responsibilities?" Projections are made monthly by the Transitional Readiness Assessments (TRA) and Battlespace Management Boards. The TRA projects when ISF units will be ready to lead co ~~alition~~ operations. The Battlespace Management Board projects when bases and real estate will be ready for handover.
2. The TRA process for Army units provides unit-level projections over the next six months. However, high degrees of confidence are possible only about 30 days prior to assumption of operational responsibilities. Currently, the Army has one division headquarters, four brigade headquarters, and thirty-three battalions conducting independent operations with support of Coalition Force enablers. As currently projected, seventy-five percent of Iraqi units will be conducting independent operations with the support of coalition enablers by June 2006.
3. The TRA process for Police Forces is much less mature. A major effort will be made over the next two months to improve ability to project capabilities. Our February 2007 goal is seventy-five percent of Iraqi police forces are capable of conducting independent policing operations.
4. Transfer of real estate and bases is more a function of Coalition Forces' needs than of ISF capabilities. The pace in 2006 will depend upon the rate at which forces off ramp. The Battlespace Management Board makes reliable transfer forecasts at least 90 days in advance.

We will lay this
out for you at
next SVTC.

George W. Casey, Jr.
General, U.S. Army
Commanding

CF:
Commander, United States Central Command

TAB
~~FOUO~~

DJS // 3/1

NG/RM

1 March 2005 For action

971

TO: Gen Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Equipment Issues

I sent you the attached memo on February 7. On February 17, you sent me your memo, which is attached. My question is, what do you propose to do with respect to the problems that apparently result from leaving equipment for the new folks to **fall** in on?

I would appreciate it if you could be sure your memos have a recommendation or conclusion.

Thanks.

Attach.

2/7/05 SD memo to CJCS [Snowflake #020705-19]

2/17/05 CJCS memo to SecDef [OSD 03407-05]

DHR:dh
022805-14

.....
Please respond by 3/17/05

Tab

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/47483

OSD 03407-05

~~TAB~~
~~FOLIO~~

DJS

February 7, 2005

951

TO: Gen Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: LTG Blum's Statements

I was asked questions this weekend on television about Blum's statements that the National Guard is woefully unequipped and unprepared, and still is. What is he talking about?

Thanks.

DRM:sk
02/05-19

.....
Please respond by 2/17/05

Tab

~~FOLIO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/47484

OSD 03407-05



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

CH-2336-05
17 February 2005

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS

RBM 2/16

SUBJECT: Lieutenant General Blum's Statements (SF 951)

- **Answer.** In response to your question (TAB), General Blum's comments were taken out of context when used by Mr. Blitzer during the CNN's Late Edition interview. General Blum stated in the same testimony: "When they get to theater, they will absolutely have what they need. General Cody, General Schoomaker, Secretary Harvey, all of us work very hard to make sure that, in fact, is ensured."
- **Analysis.** General Blum's comments addressed equipment issues, while Mr. Blitzer's question focused on personnel. The Army's long-standing tiered resourcing strategy of the National Guard (NG) resulted in the existing equipment shortfalls. Substantial cross-leveling of equipment is required to prepare units for deployment. The present strategy of leaving substantial amounts of equipment in theater further complicates the NG ability to train, reset and perform missions in support of homeland defense and support to civil authorities after redeployment. Nonetheless, the bottom line is that every NG unit is properly equipped before deploying to perform its combat mission in theater.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:
As stated

Prepared By: MG C. A. Vaughn, USA; Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for National Guard Matters; (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/47485

UNCLASSIFIED without attachments

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~ OSD 03407-05

TAB
~~FOUO~~

DJS

February 7, 2005

951

TO: Gen Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: LTG Blum's Statements

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Thanks.

DHR:ss
020705-19

.....
Please respond by 2/17/05

Tab

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/47486

OSD 03407-05



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

CM-2423-05
4 April 2005

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBM/so*

SUBJECT: Equipment Issues (SF 971)

- **Answer.** In response to your issue (TAB), the Army and Army National Guard (ARNG) are managing this issue through cross-leveling equipment remaining in CONUS and by applying resources from the supplemental and the Army's baseline budget, according to the Army's Equipment Plan. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau (NGB) stated in testimony on 15 March that he is confident that Army leadership will reset the ARNG and provide an equitable solution for mid- and long-standing equipment shortfalls.
- **Analysis.** While leaving equipment behind is not the root of the problem, it does exacerbate the effects of the Army's long-standing tiered resourcing strategy.
 - The National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report, which was delivered to the Congress on 22 March, states that equipment shortfalls for the Army National Guard are 26 percent (\$11.6B).
 - The Secretary of the Army also stated in House Appropriations Committee-Defense testimony on 2 March that the National Guard and Reserve will receive equitable consideration under the Army reset plan.
- **Conclusion.** As LTG Blum acknowledged in his 15 March testimony, senior Army leaders are addressing long-standing ARNG equipment shortfalls and reset while NGB cross-levels remaining CONUS equipment to manage local shortages.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:

As stated

Prepared By: MG C. A. Vaughn, USA; Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for National Guard Matters; (b)(6)

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/47487

OSD 03407-05

~~TAB~~
~~FOUO~~

DJS / 3/1

NG/RM

1 March 2005 For action

911

TO: Gen Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Equipment Issues

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2/17/05 CJCS memo to SecDef [OSD03407-05]

DHR:dh
022805-14

.....
Please respond by 3/17/05

Tab

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/47488

OSD 03407-05

~~FOUO~~

DJS

February 7, 2005

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FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: LTG Blum's Statements

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"hunks.

DHR: *
020795-15

.....
Please respond by 2/17/05

Male Blum

old 2/18
Sir,
Response attached.
vm
LTCol Lengyel

FEB 18 2005

Tab

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/47489

OSD 03407-05



TAB
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

*dlb
2/28*

075 FEB 17 11 34
CH-2336-05
17 February 2005

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS

RM/16

SUBJECT: Lieutenant General Blum's Statements (SF 951)

- **Answer.** In response to your question (TAB), General Blum's comments were taken out of context when used by Mr. Blitzer during the CNN's Late Edition interview. General **Blum** stated in the same testimony: "When they get to theater, they will absolutely have what they need. General Cody, General Schoomaker, Secretary Harvey, all of us work very hard to make sure that, in fact, is ensured."
- **Analysis.** General Blum's comments addressed equipment issues, while Mr. Blitzer's question focused on personnel. The Army's long-standing tiered resourcing strategy of the National Guard (NG) resulted in the existing equipment shortfalls. Substantial cross-leveling of equipment is required to prepare units for deployment. The present strategy of leaving substantial amounts of equipment in theater further complicates the NG ability to train, reset and perform missions in support of homeland defense and support to civil authorities after redeployment. Nonetheless, the bottom line is that every NG unit is properly equipped before deploying to perform its combat mission in theater.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:
As stated

Prepared **By:** MG C. A. Vaughn, USA; Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for National Guard Matters; (b)(6)

MA SD	SMA DSD		
TSA SD	SA DSD		
EXEC SEC	<i>MZ/18</i>		
ESR MA	<i>Pat 3/18</i>		

Tab

UNCLASSIFIED without attachments

~~**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**~~ OSD 034 07-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47490



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CM-2340-05 17
18 February 2005

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RM/4/17*

SUBJECT: Staffing (SF 937)

- **Answer.** In response to your question (TAB A), an execute order directing 100 percent manning was released on 24 January. To date, the manning level is at 90 percent. Your letter dated 31 January 2005 requested assistance from the National Security Advisor in filling 28 of the 33 positions. I will send you a memorandum shortly requesting DOD agencies fill the remaining 5 positions. Recommend we continue to solicit support from other government departments and agencies in areas that require personnel possessing high-demand low-density skills such as intelligence. This support is critical to USCENTCOM's mission.
- **Analysis.** USCENTCOM joint task forces were 79 percent boots on ground on 13 January. Their joint task forces are currently at 90 percent boots on ground for DOD forces. I met with the Service Chiefs on 14 January and they are committed to fully support the personnel required for mission success. We continue our dialog with selected government agencies regarding their support for 33 personnel, as they are enablers to mission success.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments :

As stated

Prepared By: Rear Admiral Donna L. Crisp, USN; Director, J-1; (b)(6)

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~ ¹⁶ D 03428-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47491

TAB A

~~FOUO~~

JAN 13 2005 17:17

937

TO: Gen Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Staffing

If we are not filling the Joint Manning Document for the Iraqi folks out there -- which we are not -- how can we complain to the other government agencies that they are not getting the advisors into the ministries?

Thanks.

DHR:ss
011205-9

.....
Please respond by 1/14/05

~~FOUO~~

Tab A

OSD 03428-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47492

TAB B
COORDINATION

Unit	Name	Date
USCENTCOM	Colonel Hall, USA	18 January 2005

TAB A

~~FOUO~~

JAN 13 2005 10:43:17

937

TO: Gen Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Staffing

If we are not filling the Joint Manning Document for the Iraqi folks out **there** -- which **we** are not -- how can we complain to the other government agencies that they are not getting the advisors into the ministries?

Thanks.

DHR:ss
611205-9

.....
Please respond by 1/14/05

~~FOUO~~

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/47494

OSD 03428-05

~~FOUO~~

11:03:55

December 19, 2005

TO: Steve Cambone
Jim Haynes

FROM Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*

SUBJECT Counter-Intelligence for Force Protection Program

Do let me know what you decide to do on using our privacy lawyers to take a look at the program on counter-intelligence for force protection, and how it is being managed.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
121905-01

.....
Please Respond By 01/10/06

~~FOUO~~

11- L-0559/OSD/47495

OSD 03450-06

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dr. Stephen Cambone 
William J. Haynes II  2/12/06

SUBJECT: Counterintelligence Force Protection Program

- You asked in a December 19, 2005 snowflake how we are using our privacy lawyers to review the program on counterintelligence for force protection.
 - DoD elements involved in the Talon Reporting System, including DoD lawyers, have conducted an internal review of the program. This review identified areas that require attention.
 - Guidance is being prepared for the DepSecDef to issue, which will include a request that both the ATSD (Intelligence Oversight) and the Department's Inspector General conduct reviews of the program.
- We considered whether to recommend that the Department request an entity outside DoD review the Talon Reporting System for compliance with privacy laws and the protection of civil liberties. However, since the program is now being closely scrutinized, and because the Department's IG and ATSD (IO) will review it, we think the program now has sufficient oversight.

~~FOUO~~

ES-2355
05/002448

February 8, 2005

TO: COL Steve Bucci

CC: Doug Feith

SUBJECT: Scheduling Meetings w/Foreign Dignitaries

When an interpreter is required for a meeting I am having with a foreign dignitary, the meeting takes twice as long as scheduled. The meeting with the Polish MoD today took an **hour**, not the **30 minutes** on the calendar.

In the future, please allow extra time for interpretation.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
020805-23

.....
Please respond by _____

~~FOUO~~

OSD 03474-05

070

075

10 11 2 01


Policy Executive Secretariat Note

February 17, 2005
I-05/002448/ES-2355

Reference: **020805-23**, "Scheduling Meetings with Foreign Dignitaries"

Colonel Bucci,

Mr. Feith raised issue with Policy staff at his February 14 large staff meeting.


June Bartlett
Deputy Director
Policy Executive Secretariat

OSD 03474-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47498

~~FOUO~~

ES-2355
05/002448

February 8, 2005

0000 0000 0000 0000

TO: COL Sitve Bucci

CC: Doug Feith

SUBJECT: Scheduling Meetings w/Foreign Dignitaries

When an interpreter is required for a meeting I am having with a foreign dignitary, the meeting takes twice as long as scheduled. The meeting with the Polish MoD today took ~~an~~ hour, not the **30 minutes** on the calendar.

In the future, please allow extra time for interpretation.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
020805-23

.....
Please respond by _____

~~FOUO~~

OSD 03474-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47499

09-02-05 11:07 AM

~~FOUO~~

February 8, 2005
I-05/001965
ES-2271

333

TO: Doug Feith
FROM:
SUBJECT: Elaine Chao and Margaret Spelling

Elaine Chao and Margaret Spelling (the new Secretary of Education) would both like to go to Afghanistan. Margaret Spelling has been there before. They said there may be a trip scheduled in March for the Afghan women's group. That might be a good time to do it. Please check and see if that is the case.

Thanks.

DHR ss
020805-10

.....
Please respond by 2/17/05

8 Feb 05

OSD 03496-05

~~FOUO~~

09-02-05 07:22 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/47500

2005

February 11, 2005

I-05/001965
ES-2271

USDP

*Approved
2/17/05*

INFO MEMO

TO: THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs,
Peter W. Rodman (b)(6)

[Handwritten signature]

FEB 16 2005

SUBJECT: Elaine Chao and Margaret Spelling

33350

- You asked us to find out if the US-Afghan Women's Council is scheduled to meet in Kabul this March.
 - Secretaries Chao and Spelling recently told you they would both like to travel to Afghanistan.
- We contacted Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs Paula Dobriansky's office (U/S Dobriansky is one of the Council's co-chairs).
 - A member of U/S Dobriansky's staff said the next meeting of the Council has not yet been set.
- We will follow up with U/S Dobriansky's office and advise you once a date is known.

16 Feb 05

Prepared by: Kurt Amend, ISA/NESA, (b)(6)

OSD 03496-05

DUSD (NESA)

[Handwritten signature]
2/10

PDASD/ISA

[Handwritten signature]

FEB 16 2005

8 Feb 05

~~FOUO~~

FEB 15 2005

I-05/002274
ES-2319

TO: Doug Feith

FROM:

SUBJECT: Schröder Speech

You ought to get a copy of the Schröder speech that was delivered by Stuck at Wehrkunde. We need to develop an Administration position on it.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
021405-14

.....
Please respond by 24 Feb 05

350.001
15 Feb 05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/47502

OSD 03518-05

~~FOUO~~

February 7, 2005

I-05/001930

ES-2261

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: -
SUBJECT: Timeline for Iraq

I would like a timeline of what is going to happen next in Iraq, and the ranges of dates as to when they will take place. The fellow from the State Department who testified with Wolfowitz and Myers gave it orally, but I can't write it down.

Thanks.

DHR ss
020705-16

.....
Please respond by 2/17/05

~~FOUO~~

08-02-05 07:49 IN

OSD 03546-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47503

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

CF 2005

I-05/001930

ES-2261

USDP: 2/20/05

INFORMATION MEMO

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

18 FEB 2005

FROM: Peter W. Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs

[Handwritten signature]

SUBJECT: Timeline for Iraq

- You asked for a timeline of what is going to happen next in Iraq, and the ranges of dates as to when they will take place.
- The attached timeline was presented by Ron Schlicher of the State Department at the 3 February Senate Armed Services Committee hearing.

DUSD (NESA) *[Handwritten signature]*

PDASD/ISA *[Handwritten signature]*

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/47504

18-02-05 10:01 AM

OSD 03546-05

Iraq Timeline

Ron Schlicher, Office of Coordinator for Iraq, State Department, provided the Senate Armed Services Committee with the following timeline for upcoming events in Iraq:

- The IECI expects to announce final election results by February 15;
- The Transitional National Assembly (TNA) will then convene and select the three-member Transitional Government Presidency Council.
- The three members of the Presidency Council must unanimously name a Prime Minister within two weeks.
 - If the Presidency Council fails to name a Prime Minister within two weeks, the responsibility moves to the TNA, which must confirm a nomination by a two-thirds majority.
- The Prime Minister then has up to one month in which to name a Council of Ministers.
 - If the Prime Minister is unable to nominate a Council of Ministers within one month, the Presidency Council shall name another Prime Minister.
- The transitional government will draft a new constitution by August 15.
- The constitution will be put before Iraqi voters in a referendum no later than October 15.
 - If Iraqi voters approve the constitution, they will vote again according to its precepts for a permanent government by the end of this year.

~~FOUO~~

075 FEB 02 01:57

February 7, 2005

I-05/001930
ES-2261

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: -
SUBJECT: Timeline for Iraq

I would like a timeline of what is going to happen next in Iraq, and the ranges of dates as to when they will take place. The fellow from the State Department who testified with Wolfowitz and Myers gave it orally, but I didn't write it down.

Thanks.

DHR ss
020705-16

.....
Please respond by

2/17/05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/47506

08-02-05 07:49 JN

OSD 03546-05

~~TOP SECRET~~

September 22, 2004
ES-0849
04/012725-ES

384

TO: Paul McHale.
CC: Jim Haynes
Gen Dick Myers
Gen Pete Pace
ADM Vern Clark

FROM:
SUBJECT: Navy - Coast Guard Authorities

As we move forward toward creating a Maritime NORAD structure to deal with homeland security on the seas, it **makes** sense to sort out the specific authorities between the Navy and Coast Guard.

Please do a thorough review of the current relationship, with particular focus on homeland defense, and send up proposals that make the most sense for both departments. We should also look at the larger relationship between the Sea Services across the board - combat coordination, interaction overseas, acquisition, command and control arrangements and so forth.

22 Sep 04

Thanks.

DHR:ss
092204-5

.....
Please respond by 11/30/04



HOMELAND
DEFENSE

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2600

INFO MEMO

9 FEB 2005

DepSecDef

ADUSD(P)

Rozhiles
I-04/012725-ES

ES-0849

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense) *PM*

SUBJECT: Navy - Coast Guard Authorities and Relationship

- In response to your inquiry (TAB A), this memorandum addresses Navy and Coast Guard authorities and their relationship.
- Your authority to conduct Maritime Homeland Defense missions is not restricted by any geographic boundary.
 - In the Unified Command Plan, the President has directed you to conduct DoD maritime operations to defend the U.S. from national security threats within and beyond U.S. territorial seas.
- Navy forces operate globally under the control of the combatant commanders.
 - You have provided guidance to the combatant commanders for the use of Navy forces (and other Services' forces, as appropriate) in maritime defense operations by approving three execute orders (EXORDs), since January 2004.
 - These EXORDs provide the combatant commanders with authorities and procedures related to (a) maritime homeland defense, (b) expanded maritime interception operations, and (c) maritime WMD threats.
- The Coast Guard serves as the primary U.S. maritime law enforcement agency and, as a branch of the armed forces, operates concurrently as a military service and law enforcement agency (Title 10 and Title 14).
 - Coast Guard forces exercise their broad law enforcement authorities globally, including in U.S. internal waters, territorial seas, and international waters.
 - In addition, Coast Guard forces routinely provide operational support to overseas combatant commanders, as coordinated with the Department of Homeland Security.



11-L-0559/OSD/47508

09-02507-1104-11

OSD 03614-05

- For homeland security and defense operations, Navy and Coast Guard forces provide mutual support to each others' operations.
 - Coast Guard forces conduct routine homeland security patrols and boardings in the approaches to the U.S. and in U.S. territorial seas.
 - Navy forces, supporting the Coast Guard and their embarked law enforcement detachments, conduct maritime law enforcement interception and counterdrug operations.
 - During a maritime homeland defense event, on-scene Coast Guard forces will operate under the control of the combatant commander, augmenting his Navy homeland defense forces.
- DoD and DHS (including the Navy and the Coast Guard) will continue to improve their maritime operational roles and capabilities through the development and implementation of a number of on-going initiatives. Most notably, a presidential directive on maritime security policy was signed on December 21, 2004 (NSPD-41/HSPD-13). It directs DoD and DHS to develop a National Strategy for Maritime Security and supporting plans by the end of June, 2005. As directed by the President, DoD and DHS will also co-lead the development of plans for Maritime Domain Awareness, Maritime Threat Response, and Global Maritime Intelligence Fusion. Through these initiatives, we will continue to evaluate DoD's authorities, roles, and responsibilities, as well as our relationship with DHS and the Coast Guard, and update you as these efforts progress.
- TAB B provides more detailed information regarding Navy and Coast Guard authorities and the list of current DoD/DHS maritime initiatives.

COORDINATION: TAB C

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared by: CAPT Soloduk and CDR Kuepper, OASD(HD), (b)(6)

TAB

A

~~FOUO~~

September 22, 2004

ES-0849

04/012725-ES

TO: Paul McHale

CC: Jim Haynes
Gen Dick Myers
Gen Pete Pace
ADM Vern Clark

FROM:

SUBJECT: Navy - Coast Guard Authorities

As we move forward toward creating a Maritime NORAD structure to deal with homeland security on the seas, it makes sense to sort out the specific authorities between the Navy and Coast Guard.

Please do a thorough review of the current relationship, with particular focus on homeland defense, and send up proposals that make the most sense for both departments. We should also look at the larger relationship between the Sea Services across the board - combat coordination, interaction overseas, acquisition, command and control arrangements and so forth.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
092204-5

.....
Please respond by 11/30/04

OSD 03614-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47511

TAB

B

Additional Information Regarding the Navy and Coast Guard

- In the Unified Command Plan, the President has recognized your responsibility to direct the execution of military missions in defense of the homeland, including missions within the maritime domain. Therefore, when a threat emerges within the maritime domain for which you determine a military response is required, you have the authority to direct DoD forces to interdict that threat.
- The 1986 Goldwater - Nichols Act established the current combatant command structure, which directs the responsibility for maritime warfighting to the combatant commanders rather than the Services. As a result, the Navy no longer has direct operational responsibility, but remains responsible for organizing, training, and equipping maritime forces.
- DoD support to the Coast Guard's homeland security and counter-narcotics missions includes essential communications, intelligence, surveillance, detection, and sea control capabilities. Coast Guard support to the DoD and combatant commanders' maritime defense roles, including maritime interception operations, proliferation security initiative boardings, and force protection includes vessels and personnel, as well as specific expertise in maritime law enforcement and port security operations.
- The Coast Guard supports the combatant commander and DoD's global maritime operations while simultaneously performing traditional homeland security missions, including: port, waterway, and coastal security; drug and migrant interdiction; marine safety; and environmental protection. For example, the Coast Guard provides support directly to the combatant commanders, with patrol boats and port security units within USCENTCOM's AOR. Also, a Coast Guard officer recently served as a maritime component commander to USSOUTHCOM during Haitian stability operations.
- Both DoD and the Coast Guard have global maritime authorities and capabilities. It is reasonable to anticipate, however, that operations on the high seas and in forward regions will likely be led by DoD, employing its greater resources and global reach capability. Similarly, the Coast Guard will likely respond to terrorist threats within U.S navigable waters, U.S. territorial seas, and international waters, when deemed appropriate due to the presence of their operational assets. As both DoD and DHS organizations work to draft the National Strategy for Maritime Security, we anticipate that DoD and DHS maritime responsibilities will be further clarified and coordinated.

- The National Fleet Policy Statement, first prepared in 1998 and updated in 2002, is a Chief of Naval Operations and Coast Guard Commandant document that commits their Services to work together to integrate acquisition, platforms, infrastructure, and operations to ensure their forces mutually complement each other's roles and missions. The commitment to build multi-mission capabilities across all maritime missions has been demonstrated through cooperation on the Coast Guard's Deepwater Program and the Navy's Littoral Combat Ship project.
- Both Services continue to coordinate policy at the headquarters level and coordinate operations at the local command center level. To increase seamless DoD - Coast Guard operations, the Maritime Homeland Defense MOA recently signed by the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security provides for the rapid transfer of Coast Guard forces to commanders of USNORTHCOM and USPACOM for maritime homeland defense operations. We are examining the benefits of a similar arrangement for providing rapid DoD support to the Coast Guard for time-critical maritime homeland security activities.
- DoD and Coast Guard interoperability is reinforced through regularly scheduled exercises and real-world operations. A recent CJCS exercise demonstrated, however, that we must consider the assets of other agencies in our maritime response. In the scenario, when threatened with a terrorist vessel carrying WMD, we saw the need to integrate USSOCOM and both the FBI and CIA into our operational task force. They joined DoD and Coast Guard assets, forming an integrated interagency task force under the control of a combatant commander to interdict the vessel, conduct an opposed boarding, render-safe the WMD device, and conduct immediate forensic and investigative activities.
- Executing an active, layered maritime defense-in-depth requires the full integration of our national maritime capabilities. The draft *Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support*, coordinated with the Coast Guard, directs the Commander, USNORTHCOM, to further assess the maritime requirements of his AOR with a focus on providing a unified concept of combined maritime operations, including recommendations for integration of appropriate Coast Guard capabilities and those of other agencies.
- DoD and DHS, including the Navy and Coast Guard, are working with other U.S. Government agencies on the following initiatives:
 - You and Secretary Ridge recently signed a MOA that provides for the rapid transfer of Coast Guard forces to the commanders of USNORTHCOM and USPACOM for maritime homeland defense operations. We are engaged with DHS on the possibility of a similar

arrangement for providing DoD support for DHS/Coast Guard activities.

- o National Security Presidential Directive 41/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 13, Maritime Security Policy was signed on December 21, 2004. It directs DoD and DHS to jointly develop a National Strategy for Maritime Security and additional supporting plans for maritime domain awareness, maritime threat response, and global maritime intelligence integration. DoD played a significant role in the drafting of the NSPD/HSPD, which does not impinge on your exclusive authority to command and control DoD forces, engage in cooperative activities with foreign militaries, and conduct global maritime defense operations.
- The Deputy Secretary of DHS and ASD(HD) co-chair an interagency Maritime Domain Awareness Steering Group to improve and better integrate our ability to deploy maritime surveillance capabilities. A National Maritime Surveillance and Awareness Plan will be developed and incorporated into the National Strategy for Maritime Security as required by the NSPD/HSPD.
- To summarize, the relationship between DoD and the Coast Guard is based on complementary capabilities and appropriate authorities. The staffs of OSD, The Joint Staff, and the Navy and Coast Guard are working to build a more effective, layered maritime defense using the complementary maritime capabilities of DoD and the Coast Guard.

TAB

C

COORDINATION SHEET

Navy - Coast Guard Authorities

Office	Representative	Date
Department of the Navy	CDR Dykes CDR Watts	Dec 6,2004
US Coast Guard	CAPT Baumgartner Mr Terriberay	Dec 6,2004
Joint Staff	CAPT Gray CDR Banks	Dec 6,2004
General Counsel	Mr Dell'Orto	Dec 6,2004
USNORTHCOM	CDR Sulley	Dec 6,2004

February 23, 2005

TO: ADM Tom Fargo

c c : Paul Wolfowitz
Gen Dick Myers
Gen Pete Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Tsunami Relief Efforts Complete

Tom,

Great job on Operation UNITED ASSISTANCE. It was clearly a successful operation. Your team hit every mark smoothly and professionally, and we are all proud of PACOM's good work. Apart from the life saving assistance to so many, it should resonate favorably in the region and the Muslim world for some time.

DHR:ss
022205-8

.....
Please respond by _____

~~FOUO~~

February 23, 2005

TO: The Honorable Dr. Condoleezza Rice
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Afghan National Police

Please take a look at the attached pages 41 and 42 of the Afghanistan Security Update. This is the Afghan National Police situation. It is a serious problem.

My impression is that these two pages were written in as graceful and non-inflammatory a way as is humanly possible.

DHR:ss
022305-8

Afghanistan

~~FOUO~~

09D 03708-05

022305-8

11-L-0559/OSD/47519



ANP Horror Stories

- Current Basic Training Course insufficient to produce quality police officer – 8 week course does not include weapons or drivers training
- Of the 34,000 "trained" police officers only 3,900 have been through the 8 week course, the rest have been through two week transition courses, 4 week illiterate course or similar type courses
- **ANP** demonstrated basic logistical planning shortcomings on its recent operations in Shindand when it deployed police without food, water, sufficient ammunition, cold weather clothing, blankets, etc
- Unlike for the **ANA**, where **OMC-A** provides over **1500** field mentors, the **ANP** has no formal field mentor program; the Germans provide approximately 6 mentors and **UNAMA** 9 mentors
- Lack of **ANP** Literacy seriously impacts on the MoI's objective of achieving a quality police force; and yet the only **ANP** Literacy program is a German program in Konduz for 200 officers
- Lack of formal recruiting plan for the **ANP** is contributing to the under utilization of capacity at four of the five RTCs
- The **ANP** currently only has approximately 50% of the required rolling stock on hand



ANP Horror Stories

- The **ANP** currently only has less than **15%** of the required communications equipment on-hand
- The **ANP** is currently "Rank Heavy" with one officer for every **two** sergeants/patrolmen; to implement pay reform, thus raising the quality of recruits, will require immediate reform
- Basic infrastructure to include border crossing points, police station, training ranges, maintenance facilities is either lacking or in need of renovation; the **IC** estimates the need for over 800 projects
- The **ANP** has less than **15%** of the required weapons on-hand (one can not rely upon the **AK-47s** that it currently possesses as DDR results have shown that a majority of them are, in fact, unserviceable
- **INL** currently issues limited clothing to a police officer that graduates from the RTC/CTC – pants, shirt, utility belt, hat; the **IC** estimates a need for approximately **3.4** million items to include cold weather gear, boots, sleeping bags, etc
- Basic ammunition for training and operations is required

~~FOUO~~

1/29

TAB

January 28, 2005

943

J8 lead

J3 assist

TO: Gen Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Stability Operations

We need the force structure necessary to do Stability Ops.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
012805-24

.....
Please respond by 2/17/05

Tab

~~FOUO~~

OSD 03860-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47522



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CM-2345-05
25 February 2005

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS ^{FIR} *in/RSBam 2/24/05*

SUBJECT: Stability Operations (SF 943)

- **Answer.** In response to your issue (TAB), we have and will continue to evaluate stability operations and the associated force structure and capabilities. Numerous past and ongoing analytic efforts directly address stability operations. The studies are serving as input to the upcoming Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The QDR is tentatively scheduled to provide initial capability mix recommendations, which will include the capabilities and force structure required for stability operations, by May 2005. Final decisions on the recommendations are expected in July 2005.
- **Analysis**
 - Two Strategic Planning Guidance (SPG) 06-11 studies, "Increase US Military Capabilities for Stability Operations" and "Enhancing Stability Operations," captured current Service and Joint Staff initiatives to address shortfalls in the required capabilities for sustained stability operations. These studies evaluated the intelligence requirements, the Active/Reserve Component implications and the ability to rapidly generate capabilities and technologies for stability operations.
 - The Operational Availability series of studies (OA-04, 05) also identified key capabilities for conducting stability operations and the implications stability operations have on force structure. The contemporary analysis contained in OA-05 will be used in the QDR. The OA-05 study will be complete in March 2005.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:
As stated

Prepared By: VADM R. F. Willard, USN; Director, J-8; (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/47523

OSD 03860-05

008
03

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

ES-2194
2005

ACTION MEMO

DepSecDef
USD(P) *copy provided*
05/001504 *(+ 2/23/05)*

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Peter W. Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)

25 FEB 2005

SUBJECT: Letters to Mr. Valenzuela and Ambassador Qazi

Paul Butler

- You asked that a letter be drafted to Mr. Valenzuela, UN Representative to Iraq, thanking him for the fine job he did in Iraq.
- The DepSecDef suggested that a letter be sent to Ambassador Qazi, Special Representative for Iraq, as well.

RECOMMENDATION: Sign the attached letters.

PDASD/ISA

Handwritten initials

33555

25 Feb 05

31 Jan 05

MA SD	SMA DSD	<i>2/28</i>	
TSA SD	SA DSD	<i>2/28</i>	
EXEC SEC	<i>M 2/28</i>		
ESR MA	<i>L8V</i>	<i>2/28/05</i>	<i>924</i>

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~
11-L-0559/OSD/47524

OSD 03897-05

28-42-2 14109 11

~~FOUO~~

January 31, 2005
JOS/po/504
ES-2154

2005 JAN 31 10 51 AM

TO: Doug Feith
FROM:
SUBJECT: Letter to Valenzuela

Let's get a letter drafted to Valenzuela thanking him for the fine job he did in Iraq and telling him that if he is in DC sometime, I would very much like to visit with him.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
013105-13

.....
Please respond by 2/10/05

335517

8/Jan 15

OSD 03897-05

~~FOUO~~

31-01-05 17:01 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/47525



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

MAR 1 2005

The Honorable Ashraf Jehangir Qazi
Special Representative for Iraq
UN Secretariat
NY, NY 10017

Dear Ambassador Qazi:

I would like to congratulate you on your work in helping to bring about successful elections in Iraq on January 30th. That day will long live in the minds of those who have sacrificed so much to bring the reign of tyranny in Iraq to an end.

I hope to have the opportunity of thanking you personally when you return to Washington.

Sincerely,

335-517

1 Nov 05

3/4/05



OSD 03897-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47526



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

MAR 1 2005

Mr. Carlos Valenzuela
UN Electoral Division
UN Secretariat
New York, New York 10017

Dear Mr. Valenzuela:

I want to thank you for the fine job you did in Iraq on the elections. You and your team played a crucial role in insuring that the Iraqi people for the first time in half a century could freely express their will.

I would very much like to visit with you the next time you are in Washington.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be "Rumsfeld", written in a cursive style.



11-L-0559/OSD/47527

OSD 03097-05

February 25, 2005

TO: The Honorable Dr. Condoleezza Rice
CC: Gen Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: MOU on Ward

I need a memorandum of some sort explaining to me what General Ward's assignment is, so that DoD and DoS are all on the same wavelength.

Thank you.

~~DISP~~
~~25 FEB 05~~

210 Army (344)

25 Feb 05

TAB A
~~FOUO~~

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2005 FEB 23 PM 3:24
February 15, 2005

563

TO: Gen Pete Pace
CC: Gen Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Petraeus' Operation

Please give me an indication of the number of people who **work** for Petraeus and how many **flag** officers and their ranks.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
021405-40

.....
Please respond by 2/22/05

IT = ?

15 Feb 05

~~FOUO~~

Tab A



THE VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

OFFICE
SECRET

CM-2348-05-2005 28 February 2005

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Peter Pace, VCJCS *VR/Pace 2/25*

SUBJECT: Petraeus' Operation (SF 963)

- **Answer.** In response to your issue (TAB A), 1,283 personnel are working at Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq. Five flag officers work for Lieutenant General Petraeus: one US Army Major General, two US Army Brigadier Generals and two British Brigadiers.

Prepared By: Rear Admiral Donna L. Crisp, USN; Director, J-1; (b)(6)

Tr 9

28 Feb 05

15 Feb 05

~~FOUO~~

FEB 28 2005

TO: Dina Powell
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Peter Secchia

Attached is a letter from Pete Secchia, who served as Ambassador to Italy for, I believe, President Bush 41. Needless to say, he is anxious to do something else.

Thanks.

Attach.
2/9/05 Memo from Peter F. Secchia to SecDef

DHR:ss
021405-27

OSD 03992-05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/47531

MEMORANDUM**FROM: Peter F. Secchia**

SIBSCO, LLC

220 Lyon Street, NW, Suite 510

Grand Rapids, MI 49503

616-235-0010 phone; 616-235-0014 fax

TO: Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
c/o (b)(6) (by fax (b)(6))**DATE:** February 9, 2005**SUBJECT:** Our Past Conversations

Each time we see each other at the Gerald R. Ford Foundation meetings we have a few laughs, and I thoroughly enjoyed our discussion in the Presidential Reviewing stand on Inaugural day.

In a side conversation you said to me: "Would you ever do it again?" I assume you meant "government service."

The answer to that is **YES**, and I make myself available in any way possible. **My** friends are everywhere.

If you referred to "going back to Rome", I would also be receptive to that, but know that it is a very choice post that there may be a long line.

This past week I was on the GERALDO SHOW (Fox News) and we talked about Berlusconi, Italian support, and how I am concerned that America uses the word "insurgents" which I believe is too nice and too gentle.

I gave my piece that if these "thugs and gangsters" were operating in our country, financed by our neighbors, blowing up school children, destroying our churches, exploding market places, and beheading our friends... how angry would we be?

At the conclusion of the show, Geraldo said: "you are a rare commodity because you speak with clarity."

As you know I am a big supporter of yours, and would appreciate your advice on the above. Nominate me to go anywhere. I can suit up, and even though I can't fit in my 1956 USMC uniform. ..I can get a new one made with expando pants.

I am also going to be in Washington on the 15th and 16th of this month and would love to have lunch with you on either day, or if you and your lovely bride would like to join me for dinner at a local Italian pub (where everyone will love us both). I would love to host you on the 15th.

Let me know what's possible.

PFS:mpt

11-L-0559/OSD/47532

February 23, 2005

TO: Attendees of OSD Senior Staff Meetings

FROM Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: 1958 DoD Directive

300.8

Attached is a DoD Directive from the 1950s. It is interesting. It is short, clear, and Written in English.

Think of what today's directives read like, by comparison. They are almost unintelligible.

Thanks.

Attach. 11/7/58 Department of Defense Directive

DHR:ss
022205-27

.....
Please respond by _____

OPTIONAL FORM 98 (7-83)

FAX TRANSMITTAL # of pages = 3

To <i>Paula Rebar</i>	From <i>Doug Saunders</i>
Dept./Agency	Phone # (b)(6)
Fax # (b)(6)	Fax #

NSN 7540-01-317-7300 5285-101 GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION

23 Feb 05

~~POUO~~

OSD 04064-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47534



February 7, 1958
NUMBER 6105.15

Department of Defense Directive

SUBJECT Department of Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency

I. PURPOSE

The purpose of this directive is to provide within the Department of Defense an agency for the direction and performance of certain advanced research and development projects.

II. RESPONSIBILITY AND AUTHORITY

A. Establishment

In accordance with the provisions of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, and Reorganization Plan No. 6 of 1953, there is established in the Office of the Secretary of Defense the Department of Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. The Agency will be under the direction of the Director of Advanced Research Projects.

B. Responsibility

The Agency shall be responsible for the direction or performance of such advanced projects in the field of research and development as the Secretary of Defense shall, from time to time, designate by individual project or by category.

C. Authority

Subject to the direction and control of the Director:

1. The Agency is authorized to direct such research and development projects being performed within the Department of Defense as the Secretary of Defense may designate.
2. The Agency is authorized to arrange for the performance of research and development work by other agencies of Government, including the military departments, as may be necessary to accomplish its mission in relation to projects assigned.

3. The Agency is authorized to enter into contracts and agreements with individuals, private business entities, educational, research or scientific institutions including federal or state institutions.
4. The Agency is authorized to acquire or construct such research, development and test facilities and equipment as may be approved by the Secretary of Defense, in accordance with applicable statutes. However, existing facilities of the Department of Defense shall be utilized to the maximum extent practicable.

III. ORGANIZATION

- A. The Director of Advanced Research Projects shall report to the Secretary of Defense.
- B. The Department of Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency shall be provided such personnel and administrative support as may be approved by the Secretary of Defense.
- C. Other officers and agencies of the Office of the Secretary of Defense within their respective areas of responsibility shall provide support to the Director of the Advanced Research Projects Agency as may be necessary for him to carry out his assigned functions.

IV. EFFECTIVE DATE

This directive is effective immediately.

Don D. Terry

1 March 2005


TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



Attached is a copy of a greeting card (I kept the original, needless to say!) that I think you'll find encouraging – let me put it that way.

Regards,



Attach.
Benedetti card to SecDef

DHR:dh
022805-12

3355D

1 MAR 05

240204


OSD 04075-05

335 57

A * M * E * R * I * C * A



24 Dec 04



UNITED WE STAND!

There are no words to
express my respect for you.

The garbage dumped on you
daily by the media. This
media that seems happy
to report event death
in the war. Especially

I'm sure the military
is watching our backs and
you're watching them. Though

I'm getting up there in age,

(b)(6)

to me you and vice

President Cheney are the
best men in America,
next to my husband.

GOD BLESS AMERICA

The Soldiers,
President Bush
Vice President Cheney
and you Mr. Rumsfeld

~~FOUO~~

March 1, 2005

TO: Steve Cambone
Gen James Cartwright

CC: Gen Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Bunker Buster

Richard Garwin is a very thoughtful person. I would appreciate your reading this, looking into his suggestions, and getting back to me.

Thanks.

Attach.

2/23/05 Garwin ltr to SD
SD ltr in response to Garwin

DHR:dh
022805-26

.....
Please respond by 3/31/05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 04077-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47540

4/7/06

1/11/05

23 FEB 05



*add
2/28*

Richard L. Garwin
IBM Fellow Emeritus
Thomas J. Watson Research Center
P.O. Box 218
Yorktown Heights, NY 10598-0218
(914) 945-2555
FAX: (914) 945-4419
INTERNET: RLG2 at us.ibm.com

February 23, 2005
(Via FAX to (b)(6))

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
U.S. Department of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-1000

Dear Don,

Lois and I send our best wishes to you and Joyce and hope that all goes well for all of us in the *new* year.

This is, however, one of my rare notes of advice to you, on a matter on which I have continuing and current expertise. This is the question of "sensible bunker buster study funds."

I had been a member of the National Academies' Nuclear Earth-Pen — Weapons Study, along with a pretty knowledgeable panel:

John F. Ahearn (Chair)
Lynn R. Anspaugh
Rodney C. Ewing
Steven A. Fetter
Richard L. Garwin
Sydell P. Qold
Eugene G. Grewis
Theodore M. Hardebeck

Raymond Jeanloz
William J. Patterson
Gloria S. Patton
Heinz W. Schmitt
Eugene Sevin
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Robert H. Wertheim

The unclassified portion of our study should be out soon, and the classified not far behind it. As with our 1998 Missile Threat Commission, reading the classified portion would not tell you much that isn't in the unclassified. For reasons of Academy protocol, I can't address the study itself, but I can give you my own views.

There is a lot of confusion about bunker busters, low-yield weapons, and the like. In your Senate testimony, you discuss underground facilities that might be used as command bunkers or WMD storage sites. First, no bomb or projectile is capable of descending to the depth that is easy to excavate these days in rock or soil. So we are

talking about **strengthening ground shock from an ordinary nuclear weapon-- not about penetrating to the facility**

Indeed, there is a factor 20 or so increase in ground shock-- that is, a 100 kt weapon will give the same ground shock if buried two meters underground as would a two megaton weapon on the surface.

For soft and frozen earth, we already have the B61-11 nuclear earth penetrator. I have a firm **opinion** that it is **highly desirable** for us to be able to have nuclear weapons that will take **advantage** of this increased effectiveness (or reduced yield) by **reliably penetrating to the 2-m depth** required. But this is **very different from a program that would achieve** with same pretty good reliability a burial of 10-20 m, and that is **all that can be achieved by the study program**.

On the other hand, it is **entirely possible to arrange for the B61-11 bomb to penetrate two meters into rock, concrete, or steel**. This would involve **fitting an existing weapon with a large high-explosive shaped charge and arranging for the weapon to detonate in flight after it has penetrated the 2 m or so under the surface**.

I proposed to the *Academies'* panel that we look at this option, but **since it is not an existing program, it was ruled out of scope**. We did, however, hear about previous **Sandia work on this concept**.

I have absolutely no doubt as a nuclear weapons *expert* and **engineer** that this is **feasible and could be done at much lower cost and with greater reliability than strengthening and repackaging nuclear weapons for the rock/concrete penetration task**. But **like most of these sensible approaches, nothing will be done on this unless the misguided program is cancelled**.


So I am urging you to be **more specific about your request for capability and less specific about your support for the program to develop new nuclear weapons**.

What **you really want is to have a nuclear explosion no more than a couple of meters below the surface of the soil or rock**.

I would, of **course**, be delighted to talk with you about this in person or by **telephone**.

very best regards,

Sincerely yours,



Richard L. Garwin

cc:

S.A. Cambone. (Via Email to stephen.cambone@osd.mil)

RLG:jah:5054DHR:022305.DHR



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

MAR 1 2005

Dr. Richard L. Garwin
IBM Fellow Emeritus
Thomas J. Watson Research Center
P.O. Box 218
Yorktown Heights, NY 10598-0218

Dear Richard,

I read your note of February 23 again this past weekend. Thank you so much for taking the time to offer your thoughtful comments.

I have asked Steve Cambone and General Cartwright, Commander of STRATCOM, to take a look at it. We will be discussing these thoughts in the weeks ahead.

With my appreciation and best wishes,

Sincerely,

A large, stylized handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be the name of the Secretary of Defense.

~~FOUO~~

MAR 08 2005

TO: COL Steve Bucci
 CC: (b)(6)
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
 SUBJECT: Deep Earth Penetrator Meeting

4771.6

Please tickle the attached memo for the Deep Earth Penetrator meeting. I also need a copy of the Garwin letter for that meeting.

Thanks.

Attach.
2/28/05 SecDef Memo to Steve Cambone

DHR:ss
030705-65

.....
Please respond by _____

8 Mar 05

23 Feb 05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/47544

OSD 04077-05

28
FEB 25 2005

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Deep Earth Penetrator

Someone has to help get me ready to meet with Hobson about the **Deep Earth** Penetrator.

I would like information on:

- All appropriate countries that are doing a good deal underground
- The intel on the new capabilities to dig large underground facilities (basketball courts, etc.)
- All questions (and answers) that have been raised by opponents

We need to get the CJCS, VCJCS and Cartwright, and anyone else, expressing whether they want this study done.

We need to have some way of addressing whether it is a requirement. In the hearing I said that *airplanes* were not a requirement, until we had them.

Thanks.

Alp, tell me what you think about Garwin's interesting letter.

DHR:ss
022305-10

.....
Please respond by 3/7/05



old
2/28

Richard L. Garwin
IBM Fellow Emeritus
Thomas J. Watson Research Center
P.O. Box 218
Yorktown Heights, NY 10598-0218
(914) 945-2555
FAX: (914) 945-4419
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February 23, 2005
(Via FAX to (b)(6))

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Secretary of Defense
U.S. Department of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-1000

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talking about strengthening ground shock from an ordinary nuclear weapon-- not about penetrating to the facility.

Indeed, there is a factor 20 or so increase in ground shock-- that is, a 100 kt weapon will give the same ground shock if buried two meters underground as would a two megaton weapon on the surface.

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
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RLG:jah:5054DHR:022305.DHR



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
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Sincerely,



March 16, 2005

TO: Gen Hoss Cartwright
Dale Klein
Mike Wynne

CC: Gen Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Deep Earth Penetrator

471.6

Attached is a letter I received from a friend, Dr. Richard Garwin, a very thoughtful person. You might want to be aware of his thoughts on the issue we discussed yesterday.

Thanks.

Attach.
2/23/05 Garwin ltr to 

DHR:dh
031605-6

.....
Please respond by _____

OSD 04077-05

16MAR05



*out
2/28*

Richard L. Garwin
IBM Fellow Emeritus
Thomas J. Watson Research Center
P.O.Box 218
Yorktown Heights, NY 10598-0218
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February 23, 2005

(Via FAX to (b)(6))

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secretary of Defense
U.S. Department of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-1000

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RLG:jah:5054DHR:022305.DHR



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

Dr. Richard L. Garwin
IBM Fellow Emeritus
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Yorktown Heights, NY 10598-0218

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Sincerely,

A large, stylized handwritten signature in black ink, consisting of a large loop at the top and a long, sweeping stroke at the bottom.

Richard L. Garwin
 IBM Fellow Emeritus
 Thomas J. Watson Research Center
 P.O. Box 218
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 INTERNET: RLG2 at us.ibm.com

old
2/28

471.6

February 23, 2005

(Via FAX to (b)(6))

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23 FEB 05

11-L-0559/OSD/47553

talking about strengthening ground shock from an ordinary nuclear weapon— not about penetrating to the facility.

Indeed, there is a factor 20 or so increase in ground shock— that is, a 100 kt weapon will give the same ground shock if buried two meters underground as would a two megaton weapon on the surface.

For soft and frozen earth, we already have the B61-11 nuclear *earth* penetrator. I have a firm opinion that it is highly desirable for us to be able to have nuclear weapons that will take advantage of this increased effectiveness (or reduced yield) by reliably penetrating to the 2-m depth required, But this is very different from a program that would achieve with some pretty good reliability a burial of 10-20 m, and that is all that can be achieved by the study program.

On the other hand, it is entirely possible to arrange for the B61-11 bomb to penetrate two meters into rock, concrete, or steel. This would involve fitting an existing weapon with a large high-explosive shaped charge and arranging for the weapon to detonate in flight after it has penetrated the 2 m or so under the surface.

I proposed to the Academies' panel that we look at this option, but since it is not an existing program, it was ruled out of scope. We did, however, hear about previous Sandia work on this concept.

I have absolutely no doubt as a nuclear weapons expert and engineer that this is feasible and could be done at much lower cost and with greater reliability than strengthening and repackaging nuclear weapons for the rock/concrete penetration task. But like most of these sensible approaches, nothing will be done on this unless the misguided program is cancelled.


So I am urging you to be more specific about your request for capability and less specific about your support for the program to develop new nuclear weapons.

What you really want is to have a nuclear explosion no more than a couple of meters below the surface of the soil or rock.

I would, of course, be delighted to talk with you about this in person or by telephone.

Very best regards.

Sincerely yours,



Richard L. Garwin

cc:

S.A. Cambone. (Via Email to stephen.cambone@osd.mil)

RLG:jah:5054DHR:022305.DHR



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

MAR 1 2005

471.6

Dr. Richard L. Garwin
IBM Fellow Emeritus
Thomas J. Watson Research Center
P.O. **Box** 218
Yorktown Heights, N Y 10598-0218

Dear Richard,

I read your note of February 23 again this past weekend. Thank you so much for taking the time to offer your thoughtful comments.

I have asked Steve Cambone and General Cartwright, Commander of STRATCOM, to take a look at it. We will be discussing these thoughts in the weeks ahead.

1 MAR 05

With my appreciation and best wishes,

Sincerely,


OSD 04077-05

23 FEB 05

11-L-0559/OSD/47555

March 2, 2005

TO: GEN George Casey
GEN Tom Metz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Letter from Retired General Rhiddlehoover

Attached is a letter from Loyd Rhiddlehoover, which I think you will find interesting. I certainly remember my visit to Vicenza so many years ago, but I didn't know you two were in the unit!

Attach.
3/1/05 Letter from BG Rhiddlehoover to SecDef

DIR:ss
030205-7



Please respond by _____

335 SD

2

01 05

18 Feb 05

(b)(6)

18 February 2005

Mr. Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington DC 20301-1000

Dear Mr. Rumsfeld -

This is not yet another letter from an old Soldier firing hot rivets in your direction for one reason or another. No, this letter is to express my admiration for your "stand up - tell it like it is" approach to complicated situations. In short, you are my kind of guy! My admiration is not exactly something arrived at "yesterday", but something that goes back 40 years during your first "tour" as SECDEF!

We met briefly at a luncheon in your honor at Caserma Ederle in Vicenza, Italy not too long after the parachute battalion combat team had closed that location. You have no cause to remember me, but I have good cause to remember you. At that luncheon that day you regaled the paratroopers present (of which I was one) with the story of what I recalled as your one and only parachute jump! It was then I decided that this SECDEF was my kind of guy.

By the way, there were 2 lieutenants in that parachute unit who certainly have climbed the ladder of Army success - First Lieutenants George W. Casey, Jr. and Tom Metz, and whom I am sure you have met as generals a number of times. If you should have occasion to meet them again in Iraq, I would appreciate your letting them know that their old Mainz, Germany Brigade Commander remembered them to you.

Sincerely,



Loyd Riddlehoover
BG - USA, Ret

OSD 04080-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47557

March 2, 2005

TO: GEN George Casey
GEN Tom Metz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Letter from Retired General Rhiddlehoover

Attached is a letter from Loyd Rhiddlehoover, which I think you will find interesting. I certainly remember my visit to Vicenza so many years ago, but I didn't know you two were in the unit!

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3/1/05 Letter from BG Rhiddlehoover to SecDef

DHR:ss
030205-7

.....

Please respond by _____

(b)(6)

18 February 2005

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Secretary of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington DC 20301-1000

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Sincerely,



Loyd Riddlehoover
BG - USA Ret

OSD 04080-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47559

(b)(6)

18 February 2005

Mr. Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington DC 20301-1000


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Sincerely,



Loyd Rhiddlehoover
BG - USA Ret

OSD 04080-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47560



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

MAR 2 2005

335 53

Brigadier General Loyd Rhiddlehoover, USA (Ret.)

(b)(6)

Dear General Rhiddlehoover,

Thank you so much for your thoughtful note. It was good to hear from you.

I remember well my visit to Vicenza, Italy so many years ago, but I had no idea our mutual friends, Generals Casey and Metz were first lieutenants in that unit. I will certainly let them know that you reminded me of that visit.

2 MAR 05

I hope and trust things are going well for you.

With my appreciation for your support,

Sincerely,

18 FEB 05

OSD 04080-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47561

85 January 19, 2005

2005 JAN 19 10 15 AM

TO: Tina Jonas
 Mike Wynne
 Jim Haynes
 Fran Harvey

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: AID Funds in Iraq

Iraq

Attached is a cable from John Negroponte in Iraq. It seems that a promising initiative to allow quick disbursement of AID funds to Iraqi ministries is at a standstill over some contracting and legal issues raised by the Department of the Army.

Please get into this fast, and see if we can get this back on track,

Thanks.

Attach

AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD Cable 0181508Z JAN 05, "In Trouble: Getting AID Funds Out Quickly Through Grant Agreements to Execute Construction Projects"

DHR:dh
 011905-1

.....
 Please respond by 1/26/05

19 Jan 05



GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

2005 FEB 28 PM 11:50

INFO MEMO

February 28, 2005, 09:00 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel 

SUBJECT: "AID Fund in Iraq" -- Grants for Iraq Reconstruction

- You asked about Ambassador Negroponte's concerns on this subject (Tab A, including Baghdad 199 of January 18, 2005). His concerns have been fully addressed.
- Over the past several weeks, we have worked closely with the Army/Project and Contracting Office (PCO) and counsel within DoD and at State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).
 - As a threshold ~~matter~~ and as requested in the cable, we determined that DoD **has** the authority under the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) to make **grants** to Iraq to carry out a reconstruction program and that this authority **has** been delegated to the Secretary of the **Army**. (Tab B).
- As a result, the Army PCO signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Iraqi **Ministry** of Construction and Housing on January 29, 2005. (Tab C). This MOU establishes a pilot program for providing grant assistance, as Ambassador Negroponte requested.
- Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz sent a memo to the Secretary of the Army encouraging him to continue the momentum of the pilot program. (Tab D)
- Because the Army does not have experience in making grants under the FAA, the **Army** has been working closely with USAID to **draft** a grant agreement. The drafting process is in the final stages.

Attachments: as stated



11-L-0559/OSD/47563

OSD 04084-05

A

January 19, 2005

TO: Tina Jonas
 Mike Wynne
 Jim Haynes
 Fran Harvey

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: AID Funds in Iraq

Attached is a cable from John Negroponte in Iraq. It seems that a promising initiative to allow quick disbursement of AID funds to Iraqi ministries is at a standstill over some contracting and legal issues raised by the Department of the Army.

Please get into this fast, and see if we can get this back on track.

Thanks.

Attach.

AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD Cable 0181508Z JAN 05, "In Trouble: Getting AID Funds Out Quickly Through Grant Agreements to Execute Construction Projects"

DHR:dh
 011905-1

.....
 Please respond by 1/26/05

OTTUZYUW RUEHGRA0199 0181508-UUUU--RUEKNMA.
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 181508Z JAN 05
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3951
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
INFO RUEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS BAGHDAD 000199

IRAQ COLLECTIVE

E.O. 12958: DECL: N/A
TAGS: KCRS, PREL, ECON, IZ

SUBJECT: IN TROUBLE: GETTING AID FUNDS OUT QUICKLY THROUGH
GRANT AGREEMENTS TO EXECUTE CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS

1. THIS CABLE CONTAINS AN ACTION REQUEST. PLEASE SEE PARAGRAPH 7.
2. SUMMARY: SINCE NOVEMBER, AN INTERAGENCY GROUP FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, AND USAID HAS WORKED ON FINALIZING AGREEMENTS FOR THE PROJECT AND CONTRACTING OFFICE (PCO) TO PROVIDE GRANTS TO IRAQI MINISTRIES. THESE AGREEMENTS WOULD ALLOW FUNDS TO BE DISBURSED DIRECTLY TO IRAQI COMPANIES CONTRACTED BY THE MINISTRIES FOR DEFINED CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS FUNDED BY THE IRAQ RELIEF AND RECONSTRUCTION FUND (IRRF). THIS NEW PROCESS IS AN URGENT PRIORITY OF THE MISSION AND THE IRAQI INTERIM GOVERNMENT. WHAT APPEARED TO BE NEAR COMPLETION HAS COME TO A STANDSTILL DUE TO QUESTIONS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY REGARDING THE PCO'S LEGAL AUTHORITY TO ENTER INTO GRANT AGREEMENTS.

BACKGROUND

3. RECOGNIZING THE NEED TO ACCELERATE WORK TO OFFSET THE POTENTIAL SLOWDOWN EFFECTS OF INCREASED INSURGENCY, THE IRRF IMPLEMENTING AGENCIES -- PCO AND USAID -- HAVE INCREASED THEIR CAPACITY TO DO MORE CONSTRUCTION WORK BY CONTRACTING DIRECTLY WITH IRAQI FIRMS. IN ADDITION, THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY HAS BEEN WORKING ON THE TEXT OF AN AGREEMENT THAT PCO WOULD CONCLUDE WITH THE MINISTRIES TO

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- Comptroller
- AT/L
- GC
- Sec Army

11-L-0559/OSD/47566

GRANT FUNDS WITH THE MINISTRIES TO IRAQI COMPANIES FOR SPECIFIC PROJECTS. FUNDS WOULD NOT PASS THROUGH THE MINISTRIES BUT WOULD INSTEAD BE DISBURSED DIRECTLY TO THE CONTRACTORS. BOTH INITIATIVES HELP TO REDUCE SECURITY COSTS BY MINIMIZING THE PRESENCE OF NON-IRAQI WORKERS, WHICH PRESENTS A LESS ATTRACTIVE TARGET TO INSURGENTS AS WELL AS ASSISTING TO BUILD CAPACITY WITH THE MINISTRIES IN PROGRAM AND PROJECT MANAGEMENT. BOTH INITIATIVES ARE MAJOR PRIORITIES FOR POST TO CARRY OUT ITS RECONSTRUCTION MISSION IN THE CONTEXT OF THE JANUARY ELECTIONS, IRAQ'S POLITICAL TRANSITION, AND THE COUNTER-INSURGENCY OFFENSIVE.

4. SINCE NOVEMBER, AN INTERAGENCY GROUP OF LAWYERS FROM DEFENSE (BOTH THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND THE DEPARTMENT OF ARMY), STATE, AND USAID HAVE WORKED ON THIS AGREEMENT. TWO WEEKS AGO, PCO UNVEILED A DRAFT AGREEMENT THAT EMPLOYED A HYBRID GRANT/CONTRACT MECHANISM THAT WAS LEGALLY OBJECTIONABLE TO THE DOD OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL AND THE U.S. EMBASSY LEGAL ADVISOR UNDER APPROPRIATIONS AND CONTRACTING LAW.

5. IN AN EFFORT TO CRAFT AN AGREEMENT THAT COMPLIED WITH APPLICABLE LAWS AND REGULATIONS, THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, USAID, AND THE EMBASSY LEGAL ADVISOR WORKED WITH DOD AND THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY TO PRODUCE AN AGREEMENT THAT UTILIZES THE GRANT-MAKING AUTHORITY UNDER SECTION 635(B) OF THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961 (THE IRRF WAS APPROPRIATED "FOR THE PURPOSES OF THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT").

6. AN APPROVED TEXT FOR THE GRANT AGREEMENTS APPEARED CLOSE, BUT THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY QUESTIONS WHETHER THEY HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO IMPLEMENT A GRANT PROGRAM. POST, THE DEPARTMENT, AND DOD/GC ARE PREPARED TO PROCEED WITH THIS NEW INITIATIVE. THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, HOWEVER, HAS PUT ANY FURTHER WORK ON THE GRANT AGREEMENT ON HOLD UNTIL THEY RESOLVE THE ISSUE. IF THIS ISSUE IS NOT RESOLVED, THIS VERY IMPORTANT INITIATIVE WILL NOT COME TO FRUITION.

7. ACTION REQUEST: IN ORDER TO EXPEDITE THE COMPLETION OF THESE GRANT AGREEMENTS, POST ASKS THE DEPARTMENT TO REQUEST THE FOLLOWING:

A. (DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE/OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL) DETERMINE THAT THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HAS THE LEGAL AUTHORITY TO EXECUTE GRANT AGREEMENTS UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12163 OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY. IF IT IS DETERMINED THAT THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HAS THIS AUTHORITY, THEN CONFIRM THAT THE AUTHORITY HAS BEEN DELEGATED TO THE DIRECTOR OF THE PCO. IF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HAS GRANT AUTHORITY, BUT IT IS NOT CONFIRMED THAT SUCH AUTHORITY HAS BEEN PROPERLY DELEGATED TO THE DIRECTOR OF THE PCO, POST REQUESTS IMMEDIATE ACTION TO EFFECT SUCH A DELEGATION.

B. (DEPARTMENT OF STATE/LEGAL) CONFIRM TO DOD/OGC THAT THE PROPOSED GRANT AGREEMENT IS NOT AN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT FOR PURPOSES OF SECTION 1-301(B) OF E.O. 12163.

C. (DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY AND PCO/WASHINGTON) FINALIZE TEXT OF GRANT AGREEMENT, INCORPORATING COMMENTS RECEIVED TO DATE, AS APPROPRIATE, AND TRANSMIT IT TO THE MISSION.

D. (DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE) IF IT IS CONFIRMED THAT THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HAS GRANT AUTHORITY UNDER SECTION 635(B) OF THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT, DESIGNATE IMMEDIATELY ONE OR MORE WARRANTED GRANT OFFICERS AT PCO.

NEGROPONTE

SECDEF V2

ACTION
INFO

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SECDEF-C(*) ASD:PA-SMTP(*) DIR PAE-RAM(*) USDCOMP(*)
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TOTAL COPIES REQUIRED

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NNNN

Copenhaver, Thomas, CDR, DoD OGC

From: Lengyel, Greg, Lt Col, OSD

Sent: Wednesday, January 19, 2005 15:46

To: Reed, Ronald, **COL**, DoD OGC; Copenhaver, Thomas, CDR, DoD OGC; Bowman, Keith, CAPT, OSD-COMPT; Gillam, Mary, Col, OSD-COMPT; Shufflebarger, Newman, LTC, OSD-ATL; Porter, William, CAPT, OSD-ATL; Palekas, Edmund J LTC SECARMY

CC: Bucci, Steven, **COL**, OSD; Marriott, William P, CAPT, OSD

Subject: AID Funds in Iraq- SecDef Snowflake 19 Jan 05

Re: subject snowflake. OSD/GC please take lead on response. Coord with Comptroller, AT&L, and SecArmy.

V/r,
gjl

Greg Lengyel, Lt Col, USAF
Military Assistant to SecDef

(b)(6)

B



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1600



January 19, 2005

MEMORANDUM FOR JOSEPH BENKERT, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, DEFENSE
SUPPORT OFFICE - IRAQ

SUBJECT: Authority to Make Grants to Iraq

1. In response to your **question** on this issue, attorneys in this office have reviewed the matter and consulted closely **with** our colleagues in the offices of the DoD Deputy General Counsel (Acquisition and Logistics) and the Deputy General Counsel (Fiscal).
2. It is our opinion that the Secretary of the **Army** may make grants to Iraq to carry out a reconstruction program when using funds apportioned to DoD from the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF). IRRF funds were appropriated "to carry out the purposes of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961." When OMB apportions IRRF funds to DoD to administer a reconstruction program for Iraq, it is reasonable to conclude that the program is a "function under" the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to be "administered by the Department of Defense." See section 1-301(b) of Executive Order 12163, as amended. Under these circumstances, the Department of Defense may make grants to Iraq under section 635(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act.
3. Pursuant to National Security Presidential Directive-36, "United States Government Operations in Iraq," dated May 11, 2004, and 10 U.S.C. 113, the Deputy Secretary of Defense memorandum, "Organizational Establishment and Placement of the Project and Contracting Office within the Department of the Army," dated June 22, 2004, directed that the Project and Contracting Office (PCO) "be organizationally established and placed within the Department of the Army to provide acquisition and project management support with respect to activities in Iraq After June 30, 2004, the PCO will . . . provide acquisition and project management support . . . for other activities in Iraq, as requested by the heads of other Departments and agencies."
4. As defined in the Deputy Secretary of Defense memorandum, "Assignment of Responsibility for Acquisition and Program Management Support for the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)," dated January 14, 2004, "acquisition support" include: "award, administration and oversight of all contracts, grants, and other acquisition actions in support of the CPA and any successor entity." Thus, our conclusion is that the Secretary of the **Army** has been delegated authority to make grants under the authorities described above.
5. The foregoing has been coordinated with the offices of the DoD Deputy General Counsel (Acquisition and Logistics) and the Deputy General Counsel (Fiscal).

Charles A. Allen

Charles A. Allen
Deputy General Counsel
(International Affairs)



11-L-0559/OSD/47571

C

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

BETWEEN

**THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE / DEPARTMENT OF
THE ARMY PROJECT & CONTRACTING OFFICE**

AND

THE IRAQI MINISTRY OF CONSTRUCTION AND HOUSING

CONCERNING

IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION ACTIVITIES

PREAMBLE: This Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) is between the Iraqi Ministry of Construction and Housing (MOCH) or its successor, and the United States Department of Defense/ Department of the Army Project and Contracting Office (PCO), or its successor, hereinafter referred to as "the Participants":

WHEREAS: The Participants share the common objective of reconstituting Iraq as a secure, stable, and independent state, and restoring infrastructure is a key element of achieving that aim:

WHEREAS: It is in the Participants' intention to include Iraqi businesses and citizens in the reconstruction of Iraq's infrastructure so that the Iraqi people may invest in the future of their country, improve their quality of life, and spur economic growth, all of which will promote greater stability and security; and

WHEREAS: The PCO intends to assist MOCH to build reconstruction and contracting capacity.

NOW, THEREFORE the Participants have the following understanding:

SECTION 1. PURPOSE

- 1 The purpose of this MOU is to set out a framework for a pilot program to identify projects for the reconstruction of Iraq that can be carried out by a grant from the PCO. One of the goals is to assist MOCH in building reconstruction and contracting capacity. This MOU sets forth the procedures by which the Participants intend to identify appropriate specific projects. Nothing in this MOU shall be construed as superseding or interfering in any way with other agreements entered into by a Participant, either prior, during, or subsequent to the signing of this MOU. The Participants further acknowledge that this MOU is not an obligation of funds, nor does it constitute a legally binding commitment by either Participant.

SECTION 2. CONSULTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS

- 2 The Participants endeavor to **work** together to achieve the purposes of this **MOU**.
- 2.1 Each Participant will appoint representatives to identify and consult on potential projects.
- 2.2 Questions that arise relating to the **MOU** will be resolved by consultation between the Participants, including their authorized representatives.

SECTION 3. PROPOSED PROCEDURES

- 3 The Participants will use the procedures in this section in identifying projects that may be suitable for grant assistance and the format for *grants* made by the **PCO** to the **MOCH**. They will also discuss how contracts awarded by the **MOCH** and financed by the **PCO** through grant assistance will be awarded and administered.
- 3.1 Either Participant may propose a construction project as suitable for grant assistance. The Participants' representatives intend to consult on whether the project should receive further consideration.
- 3.2 **Once** a potential project has been identified, the **MOCH** will develop a cost estimate for the project to be provided to the **PCO** for review, along with draft tender and contract documents.
- 3.3 For those projects the **PCO** decides to fund, the **PCO** would award a grant to the **MOCH** to carry out the project using a Grant Template. The Participants will work together to determine which terms and conditions to include in the grant agreement for the specific project. Among other things, the grant would serve to obligate funds for a project and set forth terms and conditions for the implementation of a project. The grant may include conditions precedent to disbursement of grant funds which set forth specific requirements for the **MOCH's** preparation of tender and contract documents, including criteria and instructions for **PCO's** actual disbursement of grant funds, **PCO** audit and inspection rights, and other clauses that may be required to be included in such documents.

SECTION 4. EFFECTIVE DATE, AMENDMENT, AND TERMINATION

- 4 This **MOU** may be implemented immediately following the date of the last signature.
- 4.1 The Participants may amend in writing this **MOU**.
- 4.2 This **MOU** may be terminated by mutual consent of both Participants. Either Participant may unilaterally terminate this **MOU** upon 30 days advance written notice indicating its intention to terminate this **MOU**.


The above represents the understandings reached between the **MOCH** and the **PCO**.

SIGNED IN BAGHDAD.

 Director, PLO

FOR THE PROJECT AND
CONTRACTING OFFICE

DATE: 29 JANUARY 2005


Minister

FOR THE IRAQI MINISTRY OF
CONSTRUCTION AND HOUSING

DATE: January 29, 2005

D



DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1010

FEB 22 2005

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY.

SUBJECT Pilot Program to Implement Grant Assistance with the Iraqi Ministry of Construction and Housing (MOCH)

Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Marc Grossman requested on behalf of the Department of State that the Department of Defense, through the Iraq Project and Contracting Office (PCO), establish a pilot program through which the PCO would furnish grant assistance by agreement with the MOCH, using funds apportioned to the DoD from the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF).

The DoD Office of the General Counsel advised that the Secretary of the Army has the authority to make grants to Iraq to carry out a reconstruction program when using funds apportioned to DoD from the IRRF.

I commend the quick action the PCO has already taken by signing a Memorandum of Understanding with the Iraqi MOCH on January 29, 2005. I urge you to continue the momentum of this important pilot program.

In implementing this pilot program, Department of State and the U.S. A in making any grants and in taking may wish to request from USAID be willing to provide.

4 Encourage you to coordinate with the Agency for International Development (USAID) or steps to implement this program. You necessary assistance, which I trust it would



OSD 03539-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47577



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20310-1000

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FEB 19 2005 Mzf

DEFENSE
SUPPORT
OFFICE
IRAQ

ACTION MEMO

FEB 16 2005

FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Director, Defense Support Office - Iraq *J. J. [Signature]*

SUBJECT: Pilot Program to Implement Grant Assistance with the Iraqi Ministry of Construction and Housing (MOCH)

- On behalf of the Department of State (DoS), Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs ~~Marc~~ Grossman requested that the Department of Defense (DoD), through the Iraq Project and Contracting Office (PCO), establish a pilot program by which the PCO would furnish grant assistance by agreement with the MOCH, using Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Funds (IRRF) (Tab B). The program would use the MOCH (rather than a U.S. design-build contractor) to select and oversee Iraqi contractors for several road projects. The intent of the program is to:
 - Reduce project costs by reducing U.S. support/security costs.
 - Support the economic reconstruction of Iraq.
 - Put an "Iraqi face" on reconstruction activities in Iraq.
- This concept was discussed by Deputies. The DoD Office of the General Counsel confirms that the PCO has the legal authority to make such grants (Tab C).
- The PCO signed a non-binding Memorandum of Understanding with the MOCH on January 29, 2005 (Tab D), setting forth the intent of the parties. Work is now underway on a legally binding grant agreement that would:
 - Outline controls over grant funds.
 - Provide conditions and milestones for disbursements of grant funds.
 - Provide for DoD access to all MOCH and contractor records pertaining to the pilot program.
- We have prepared a memorandum from you to the Secretary of the Army to make this grant as DoS requests (Tab A). The proposed memorandum encourages the Army to continue to coordinate with DoS and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) in making any grants and in carrying out this program, and to ask for any necessary assistance from them.

J. J. [Signature] 2/17
OSD 03539-05

RECOMMENDATION Sign the memorandum to the Secretary of the Army at Tab A

Approve PW 2/19/05 Disapprove _____

COORDINATION: Tab E

~~FOUO~~

February 15, 2005

ES-2329
I-05/002324

2005 FEB 15 11:23

TO: Doug Feith

FROM:

SUBJECT: Usability Data

I want to see the usability data for the U.S. Forces using the metrics that NATO is currently using for other countries. And show me the other countries as well.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
021405-47

.....
Please respond by 3/10/05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 04114-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47580

4

~~FOUO~~

February 15, 2005

11-0559/OSD/47581

I-05/000325

ES-2330

TO: Doug Feith

FROM:

SUBJECT: Apache Helicopters

The DoD want to see us some Apaches. Would you **look** into that?

Thanks.

DHR:ss
021405-49

.....
Please respond by 3/17/05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 04117-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47581

ie

INFO MEMO

DSD

POUSDR 1-07-28-05

1-05/002325-ES

FEB 28 2005

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: MIRA R. RICARDEL, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY (ACTING)

FEB 23 2005

SUBJECT: Dutch Desire to Sell Apaches to the U.S. Army

- You had asked about Dutch MOD Kamp's request regarding Apaches.
- The Dutch want to sell back 5 Apaches that they bought from us in order to raise funds for transformation initiatives. They will keep 26.
- The US Army discussed the buy-back (at a cost of \$80 million) with the Dutch as a means of replacing combat losses, but decided against it in November 2004.
 - The Army is instead purchasing 13 new Apaches in order to avoid a shutdown in Boeing's production line that would increase the cost of future buys.
- In December 2004, the Dutch expressed their displeasure with Army's decision to the Joint Staff and OSD, saying they thought they had reached an agreement.
 - Our Ambassador to the Netherlands, Cliff Sobel, says the Dutch made programming and budgetary decisions based on this deal and would not have done so without absolute confidence that we were committed to this sale.
 - Army maintains they consistently told the Dutch that their discussions did not constitute an agreement to purchase.
- In light of the role this important ally has played in helping to stabilize Iraq, strengthen NATO, and fight terrorism, we are exploring whether there is a solution that meets Dutch expectations, the Army's requirements, and the Department's budgetary constraints.
- OSD Comptroller and General Counsel are currently reviewing a proposal. If it proves feasible, we will submit it to you for review and decision.

Dir. EUR North

Jal for 2/22/05

DASD EUR/NATO

Jal



LEGISLATIVE
AFFAIRS

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

*ack
3/1*

February 28, 2005 6:10 p.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Daniel R. Stanley, Acting Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Legislative Affairs, 697- 62 10

SUBJECT: Response to SecDef Snowflakes #022305-13 and #021705-4

032

- Attached is the letter you requested to Chairman Duncan Hunter regarding the follow-on HASC hearing.

Attachments:

1. Snowflake dated 2/25/05
2. Snowflake dated 2/17/05
3. Letter to Chairman Hunter

28 Feb 05

17 Feb 05-

OSD 04119-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47583

February 17, 2005

TO: Dan Stanley

c c : COL Steve Bucci
Cathy Mainardi

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: ~~Statistics~~ *Hearing Follow-up*

032

Sometime over the next three weeks we need to invite to the Members who did not have a chance to ask questions to breakfast here at the Pentagon, and have the folks there who can answer those questions. When we invite them, we should tell them if they let us know what those questions are, we will be happy to have people there who can respond precisely. We ought to include Duncan Hunter, but not Ike Skelton. The Members I have as not having been able to ask questions are as follows:

McKinney	Langevin	Cooper	Marshall
Bordallo	Conway	Wilson	Schwarz

McKinney had a question about war games taking place on 9/11 which interfered with the ability to respond to the attacks that day. I don't know where she got that information, but I believe that is the question she asked.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
021705-1

17 Feb 05

.....

Please respond by 2/23/05

FEB 25 2005

TO: Larry Di Rita
CC: Dan Stanley
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Letter to Duncan Hunter

032
25 Feb 05

We need to get a letter to Duncan Hunter saying that, since he has decided not to have the breakfast and would prefer to have a hearing, we will need to work out a date, etc. I assume the hearing is for these Members (on the attached list), who did not have a chance to ask questions. And include in the letter the following:

"I sure appreciate your letter to the Washington Post straightening out the fact that we already had a prior agreement, since I had to get over to the Senate."

Please let me see the draft of the letter.

Thanks.

Attach.
2/17/05 SecDef Memo to Dan Stanley

DHR:ss
022305-13

.....
Please respond by 3/1/05

Sir,
Response attached.
✓/12
LT Col Lengyel
3/1

17 Feb 05

MAR 01 2005

OSD 04119-05



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

1 MAR 2005

The Honorable Duncan Hunter
Chairman
Committee on Armed Services
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515-6035

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I understand that instead of having a breakfast, you will be scheduling a brief follow-up hearing to my appearance before the HASC on February 16th. I'll have Dan Stanley call you to work out an appropriate date.

As we had discussed well beforehand, we had to leave your hearing to go to the Senate for another hearing. I appreciate your straightening out the facts with the *Post* in your press release that we had had a prior agreement. It is a shame *The Washington Post* chose not to print your letter, but not surprising.

Sincerely

032

1 Mar 05

17 Feb 05

OSD 04119-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47586



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000



INFO MEMO

February 25, 2005, 12:10PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dr. David S. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense (P&R)

David S. Chu 25 Feb 05

SUBJECT: League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) Group--Snowflake

- After an October meeting with members of LULAC, you asked for proposals to increase Hispanic representation in DoD (attached).
- Over the last decade, Hispanic military representation has shown marked improvement (from 5.4% overall in FY94 to 9% in FY04); civilian representation, however, has only increased from 5.8% to 6.2% over the same time frame.
- In 2000, the Department published Hispanic Employment Initiatives to guide the Services' efforts; the document emphasized recruitment, development, and retention; we revitalized those initiatives and increased joint OSD and Service endeavors.
- Recent efforts include several major outreach events, increased collaboration with key Hispanic organizations (signed partnerships with LULAC and the Hispanic Association of Colleges and Universities), focused/tailored recruiting programs, and increased contracts and grants to Hispanic businesses and Hispanic Serving Institutions.
- We also asked the Defense Business Board (DBB) for advice; the Defense Human Resources Board is monitoring the Services' progress at implementing the DBB report recommendations.
- Additionally, we have funded several research projects aimed at better understanding the Hispanic market and enhancing our recruitment and retention efforts.
- Achieving a diverse and capable workforce is an expressed goal in the Department's Human Capital Strategic Plan, and we are increasing our efforts toward this end.

RECOMMENDATION: That we continue to implement current plans and initiatives to enhance Hispanic recruitment and retention and closely monitor these efforts for positive results, providing you a semi-annual report.

PREPARED BY: John M. Molino, Acting DUSD (EO), (b)(6)



INFO MEMO COORDINATION PAGE

PDUSD(P&R)

Charles S. Abell

SA 2-22-67

Acting DUSD(MPP)

Bill Carr

November 16, 2004

Subsequent coordination from Accession Policy, CAPT Arendt

January 11, 2005

Acting DUSD(CPP)

Ellen Tunstall

November 19, 2004

Subsequent coordination from Ms. Tunstall

January 11, 2005

~~FOUO~~

PD USB QTR

Ala. Molino

OCT 15 2004

No suspects -
Shov- for Nov 1.

TO: David Chu
Jim O'Beirne

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: LULAC Group

I was glad I met with the LULAC Group.

I think it is extremely important that the Department of Defense do a better job at recruiting Hispanics at all levels - civilian and military.

Please put together a good plan - each of you in your respective areas - and get back with me some proposals.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
101404-26



Please respond by _____

~~FOUO~~

DSD 04133-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47589

MAR 02 2005

TO: Fran Harvey
CC: Gen Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*
SUBJECT: JAICV Program

Attached is a letter I received from Mr. Russell W. Strong. It is self-explanatory.

Please let me know what the **status** is, **and** what your thoughts on **this are**. **And** please communicate with Russell Strong directly as well.

Thanks.

Attach.
2/11/05 Letter from Russell W. Strong to SecDef
3/1/05 Letter from SecDef to Russell Strong

DHR:ss
030105-19

.....
Please respond by 3/24/05

451

2 Mar 05

11 Feb 05



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

Mr. Russell ~~W~~ Strong -
Integrated Vision Inc.
410 S. Pitkin Road
Craftsbury Common, VT 05827

Dear Mr. Strong,

I received your letter of February 11 concerning JAICV. I have asked the Secretary of the Army to look into the matter carefully and get back to me. I am sure he will be in touch with you as well.

With my appreciation,

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Donald Rumsfeld". The signature is written in a cursive style with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

cc: Secretary Fran Harvey ✓

integrated Vision inc.
410 S. Pitkin Road
Craftsbury Common, VT 05827 USA
Telephone: 802-755-6704
Fax: 802-755-6339
www.integratedvision.com
Shipping: 410 Pitkin Road
Albany, VT 05820 USA



INTEGRATEDVISION
CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT

February 11, 2005

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense —
Washington DC 20301

Dear Mr. *secretary*;

The program outlined in the following pages was developed to *support our troops* in the very situation in which *my brother's son*, SGT Jesse Strong was killed *Jesse was the best of men* amongst us and the best of Marines. It is in *great* sadness that I was too late to help him.

The JAICV program has had to be kept *off radar*, because such *radically new* programs are so *vulnerable in a harsh specification-driven military culture*. Derived from a *commercial vehicle* for extreme mobility, with its *new architecture* first recognized by USASOF Col Michael Kershner, it is advanced with the US Army *Special Operations*. Jay Gothard's *combat development group's* *commitment* to *new tactics* and capabilities to *protect their guys*, to defeat an *asymmetric enemy*, and to win hearts and *minds* through new levels of diplomacy, leads us to bold *innovations*.

Mr. Rumsfeld, your *hard push for change* in the military establishment and your *relentless pursuit of technology* and a *lighter agile military* has emboldened me to bring this JAICV modular technology platform forward. I do this *despite all odds* and all *experience* of the impossibility of fielding such a *broadunsolicited* platform.

U.S. Army Vice-Chief of Staff, *General Richard Cody* has been *supportive* in promising me a *common sense* assessment of this *networked system of systems* program. John Geddes of the US Army Rapid Equipping Force is involved in *determining a path* for *fielding of the warfighter system* while avoiding the *committees* and *specs* that so easily *encumber* new developments.

Yesterday, *Vermont* Lt. Governor Brian Dubie provided *General Cody* an *update*, so that he is able to provide you a complete brief, including an 8 min. *video on capabilities, configurations, diplomacy and networked tactics*. Lt. Governor Dubie was also able to introduce the *capabilities* of this program to Senator Leahy, Senator McCain, and Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz

I am confident in this program's ability to fill a *capabilities gap* existing in *America's* defense, and to *spiral forward greater innovation* with its development. And as you know best, this program will require an *end run of bureaucratic resistance* to *change*. SGT Jesse Strong's *Marine buddies* are still *out there in the fight*, and he wouldn't want us to let up now.

For SGT Jesse Strong; *Semper Fi*

Sincerely,

Russell W. Strong


Cc: General Richard Cody, Vermont Lt. Governor Brian Dubie

11-L-0559/OSD/47592

Integrated Vision's Warfighter Platform Potential

Michael Kershner, retired COL US Army Special Operation Forces; "This is a revolutionary capability that provides both force protection and lethality." If not the spec for the urban fight, it will be found while developing this platform.

Partnered with larger units as "motherships", the capabilities of the JAICV Warfighter Platform place it on-target with today's system of systems technology and **networked** force projection **required** to defeat an asymmetric enemy **in** multiple **environments**. The Joint Application Integrated Combat Vehicle platform **can** rapidly fill the firepower and capabilities **gap** existing between the footsoldier and the HMMWV.



The JAICV system is based around power, stability, and ballistics modules readily mission-configurable to **balance** agility, firepower and payload. The **warfighter's** simultaneous and rapid maneuver-and-& capability combined with manned **and** unmanned operation yields **new** levels of lethality and survivability. Independent units split the enemy's target opportunity and **amplify** response while **supporting** the squad.



This rapidly deployable, compact 2600lb. (2500lb. load) technology **carrier** brings advanced tactics into urban alleys. (**Think** self-propelled **50 cal gun turret ...think** manned/unmanned re-positionable bunkers ...think robotics integrated into today's fight). The platform's eye-level diplomacy, rotational maneuverability **and** high response capability is also applicable to **patrol** of civilian areas, and in Homeland Security, to patrol of airports, refineries, at-risk facilities **and** the perimeters.

The JAICV Warfighter Platform and its expansion of capabilities grew from a commercial program on extreme mobility:


Integrated Vision "found" this platform during aggressive development with Roush Industries of a powerful **all-barrier-breaking** tool for paralyzed veterans and outdoorsmen. Following a proven innovation **process**, these new **concepts** were advanced through **interaction** with the Special Operations Command's Combat Development Group at Ft. Bragg. It is recognized that **this** extended effort **results** in **innovation** for all **markets**, including Integrated Vision's original mission.

ilities o hi wa r-ce rl platform radically change the risk/reward equation on insurgents.

The JAICV **balances** protection provided by a 'reduced window of vulnerability' with a warfighter's maximum situational awareness and over-whelming lethality. **This** combination creates **the deterrent** to **insurgent** attacks by capability of an immediate **fight** taken to their **quarters**. 'Touching' a JAICV patrol = high **risk**

Integrated Vision's strength is facilitating innovation, linking lead **technologies** and positioning the program with the **strategic** support required for the **U.S.** military's rapid fielding. Strategic, **because** the JAICV's commercial derivation yields both acquisition path opportunities and challenges for a **system** of **system** platform. **Program** **speed** and **innovation** can be maintained with an REF role in **initial** fielding, a TRADOC role in **impact** studies relative to **the** Future Combat System, a DARPA **role** in power density and advanced weapons, and **RDECOM** role in full fielding of the resulting system. Integrated Vision is a proven leader **m** product development **and** has major industry and technology players aligned for action **on** **this** aggressive and asymmetric **response** to an asymmetric enemy.

Strategic efforts can rapidly field needed warfighter capabilities, today





**PROFESSIONAL VIDEO ILLUSTRATING CONFIGURATIONS
TACTICS, DEPLOYMENT, CAPABILITIES, ROBOTICS,
DIPLOMACY AND PHILOSOPHY OF USE**

WAR FIGHTER AMPLIFICATION




NEW CAPABILITIES FOR WARFIGHTERS
... OF ARMIES OF ONE



MODULAR
CONSTRUCTION
ENHANCING
W/ TRACK, BW
AND ARTICULATED
UNITS

TEAM-BASED AMPLIFIED WARRIORS
... NETWORKED, INDEPENDENT AND
REACTIVE ... ASYMMETRIC CAPABILITIES
TO WIN THE ASYMMETRIC FIGHT...




JAICV CAPABILITIES SOUGHT BY SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND
COMBAT DEVELOPMENT GROUP

- RAPID DEPLOYMENT WITH LIGHT FORWARD FOOTPRINT
- AGILE MANUEVERABILITY – FOOT PATROL INTEGRATION
- MAXIMUM FORCE PACKAGING
- MAXIMUM PATROL SECURITY – BALLISTICS PROTECTION
- REDUCTION OF TARGET OF CONSEQUENCE (RPG EVASIVE)
- EXPANDED WARFIGHTER TACTICS
- INTEGRATED REMOTE OPERATION
- ACCOMMODATION OF GROWTH IN ROBOTICS TECHNOLOGY
- RAPIDLY CONFIGURABLE • MISSION SPECIFIC
- BROAD CAPABILITIES – SHORT LOGISTICAL **TAIL**
- PLUG –AND-PLAY MODULAR FIELD SERVICE
- DIPLOMATIC PRESENCE IN AN URBAN INTERFACE



HELICOPTER
MK19, MK4
M60, M240B, 249SAW
ON PINTLES AND
SWINGARMS



TOUGH, SOLID, CONFIGURABLE...
WITH ATTITUDE


Proprietary

JAICV - JOINT APPLICATION INTEGRATED COMBAT VEHICLE

Joint forces sharing capabilities of a new common warrior platform for integration into warfighter mobility, robotics and utility support functions

The agile and compact JAICV brings military Jeep attributes in a 21st century format. The vehicle links networked technology with a cost effective and rapidly configurable fighting platform. **Manned** and **unmanned**, the JAICV **teams** with existing platforms to greatly expand tactics for today's challenge of defeating an urban and asymmetric enemy.

21ST CENTURY SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS



The JAICV positions an operator at HMMWV level, for excellent visibility amongst obstacles and eye-to-eye interaction with squad teams and civilians on foot. The vehicle's robust design provides stability and a beltline of security around vehicles in urban traffic.

In fighting format, maximum force projection is mated with agility for dynamic coordination with foot soldiers. Able to rapidly reconfigure the fight in close urban quarters with individual reaction capabilities, "the cat can now follow the mouse into its hole" ...a new deck of tactical cards means survivability.

This commercial vehicle platform offers the rapid filling of an existing gap in urban warfighter capabilities, patrol **security** and civil diplomacy. Of **further** significance, its modular architecture facilitates **spiraling** forward new technologies and concepts **fueling** Future Combat System developments.

Mr. Donald Lumsfeld

Dear Sir,

Thank you for your letter of condolence in our time of loss. We were proud of our Marine son and of what he was doing for our country and for the Iraqis.

As you have been especially supportive of our troops, I thought you should see the enclosed information, which bureaucracy has prevented you from seeing before. I'm writing this on behalf of my son, who could have been helped by this and on behalf of all our soldiers still out there. Sincerely,
Nathan ~~Stroy~~

Vermont loses another Marine



**SGT JESSE STRONG, ONE OF FOUR U.S. MARINES KILLED
IN A HIGHBACK IN IRAQ BY ONE RPG JAN 26, 2005**

Integrated Vision Inc.
410 S. Pitkin Road
Craftsbury Common, VT 05827 USA
Telephone: 802-755-6704
Fax: 802-755-6339
www.integratedvision.com
Shipping: 410 Pitkin Road
Albany, VT 05820 USA



INTEGRATED VISION
CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT

February 11, 2005

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
Washington DC 20301

Dear Mr. Secretary;

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Mr. Rumsfeld, your hard push for change in the military establishment and your relentless pursuit of technology and a lighter agile military has emboldened me to bring this JAICV modular technology platform forward. I do this despite all odds and all experience of the impossibility of fielding such a broad unsolicited platform.

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For SGT Jesse Strong; Semper Fi

Sincerely,

Russell W. strong

Cc: General Richard Cody, Vermont Lt. Governor Brian Dubie

11-L-0559/OSD/47601


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11 Feb 05

Integrated Vision Warfighter Platform

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Partnered with larger units as "motherships", the capabilities of the JAICV Warfighter Platform place it on-target with today's system of systems technology and networked force projection required to defeat an asymmetric enemy in multiple environments. The Joint Application Integrated Combat Vehicle platform



The JAICV system is based around power, stability, and ballistics modules readily mission-configurable to balance agility, firepower and payload. The warfighter's simultaneous and rapid maneuver-and-fire capability combined with manned and unmanned operation yields new levels of lethality and survivability. Independent units split the enemy's target opportunity and amplify response while supporting the squad.



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
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Agility, firepower and swarming capabilities of this warfighter-centric platform radically change the risk/reward equation on Insurgents.

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



**PROFESSIONAL VIDEO ILLUSTRATING CONFIGURATIONS
TACTICS, DEPLOYMENT, CAPABILITIES, ROBOTICS,
DIPLOMACY AND PHILOSOPHY OF USE**

AVANCEMENTE EN LA VISIÓN



AVANCEMENTE EN LA VISIÓN
AVANCEMENTE EN LA VISIÓN




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JAICV CAPABILITIES SOUGHT BY SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND
COMBAT DEVELOPMENT GROUP

- e **RAPID** DEPLOYMENT WITH LIGHT FORWARD FOOTPRINT
- e AGILE MANUEVERABILITY – FOOT PATROL INTEGRATION
- e MAXIMUM FORCE PACKAGING
- e MAXIMUM PATROL SECURITY – BALLISTICS PROTECTION
- e REDUCTION OF TARGET OF CONSEQUENCE (RPG EVASIVE)
- e EXPANDED WARFIGHTER TACTICS
- e INTEGRATED REMOTE OPERATION
- ACCOMMODATION OF GROWTH IN ROBOTICS TECHNOLOGY
- e RAPIDLY CONFIGURABLE - MISSION SPECIFIC
- BROAD CAPABILITIES – SHORT LOGISTICAL TAIL
- e PLUG –AND-PLAY MODULAR FIELD SERVICE
- e DIPLOMATIC PRESENCE IN AN URBAN INTERFACE



TOUGH SOLID CONFIGURABLE
WITH ATTITUDE



TOUGH SOLID CONFIGURABLE
WITH ATTITUDE

Proprietary

JAICV - JOINT APPLICATION INTEGRATED COMBAT VEHICLE

Joint force's inherent capabilities of a new common vehicle platform for
into war with mobility, robotics and utility support functions

The agile and compact JAICV brings military Jeep attributes in a 21st century format. The vehicle links networked technology with a cost effective and rapidly configurable fighting platform. Manned and unmanned, the JAICV teams with existing platforms to greatly expand tactics for today's challenge of defeating an urban and asymmetric enemy.

21ST CENTURY SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS




The JAICV positions an operator at HMMWV level, for excellent visibility amongst obstacles and eye-to-eye interaction with squad teams and civilians on foot. The vehicle's robust design provides stability and a belline of security around vehicles in urban traffic.

In fighting format, *maximum* force projection is mated with agility for dynamic coordination with foot soldiers. Able to rapidly reconfigure the fight in close urban quarters with individual reaction capabilities, "the cat can now follow the mouse into its hole" ... a new deck of tactical cards means survivability.

This commercial vehicle platform offers the rapid filling of an existing gap in urban warfighter capabilities, patrol security and civil diplomacy. Of further significance, its modular architecture facilitates spiraling forward new technologies and concepts fueling Future Combat System developments.

SA BOWEN/Integrated Vision Inc.



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

MAR 1 2005

Mr. Russell W. Strong
Integrated Vision Inc.
410 S. Pitkin Road
Craftsbury Common, VT 05827

Dear Mr. Strong,

I received your letter of February 11 concerning JAICV. I have asked the Secretary of the Army to look into the matter carefully and get back to me. I am sure he will be in touch with you as well.

With my appreciation,

Sincerely,

cc: Secretary Fran Harvey

OSD 04149-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47608

451

1 Mar 05

11 Feb 05

TAB
~~FOUO~~

February 17, 2005

965

TO: Gen Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*
SUBJECT: Question from Senator Kohl

Let me know what answer is with respect to that Wisconsin brigade question
Senator Kohl asked you about.

Thanks.

DHR:as
02/17/05-5

.....
Please respond by 2/21/05

400

~~FOUO~~

Tab

17 Feb 05

OSD 04188-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47609

March 4, 2005

400

TO: Dan Stanley
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*
SUBJECT: Answer for Senator Kohl

Has someone given Senator Kohl the answer to this question?

Thanks.

Attach.

- 2/17/05 SecDef Memo to CJCS: Question from Senator Kohl
- 3/2/05 CJCS Memo to SecDef: Question from Senator Kohl

DHR:ss
030405-6

.....
Please respond by 3/10/05

4 Mar 05

17 Feb 05



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CM-235505
2 March 2005

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBMS/1*

SUBJECT: Question from Senator Kohl (SF 965)

- **Answer.** In response to your question (TAB), the 32nd Infantry Brigade will receive all required equipment before deploying into combat. At this time, the brigade is not formally sourced or scheduled to fill such a requirement.
- **Analysis.** The 32nd Infantry Brigade currently has shortages of key equipment. Once the unit is formally sourced against a specific combatant commander's requirement, shortages of equipment will be filled before and during the alert and mobilization phases preceding unit deployment.
- Equipment shortages will first be filled through cross-leveling from within Wisconsin state resources and then by other state or federal sources under direction of the Army National Guard and US Forces Command.
 - This process will typically take place following issuance of a formal alert order.
 - Remaining shortages, if any, will be filled when the unit reaches Kuwait for processing into the US Central Command theater of operations before onward deployment into the area of operations.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:
As stated

Prepared By: Brigadier General T. A. Dyches, USAF; Assistant to the Chairman for Reserve Matters; (b)(6)

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/47611

OSD 04188-05

400
2 Mar 05
17 Mar 05

TAB
~~FOUO~~

February 17, 2005

965

TO: Gen Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Runsfeld *D*
SUBJECT: Question from Senator Kohl

Let me know what answer is with respect to that Wisconsin brigade question
Senator Kohl asked you about.

Thanks.

DHR:s
021703-S

.....
Please respond by 2/21/05

~~FOUO~~

Tab

11- L-0559/OSD/47612

~~FOUO~~

JAN 31 2005

I-05/001453
ES-2186

TO: **Doug Feith**
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Plan for Saudis

We need a plan as to how we can help the Saudis.

Thanks.

DHR ss
012805-13

.....
Please respond by 2/24/05

SAUDI PLAN

31 Jan 05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/47613

OSD 04191-05

31-01-05 09:02 14



LEGISLATIVE
AFFAIRS

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

*ASST
3/2*



CONFIDENTIAL

February 28, 2005, 1:00 p.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Daniel R. Stanley, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Legislative Affairs, (b)(6)

Daniel R. Stanley

SUBJECT: Response to SECDEF Snowflake #021705-23

- Attached is a draft letter for Acting Under Secretary Wynne's signature answering Representative Conway's request that quality of life issues be included in BRAC considerations.

Attachments:

1. Snowflake #021705-23 dated 2/17/05
2. Acting Under Secretary Wynne's draft letter to Conway

3233-3

28 Feb 05 - 17 Feb 05

OSD 04207-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47614

The Honorable K. Michael Conaway
United States House of Representatives
511 Cannon House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Representative Conaway:

This is in reply to your note to the Secretary of Defense regarding the support communities provide to our installations, and the impact of this support on quality of life within the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process. I am responding on his behalf.

The Department agrees that the quality of life provided to its military personnel and their families significantly contributes to the Department's ability to recruit and retain quality personnel. Clearly, military personnel are better able to perform their missions when they feel comfortable that their needs and those of their families are taken care of. Quality of life considerations are captured throughout the BRAC Selection Criteria, particularly Criterion Seven. Selection Criterion Seven requires the Department to consider the "ability of the infrastructure of both the existing and potential receiving communities to support forces, missions and personnel."

The Department understands and greatly appreciates the high value that communities place on the installations in their area and the relationships that have emerged between the Department and local communities. Both the BRAC legislation and the Department's implementation of it ensure that all installations will be treated equally in BRAC.

I appreciate having the benefit of your thoughts on this matter.

Sincerely,

Michael W. Wynne
Acting

11-L-0559/OSD/47615

February 17, 2005

173 MAR -0 10 1:03

Handwritten circled notes:
OK
Do it

TO: Dan Stanley
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Response for Cong. Conaway

Attached is a note I received at the HASC hearing from Congressman Conaway of Texas. Please handle it. I would like him to receive an answer within **ten** days and I would like a copy of the response, along with a copy of his inquiry.

Thanks.

Attach.
2/16/05 Note from Cong Michael Conaway to SecDef

DHR:ss
021705-23

.....
Please respond by 2/28/05

can go back to Dan Stanley

(LA)

Handwritten notes:
Sir, *DR 3/2*
Response attached.
Yr
Lt Col lensyel

FEB 28 2005

3233

17 Feb 05

DUGAN HUNTER
CHIEF OF STAFF
CHAIRMAN

ROBERT S. RANGEL
STAFF DIRECTOR

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20315-6035

IKE SKELTON
MISD JUDGE
RANKING MEMBERSHIP
MEMBER

2-16-05

MR. SECRETARY

AS YOU DETERMINE MILITARY
FACILITIES THAT GO ON THE BRAC
LIST, PLEASE TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION
THE QUALITY OF LIFE AT EACH INSTALLATION.

ALL TOWNS WANT THE MILITARY
PAYROLL BUT NOT EVERY COMMUNITY
WANTS THE TROOPS. PLEASE GIVE SOME
CONSIDERATION TO THOSE COMMUNITIES
THAT DEMONSTRATE THEIR POSITION ON
WANTING THE TROOPS AS WELL AS THE
PAYROLL -

K. MICHAEL
LOWERY
TX 11



~~FOUO~~

November 8, 2004

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: HAG Program

NOV 10 2004
11 10 2004

Please take a look at this HAG Program and tell me what you think of it -- if we ought to be doing anything with it.

Thanks.

Attach.
Paper on High Accuracy Guidance Program

DHR:ss
110804-8

OSD 04210-05

373.24

.....
Please respond by 11/26/04

- Met with The proponents
- Missile Defense Agency is interested; issue is legal/contractual.
- Inventor wants an agreement to be paid for "value" after testing - raising the ^{possibility} prospect of a different assessment by the government and law suits by the inventor.
- MDA wants to use a legal vehicle by which they "buy" the intellectual property in advance. Inventor has no residual value.
- I'd leave this to the missile defense agency to solve.

S. Howard

~~FOUO~~

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

04/11/18

High Accuracy Guidance (HAG)

- HAG is a homing guidance and missile command generator whose proponents claim can achieve a small miss distance in homing missile engagements, especially against highly maneuvering endoatmospheric targets.
- HAG technology is proprietary and has been offered for sale to the Government as a sealed "black box" by HAG Technologies.
- In simulations of U.S. missile engagements conducted by DoD, academia, and industry from 1994 to 2000, HAG sometimes outperformed classical homing guidance algorithms but was not evaluated against modern algorithms.
- HAG's inventor is no longer available, complicating the understanding of its underlying principles. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has suggested that HAG Technologies give DoD access to HAG source code in order to ascertain the true nature and potential of HAG algorithms.
- Radiance Technologies has proposed that MDA fund an ongoing program sponsored by HAG Technologies to reverse engineer HAG. The proposed program would assess HAG performance in simulation testing, rewrite HAG computer code in maintainable format, and determine its weaponization potential.
- MDA has an open Broad Agency Announcement for technologies such as HAG, MDA suggested to the HAG owners to submit a proposal to allow an in-depth evaluation.

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

Drafted by: Keith Englander (b)(6)
1/05/04

11-L-0559/OSD/47619



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY
7100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-7100

DT

00 8 2004

The Honorable Jon Kyl
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510-0304


Dear Senator Kyl:

In my response to your letter of June 24, 2004, I promised to provide an assessment of the High Accuracy Guidance (HAG) algorithms for defense against high speed maneuvering reentry vehicles, as it may be applied within the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS).

We formed a team of missile guidance experts and they have concluded that given extremely good seeker measurements, HAG generally outperforms classical homing guidance techniques against some classes of targets. Without access to the HAG some code, the true nature and potential of the HAG algorithms cannot be ascertained. With access to the code we could avoid the current "black box" approach and allow a more thorough comparison to similar modern guidance, estimation and control techniques against threatening targets.

Since the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has an open Broad Agency Announcement (BAA, Solicitation Number HQ0006-04-MDA-BAA) for technologies such as HAG, I suggest the HAG owners consider some of the questions raised by our assessment team, which we will forward to them directly, and then submit a proposal to us through this BAA. Again, thank you for your support of Ballistic Missile Defense and the technologies that will keep us outpacing the threat.

Sincerely,


HENRY A. OBERING III
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director



**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY
7100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-7100**

7
Power 2/11/05
4/14

INFO MEMO

March 24, 2005

37
24

FOR: UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE (INTELLIGENCE)
FROM: Lieutenant General Henry A. Obering III, Director, Missile Defense Agency
SUBJECT: High Accuracy Guidance Algorithm Status

- The High Accuracy Guidance (HAG) is a homing guidance and missile command algorithm currently under evaluation by the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command and the Missile Defense Agency.
- Proponents claim it can improve the hit accuracy of an interceptor against a missile, especially against highly maneuvering targets within the atmosphere.
- The HAG intellectual property is believed to be owned by a U.S. citizen living in Israel. Space and Missile Defense Center has been negotiating with the owner's representative since January 2005 to evaluate the algorithm and examine the source code.
- The evaluation is to be conducted over the next year in a Patriot missile simulation environment. During the evaluation period, the owner will retain all intellectual property rights. The government will assume no obligations and will make no commitments regarding the purchase of the HAG intellectual property.
- Upon completion of the evaluation, the government will determine whether inclusion of the algorithm improves the performance of the Patriot missile.
- If the results show reason for continued government interest, then SMDC will recommend options to acquire the defense rights to the HAG intellectual property.
- The government and the owner's representative are expected to complete contract negotiations by July 2005 and the test evaluation period is from September 2005 through May 2006.

24 MAR 05

COORDINATION: None

cc: DSD

Prepared by: Keith Englander, MDA/DT, (b)(6)

8 MAR 05

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE

DATE 3/25/05

MEMO FOR Sec Def

You have asked about
the status of HAG.

Attached is an info paper.

The HAG is now in an
evaluation program.

Its future contribution(s)
will be determined accordingly.

SL



OSD 04210-05



ADMINISTRATION AND
MANAGEMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

HOLD

ACTION MEMO

March 1, 2005

350.09

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action _____

FROM: Raymond F. DuBois, Director of Administration and Management

Ray DuBois

SUBJECT: May 25, 2004 Memo on Intelligence Oversight

- In your attached Snowflake, you asked about the status of a memo you sent to Steve Cambone in May in which you raised organizational placement and access issues associated with the position of Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight (ATSD(IO)).
- In his response to you on February 15, 2005, Steve stated: "As part of the effort to review and revise oversight, I am working with DuBois to transfer this activity to OUSD(I)."
- While Steve has shared his views with me, I strongly believe that this concept is ill-advised (1) a conflict of interest would exist, since the OUSD(I) should itself be subject to the Intelligence Oversight function and (2) the dynamic state of National and Defense intelligence argues for a careful approach, for reasons of both substance and perception.
- Taking into consideration concerns regarding the number of officials who report directly to you and the Deputy Secretary, we will examine organizational options, which include: (1) realigning the function under the DA&M or (2) realigning the function under the IG, DoD.

2 MAR 05

COORDINATION: None.

RECOMMENDATION: In coordination with Steve Cambone and Jim Haynes, we will forward a recommendation to you in 30 days or less.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____ Other _____

Attachments: As stated

cc:
USD(I)
GC, DoD

OSD 04230-05

Amc 03231-05

25 MAR 05

Prepared by: Mark A. Munson, Sr., O&MP/ODA&M Staff, (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/47623

FEB 25 2005

TO: Ray DuBois
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: May 25, 2004 Memo on Intelligence Oversight

~~Here~~'s a memo I sent to Steve Cambone ~~May~~ 25, 2004. He says he is working with you on it. What is the status?

Thanks.

Attach.
5/25/04 SecDef Memo to USD (I) re: Intel Oversight

DHR:aa
022405-1

.....
Please respond by 3/1/05

May 25, 2004

TO: Steve Cambone
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Intelligence Oversight

Please give me a briefing on this person who is responsible for intelligence oversight and whether we want to reorganize the departments. If this person supposedly is reporting to me, and I don't even know who he is, there is something wrong with the organization chart.

Please advise.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052504-14

.....
Please respond by 6/4/04

*As part of the effort
to review & revise oversight,
I am working w/ DuBois to
transfer this activity to OUSD.I.*

JR 2/15/05

OSD 04230-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47625

FEB 25 2005

TO: Ray DuBois
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: May 25, 2004 Memo on Intelligence Oversight

Here's a memo I sent to Steve Cambone ~~May~~ 25, 2004. He says he is working with you on it. What is the status?

Thanks.

Attach
5/25/04 SecDef Memo to USD (I) re: Intel Oversight

DHR:sp
022405-1

.....
Please respond by 3/1/05

350.09

25 Feb 05

25 May 04

OSD 04230-05

May 25, 2004

TO: Steve Cambone
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Intelligence Oversight

Please give me a briefing on this person who is responsible for intelligence oversight and whether we want to reorganize the departments. If this person supposedly is reporting to me, and I don't even know who he is, there is something wrong with the organization chart.

Please advise.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052504-14

.....
Please respond by 6/4/04

*As part of the effort
to review & revise oversight,
I am working w/ DuBois to
transfer this activity to OUSD.I.*

J 2/15/05

350.09

25 m aug 04

November 30, 2004

000.4

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Pentagon Memorial Fund

I'm told a fellow named Jack Taylor is the retired chairman of Enterprise Rental Car. He's about 80 years old. He apparently gave about \$80 million to the Naval Aviation Museum Academy Program. I wonder if someone in the private fundraising business ought to include him in their solicitation of the Pentagon Memorial. He sounds like a person who could be helpful.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
113004-28

.....
Please respond by 12/22/04

30 NOV 04

November 30, 2004

TO: Gen Dick Myers
Gen Pete Pace
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Assessments in Iraq and Afghanistan

I
R
A
Q

I think it is important that we conduct honest assessments by outside reviewers of how we are doing with security force development in Iraq and Afghanistan. I understand we've just completed such an assessment in Afghanistan – good. I'd like to see it as soon as it is ready.

For the assessment in Iraq, I'd like a look at a specific proposal, including details on who you suggest to conduct it, what the time table will be, and the draft charter.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
113004-27

.....
Please respond by 1/6/05

30NOV04

November 23, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Larry Di Rita
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Public Diplomacy Papers

Attached is a series of interesting papers on public diplomacy, which we might want to think about.

Attach.
The Ambassadors Review, Spring 2004, Special Section on Public Diplomacy

DHR:ss
112304-4



Please respond by _____

000, 7

03 Nov 04

Special Section on Public Diplomacy

Public Diplomacy: Reaching Beyond Traditional Audiences

Margaret D. Tutwiler

Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs

Chairman Wolf, Congressman Serrano and members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. Your interest and commitment to public diplomacy is greatly appreciated, and I look forward to working with this Subcommittee.

In less than two months that I have been serving as the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, I have gained a much better sense and appreciation of what the Under Secretary's office, as well as our three bureaus, the public diplomacy offices of the regional bureaus, and our overseas posts do in the field of public diplomacy.

Over the last two years, much has been written and debated about the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the United States (US) government's public diplomacy activities and programs overseas. Helpful and responsible reports by Ambassador Ed Djerejian's Advisory Group, the Council on Foreign Relations, the Heritage Foundation, and the Center for the Study of the Presidency, have served to help us examine that which our government does well and that which can be improved. Many of their insights and recommendations we can all agree upon.

As we all know, unfortunately our country has a problem in far too many parts of the world today—a problem we have regrettably developed over many years through both Republican and Democratic administrations, and a problem that does not lend itself to a quick fix or a single solution. Just as it has taken us many years to get into this situation, so too will it take many years of hard focused work to get out of it.

We need to continue to focus on those areas of the world where there has been a deterioration of the view of our nation and, at the same time, work equally as hard in those areas where the opinion of the United States has not changed to date.

We need to support those programs and activities that go to the bottom line of halting and reversing this deterioration. We need to constantly ask ourselves, "Is this activity or program still effective in today's world?" If it is, we should keep it. If it is judged to no longer contribute, then we should let it go.

We should listen more, not only to foreign audiences, but to our own personnel overseas. We will shortly be able to communicate and share new ideas amongst ourselves and across all regions through a new interactive Web site.

I believe we basically do a good job of advocating our policies and explaining our actions. Audiences may not agree or like what we say and do, but we are communicating our policies to governments and influential elites, including in the foreign media. **Our**

senior officials, Ambassadors and Embassy staff are out there explaining US policy, goals and initiatives. However, we can all do better.

In addition, we must do a better job of reaching beyond the traditional elites and government officials. Where we have not placed enough effort and focus is with the non-elites who, today much more so than in the past, are a very strong force within their countries. This must be a priority focus now and in the future. We only have to look at the outreach activities of many US corporations overseas to see the value of being present and engaged in neighborhoods that we in government have for too long neglected.

We must continue pursuing new initiatives and improving older ones in the hopes of reaching younger, broader and deeper audiences.

For instance:

- ◆ The Bureau of Public Affairs worked with our Embassy in Jakarta to year's State of the Union Address live, with simultaneous interpretation Indonesian. One national radio station carried the entire broadcast millions in this predominately
- ◆ In China, growing numbers of media outlets, including official are carrying material distributed via the International Chinese-language Web site and Embassy

I believe we can all agree that programs that bring Americans together, whether in person or even in a video or press conference, create greater understanding. Last year, the State Department directly sponsored over 30,000 academic, professional and other exchanges worldwide.

Since 9/11, we have organized over 1,000 digital videoconferences between American officials and experts and foreign audiences. In the past year, we facilitated nearly 500 interviews and press conferences with senior officials from the Department of State for foreign media outlets.

As Under Secretary, I would like to see us expand our exchange programs however we can. Exchange programs constitute the single largest part of the State Department public diplomacy budget, \$316,633,000 in FY 2004, which regrettably is \$28,713,000 less than the President's request including a rescission of \$3,367,000. Within this amount, we must set priorities.

Through our School Internet Connectivity Program, 26,000 high school students from the Middle East, South Asia, South East Europe, Central Asian and the Caucasus currently collaborate in online projects on current affairs, entrepreneurship, health, and civic responsibility with US students.

Expanding the circle of opportunity is the concept behind Partnerships for Learning (P4L), an initiative of the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA), which seeks to extend our exchange programs to undergraduate college students and also high school students. P4L has initiated our first high school exchange program with the Arab and Muslim world. Today, 170 high school students from predominantly Islamic countries are living with American families and studying at local high schools. Another 450 high school students from the Middle East and South Asia will come here in 2004 for the next academic year. In addition, 70 undergraduate students, men and women, from North Africa and the Middle East will come to the US beginning next month for intensive English language training prior to their enrollment in university degree programs.

These are the kinds of initiatives I believe we should be pursuing. A new initiative which I am exploring is the idea of micro-scholarships for learning English and for attending our American Schools overseas. The US has been incredibly successful with micro-credits for entrepreneurs and small businesses. Why not take that same concept and apply it to education and English-language learning?

However we do it, we must engage, listen, and interact—especially with the young. They are the key to a future peaceful world.

Reaching out to the Arab and Muslim world is a top priority. With regard to exchanges, 25 percent of ECA's funding will go to programs in the Middle East and South Asia in FY 2004, compared to 17 percent in FY 2002. We have restarted the Fulbright program in Afghanistan after a 25-year hiatus. Twenty Afghan Fulbrighters will arrive next month. Just a few days ago, 25 Iraqi Fulbright students arrived here for orientation prior to beginning their regular studies.

Of course, the Muslim world extends beyond the Middle East and South Asia. We are mindful that programs in Africa, East Asia, and Eurasia are also priorities in this context. In addition to the Arab and Muslim world and reaching out to young audiences, some of the program priorities we hope to pursue include many recommended by Ambassador Ed Djerejian and others.

For example, we are taking steps to improve interagency coordination. The new State-US Agency for International Development (USAID) Joint Policy Council and State-USAID Management Council is intended to improve program coordination in public diplomacy as in other areas and help ensure the most effective use of program resources at USAID. Regrettably, all too often, our important and meaningful assistance to developing countries is going unnoticed and unappreciated, while other nations' assistance to these same countries is widely known and appreciated. This must change. Government-wide, we have to do a much better job of ensuring the US's efforts are widely known well beyond the foreign government officials. We can no longer afford for recipients overseas to have no idea that the people of the United States provide assistance to their country.

Another program which holds promise is American Corners. In recent years, we have had good results from our American Corners program, which, as you know, are

partnerships between our Embassies and local institutions like libraries, universities, and chambers of commerce. These corners are a source for information outreach at the grass-roots level.

The Bureau of International Information Programs is working with the Near Eastern Affairs and South Asia bureaus to establish 43 more American Corners in those regions in FY 2005. We currently have more than 100 American Corners around the world. In FY 2004, we are planning on opening 194 more in 64 countries. Of these 194, we will establish 58 in the Middle East and South Asia, including ten in Afghanistan and 15 in Iraq.

Virtual consulates, targeted Web-based outreach to cities where we lack an actual presence, may also offer a powerful tool for reaching wide audiences with general information about the United States, as well as specific information about commercial, visa and other issues. Virtual consulates can also provide links between foreigners and counterparts in the US with whom they might want to do business.

English Teaching: To strengthen English teaching programs, ECA is devoting an additional \$1,573,000 to these programs, creating five new Regional English Language Officer positions in FY 2005, bringing the total to 20. This is not enough, but it is a start. Whether through direct teaching or training instructors, English-language programs offer great scope for advancing public diplomacy objectives. For example, over the past five years, Embassy Damascus estimates that it has trained over 9,000 of Syria's 12,000 English-language teachers, a terrific example of outreach to the successor generation in Syria.

Book Programs: The Department has developed "book sets" about American history, culture, and values for younger audiences around the world. Embassies donate the "book sets" to local libraries and primary/secondary schools. As of September 2003, Embassies worldwide had distributed over \$400,000 worth of book sets. We are examining our overseas book buys and journal publications as well.

Private Sector Cooperation: I have created a new unit in my office to explore ways to draw on the expertise of the private sector to advance our public sector objectives. We can expand public-private partnerships, initially focusing on key industries such as technology, health care, and education. There is much more we can do in the field of sports and the arts, and I intend to pursue this.

Through ECA's new Culture Connect program, America's cultural leadership directly communicates with elite and non-elite foreign youth about our country and values. We currently have ten Culture Connect Ambassadors, and we are going to expand the program this year.

Television offers a powerful tool for public diplomacy and public affairs. We are using cooperative programming with local broadcasters and exploiting new distribution channels and technologies to create a fuller, more accurate picture of the US for general

audiences abroad. Over the past two years, we have funded several hundred journalist tours for broadcast and print media overseas, more than half of which have been in Muslim majority countries. We intend to increase these types of journalist tours.

In closing, Mr. Chairman, let me say again that we all know that there is much work to be done. We all know that our public diplomacy programs, those I have mentioned and others, must advance our national interests and do a better job of explaining not only our policies, but also who we are as a people.

In a world of finite funding, we must ensure that our public diplomacy resources are used as effectively as possible. We must prioritize and ask ourselves, "Is the activity I am doing getting the job done?" We must listen to our field force. Today the State Department has approximately 1,200 employees working in the field of public diplomacy. I maintain that every American, regardless of agency or department, has to make an extra effort to communicate, listen, and engage with not only our traditional audiences, but to audiences to whom we previously have not given as much effort and time. We must move beyond the walls of our Embassies overseas and foreign government offices.

I am realistically optimistic that we can achieve over time a better, healthier, and much more accurate impression of our nation and people. No one, most especially myself, underestimates the challenge and the difficult task at hand. The public diplomacy officials I work with are reaching, questioning, and searching for more effective ways to enunciate our policies and have our values understood. We will continue to make some mistakes but I truly believe we will ultimately get there. We have no choice. We must.

Thank you.*

* *Editor's Note: Under Secretary of State Margaret Tutwiler delivered this testimony before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State and the Judiciary on February 4, 2004.*

Overcoming our Public Diplomacy Deficit

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If we are to win the war against international terrorism, our public diplomacy will have to play a more effective role than it does at present. In the Islamic world, isolating the extremists within their own societies is a goal that can only be achieved if the majority of non-violent citizens perceive terrorism as unjustified. Unfortunately, the trend is going in the wrong direction; an increasing number of ordinary Egyptians, Turks, Pakistanis and other Muslims perceive the United States (US) as hostile to the Islamic world, determined to control Middle East oil, and hypocritical in its pro-democracy pronouncements. The terrorists draw strength from these broadly held views. Public opinion surveys in the non-Muslim world (including our traditional European allies) show that similar views are present and growing. The terrorists are strengthened by our estrangement from publics in Europe.

These are challenges that cannot be dealt with by the might and skill of our armed forces. To ultimately defeat terrorism, we must also engage the Muslim world in the realms of ideas, values, and beliefs. No previous foreign affairs crisis has been so deeply rooted in cultural misunderstanding, and we must address this gulf of misunderstanding if we are to succeed.

It would be naïve indeed if we failed to acknowledge that American policy in the Middle East as perceived by the Islamic world is a persistent and pervasive source of tension and hostility toward the United States. Nevertheless, policy disagreements alone cannot account for the fact that many in Islamic countries regard the United States as a source of evil. As a nation, we have not done an adequate job of explaining ourselves to the world, or of building the personal and institutional connections with these countries that support healthy bilateral relationships. As a long-term solution to the profound problems of cultural misunderstanding there will be no substitute for public diplomacy (PD). It must be a key component of our long-term effort to eradicate terrorism.

Since the advent of the current administration, no fewer than a dozen studies and reports have focused attention on the shortcomings of our public diplomacy. These studies differ in detail and emphasis, but for the most part they share two conclusions. We don't put enough resources into PD, and we need to make certain that the reorganization that folded the US Information Agency (USIA) into the State Department does not harm our ability to carry out PD's vital functions. I believe that four major areas of concern require urgent attention if public diplomacy is to fulfill its obligations to the American taxpayer:

(1) the need to strengthen our international exchange programs with the Islamic world; (2) the need for a rational, effective visa policy; (3) the need for improved media outreach to the Islamic world; and, (4) the need to correct anomalies in the State Department's bureaucratic structure that I believe diminish the effectiveness of our public diplomacy. Let me turn first to exchange programs.

The Importance of Exchange Programs: Building Cultural Bridges

People-to-people ties are an essential part of our public diplomacy. As Ambassador Arthur Bums once said, "The achievement, of true understanding between any two governments depends fundamentally on the kind of relationship that exists between the peoples, rather than on the foreign ministers and ambassadors."

In the Islamic world, we clearly have not done an adequate job of fostering relationships between our peoples. A Gallup poll conducted in February 2002 reported that 61 percent of Muslims believe that Arabs did not carry out the attack on the United States. More recent surveys show that Muslims in general doubt America's sincerity in its stated aims in the war against terrorism. They believe that our actions reveal deeply-rooted antipathy toward Islam, and they point to inflammatory anti-Muslim utterances by American religious and social leaders, as well as unsympathetic portrayal of Arabs in films and television as evidence to support this view. Many doubt our commitment to democratic values and basic fairness in our dealings with the region, and they cite our uncritical support of Israel and our strong links to non-democratic regimes in the Middle East and elsewhere. As we struggle to bring some kind of stability and peace to post-Saddam Iraq, the perception has arisen that our promise to promote democracy in that benighted country was insincere, particularly in view of US opposition to early direct elections for the country's leaders. The public manifestations of these views frustrate our ability to advance the nation's interests throughout the Islamic world. It is no exaggeration to say that our policies, our purposes and our fundamental values are under increasing fire in this broad swath of the globe. Our public diplomacy has—in many ways—a more difficult challenge than we faced at the height of the Cold War.

We must recognize that we are facing this challenge from a very unfavorable position. Changing minds—or merely opening them—is a long, painstaking process. There are no quick fixes. And if we are truly to win the war on terrorism, there will be no avoiding the need to build bridges between the American people and the people of the Muslim world. This effort will require us to be creative, disciplined, and patient as we try to reach audiences whose attitudes towards us range from profoundly skeptical to openly hostile. We will not succeed in opening every mind, but we do not need to do so. What we must succeed in doing is challenging and changing a climate of opinion that unjustly paints the United States as a source of evil. Improving the relationships that exist between our peoples is the best way to do that.

America's unique status in today's world as the sole superpower puts new and difficult challenges before us. These new relationships with the people of other nations don't come easy. They can be, and often are, colored by resentment, jealousy, and

suspicion. In this world there is an absolute requirement that we demonstrate a true respect for the opinions of mankind, that we listen as well as speak, and that we hear and understand those opinions and take account of them as we set our policies. Our public diplomats are trained to do exactly that, as well as to articulate clearly and persuasively the true nature of US values and goals. The exchange components of our public diplomacy must serve to deepen that understanding that we must achieve. And if we succeed, terrorists will find it much more difficult to gain support or sympathy, either from their governments or from their societies.

Recognizing the need for more funding for public diplomacy in the Islamic world, the 107th Congress acted quickly to increase the State Department's exchanges with the Islamic world. This marked the beginning of an effort to give us the means to build a range of productive, positive relationships based on shared interests. This initiative will engage the American public—in our communities, schools, and universities—in an effort to project American values. We will find no better or more convincing representatives of our way of life. And the engagement of the American public will leverage significant additional resources to support this effort.

Initial efforts were made during the 107th Congress to both authorize and fund programs on a broad range of exchange activities to build relationships with the Islamic world and enhance US national security. The Cultural Bridges Act of 2002 called for an additional \$95 million annually for exchanges with the Muslim world. In tandem with the Freedom Promotion Act introduced by House International Relations Committee Chairman Henry Hyde and passed by the House of Representatives, this bipartisan effort led to initial funding for these programs in the supplemental appropriations legislation for fiscal year 2002. The supplemental included \$10 million for a high school exchange program aimed at Muslim youth and an additional \$10 million for the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Exchange (ECA) at the State Department to fund more Fulbright exchanges, programs to promote religious tolerance and values, English language programs, American studies programs, media training and other key initiatives for the Islamic world.

In addition to emergency ECA funding, an independent office was created to administer a Middle East Program Initiative (MEPI). This was a welcome beginning in building new ties to the Islamic world, but only the first steps in what will need to be a major effort, necessitating our engagement in a very broad range of countries, in an arc reaching from Africa to the Middle East, stretching further eastward from Central Asia to the Indian subcontinent to Southeast Asia. Addressing so many countries and cultures will demand thoughtfully differentiated approaches to public diplomacy. In some countries, significant increases in our traditional exchanges, such as the Fulbright and International Visitor programs, will be appropriate, welcome, and effective. In other countries, such an approach may be seen as threatening. Particularly in those cases, we must be creative in finding ways of reaching more skeptical publics, such as journalists and religious communities. And everywhere, we must seek ways of reaching younger participants.

Significant new resources will be required to develop these programs. The scope of the task is too great, and its importance to our national security too critical to be able to accomplish our goals by simply shifting money from other regions of the world. The importance of maintaining a broad, worldwide coalition to combat terrorism suggests strongly that shortchanging one area of the world in order to temporarily emphasize another will be an ineffective strategy. Yet it appears that by mandating that 25 percent of ECA funding must be spent in the Near Eastern Affairs (NEA) region—while keeping the budget virtually flat—Congress has unintentionally taken away resources from other critical areas, notably the New Independent States (NIS), Africa and perhaps even Islamic countries in other regions.

Reductions in public diplomacy over time have limited our reach: we have closed posts and cultural centers, reduced numbers of public diplomacy positions in our embassies, and steeply reduced the number of exchange participants. As populations in significant Muslim countries have increased by approximately 15 percent over the past ten years, the numbers of exchange participants from key countries such as Egypt, Indonesia, Pakistan and Turkey have declined by approximately 25 percent.

In the face of those reductions, it is important for us to recognize the dedication, hard work, and effectiveness of the State Department's corps of public diplomacy officers. Faced with diminishing resources and a major reorganization that abolished USIA and moved their function and careers into State, these professionals have performed in their typical fashion: professionally and effectively. It must be noted, parenthetically, that the movement of the public diplomacy function into the State Department has had two important effects on PD officers, one intended, one not. On the positive side, PD officers have easier career access to the tracks that lead to ambassadorial assignments: political and economic jobs, and deputy chief of mission (DCM)-ships. On the negative side, it has been difficult to maintain the critical mass of PD officers with cumulative experience and a commitment to PD careers.

The exchanges community has told Congress that a meaningful and effective Islamic exchange initiative will require \$100 million above the current appropriation for State exchanges. In the current budget circumstances, this is a significant amount of money. Nevertheless, this funding level is necessary and appropriate given the expanse of the Muslim world and the urgency and importance of the task at hand. Redistributing money from a roughly steady appropriation will not do the job. Furthermore, this amount of money spent on promoting our ideas and values is really very small when compared to the sums we are spending on military operations, but it is no less crucial to our success.

One largely unseen area in the realm of exchange is that large group of non-government programs, officially known as the Exchange Visitor Program and often referred to as the "J-visa" programs. It is difficult to overestimate the long-term value to the United States of the thousands of youngsters who come to this country each year on summer work-travel, camp counselor, au pair, high school, and professional training-study programs that don't cost the US government one cent in funding support. On the contrary, these programs add a significant amount to the US economy, are vital sources of workers

for camps, resorts and theme parks, and provide jobs for hundreds of Americans who administer the programs. One example: some 20,000 Polish youngsters come here each summer, generally have a positive experience and return to Poland with an understanding of our country and an affection for our people. Our Embassy in Warsaw rightly regards this as among its most significant public diplomacy assets. I will discuss the visa complications for these and other potential friends of the US below, but it is worth citing these exchange programs as part of our answer to the sliding favorability numbers of the US throughout much of the world, which in turn provide aid and comfort to our enemies. Most important, these programs touch youth, a category that was historically neglected in US core exchange programs.

Today, these programs are in trouble. Visa issues are involved, but the immediate problem is regulation. J-Visa programs are regulated by the State Department. A new set of revised regulations for several program categories has been hung up in the bureaucracy for more than a year, creating uncertainty and difficulty in planning for the operators of the J-Visa programs. Moreover, the trend of regulation over the past decade has generally been to limit these exchange opportunities, rather than to expand them. The exchanges community is urging the Department to expedite the issuance of these regulations, but it is likely that for the foreseeable future, program sponsors will continue to operate in an uncertain regulatory environment.

Needed: A Visa Policy that Serves All Aspects of Our National Security

Since the horrific September 11 attacks on the US, the way the United States administers its visa policy has received much scrutiny, and appropriately so. Members of the exchange community, like all Americans, want a visa policy that protects us from those who would do us harm. We understand that greater scrutiny is required, and we support this. The exchanges community also campaigned vigorously to maintain the visa function within the Department of State; State's long-time involvement with the exchanges programs means that the steep learning curve that would accompany a shift of the function to another agency has been avoided.

State's effort to tighten visa adjudication, in consultation with the Department of Homeland Security, is necessarily a work in progress, and has led to unpredictability and confusion. The impact of this somewhat messy process is being felt in virtually all walks of American life: business, medicine, education, scientific research, travel and tourism. The simple fact is that in 2004, there is very little activity in American life that does not have an important international dimension. And by disrupting these activities through slow or inconsistent visa procedures, we pay a high price as a nation.

As spring and summer and their high volume of visa applicants approach, we urgently need to implement a balanced approach to visas, one that addresses our national security concerns and also encourages the many legitimate visitors whose presence benefits the United States. We must not view the issue as a trade-off between security and openness; continued openness contributes to our national security by building a web of positive international contacts. Our true security interest lies in finding the right balance.

As noted above, participants in long-standing summer exchange programs, such as camp counselors and summer work-travel students, are enormously valuable to American businesses and gain first-hand exposure to American life. Often these are individuals who could not afford to come to our country without a job to cover their expenses. Because these programs are of short duration and keyed specifically to the summer season, long delays in visa processing this spring could prove very disruptive both to exchange participants and to the many American businesses that depend on them.

Uncertainty over visas also is having a significant impact on American campuses. I serve on the advisory board for international programs at the University of Kansas, my *alma mater*. KU reports that the international student population for the academic year 2003-2004 is down nearly 40 percent. Universities throughout the country are reporting diminished undergraduate applications, as good students around the world increasingly look to Great Britain, Australia, Canada and New Zealand for higher education. Growing difficulty in attracting foreign faculty and researchers leads my colleagues in the heartland to the conclusion that many in the international scholarly community, both faculty and students, view the US as inhospitable to them. This perception and the behavior it impels are enormously damaging to our long-term interests, which are well-served by attracting the best and brightest to an American education. What is needed is a visa policy that supports our national security in all its aspects. The exchanges community believes that the consular function is inadequately resourced in the field, particularly given new demands for interviewing nearly every applicant.

Our security requires that we screen more carefully and effectively identify and keep out those who would harm us. Our security also demands that we welcome those with a legitimate purpose for being here, and whose presence manifestly benefits our nation.

The Media Challenge: Carrying Our Message More Effectively

It is vitally important that our government-sponsored media and our relationships with foreign media must be improved if we are to succeed in the competition for attention in Islamic nations. As Coalition Spokesman during the campaign to unseat the Taliban government and destroy al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, I faced two challenges. One, facing down the disinformation from the Taliban ambassador in Islamabad, was relatively easy to achieve. The second, convincing a skeptical Islamic world press that the Coalition was at war with terrorism and not with Islam, was far more difficult. In truth, we made little headway in that essential struggle. But a useful lesson was learned: the US must take foreign media more seriously. Our government understandably focuses its attention on the domestic press. It should now be clear that renewed efforts to get our message into foreign media are required. Nine out of ten Middle East adults get their news from either their national television networks or satellite stations such as Al-Jazeera, Al-Arabiya and others. Most of those outlets, including Al-Jazeera, are open to us, and we should use them. I believe this will not require major new funding, but a change in emphasis.

I applaud the innovative FM radio programming undertaken by the Voice of America. Radio Sawa seems to be steadily gaining listenership among Arab youth. On a

recent trip to Iraq, I heard Radio Sawa from radios from Kurdistan to Baghdad. It has been argued that its “drive time” format has limited impact on political attitudes. This may be true, but Sawa is nevertheless valuable because it reaches a broad youth audience with “light freight” and popular music, and creates a positive, non-threatening image of the US. Moreover, if they’re listening to Sawa, they’re not listening to something more negative toward us.

However, television is the key, and broadcasting on local facilities is politically tricky. Al-Hurra has now gotten off the ground. It faces numerous hurdles as it seeks to find audience share. But the experiment needs to be funded and results carefully measured. It will need to prove itself over time.

State Department Structure Inhibiting *li Di*

I share the view of many in the public diplomacy community that the merger of USIA into State has inhibited rather than enhanced our efforts. Under the current structure, which I believe to be flawed, the primary purveyors of public diplomacy programs and resources—the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, and the Office of International Information Programs (IIP)—have no direct connection with the public diplomacy sections in our Embassies, and no *formal* connection with the regional bureaus that supervise those posts.

This anomalous structure runs the risk of marginalizing public diplomacy within State, and already has diminished its effectiveness. Those senior officials with responsibility for public diplomacy do not control field resources; those with a direct connection to the field resources are mid-ranking office directors in the regional bureaus, and do not have the clout to take bold action. Instead of sitting in policy-making councils, these public diplomacy office directors spend their very long days responding to task assignments. The structural flaw already is manifesting itself in diminished focus, uncoordinated activities, and reduced field resources.

And then there is the matter of the State Department *culture* as a home for public diplomacy. I led the USIA team that negotiated the merger into the State Department in the summer of 1997. I came to deeply respect my State counterpart, Maura Hardy. With regard to public diplomacy, she—like so few of her State colleagues—actually got it. USIA people worried that in moving to State they would get absorbed in an alien culture in Washington, and would move down the food chain in the field. Maura argued vigorously to the contrary, especially when it came to the merger in Washington. She was convinced that an influx of USIA people would bring a refreshing creativity to the State Department. In fact, USIA’s fears have been largely realized. Public diplomacy was the *only* business of USIA; it is barely visible at State.

The fifteen or so independent reports on public diplomacy have acknowledged these problems and have recommended various prescriptions for change. Congressman Frank Wolf, who godfathered the oft-cited Djerejian report, has called for a White House public diplomacy czar who can produce high-level attention and support to the effort.

Public diplomacy veterans like former director Charles Wick want to see a USJA-like structure within State, with an Under Secretary who has most of the same authorities enjoyed by former **USIA** leadership. Congressman Hyde has proposed another version that would give the Under Secretary more control over resources and program.

The debate, I believe, will continue. Although various Congressional actions are moving forward, it is hard to envision bold action being taken concurrently with the distractions of a presidential election campaign. But *at a minimum* there is one thing that can go some distance toward ameliorating the damage of the structural flaw. Congress should authorize and the Department should create in each regional bureau a Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) position responsible solely for public diplomacy.

Establishing a DAS in each regional bureau would ensure that public diplomacy is actively represented in senior-level meetings and thus an integral component in our approach to every foreign policy issue. A senior officer with these responsibilities could effectively coordinate public diplomacy activities across the region, make the case for additional resources when needed, and play an active role in personnel decisions. The DAS would coordinate closely with the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy, creating a policy-level link between these two functions that is not constricted by the competing demands of a DAS who deals with public diplomacy as one of several responsibilities.

Creating and maintaining new DAS positions for public diplomacy would be a critical first step in changing the Department's culture, and would send an unmistakable message to those who work at State: that public diplomacy matters, and matters enough to require senior leadership.

This proposal has surfaced before. It was part of the "bracketed" language of the blue print for the reorganization presented to Secretary of State Albright in August 1997. The Department has not appeared to welcome it. There are two primary arguments against adding public diplomacy DAS positions: that State already has all the DAS positions necessary to do its job, and that there are not enough senior public diplomacy officers qualified for these positions. Neither of these objections holds water.

As to the limitation on the number of **DAS** positions, what we are talking about today is how to increase the effectiveness of public diplomacy, a vital element of our national security strategy. Are we to ignore an opportunity to strengthen our public diplomacy in order to preserve an arbitrary ceiling on DAS positions? I believe the American public is more interested in effective action than it is in the number of senior officers required to accomplish it.

As to the availability of qualified senior officers, my own knowledge of the public diplomacy corps suggests to me that there are any number of experienced officers well suited to this type of leadership role. But State need not exclude senior officers from other career specialties when assessing candidates for these new positions. For example, one can easily imagine many political officers being particularly effective in making the connection between public diplomacy and policy.

The bureaucratic structure imposed on public diplomacy by the merger is not working. The office directors for public diplomacy in the regional bureaus are seeing their people and resources drained away. The NEA public diplomacy office has effectively been placed under the control of the MEPI office, which is headed by people with no public diplomacy experience in the field. The overall trend is to disperse public diplomacy assets, while the need is to create a critical mass. PD officers who get completely absorbed in preparing for the noon briefing or providing background papers for senior level visits *cannot* make sufficient time to coordinate with the producers of public diplomacy educational, cultural and information products the field officers need. That coordination is vital. It is the PD officer who, in an earlier life, insured the proper confluence between Washington-centric ECA and IIP products and actual field needs.

Will the establishment of DAS positions solve all these problems? Perhaps not, but it would add the bureaucratic clout that is the coin of the realm in the Department of State. Change would then be achievable.

The Pew Global Attitudes Project: Giving World Publics a Greater Voice

Donald Kimelman

Director of Information Initiatives, The Pew Charitable Trusts

When the Pew Global Attitudes Project was conceived, the original plan was to measure attitudes around the world toward globalization and democratic values in a single major survey. In June 2001, The Pew Charitable Trusts committed \$3.8 million to The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, an opinion research organization we have funded since 1995, to carry out this ground-breaking work. This initiative was in keeping with the Trusts' long-standing commitment to informing the public on a range of important issues through independent, non-partisan research and polling.

When the grant was made, no one realized the full scope and impact the project would have. Well before the survey was ready to go into the field, the terrorists struck the United States on 9/11, and the war on terrorism began. Andy Kohut, who directs the Pew Research Center, responded by reordering priorities to include survey questions about the war on terrorism and America's standing in the rest of the world.

The Pew Global Attitudes Project released the results in two stages: *What the World Thinks in 2002*, issued in December 2002, and *Views of a Changing World*, released in June 2003. The surveys were based on 66,000 interviews in 49 nations and the Palestinian Authority. The reports found widespread acceptance of globalization, particularly in the developing world, and strong support across cultures for democratic values, including in the Middle East. But much of the media's attention focused on the increasing antipathy toward America's policies abroad—especially in Europe and the Muslim world. Anger about the Iraq war appeared to be the principal factor in driving up this level of opposition.

In February of this year, on the eve of the first anniversary of the start of the war, The Pew Research Center went back into the field for a follow-up survey in nine countries, including the United States. The survey set out to determine whether the passage of time since the fall of Saddam Hussein had moderated negative views about America in Europe and the Muslim world. The results, published in the Center's latest report, *A Year After the Iraq War*, were sobering, suggesting an ever-growing divide between this country and its post-war allies.

What follows is an excerpt from this study. It is the most recent set of findings from a project that has expanded its original charge to give world publics a greater voice on a host of important issues that transcend national borders. In a drastically changed world, we now view global polling as an ongoing mission.

* * *

A Year After the Iraq War: Excerpts

A year after the war in Iraq, discontent with America and its policies has intensified rather than diminished. Opinion of the United States (US) in France and Germany is at least as negative now as at the war's conclusion, and British views are decidedly more critical. Perceptions of American unilateralism remain widespread in European and Muslim nations, and the war in Iraq has undermined America's credibility abroad. Doubts about the motives behind the US-led war on terrorism abound, and a growing percentage of Europeans want foreign policy and security arrangements independent from the United States. Across Europe, there is considerable support for the European Union to become as powerful as the United States.


In the predominantly Muslim countries surveyed, anger toward the United States remains pervasive, although the level of hatred has eased somewhat and support for the war on terrorism has inched up. Osama bin Laden, however, is viewed favorably by large percentages in Pakistan (65 percent), Jordan (55 percent) and Morocco (45 percent). Even in Turkey, where bin Laden is highly unpopular, as many as 31 percent say that suicide attacks against Americans and other Westerners in Iraq are justifiable. Majorities in all four Muslim nations surveyed doubt the sincerity of the war on terrorism. Instead, most say it is an effort to control Mideast oil and to dominate the world.

There has been little change in opinion about the war in Iraq—except in Great Britain, where support for the decision to go to war has plummeted from 61 percent last May to 43 percent in the current survey. In contrast, 60 percent of Americans continue to back the war. Among the coalition of the “unwilling,” large majorities in Germany, France and Russia still believe their countries made the right decision in not taking part in the war. Moreover, there is broad agreement in nearly all of the countries surveyed—the US being a notable exception—that the war in Iraq hurt, rather than helped, the war on terrorism.

In the four predominantly Muslim countries surveyed, opposition to the war remains nearly universal. Moreover, while large majorities in Western European countries


Transatlantic Tensions Unabated			
<i>Support for an Independent European Foreign Policy</i>			
	Apr 2002	Mar 2003	May 2003
	%	%	%
Britain	47	48	45
France	60	67	76
Germany	51	52	57

U.S. Favorability Ratings			
	Summer 2002	Mar 2003	May 2003
	%	%	%
Britain	75	48	70
France	63	31	43
Germany	61	25	45



opposed to the war say Saddam Hussein's ouster will improve the lot of the Iraqi people, those in Muslim countries are less confident. In Jordan, no less than 70 percent of survey respondents think the Iraqis will be *worse off* with Hussein gone.

This is the latest in a series of international surveys by the *Pew Global Attitudes Project*. It was conducted from late February to early March in the United States and eight other countries, with fieldwork under the direction of Princeton Survey Research Associates International.¹ The survey finds a significant point of agreement in opinion on Iraq's future. Overwhelming majorities in all countries surveyed say it will take longer than a year to establish a stable government in Iraq.



But there are deep differences about whether the US or the United Nations should do the best job of helping Iraqis to form such a government. The UN is the clear choice of people in Western Europe and Turkey; Americans are divided over this issue. However, roughly half of Jordanians and a third of Moroccans volunteered that neither the US nor the UN could do best in this regard.

Americans have a far different view of the war's impact—on the war on terrorism and the global standing of the US—than do people in the other surveyed countries. Generally, Americans think the war helped in the fight against terrorism, illustrated the power of the US military, and revealed America to be trustworthy and supportive of democracy around the world. These notions are not shared elsewhere. Majorities in Germany, Turkey and France—and half of the British and Russians—believe the conflict in Iraq undermined the war on terrorism. At least half the respondents in the eight other countries view the US as less trustworthy as a consequence of the war. For the most part, even US military prowess is not seen in a better light as a result of the war in Iraq.

	April 2002	March 2004
	%	%
France	30	57
Germany	33	49
Britain	20	33
Jordan	--	76
Morocco	--	72
Pakistan	--	66
Turkey	--	55
Russia	--	34
U.S.	--	13

A growing number in Western Europe also think that the United States is overreacting to the threat of terrorism. Only in Great Britain and Russia do large majorities believe that the US is right to be so concerned about terrorism. Many people in France (57 percent) and Germany (49 percent) have come to agree with the widespread view in the Muslim countries surveyed that America is exaggerating the terrorist threat.

¹ All surveys are nationwide representative samples except in Pakistan, which was predominantly urban, and Morocco, where the survey was conducted only in urban areas.

Nevertheless, support for the US-led war on terrorism has increased dramatically among Russians, despite their generally critical opinion of US policies. More than seven-in-ten Russians (73 percent) currently back the war on terrorism, up from 51 percent last May. Since the end of the Iraq war, there also have been gains in support for the US anti-terrorism campaign in Turkey (from 22 percent to 37 percent) and Morocco (nine percent to 28 percent). On the other hand, backing for the war against terrorism has again slipped in France and Germany; only about half of the public in each country favors the US-led effort.


Trend: Favor US-led War on Terrorism

	Summer 2002 %	May 2003 %	March 2004 %
U.S.	89	--	81
Britain	69	63	63
France	75	60	50
Germany	70	60	55
Russia	73	51	73
Turkey	30	22	37
Pakistan	20	16	16
Jordan	13	2	12
Morocco	--	9	28

Publics in the surveyed countries other than the United States express considerable skepticism of America's motives in its global struggle against terrorism. Solid majorities in France and Germany believe the US is conducting a war on terrorism in order to control Mideast oil and dominate the world. People in Muslim nations who doubt the sincerity of American anti-terror efforts see a wider range of ulterior motives, including helping Israel and targeting unfriendly Muslim governments and groups.

Large majorities in almost every country surveyed think that America and British leaders lied when they claimed, prior to the Iraq war, that Saddam Hussein's regime had weapons of mass destruction. On balance, people in the United States and Great Britain disagree. Still, about three-in-ten in the US (31 percent) and four-in-ten in Great Britain (41 percent) say leaders of the two countries lied to provide a rationale for the war.

In that regard, opinions of both President Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair are negative. Large majorities in every country, except for the US, hold an unfavorable opinion of Bush. Blair is rated favorably only by a narrow majority in Great Britain but fully three-quarters of Americans. In contrast, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan is viewed positively in nearly all nine countries surveyed, with Jordan and Morocco as prominent exceptions.



The United Nations itself engenders varied reactions around the world. Just 55 percent of Americans have a favorable opinion of the world body. This is the lowest rating the UN has achieved in 14 years of Pew Research Center surveys. People in Russia and the Western European countries have a considerably more favorable view of the UN. But large majorities in Jordan and Morocco hold negative views of both the UN and the man who leads it.

Majorities in the Western European countries surveyed believe their own government should obtain UN approval before dealing with an international threat. That idea is much more problematic for Americans, and on this issue Russians and people in Muslim countries are much closer to Americans than they are to Western Europeans.

Despite that small piece of common ground, however, there is still considerable hostility toward the US in the Muslim countries surveyed. Substantial numbers in each of these countries has a negative view of the US. Overwhelming majorities in Jordan and Morocco believe suicide attacks against Americans and other Westerners in Iraq are justifiable. As a point of comparison, slightly more people in those two countries say the same about Palestinian suicide attacks against Israelis.

The Gap Over Using Force			
<i>Country Needs U.N. Approval First</i>			
	<u>Yes</u>	No, too <u>difficult</u>	DK/ <u>Ref</u>
	%	%	%
U.S.	41	48	10
Britain	64	30	6
France	63	35	2
Germany	80	15	6
Russia	37	41	21
Turkey	45	44	11
Pakistan	38	34	28
Jordan	47	38	15
Morocco	42	42	16

About half of Pakistanis also say suicide attacks on Americans in Iraq—and against Israelis in the Palestinian conflict—are justifiable. Fewer respondents in Turkey agree, but slightly more Turks view suicide attacks on Americans in Iraq as justifiable as say the same about Palestinian attacks on Israelis (31 percent vs. 24 percent).

Other Findings

- ◆ Despite concerns about rising anti-Europe, there are no indications that anti-sentiment has increased over the Favorable ratings of Jews are now in France, Germany and Russia were in 1991. Nonetheless, Jews are in the US than in Germany and Russia. As case with Americans, Europeans more negative views of Muslims than
- ◆ The survey finds, however, that much lower ratings in predominantly Muslim countries than do Muslims in mostly Christian countries. Majorities in Morocco (73 percent), Pakistan (62 percent) and Turkey (52 percent) express negative views of Christians.
- ◆ The adage that people in other nations may dislike America, but nonetheless want to move there is borne out in Russia, Turkey and Morocco. Roughly half of the respondents in those three countries say people who have moved to the US have a better life.

Favorability Ratings: Jews			
	<u>Very Fav</u>	<u>Somewhat Fav</u>	<u>Un-Fav</u>
	%	%	%
U.S.	36	41	8
Britain	23	53	9
France	28	53	11
1991	14	58	14
Germany	10	53	20
1991	5	47	24
Russia	18	47	25
1991	9	49	26
Turkey	6	21	49
Pakistan	1	2	80
Morocco	1	5	92

Question not permitted in Jordan.

- ◆ But one of the largest gaps between Americans and Europeans concerns the question of whether people who move to the US have a better life. Americans overwhelmingly believe this to be the case—88 percent say people who move to the US from other countries have a better life. By contrast, just 14 percent of Germans, 24 percent of French and 41 percent of British think that people who have moved to the US from their countries have a better life.*

Favorability Ratings:			
Muslims			
	Very Fav	Somewhat Fav	Un-Fav
	%	%	%
U.S.	13	35	32
Britain	18	49	18
France	16	48	29
Germany	5	36	46
Russia	15	38	38
Turkey	66	22	9
Pakistan	a7	10	2
Morocco	70	20	9
Christians			
	Very Fav	Somewhat Fav	Un-Fav
	%	%	%
U.S.	55	29	6
Britain	36	48	6
France	34	50	9
Germany	15	60	16
Russia	44	49	3
Turkey	6	25	52
Pakistan	4	20	62
Morocco	2	21	73
Questions not permitted in Jordan.			

* *Editor's Note: These excerpts and charts are taken from the March 16, 2004, report, "A Year After the Iraq War." Reprinted by permission of The Pew Global Attitudes Project, a project of The Pew Research Center for the People & the Press.*

Is American Security Being Lost In Translation?

Rush Holt

Member, United States House of Representatives
Member, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
Member, Committee on Education and the Workforce

“The United States [US] today carries new responsibilities in many quarters of the globe, and we are at a serious disadvantage because of the difficulty of finding persons who can deal with the foreign language problem.”

– John Foster Dulles, US Secretary of State, 1953

What was true in the post-World War II world of 1953 is true in the post-9/11 world of 2004. Our national deficiency in the languages and cultures of critical areas around the world is compromising American security interests at home and abroad. In addition to diminishing our opportunities economically and culturally, the deficiency is making our troops overseas more vulnerable and the American people less safe than they should be. We must eliminate the severe shortage of language professionals in our diplomatic corps, our military, and our intelligence agencies. Almost three years after the events of September 11, 2001, we still fail to address one of the most serious security problems facing this nation. So far, the approach has been superficial or temporary, with Congress and senior Administration officials exhorting agencies to hire more linguists. That is not enough.

The current shortage of language professionals is well documented throughout the federal government. In January 2002, the Government Accounting Office (GAO) reported that “diplomatic and intelligence officials have stated that lack of staff with foreign language skills has weakened the fight against international terrorism,” while at the Federal Bureau of Investigation “shortages of language-proficient staff have resulted in the accumulation of thousands of hours of audiotapes and pages of written material that have not been reviewed or translated.” More recently, the 9/11 Joint Inquiry reported last July that our intelligence community is at 30 percent readiness in languages critical to national security, while a State Department commissioned report from October found that our government has only 54 genuine Arabic speakers working in the entire Foreign Service.

When I recently asked David Kay, former head of the Iraq Survey Group, how many of his 1,400 member-team spoke Arabic, he could count the number on the fingers of one hand. I posed similar questions to some members of the Special Forces who have been combing the mountains of Afghanistan looking for Osama bin Laden. I asked them how much Pashto they spoke. They responded that they had “picked up some” during the year they had been there. Although our Special Forces represent some of the best trained soldiers in the world, we’re clearly not giving them all the skills they need to be successful in their mission.

While the Defense Department, the State Department and our intelligence agencies have recently turned their attention to the language problem, their approach remains focused on immediate needs. They're stepping up recruitment efforts and expanding their respective language education programs. These are promising and necessary changes, but they only scratch the surface of what is fundamentally a national problem.

Federal Language Schools: A Tool, Not the Solution

The federal government long ago recognized that our public education system alone could not provide the advanced language specialists that it required. As a response, the government established language schools to train its own people in the languages of the world. I recently visited the Defense Language Institute (DLI) in Monterrey, California, where each year approximately 3,700 members of the armed forces study languages ranging from Arabic to Chinese to Spanish. DLI touts itself as the country's largest center of foreign language study.

Indeed, DLI is a remarkable educational facility. I watched students there learning in the classroom from smart boards connected to the Internet from which instructors could call up, highlight, and use text, audio and video streams, and from specially formatted MP3 players (e.g. iPods) to replay foreign news broadcasts and music directly into their headphones. DLI is certainly on the cutting edge of educational technology, but technology alone cannot surmount the challenges of learning a language. I also have visited the language schools of the Central Intelligence Agency and the State Department (Foreign Service Institute), and have talked with many officers with the various agencies they serve.

The problem these federal language schools have is two-fold. First, the schools react specifically to the immediate needs of the agencies they serve. If the army needs Arabic speakers, then the DLI hires Arabic teachers. The other schools operate in much the same way. They do not plan for the long term. When a language is no longer designated "high-need," teachers lose their jobs and training in that language is cut back. In short, we are not preparing to meet the potential needs of the future. There is no built-in system to adapt to future and emerging linguistic needs. Unfortunately, as any linguist will tell you, it's simply not possible to produce adequate speakers of difficult languages in a short period of time no matter how good the faculty or how advanced the technology. They take years of training and immersion to cultivate.

Second, the federal language schools alone simply cannot meet the language needs of the armed forces, the State Department, our intelligence agencies, and the larger federal government. Too often, their students have a limited foundation in foreign languages and are starting their language classes with little or no previous language training. This makes them very expensive to train and many of them finish their one-year programs with only basic language skills. As a result, they can only make a limited contribution to the agencies they serve. Ultimately, the language problem cannot be solved at the federal level because the root problem lies in public schools throughout the country.

The Root Problem: Our Schools

If we are to address adequately the language shortage in the federal government, we have to look past the issues of immediate recruitment and federal language training. Federal language schools are building on a poor language foundation, and the federal government cannot recruit linguists from a pool that does not exist. With this approach, we will always be trying to catch up. We must design and implement a federal language strategy that begins in the earliest years of education and continues through college.

Consider the following sober facts. Al-Qaeda and like-minded terrorist elements operate in over 75 countries, where hundreds of languages and dialects are spoken. However, 99 percent of American high school, college and university programs concentrate on a few (mostly European) languages. In fact, more college students currently study Ancient Greek (20,858) than Arabic (10,596), Korean (5,211), Persian (1,117), and Pashto (14) put together, according to figures from 2002. Last year, American universities granted only six degrees in Arabic and eight in Korean, while they granted more than 7,000 in Spanish. We need to improve the numbers in critical languages if we're going to make sure that America has the language professionals necessary to defend our national security and represent American interests abroad.

National Security Language Act

In Congress, I have introduced the National Security Language Act, legislation that would expand federal investment in education in foreign languages of critical need, such as Arabic, Persian, Korean, Pashto and Chinese. It would provide federal incentives for high school students to study languages into college, give universities resources to expand language programs overseas, and identify Americans with pre-existing language abilities for recruitment. The main provisions of the bill include:

- ◆ **The International Flagship Language Initiative (IFLI):** Providing federal grants to specific American universities and colleges to establish high quality, intensive in-country language study programs in a broad range of countries around the world. Institutional grants of up to \$400,000 per language would be provided to establish new programs. The initial target will be the languages identified by the government-wide needs assessment conducted regularly by the National Security Education Program (NSEP). The NSEP, which already oversees the National Flagship Language Initiative (NFLI), will also administer the program.
- ◆ **Science and Technology Advanced Foreign Language Grants:** Providing federal grants to institutions of higher education to establish programs that encourage students to develop foreign language proficiency as well as science and technological knowledge. Eligible institutions will develop programs in which students take courses in science, math and technology taught in a foreign language. Funds will also support immersion programs for students to take science and math courses in a non-English speaking country.

- ◆ **Loan Forgiveness for Undergraduate Students in Foreign Become Teachers or Federal Employees:** Authorizing the Secretary to assume the obligation to repay a total of not more than \$10,000 of and interest for a student borrower who has obtained an undergraduate degree critical need foreign language. To qualify the recipient must be employed agency of the United States government or in a full-time position in or secondary school as
- ◆ **Encouraging Early Foreign Language Studies:** Establishing grants language partnerships between local school districts and departments at institutions of higher education. Also eligible to participate partnerships would be state education agencies, an education or department of institutions of higher education, a business, a non-organization, heritage or community centers for language study, or Resource Center. Priority would be given to partnerships that include a high-local educational agency and to partnerships that emphasize the less-commonly
- ◆ **National Study of Foreign Language Heritage Communities Marketing Campaign:** Commissioning a national study to communities with native speakers of critical foreign languages and targets of a federal marketing campaign encouraging students to pursue those languages. Members of heritage communities are a better and educational investment than non-heritage speakers with no experience. Unfortunately, many heritage communities view knowledge language other than English as a problem to be overcome. A campaign should educate heritage language speakers about the professional opportunities that their language skills may

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A few years after Secretary of State John Foster Dulles lamented America's lack foreign language abilities, the Soviet Union surprised America with the launch of the first Sputnik into space in 1957. American leaders vowed never to be second to anyone in proficiency in science and mathematics. In 1958, Congress responded to Sputnik by passing the National Defense Education Act (NDEA), which created a generation of scientists, engineers, and Russian linguists who helped win the Cold War.

Immediately after September 11, 2001, Americans found themselves again facing a Sputnik moment. They realized that they were caught flat-footed, unprepared to confront al-Qaeda terrorists. We need a national commitment to languages on a scale of the NDEA commitment to science, including improved curriculum, teaching technology and methods, teacher development, and a systemic cultural commitment. I offer the National Security Language Act as the first part of a solution that will give us a generation of Americans able to confront the new threats we face today.

America's Language Challenge: Multidimensional Responses

Katherine H. Peterson

Director, Foreign Service Institute

United States Ambassador to the Kingdom of Lesotho, 1998-2001

Secretary Powell has called our diplomatic personnel "America's first line of offense." The overarching goal, therefore, is to get the right people, with the right skills, in the right place at the right time to carry out America's foreign policy. One of the skills that is the hallmark of effective diplomacy is the ability to use a foreign language to carry out our responsibilities. In the wake of the watershed events of September 11, 2001, the press, the public and the United States (US) government have grown painfully aware of the phenomenon that Senator Paul Simon called (in 1980!) "The Tongue-Tied American." Repeatedly, we see compelling evidence of the critical role of high-level foreign language capabilities in our foreign policy, our international responsibilities, and our national security. It has become both obvious and urgent for the foreign affairs community to stand up and address the "language challenge."

Some Facts: What We Have to Work with to Meet the Challenge

In an article with a stinging title, "Now That We're Comrades, We Don't Care Anymore," Washington Post, November 9, 2003, we learned that:

"The US government is spending 25 percent less today, adjusted for inflation, than it did in 1967 on high-level foreign language training. And that figure includes an additional 20 percent for Arabic and Middle Eastern studies appropriated by Congress after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. A Washington-based consultant on international education [noted] that the number of fellowships in all advanced foreign language and area studies declined from 2,344 in 1967 to 1,640 in fiscal year 2003."

In addition, in the Conference Report accompanying the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, three key pieces of data are given as reasons to support foreign language education:

"82 percent of the US population of 255 million people speaks only English. There are very few US households where languages critical for supporting US national security are spoken. For example, only 0.23 percent, or 596,000 of the US population, speaks Arabic at home, 0.13 percent for Hindi, 0.11 percent for Urdu, 0.09 percent for Serbo-Croatian, 0.27 percent for Russian, 0.18 percent for Japanese, and 0.78 percent for Chinese.

Second, less than one percent (about 144,000 in calendar year 2000) of all US students in higher education study abroad. Study abroad program data

also show that US students historically have not studied in areas that are emerging as critical to national security. In 2000, 60 percent of US study abroad students studied in Western Europe. Less than 2.9 percent studied in the Middle East (a mere 4,100 students, with 3,900 of these studying in Israel); 2.7 percent studied in Africa (3,900 students), and six percent in Asia (8,800, with 5,600 of these in China and Japan).

Third, modern foreign language class registrations in US higher education are down from a high in 1965 of 16.5 foreign language class registrations per 100 overall class registrations to 7.9 registrations per 100 in 1998. Spanish accounts for 55 percent of foreign language registrations, while Arabic accounts for 0.5 percent (5,500 registrations), Chinese for 2.4 percent (28,000), and Russian for two percent (24,000)."¹

In his "Dear Colleagues" letter in November 2003 inviting fellow House members to co-sponsor his bill, Rep. Rush Holt (D-NJ), notes:

"I am introducing legislation, the National Security Language Act, which would significantly expand our investment in foreign language education on the primary, secondary, and post-secondary level.

Al-Qaeda operates in over 75 countries, where hundreds of languages and dialects are spoken. However, 99 percent of American high school, college and university programs concentrate on a dozen (mostly European) languages. In fact, more college students currently study Ancient Greek (20,858) than Arabic (10,596), Korean (5,211), Persian (1,117), and Pashto (14) put together. We need to do more to make sure that America has the language professionals necessary to defend our national security. This cannot be done overnight. We are already years overdue."

One of the local Washington television garden advisors was asked by a viewer "When is the best time to plant trees?" His answer: "Twenty years ago." Given the unavailability of a reliable time-machine, everyone is now scrambling to propose their own ways to put good will and good money to work to ameliorate the fact that the American public and the educational system, and, yes, we in the government, have fallen short of anticipating and providing for foreign language capability across a broad range of our population. September 11, 2001, was our generation's Sputnik. We rose to that challenge in 1957, and slowly we are rising to this one.

While the Department as a whole is not formally considered part of the Intelligence Community (IC), we share with them the need for strong foreign language capability in order to achieve our mission goals, and Congress has shown special interest in the linguistic capabilities not only of the Department of State, but also the IC and the rest of

¹ Section 333 of the Conference Report accompanying the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, H. Rpt. 107-789, H.R. 4628, which adopted section 309 of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence's report on the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, H. Rpt. 107-592.

the national security agencies and in what initiatives are being undertaken to meet current and future IC language requirements. How do they and others anticipate language demands for the future, and what is being done to meet the emerging demands?

Leadership on this issue will be required from the highest levels to encourage new programs in the elementary and secondary schools and post-secondary schools and to continue the existing ones such as the National Security Education Program in order to build a talent pool from which the government can recruit candidates. This and more creative ways to tap into America's rich diversity of "heritage" language speakers can bring more people into the applicant pool for critical roles across the government and in the nongovernmental organization (NGO) and private sectors as well.

The State Department's Approach

That is the backdrop, and I would note that many of the concerns and challenges are shared ones on which we in the State Department have been very eagerly collaborating much more intensively since 9/11. There are growing fissures in the stovepipes and cracks in the iron rice bowls. And that is a very good thing.

Ameliorating our shared challenges required us to consider how to better exploit and channel existing language resources and how to create new ones. In other words, how do we recruit, train, assign, retain and further develop the cadres with those language capabilities that are needed in all their various guises to enable us to accomplish our mission? That covers a lot of ground, so where do we begin?

The Department of State has developed and started to implement a coherent, integrated strategic plan for meeting its language proficiency goals. This plan involves close collaboration among the Bureau of Human Resources, the Foreign Service Institute (FSI), the functional and regional bureaus and posts with foreign language requirements. Our approach involves targeted recruitment, credit in the hiring process for language proficiency, and incentives to acquire, maintain, and improve language skills to highly advanced levels, and to re-use over a career the critical and difficult languages that are in high demand as we build the needed language cadres. This strategic plan is reinforced by the high value that the Department's corporate culture places on language proficiency among our Foreign Service employees.

Getting the People

Language training is time consuming, expensive, difficult, and the resulting proficiency is fragile—use it or lose it. The best language training in the world, and we believe that FSI provides that, only works when there are students who can come to training, stay in training for the required amount of time, and use, maintain, and reuse their hard-won proficiency. But the Foreign Service was "hollowed-out" by the freeze on hiring in the mid-1990s, so Secretary Powell launched a successful move to bring the number of State employees back to what is required to meet critical overseas needs, as well as create a "personnel complement." That would provide for enough staff resources to make training

and crisis response possible. Known as the “Diplomatic Readiness Initiative,” it is bringing record numbers of new employees into the Department, 1,069 over three years in addition to other special hiring for security and consular affairs. This is one factor in a 150 percent rise in the amount of language training delivered in the past six years.

As I noted, one way to increase language capacity is to target the people and places where there are reservoirs of language proficiency. We look to the “heritage” community, but conducting background investigations for clearances on native speakers can be particularly difficult, because many of these individuals have lived abroad, in some cases for years. We also target those who, despite the vagaries of the American educational system, have already developed strong skills in critical languages.

There are several important reasons why we do not require language proficiency or set it as a primary criterion for selection into the Foreign Service. The fluidity of language requirements partially explains this. In other words, the Albanian speakers we would have hired three years ago would not necessarily help us meet today’s needs in Iraq and Afghanistan. Rather, the Department has identified core skills and qualities, which we call “dimensions,” that are far more indicative of a candidate’s long-term prospects for contributing successfully to the conduct of American foreign policy over a full career. These dimensions have proven essential to conducting a long career in an ever-changing environment. They represent skills that cannot be taught easily, if at all: cultural adaptability; leadership; initiative; judgment; composure; interpersonal skills, etc. A person without these skills would not make an effective diplomat even if he or she spoke Chinese just as well as a native speaker.

However, once our applicants have passed the rigorous written and oral examination process, they are placed on a selection register and then can take a speaking-only telephone test to determine whether they are at a “threshold level” at least S-2 in a hard or S-3 in a world language. If so, they are then moved higher on the selection register for possible earlier entry into the Foreign Service. A recent change in that program provides even more bonus points for certain languages and language families designated as “critical needs languages” for national security. As a result, a recent entering class of entry-level Foreign Service Officers (March 8, 2004) is comprised of a majority of candidates who have passed a preliminary screening test in designated languages and who received the extra bonus points for entry into the Foreign Service. (Reinforcing the observation about when to plant trees, it was interesting to note that most of the new officers who came into the Service with strong Japanese skills were not heritage speakers, but likely benefited from the teaching of Japanese in the public schools in the 1980s and 1990s, when the issue was global economic competitiveness.)

These pre-existing skills—in any language—will then play a major role in bids for their first assignments. In general, officers entering with language skills have more options than those who enter with none. With proven language learning ability, they generally make better candidates for more difficult languages, like Arabic or Chinese, and more often are assigned to training for positions requiring proficiency in such languages.

Once hired, and irrespective of whether they enter with language proficiency or not, new officers are acutely attuned to language training issues as part of their overall career development. Entering officers must achieve proficiency in a foreign language to gain tenure, and later in their careers, those desiring to become senior officers must have achieved a professional level of proficiency (S-3/R-3) to cross the senior threshold.

Throughout, employees' career paths are influenced in part—and in many cases, very significantly—by their language skills. When possible, the Department's goal is to assign officers who already speak languages not commonly spoken or studied in the US to a number of tours in which that language may be used. Particularly for the most difficult languages (Arabic, Chinese, Japanese, and Korean), the Department's goal is to ensure that officers with relatively rare language skills or those able to take long-term language training are given priority for assignment and re-assignment to posts where those languages are spoken.

Generous Language Incentive Pay (LIP) is available for those using designated hard languages while on assignment. Additional bonuses are paid for substantial improvement in proficiency and for repeat tours that use the same language. And I also would like to believe that the state-of-the-art language training delivered by the Foreign Service Institute is in itself an incentive to the motivated foreign affairs professional.

The Language Continuum: Developing the Needed Cadres

The immediate challenge of 9/11 for our diplomats abroad is to have the language skills to competently and credibly convey America's message to often skeptical and even hostile foreign audiences, to understand the positions of our interlocutors—allies and adversaries alike—and to advance US policy goals and interests. The "Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World," created at the request of Rep. Frank Wolf and the House Appropriations Committee and chaired by Ambassador Edward Djerejian, issued a report on October 1, 2003, recommending steps to strengthen public diplomacy. A major recommendation of that group was a very substantial increase in our capability in Arabic. And it is true that after 9/11 we had to call one of our best Arabic linguists out of retirement to go on Al-Jazeera and debate and present America's story to an Arab audience. While we do have many competent Arabic speakers, we are still too thinly staffed, and there are too many critical jobs for them to fill in the Middle East and elsewhere. And to do what amounts to the equivalent of "Crossfire" or "Meet the Press" in Arabic will take more than a basic course—or even an advanced course in Arabic. It's going to take enormous commitment and effort and experimenting with new approaches.

Over the years we had already been consciously and thoroughly increasing the professional relevance of our language training, and after 9/11 those efforts were redoubled, especially in the areas of consular tradecraft language and public diplomacy practice for all students, not just those in the public diplomacy conc. The "training float" has permitted us to make intensive targeted language training become more of a reality as those outside the Department as well as visionaries within it have put greater emphasis on language proficiency. The electronic wizardry of new multimedia technology and the

Internet have allowed us to expand our reach beyond the school house and provide continuing language education—a mandate that was laid on us by Congress some years ago and remains yearly in our authorization.

As a proactive step in response to the national language challenge, FSI peered ahead and saw beyond the status quo, and in January 2004, we published our *Language Continuum* that parallels FSI's other career and training-related continua. This strategic plan lays out in a coherent fashion a broad range of formal and informal language learning options that have existed as independent elements into the fabric of a Foreign Service career and assignment path. A collaborative effort with the personnel system and the operational bureaus, this *Continuum* outlines for the Department and its employees a way to meld the principles of strategic workforce planning and the "Open Assignments" system, by serving as a roadmap to weave language proficiency development and use into a successful career progression. Some of the elements are opportunities beyond FSI/Washington, such as post language programs, distance learning programs that maintain the hard-won proficiency of those serving away from the area where the language is spoken, FSI's full-time language training programs at overseas field schools, and highly-advanced training at regional universities abroad. The *Language Continuum* is designed to help Foreign Service personnel, including Foreign Service Specialists and eligible family members, plan a long-term integrated approach to language learning and use, leading the motivated and talented more often to attain the advanced language skills that are so difficult to achieve, so fragile to maintain, and so critical to the nation. This is a prudent leveraging of our investment in language training and can build the advanced language cadres that 9/11 and subsequent developments have made so critical to the well-being of the United States and its citizens.

The key to America's success in meeting the global language challenge will be, like the *Language Continuum*, a weaving together of complementary and mutually supportive dimensions of action in Congress, the Foreign Affairs and Intelligence Community, the broader federal government, NGOs, and the state and local educational establishments. Only then will America cease to be tongue-tied.

Public Diplomacy and the United States Information Agency, Yes!

Bruce S. Gelb

Director, United States Information Agency, 1989-1991
United States Ambassador to Belgium, 1991-1993

In the latter part of the 1950s the phrase, "Missile Gap," initially a political war cry, ultimately became accepted truth. It helped to unseat a political party, damaged not a few foreign affairs and defense establishment professionals and opened up a virtually endless treasure-trove of biting and sarcastic political cartoons. Now we have the "public diplomacy gap" which translates for many perhaps into an over-simplified question, "Why does the world suddenly seem to hate the United States (US)?"

Public opinion polls conducted by respected organizations like Zogby and others have fine-tuned these negative attitudes. We now learn from these polls that it is not Americans who are hated, it is the policies of our government. This, of course, raises immediate questions: "Do these haters understand our policies?; Can polling data in non-democratic countries be accurate?; When one's tongue will be cut off for expressing blasphemous thoughts can people speak freely and honestly?; and finally, with all of these negatives, how can there be such a disconnect between millions of people worldwide trying desperately to enter the US, legally or illegally, and these views that the world hates the US?" Carrying this hatred to the point of absurdity, maybe they hate the US because it's the middle of our President's last name: B-US-H. Who knows?

All of us living here in the United States would prefer to go to sleep at night with the comforting thought that those billions of "foreigners" do think the USA over the long haul has been a benefactor to most countries in the world. Was it not the US with the help and cooperation of our North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies in Europe who, together, helped bring on the implosion of the communist Soviet dictatorship? Does no one any longer remember something about how the US and Britain led the countries of the world in defeating the evil Axis of Germany and Japan? Then there was that thing called World War I and the small but special role we played there. One fears our (Western) historical memory is getting shorter by the year; not so amongst those peoples of Islam for whom the results of these wars and conflicts present themselves in an altogether different light. It is in our interest, perhaps our very survival, to know and understand our own history. With this understanding we will be better able to present our way of life with its emphasis on personal freedom and human rights.

Once upon a time in the United States there was an organization in Washington that was charged with the task of telling the truth, the whole truth, the un-propagandized truth about the US to the rest of the world. Some un-recognized "geniuses" like Harry Truman, Dwight Eisenhower, John Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush using the presidency and a majority in Congress provided the money to create and keep alive the UNITED STATES

INFORMATION AGENCY (USIA). The mission of the USIA was to communicate to the world's populations the true benefits of an open society and the crucial nature of freedom of speech, the rule of law, freedom of religion and the benefit of free and independent labor unions to name just a few. The message was communicated in virtually every method known at the time: the short-wave radio Voice of America, a global TV network, English-language libraries with free and open access to books, magazines and newspapers, specialized media in many different languages to reach in every way possible those billions out there "yearning to breathe free." During the Cold War, President Eisenhower said that peace was too important to be left solely in the hands of diplomats and the military—there must be "People-to-People" exchanges in addition to the more formal kinds of diplomacy. As a result, thousands of carefully selected future leaders came to this country as special guests of the US government.

In addition our ordinary tourists to foreign countries were supplemented by special experts, academics, sports heroes, jazz music greats, scientists, doctors, comedians, dancers, capitalists, clowns and college boys and girls. Way beyond the billions of dollars sent in Agency for International Development (AID) programs and by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the communication of the greatness of our country was achieved through movies of all kinds which showed not just our material wealth but the kinds of people in the US that did the everyday work, raised the families, fought the wars for freedom, followed the religions that they wished and generally despite the many differences in race, religion and ethnicity got along amazingly well.

Our major Achilles heel, the mistreatment of our African-American population began to be explored, faced up to and presented by the Hollywood of the 1950s and 1960s. For the first time, Hollywood moved away from stereotyping and faced up to the race problem in the US. However, the most important message communicated around the world was the passage of specific Civil Rights legislation by Congress and signed by the President in 1964-1965.

There was clear recognition from 1947 until 1993 that in addition to the nuclear threat posed by the Soviet Union we were facing an ideological war between communism and democracy. There was also clear recognition that it was a long-term effort with no deadline set for ending the program until our system of government "won," to use an over-simplified term.

Today we and the West are facing another ideological challenge worldwide in nature, that of extremist, fanatical Moslem sects sponsoring terrorists and teaching hatred of the United States and almost everything associated with Western culture.

To some degree there is a parallel with the British Empire in its prime and the way the US is viewed in the world today: with hatred, fear, respect and some grudging admiration. The United States' position of strength in the world today has created the same kinds of diverse emotions worldwide. There is, of course, one major difference and that is the British people were solidly behind their empire while in the United States there is a panoply of attitudes among our people ranging from generalized rage against just about

everything America stands for to a **self-satisfied glow** about our uniqueness as a bastion of freedom.

There is also a real question if any action that our country takes to help make the world understand what the US really stands for is worth the effort. **Can education end** deep-seated hatred? Can an individual driven by a blood-feud tradition of revenge against past grievances change inside? Should we care so much about how foreign populations see this country? In the view of the most experienced practitioners in the study of foreign affairs, human psychology and public diplomacy, the answer is "yes" to all four questions.

Perhaps the most important question is "Why is anti-Americanism so pervasive around the world and what can we do about it?"

In January of this year Dr. John Brademas, member of Congress for 22 years from Indiana, addressed the Royal Academy of the Kingdom of Morocco. His subject: "Education and Culture - Forces for Peace in a Troubled World." As President Emeritus of New York University, which today has 4,400 students from countries around the world on its campus (in the heart of New York City), he speaks with authority on this subject. In his address he endorses the position of his colleague, Joseph Nye, Dean of the John F. Kennedy School of Government, namely, to invest more in "soft power." Dr. Nye's stated position is that US military power is essential to global stability and is a critical **part** of the response to terrorism; beyond that "soft power" rises **from** the attractiveness of a country's culture, political ideas and policies.

The "masters" of soft power throughout the Cold War were the men and women in the United States and in virtually every country of the world who manned the United States Information Agency. Both US citizens and the thousands of foreign nationals, who represented us locally, were the unsung heroes of the ideological victory of democracy over communism.

Since 2001 with "The Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Managed Information Dissemination" there has been a flood of studies and recommendations on this general subject. It includes blue ribbon organizations such as: the US Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy; the Council on Foreign Relations; the General Accounting Office; the Center for the Study of the Presidency; the Heritage Foundation book by Johnson and Dale; the Brookings Institution study by Graham Fuller and in October 2003 the scholarly work of Ambassador Djerejian called "Changing Minds, Winning Peace."

All of the above, one way or the other, agree with Congressman Frank Wolf's "tentative" conclusion reported in *The New York Times* of February 4, 2003: "Maybe we made a mistake in closing down the United States Information Agency." Each of the above named reports has a new, modified, re-organized, re-jiggered approach to doing what the USIA did so well, not perfectly, not without a glitch or two along the way, but well enough to have played a crucial role in fending off or bringing down communism in the USSR, Eastern Europe and in countless countries around the world.

For much of the Cold War, the Voice of America was an important part of our public diplomacy effort. While it generally received high marks for “telling America’s story” to that part of the world under the heel of Soviet communism, from time to time it came under political attack for acts of both omission and commission. It is now a part of the overall broadcasting effort of the US and that is where it should remain. It needs more financial support and more technical upgrading to bring it into the 21st century but basically it worked well. However, the rest of what constituted the USIA (or as it was known overseas, the United States Information Service, [USIS]) should be brought back to life in tact. It should be removed from its current second-rate citizen status under the State Department. There is hardly one element of what proved so helpful for so many years that needs major overhauling. Starting with its basic organization, the Director held a Sub-Cabinet appointment and reported directly to the President and to the Secretary of State. In organization terms this means a straight line to the President and a dotted line to the Secretary of State. In our political system this kind of individual was almost always readily available.

There is no question that Peter Drucker was right when he advised senior executives to avoid splitting their responsibilities. His dictum was simply “Put half a man on a job and you’ll get half a job.” The State Department focuses on many subjects: foreign politics, foreign economics, foreign military matters to name just a few and fundamentally is charged with executing the President’s foreign policy. Nothing can stand in the way of getting that job done. When the foreign country’s media deal with State Department representatives they know they are receiving the official message from a diplomat. When the USIA was in operation, the local newspaper contacts knew that they were dealing with an information specialist from an agency that reported to the US President, not to the Secretary of State. That small but crucial difference made it possible for USIA officers to develop close personal connections with the media men and women who influence the local population. This was even more true at the academic and cultural level where we clearly have major challenges today in both the Islamic and non-Islamic world.

In the world of business and generally wherever there are many possible courses of action and methods of organizing, it has often been shown that it is prudent to test an approach before using it globally to guard against unforeseen problems. In marketing there is a whole industry devoted to what is known as “test marketing.” All of the many proposals referred to above on how to deal with our country’s image overseas involve interesting and innovative changes from the established USIA experience with barely a reference to why the change was needed. It’s almost as if they were written without full knowledge of the USIA’s history.

There currently exists a nongovernmental organization in Washington, DC called the US Public Diplomacy Council (PDC), which has as its pro-bono members a broad array of the highest performing former USIA officers and Private Sector Specialists. Making a decision and getting the job started quickly is crucial. This organization which will unquestionably have the support of both Democrats and Republicans in Congress could help to put the USIA back together quickly so that it conceivably could be

functioning powerfully by the end of this year at the latest. As of today, the Council's goals are to support awareness of public diplomacy's central importance to the nation's foreign policy and serve as an activist clearing house. By offering information to the press, the public and on the Hill and elsewhere, the PDC can play a key role in helping to rebuild the structures and skills that are so essential. The Council's Web site offers timely insights into the challenges facing our public diplomacy; and its daily electronic news file is the best source anywhere of media reporting on public diplomacy (PD) issues across the country and the world.

This is not to imply that the USIA back in action will be some kind of "quick fix." Because our relationships around the world almost always involve the local publics' attitude toward the US and just about everything encompassed by our democratic system, we must gear up for a long, sustained effort just as we did in the Cold War. The rainbow at the end of this journey is a world as diverse as New York City with its 250 languages and its mix of religious and ethnic groups that goes along and gets along every day of the week.

Let's face the issue honestly and frankly. Everyone made a mistake in closing down the USIA in 1999 and for once, let's admit that mistake, get over it and get back on track.

Still Needed: A United States Policy for “Soft Power”

Carl Spielvogel

United States Ambassador to the Slovak Republic, 2000-2001
Governor, United States Broadcasting Board of Governors, 1995-2000

“Diplomacy: The Art of Letting Someone Have it Your Way.” These words are inscribed on a paperweight that sat on my desk at the United States (US) Embassy in Bratislava, the Slovak Republic, and it was the first thing I saw when I came to work each morning.

To some, it must sound a bit like a cliché, but to me, it still served as a daily reminder of a thought that unfortunately many of our government decision makers seem to have forgotten these days.

Having spent 30 years of my working life developing commercial strategies for hundreds of multinational corporations and doing business in 54 countries as a Chief Executive Officer, I believed that although I did not speak the language of all of my 10,000 multinational employees—only 1,100 of whom were Americans—I was obliged to try to help them develop “client” strategies that might be successful.

For example, I told them that one has to first understand the “problem” in our case; we call it “US public diplomacy.” Since this is the “client” we are dealing with, our challenge is to:

1. “Explain” the US and the reasons for its actions, to the rest of the world—but most importantly to our allies.
2. Try to win the hearts and minds of the Islamic world, where we have made such a halting start.

Anyone who has tried to sell US products or anyone’s products around the world understands that one cannot sell successfully a “bad” product. Yet we, the most effective democracy in the world, know that we have a superior product—the record of this young nation—and have done such a “unilaterally” poor job of selling it.

Put simply, we need more contemporary and focused communications tools in our diplomatic tool kit, and we need to use them more effectively. We have made a serious and continuing mistake in thinking that we could use our “hard power,” to the exclusion of “soft power.”

It is worth reminding ourselves that George Kennan, writing in *Foreign Affairs* in 1947, said that to win the war against communism, the US had “to create among the peoples of the world generally the impression of a country which knows what it wants, which is coping successfully with the problems of its internal life and with the

responsibilities of a world power and which has a spiritual vitality capable of holding **its** own among the major ideological currents of the time.”

That cogent observation, made some 57 years ago by a brilliant diplomat-public servant has stood the test of time and should still serve as a “client” position statement on which to build an effective program for public diplomacy.

To round out this strategy and include our currently alienated democratic allies in the fight against terrorism and fundamentalism, one needs to incorporate in our “soft power” initiative such shared basic values as individual freedoms, free trade, open markets, democracy, women’s rights, the rule of law, transparency, health care, public education, etc.

The new report just issued by the non-partisan Pew Research Center, about how foreign publics view America, confirms many of our worst fears about how hardened anti-American views have become in Europe and in Muslim countries.

This alarming report, entitled, “A Year After the Iraq War,” and its predecessors, “What the World Thinks in 2002” and “Views of a Changing World,” should be read carefully by everyone concerned about the future of our great country.

It is to be hoped that Margaret D. Tutwiler, recently named Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, can start to rectify this long neglected policy area.

As a person highly regarded by the Bush administration, her words carried weight, when in testifying before the House of Representatives in February, she said in referring to public diplomacy: “Unfortunately, our country has a problem in far too many parts of the world.”

Space limitations in this article do not permit further discussion of the many remedies available to start to cure this problem of “lack of trust” in the US although I presented some suggested solutions in the article I wrote for this publication in the spring 2003 issue, entitled “Needed: A US Policy for ‘Soft Power.’”

From my view, the most effective analysis of what needs to be done is contained in the excellent Task Force report recently released by the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). It is entitled, “Finding America’s Voice: A Strategy for Reinvigorating US Public Diplomacy.” If one reads this report, one will find a road map for what should be done to achieve a results-oriented program for public diplomacy.

However, whatever we do in the area of public diplomacy to attempt to restore our global status as the world’s leading democracy, which cares about all of the peoples around us, we: (a) must communicate that we realize we cannot defeat terrorism alone, and (b) make certain that all of our messages are free of political spin.

In our free democratic society, White House administrations come and go, but we must communicate that “these truths are self-evident” about our democracy and that they will go on forever. Our young democracy has stood the test of time, and we must do all we can with soft power to continue to hold it up **as** a model.

One does not need to reinvent the wheel: The CFR analysis, and others like it such as the Pew report, identify the problems and the solutions. Why don't we “just do it!”?

America's New Diplomacy: Winning the Race for Hearts and Minds

Nancy G. Brinker

United States Ambassador to Hungary, 2001-2003

In a country where cancer is still discussed in whispers, it was a remarkable sight—hundreds of resolute Hungarian breast cancer survivors walking across Budapest's historic Chain Bridge, illuminated in pink, the international color of breast cancer.

As the American Ambassador to Hungary at the time, I had the privilege of working with Hungarian-based nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and multinational corporate sponsors to organize last year's "Bridge of Health"—that nation's first fundraiser for women's health.* As one woman told us afterwards, "We were not sure such a huge event could be done in Hungary. Maybe we were not brave enough. So we thank you."

With Washington engaged in a global campaign to win hearts and minds, particularly in the Muslim world, such gratitude underscores one of America's greatest foreign policy tools for promoting America's image and interests around the world—healthcare.

Today, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is rebuilding public health systems in Afghanistan and Iraq. President Bush has proposed an historic 50 percent increase in foreign aid and a \$15 billion initiative to fight AIDS overseas. Secretary of State Colin Powell has elevated health care as an element of US foreign policy.

At the same time, USAID is pulling out of countries across Eastern Europe, and the European Union is doing little to assist fledgling NGOs that provide the building blocks of democracy. Who will fill the void?

It's time for a new model of diplomacy, one that communicates American values and serves US interests by harnessing the combined strength of the US government, industry, non-profits and the idealism of the American people. I have seen this model in action, and it works.

First, engage the man (and woman) on the street. Whereas traditional diplomacy concentrates on influencing foreign leaders, the new diplomacy reaches out to average citizens using nontraditional gateways of influence. Effective diplomacy need not cost billions of dollars or require another government agency.

* *Editor's Note: The walk across the Chain Link Bridge, illuminated in pink, was so successful that it was repeated in October 2003 under the auspices of Ambassador George Herbert Walker.*

For example, an essential component of any healthy society is awareness, education, prevention and healthy lifestyles. Our walk across Chain Bridge ignited a national dialogue in Hungary about women's health. By sponsoring Walks for Health through Budapest with government officials, business leaders and local celebrities, we helped empower Hungarians with the life-saving knowledge that they can take charge of their own health.

Second, grow the grassroots of democracy. Traditional diplomacy forges alliances and coalitions among nations. The new diplomacy forges civil societies within nations. In countries like Hungary, the American spirit of volunteerism is still largely a foreign concept. Only now—more than a decade after the lifting of the Iron Curtain—is something akin to an independent civil society and non-profit sector taking hold.

Americans experienced in the NGO community and coalition building can help by promoting a new culture of civic activism in developing countries. I shared with Hungarians my experience as a founder of one of America's largest breast cancer organizations. A new partnership between Hungarian and American physicians is one of dozens of USAID initiatives to promote community-based approaches to health. With active citizens comes more public faith in the ability of a democratic system to deliver a better future.

Finally, foster a spirit of corporate citizenship. Traditional diplomacy emphasizes government assistance. The new diplomacy recognizes that 80 percent of US humanitarian aid now comes from the generosity of the American people and the private sector.

Our effort to illuminate the Chain Bridge would have been impossible without the financial support of General Electric, one of the many ways GE is reaching out to Europe after the European Commission blocked its bid to takeover Honeywell in 2001. Yet after decades of communist domination, countries like Hungary have yet to develop their own sense of corporate philanthropy.

In Hungary, I explained how non-profits and the business community can partner to achieve common ends. Likewise, American business leaders can advise their foreign counterparts on how to embrace corporate philanthropy.

As Ambassador, I had the privilege of working in the office once used by Cardinal Joseph Mindszenty who took refuge in the US Embassy in Budapest for 15 years after Moscow crushed the 1956 Hungarian uprising. "Democracy," Cardinal Mindszenty once said, "implies that every citizen and every social class is equally entitled to participate in the shaping of the common fate of all of us."

The West won the Cold War with both its "hard" military power and the "soft" power of its ideals and values. Imagine how many hearts and minds the US could win today by making the promise of democracy—including the common human need for healthcare—a foreign policy priority.

Reaching out to ordinary citizens around the world and communicating America's values is no longer just a job for the US government. It's a job for all Americans, including the private sector.

~~FOUO~~

November 30, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Paper on Abu Ghraib

383.6

Here's a Tillie Fowler piece on Abu Ghraib. I don't know if she ever got it published.

Thanks.

Attach.
"Read the Report, Know the Facts" by Tillie K. Fowler

DHR:ss
113004-6

.....
Please respond by _____

3000004

~~FOUO~~

OSD 04242-05

11- L-0559/OSD/47673

READ THE REPORT, KNOW THE FACTS

By Tillie K. Fowler

During the time I represented the people of northeast Florida in Congress, it was not unusual to be forced to wrangle with political distortions and misrepresentations of various issues reported in newspapers and on television. However, none ever rose to the level of what has been recently reported on the work of the Independent Panel to Review Department of Defense Detention Operations, which was chaired by former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger and included myself, President Carter's Defense Secretary Harold Brown and retired *Air Force* General Charles Horner. Together, we conducted the first independent and comprehensive investigation into the abuses at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq and other Department of Defense detention facilities.

Our investigation found leadership failures up the chain of command and chronicled a series of missed opportunities for effective and aggressive leadership and proper exercise of duty. We very specifically concluded that had there been stronger leadership and more effective oversight within the chain of command, the abuses could have been prevented or discovered and halted much earlier.

Contrary to recent editorial and political characterizations, our report details these primary failures and assigns responsibility appropriately. Americans did not want a political witch hunt, they rightfully demanded objective answers to why and how the abuse happened and our report provides those answers.

We did not shy away from the facts and certainly did not shelter anyone from their failures. Our report was explicit as we found the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Commander of U.S. Central Command failed to develop a war plan to include effective alternatives to post-major combat operations. We also reported the leadership failures of senior civilian and military officials in the Pentagon who did not adequately clarify and enforce how the various categories of detainees were to be treated throughout the military detention facilities.

I am truly surprised every time I read or hear that our report failed to hold officials responsible for their failures. To those detractors, I would recommend taking the time to fully read the 125-paged report in which the largest section explicitly addresses command responsibility. In fact, we provide specific examples where four Generals and four Colonels failed to exercise the judgment, awareness and resourcefulness necessary to prevent the abuses. These commanders showed little signs of the leadership expected of them and certainly did not set a good example for their subordinates to follow.

Throughout our investigation, we were committed to providing an objective and independent examination of the issue. We presented the facts as we found them and did not create scenarios to fulfill political motivations and much to the chagrin of those looking for political opportunity, we found no explicit United States government policy calling for the torture or inhumane treatment of detainees.

When our report was released it was initially praised for being the first to find accountability for the scandal up to the highest levels in the chain of command, but somehow that fact has fallen victim to a variety of political agendas which are being furthered through imprecise and inaccurate reporting.

The Pentagon has moved quickly to reform its entire detention system to ensure abuses like those at Abu Ghraib never happen again. Now they must ensure that the military justice system proceeds without delay to punish those within the chain of command whose action or inaction allowed the abuse to happen. We owe it to the young men and women honorably serving in our Armed Forces in Iraq and elsewhere to restore the trust that has been tarnished by these horrible acts.

Tillie K. Fowler served on the Armed Services Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives from 1993-2001. She is the Chairman of the Defense Policy Board Advisory Committee and led the independent investigation into allegations of sexual abuse at the U.S. Air Force Academy last year.

11-L-0559/OSD/47674

~~FOUO~~

November 30, 2004

TO: David Chu

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
 Fran Harvey
 Gen Pete Schoomaker

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Paper on Saving the All Volunteer Force

320.2

Attached is an interesting paper from an expert on the subject. Why don't you take a look at it, and let me know what you think.

Thanks.

Attach.

11/04 Paper on Saving the All-Volunteer Force by Charley Moskos

DHR:ss
112904-40


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Please respond by 12/21/04

302004

~~FOUO~~

November 19,2004

For: Secretary of Defense
From: W.J. Haynes 
Subject: Email from Newt Minow concerning the All-Volunteer Force

- Newt asked me to pass along to you a note from his friend Charley Moskos.
- Newt says Moskos is the leading military sociologist in the nation. I've heard similar descriptions.
- Moskos will be meeting soon with Pete Schoomaker, and has written the attached note on "Saving the All-Volunteer Force."

Attachment: a/s

11-L-0559/OSD/47676

11/04
Charley Moskos

Subject: Saving the All-Volunteer Force

The desirable end-strength of our armed forces, especially that of the Army has become a subject of concern. All agree, however, that the military manpower demands are heightened owing to Operation Iraqi Freedom, Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and other deployments. In particular, there is apprehension that reserve components will confront severe recruitment and reenlistment problems in the near future.

The most practical way of alleviating impending shortfalls and excessive reliance on reserve components is to introduce a short enlistment option targeted at college attendees and college graduates. This would entail a 15-month active duty commitment. Such 15-month enlistees could well perform many of the roles now being met by reserve components as well as some number of active duty personnel.

There is a definite, albeit limited, market of college graduates who state a propensity for military service if the active-duty commitment is 15 months coupled with generous educational benefits. In the fall of 2002 enlistment propensities of undergraduates were assessed through surveys conducted at four representative universities: Northwestern University, University of Arizona, University of California-Los Angeles, University of Illinois-Chicago. A similar survey was completed in October, 2004, at Northwestern University. These were the first and only surveys on enlistment propensity ever conducted on a university campus.

Options were given with different enlistment lengths and educational benefits. The educational benefits options ranged from \$60,000 for a four-year enlistment to \$15,000 for the 15-month enlistment. Across all universities, shorter terms had a notable positive effect on enlistment propensity. Twenty-three percent indicated an enlistment propensity for the 15-month option (with 15K in educational benefits) compared to two percent for the four-year option (with 60K in educational benefits).

Very significantly, the October 2004 survey at Northwestern specifically asked how many of the students would consider serving as a prison guard in places like Abu Ghraid and Guantanamo. In return, they

would have their student loans forgiven and be given G.I. Bill benefits for graduate school. A remarkable 11 percent that this would be a "very likely" option and another 18 percent would "consider" such an option.

Context. Two-thirds of American high school graduates now go directly on to some form of higher education. Of these, about half will graduate with a bachelor's degree. Each year 1.2 million young people graduate with a bachelor's degree. Yet military recruitment of college graduates at the enlisted level is minuscule. The average college graduate today leaves with about \$19,000 in debt.

Very significantly, among the college graduates, 40 percent intend to go on to some form of graduate work. In point of fact, a higher percentage of youth now go on to graduate school than went to undergraduate school in the post-WWII years of the original G.I. Bill. The average debt of one who attends graduate school is \$38,000!

Few of the students at the more selective universities had close relatives or friends who were serving in the military. Noteworthy, there was no correlation between military knowledge (half of the students did not know a colonel was higher than a major). There was also no correlation between political values and enlistment with liberals and conservatives having the same propensity.

Arguments Against a 15-Month Enlistment. Three major arguments are raised against the short enlistment. These are given below with rejoinders.

(1) "Short enlistments would increase demands on the training base." Let us remember that almost one-third of our service entrants now fail to complete their initial enlistments. In fact, soldiers signing up for long enlistments -- four to six years - have attrition rates one and a half times greater than those who enter on the two-year enlistment. Completion of an enlistment term is also strongly correlated with higher education. Much better to have a soldier serve 15 months honorably than be prematurely discharged. A 15-month enlistment option would both reduce personnel turnover and counter shortfalls in end strength.

(2) "Today's military requires highly technical skills that cannot be met by short-termers." Precisely. Higher compensation should be aimed at

those who skills require extended training and experience. In the draft era, the pay ratio between a senior NCO and a private was seven to one; today it is three to one. Future pay raises must be focused on the career soldier. 15-month enlistees could readily fill the multitude of jobs that require only a short formal training period or even just on-the-job training. It is well documented that higher educated recruits not only have markedly lower attrition rates, but also have the skills and motivation to quickly learn a wide variety of military jobs.

A major morale problem among reservists is pulling guard duty for various installations. This could be an appropriate task for a short-term enlistee. Item: the total length of a training for an military police officer -- from service entry to completion is 14 weeks. The short-term enlistee, moreover would be ideally suited for duties in peacekeeping missions such as in Bosnia, Kosovo, the Sinai (and perhaps Korea). These are the very missions the surveys show are most appealing to college students. Indeed, short enlistment soldiers are especially well suited to those MOS's now confronting recruitment shortfalls and excessive reliance on reserve components.

(3) "A short enlistment option would attract soldiers who otherwise would sign up for longer enlistment." Quite the contrary. A 15-month enlistment coupled with educational benefits would attract college attendees and graduates who heretofore would have never considered entering the armed forces. The short-term option recognizes that there is a dual market in recruitment. One based on salary, skill training, and career benefits; the other on those seeking a temporary break between college and graduate studies or between school and career.

Recommendations. The following is a list of preliminary recommendations in conjunction with the 15-month enlistment option.

1. Consider a cohort enlistment for certain colleges to serve in a specified peacekeeping mission.
2. Emphasize military service as a rewarding experience between undergraduate and graduate school or between school and career. Use single-term veterans as part-time recruiters.

3. Now is the time to consider linking federal aid to college students to some form of national service. Under the present system, we have created a G.I. Bill without the G.I. Through federal grants and loan subsidies we now pay students not to serve their country,

4. Establish a commission to look at military recruitment, homeland security needs, civilian national service, and federal student aid.

Conclusion. Without attracting significant numbers of college graduates, military recruitment will most likely experience; (a) a lowering of entrance standards, (b) higher entry pay and larger enlistment bonuses, (c) an expanded recruitment force, (d) increased contracting out of military functions, (e) more recruitment of non-American citizens.

Let us also keep in mind the long-term benefits for the country if military service becomes more common among privileged youth. We will have future leaders in civilian society with a rewarding military experience - - and who will be future informal recruiters. This can only be to the advantage of the armed services and the nation.

OIF Follow Up. What follow are recommendations in areas unrelated to military recruitment. Rather, these observations can be considered a follow-up to my earlier report on OIF (14 December 2003). They are based on discussions with Arabs and Muslim knowledgeable. (1) Do not assign female guards to deal directly with Muslim male prisoners. This to avoid the cultural reality of what is considered demeaning treatment. (2) Avoid using power point presentations to Arabs in general and Iraqis in particular. Again cultural realities make such presentations seem impersonal and aloof. (3) Consider establishing something along the lines of a short-term warrant officer program to recruit native-Arab speakers for interpreters, civil affairs, and the like.

November 29, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Acquisition Reform

400.13

Please read this material on acquisition reform and come to me with your proposal.

Thanks.

Attach.

10/21/04 SecDef Memo to USD (AT&L) re: Acquisition Reform

11/23/04 USD (AT&L) Memo to SecDef re: Interim Response to Bold Ideas for Acquisition

DHR:ss
112904-26

.....
Please respond by 12/17/04

400.13

~~FOUO~~

October 21, 2004

TO: Mike Wynne

CC: Gen Dick Myers Paul Wolfowitz
Gen Pete Pace Jim Roche
Gordon England Les Brownlee
Jim Haynes Powell Moore
Ken Krieg

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Acquisition Reform

DoD has a long way to go to ensure that our acquisition process achieves the appropriate jointness and interoperability needed in the 21st Century. Despite the progress with JROC and the work by AT&L and JFCOM on Command and Control, we still end up with the Marine Corps and Army procuring, driving, and training with different kinds of heavy trucks, for example. As we move forward with the QDR, we absolutely must transform the acquisition process. There are numerous suggestions floating around including:

- Have those in acquisition stay in their jobs longer
- A process to select the best people with the right backgrounds for key acquisition jobs
- Develop a Congressional strategy that gets the legislation needed to cut through red-tape and minimize bureaucratic roadblocks
- Consider improving joint acquisition by having more truly joint programs, and perhaps having officers from one service head up programs for other services
- Other?

Please get back to me with some bold proposals. This needs to get fixed.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
102004-18

.....
Please respond by _____

~~FOUO~~

*Sir,
Response attached.
v/r
LTCol Lenzel*

NOV 24 2004



ACQUISITION,
TECHNOLOGY
AND LOGISTICS

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3 0 1 0 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3 0 1 0

ACTION MEMO

November 23, 2004, 12:00pm

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

From: Michael W. Wynne, Acting Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition
Technology and Logistics)

Subject: Interim Response to Bold Ideas for Acquisition

- The purpose of this memo is to give you some early returns in response to your snowflake on *Bold Ideas in Acquisition Management*. The ideas are relatively easy to implement and would better align key organizations to incentivize jointness, the first step in improving acquisition. These ideas would be steps towards a bolder concept but would be useful whether or not you, and perhaps the Congress, embrace a bolder proposal. Since jointness is a Department objective, you can also achieve a major refocus by aligning resources with a policy directive.
- For aligning resources, it will be necessary to direct Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E) to protect funding for joint, transformational and international programs, which AT&L will identify in each of the Services' fiscal guidance. Changes to those programs would require my approval prior to POM submission. This change would put your objectives for Joint, Transformational, and those International programs you support, at the top of the priority list. Unfortunately, as you know, joint programs are at or near the lowest priority for the Service programmers. As Secretary Roche ruefully puts it: "Joint means Navy won't pay." Transformational programs usually mean new programs and in any budget end-game, current programs beat new programs. Currently, international programs compete for the dubious distinction of being the lowest priority for the Services. Attached is a memo which gives such budgeting direction (**Tab A**) I recommend you sign it.
- Most of the objectives of Secretary Aldridge's Study regarding acquisition, and even an earlier study (1992) by Secretary Yockey, were to achieve jointness and to address capabilities, not individual systems. As I construct a bold proposal, driving jointness and avoiding duplicate systems, such as trucks, will be the overarching objectives -- saving slots should be secondary and should not therefore be the objective. In the interim, the following steps would be effective in promoting jointness and could be implemented this cycle:




11-L-0559/OSD/47683

- Realign all Service research and development (R&D) commands and laboratories under the Director Defense Research and Engineering (D,DR&E). Establish Centers of Excellence with the current DoD/Service lab resources (including the universities doing basic research) in order to concentrate Science & Technology (S&T) and R&D efforts in specific areas. Developmental priorities would be addressed without duplicative structures. If you agree, I will task D,DR&E to come back to me in forty five days with a recommendation on how they would organize these capabilities. Examples of organizations that will be realigned can be found at **Tab B**.
- Realign all Logistics organizations and functions, currently resident within the Services, under the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Logistics and Material Readiness) (DUSD(L&MR)). If you agree, I will task the DUSD(L&MR) to come back to me in forty five days with a recommendation on how they might organize to accomplish this objective. This consolidated logistics focus would facilitate efficiencies, balanced workloads and make public private partnerships more productive. Examples of organizations that will be realigned can be found at **Tab C**.

COORDINATION: **Tab D**

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. Recommend you sign the memo at **Tab A**.
2. Recommend you approve development of implementation plans for realigning R&D commands and laboratories as well as Material Management and Maintenance organizations (**Tabs B and C**) – with response within **45** days.



Approve _____

Disapprove: _____

See Me: _____

CC: DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT
DIRECTOR, PROGRAM ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION
DIRECTOR, NET ASSESSMENT
DIRECTOR, FORCE TRANSFORMATION
DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES
DIRECTORS OF THE DOD FIELD ACTIVITIES

SUBJECT: Priority for Joint, Transformational, and International Acquisition Programs

In order to ensure appropriate emphasis is given to Joint, Transformational, and International programs, I am directing Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E) to protect funding, in the budgeting process, for programs in these categories. The Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition Technology and Logistics) USD(AT&L) will identify the program funding for each of these programs in the Services' fiscal guidance.

Changes to these programs shall require USD(AT&L) approval prior to Program Objective Memorandum submission. This process is intended to ensure the integrity of these Joint, Transformational, and International programs critical to transforming the Department of Defense and meeting the capability needs of our warfighters.

11-L-0559/OSD/47685

Proposed RDT&E Realignment

- Office of Defense Research (Science)
 - Office of Naval Research (Naval Research Lab as the Defense Research Lab)
 - Army Research Office
 - Army Research Lab
 - Air Force Office of Scientific Research
 - Air Force Research Lab
 - Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
- Office of Technology and Engineering (Demonstrations and Prototypes)
 - R&D Components of the Naval Systems Commands and Warfare Centers (Non-ACAT I)
 - Marine Corps Warfighting Lab
 - R&D Components of Army Research, Development & Engineering (Non-ACAT I)
 - R&D Components of the Air Force Systems Program Offices(Non-ACAT I)

Proposed Logistics Realignment

- Materiel Management
 - Army, Navy and Air Force Inventory Control Points
 - DLA Supply Centers
 - Other Materiel Mgt storage locations from the Services and Defense Agencies
 - Army Arsenals
 - Marine Corps Logistics Base
- Maintenance and Repair Facilities
 - Army and Marine Corps Maintenance Depots
 - Naval and Marine Corps Aviation Depots
 - Naval shipyards
 - Air Logistics Centers
- Distribution Centers/Depots
 - Defense Distribution Depots
 - Weapons stations and ammunitions depots
 - Operational (retail level) stock points
- Logistics Information Services

COORDINATION

General Counsel

November 23, 2004

720
~~FOUO~~ file

November 19, 2004
I-04/015675
ES-1454

JAPAN

TO: Doug Feith
FROM:
SUBJECT: Japanese

Please coordinate with me on dates when we do the Japanese 2+2.

Thanks.

DHR ss
111904-22

.....
Please respond by 12/3/04

Sir,
DH 12/10
Response Attached.
V/R, Col B
12/9

19 NOV 04

~~FOUO~~ 19-11-04 17:37 IN

OSD 04245-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47689

DA 12/10

INFO MEMO

DepSecDef _____
USD(P) _____
ASD/ISA _____
I-04/015675

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Peter W. Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)

SUBJECT: Update on U.S.-Japan 2+2 Scheduling

- This memo provides an update on efforts to coordinate dates for a 2+2 meeting with the Japanese, per your request (Tab 1).
- The Japanese Foreign and Defense Ministers want to hold a 2+2 soon to maintain momentum on alliance transformation and force posture discussions.
 - o We think this is a good idea.
- The Japanese proposed February 11 or 12, but those dates conflict with your NATO ministerial commitments.
- We have proposed a one day event during February 18-23, but have not received a reply from the Japanese.
 - o State Department officials believe the SecState designate will support an early 2+2 meeting and that these dates would work, but they cannot make commitments until she is confirmed.
- DUSD Lawless will continue to follow up with the Japanese.

Attachment as stated

PDASD/ISA _____
DUSD/AP *[Signature]* 9.12.2004
PDIR/AP *[Signature]* 12/1/04

Prepared by: Maj Jason Perry, Country Director for Japan, ISA/AP (b)(6)

November 17, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DA*
SUBJECT: Tax Exclusions

e/10

Please look at this note from David Chu on tax exclusions for the military. We ought to think through what else we might want to propose in that area.

Thanks.

Attach.
11/3/04USD(P&R) memo to SecDef re: History of the Combat Zone Tax Exclusion [OSD 13958-04]

DHR:dh
111704-20



Please respond by _____

11/17/04

~~FOUO~~

September 2, 2004

TO: Dr. Chu
Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: History of the Combat Zone Tax Exclusion

Please give me the history of this benefit, with a particular emphasis on how it works in Congress as between the Ways and Means Committees and the Armed Services Committees. I'd also be interested in thinking through how we might creatively leverage similar arrangements as we continue to find good incentives for *the* force.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
090204-7

Please respond by

9/10

U.S. Get Answer

*5/17
Response Attached
1/10/04*

~~FOUO~~

OSD 13958-04

13/4



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-4000

INFO MEMO

2004 NOV 13 11 3 01



November 3, 2004, 9:11 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S.C. Chu, OSD (P&R)

SUBJECT: History of the ~~the~~ **Combat Zone Tax** Exclusion—SNOWFLAKE (attached)

- Prior to **the** Korean conflict, income **tax** benefits for members of the Armed Forces were **part** of individual revenue acts **passed** to finance war efforts, and the exclusion was not dependent on combat zone designation.
- Beginning **with** the Korean conflict, the law excluded military compensation earned in a combat zone.
 - o The Internal Revenue Code exclusion is generally triggered by the President establishing a combat zone by Executive Order, not by Congressional action.
 - o Presidents have designated five combat zones: Korea, Vietnam, Arabian Peninsula, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. Korea and Vietnam have been terminated.
 - o Treasury regulations allow the Secretary, or his delegate, to extend combat zone **tax** benefits to members serving outside of but in "direct support" of the combat zone.
- Congress acted only twice to extend combat zone tax benefits to members by establishing in **law** Qualified Hazardous **Duty** Areas: the Former Yugoslavia (1995) and Kosovo (1999).
 - o **Both** of these bills originated in **the** House Ways and Means Committee.

Attachment:
As stated

Prepared By: LTC Janet Fenton, USA

(b)(6)

TSA SD	11/6
BRMA SD	
MA SD	SP3 11/7
EXEC SEC	M 11/16



DSD 13958-04

11-L-0559/OSD/47693

3143

file

November 4, 2004

TO: VADM Jim Stavridis

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Letter to Karzai

If I have not sent a letter to Karzai, congratulating him on his election, I should.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
110404-11

.....
Please respond by _____

11/5 *DR 11/4*
SIR _____
Already sent.
v/r
Jim

AFghanistan

Yakov

DA 11/4

PAAUZYUW RUEWMFU3307 2911821-UUUU--RUEKNMA.
ZNR UUUUU ZUI RUEKJCS3307 2911821
P 171820Z OCT 04

FM SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
TO RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
ZEN/OSD SECDEF
ZEN/PTC OTC SPT

UNCLAS

SUBJ: SECDEF LETTER TO PRESIDENT KARZAI

PLEASE DELIVER TO PRESIDENT KARZAI FROM SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
RUMSFELD

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT,

CONGRATULATIONS ON THE SUCCESS OF ELECTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN. SO MUCH HAS BEEN ACHIEVED OVER THE PAST THREE YEARS, MUCH OF IT THROUGH YOUR HARD WORK AND DETERMINATION. YOU HAVE LED YOUR NATION WELL THROUGH AN EXTRAORDINARY AND DEMANDING TIME, AND THE FUTURE IS BRIGHT. YOU SHOULD BE PROUD.

THE AFGHANI BALLOT YOU SIGNED IS DISPLAYED IN MY OFFICE, WHERE I WILL PROUDLY SHOW IT TO VISITORS. IT WILL ALWAYS BE A TREASURED POSSESSION, REFLECTING AN IMPORTANT EVENT INDEED.

I LOOK FORWARD TO WORKING WITH YOU IN THE TIME AHEAD.

DONALD RUMSFELD

ORIGINAL SIGNED LETTER TO FOLLOW SEPARATELY
BT

SECDEF V2		2
ACTION SECDEF WASH DC(*)	(U,6,8)	
INFO CMAS(*) CMAS(1) CHAIRS(*) CHAIRS TESTBED(*)		
CHAIRS2(*) SECDEF-C(1) SECDEF-C(*) USDAT:STS(*)		
ASD:PA-SMTP(*) DIR:PAE-RAM(*) USDCOMP(*)		
DACS-ZK:POLAD(*) OSDONNIPRDA(*) OSDONSIPRDA(*)		
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file

November 4, 2004

TO: VADM Jim Stavridis
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: **HAG** Program

373.24

Please see if you can find anything out about a high altitude guidance program. It is called **HAG**. I think it's connected to missile defense and believe it has to do with a bullet hitting a bullet.

Let me know if you can figure out what it is and what its status is.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
110404-3

.....
Please respond by 11/19/04

Sir,
Response attached.
✓/r
LT Col Bengyel
11/5

42004

High Accuracy Guidance (HAG)

- HAG is a homing guidance and missile command generator whose proponents claim can achieve a small miss distance in homing missile engagements, especially against highly maneuvering endoatmospheric targets.
- HAG technology is proprietary and has been offered for sale to the Government as a sealed “black box” by HAG Technologies.
- In simulations of U.S. missile engagements conducted by DoD, academia, and industry from 1994 to 2000, HAG sometimes outperformed classical homing guidance algorithms but was not evaluated against modern algorithms.
- HAG’s inventor is no longer available, complicating the understanding of its underlying principles. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has suggested that HAG Technologies give DoD access to HAG source code in order to ascertain the true nature and potential of HAG algorithms.
- Radiance Technologies has proposed that MDA fund an ongoing program sponsored by HAG Technologies to reverse engineer HAG. The proposed program would assess HAG performance in simulation testing, rewrite HAG computer code in maintainable format, and determine its weaponization potential.
- MDA has an open Broad Agency Announcement for technologies such as HAG, MDA suggested to the HAG owners to submit a proposal to allow an in-depth evaluation.



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY
7100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-7100

DT

04 2004

The Honorable Jon Kyl
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510-0304

Dear Senator Kyl:

In my response to your letter of June 24, 2004, I promised to provide an assessment of the High Accuracy Guidance (HAG) algorithms for defense against high speed maneuvering reentry vehicles, as it may be applied within the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS).

We formed a team of missile guidance experts and they have concluded that given extremely good seeker measurements, HAG generally outperforms classical homing guidance techniques against some classes of targets. Without access to the HAG source code, the true nature and potential of the HAG algorithms cannot be ascertained. With access to the code we could avoid the current "black box" approach and allow a more thorough comparison to similar modern guidance, estimation and control techniques against threatening targets.

Since the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has an open Broad Agency Announcement (BAA, Solicitation Number HQ0006-04-MD A-BAA) for technologies such as HAG, I suggest the HAG owners consider some of the questions raised by our assessment team, which we will forward to them directly, and then submit a proposal to us through this BAA. Again, thank you for your support of Ballistic Missile Defense and the technologies that will keep us outpacing the threat.

Sincerely,

HENRY A. OBERING III
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director

11-L-0559/OSD/47698

NOV 04 2004

311 CCC

TO: Ray DuBois
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Gen Dick Myers
Gen Pete Pace
Paul McHale
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: SITE R and other Alternate Command Sites

I enjoyed the visit to Site R and learned a great deal. Thanks for setting it up. Please come back to me about our path ahead on all of our alternate command sites – including the NAOC.

We should also work to ensure that each of these sites are laid out in a way that correctly reflects the chain of command, e.g., the Services do not need large staff spaces because they are not in the operational chain.

Finally, we need to be cost conscious. We have many priorities.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
110304-1

.....
Please respond by 12/5/04

4 NOV 04

~~FOUO~~

foto

November 15, 2004

TO: VADM Jim Stavridis
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Canal Zone Security Brief

Panama

The administrator of the Canal Zone offered to come up and brief whoever we want at the Pentagon on other security arrangements and other plans.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
111504-3

.....
Please respond by _____

~~FOUO~~

ISPOV04

OSD 04250-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47700

MODE = MEMORY TRANSMISSION

START=NOV-18 08:47

END=NOV-18 08:47

FILE NO. =359

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

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CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

TO:	Gen Craddock	FROM:	VADM Stavricis
OFFICE:	Southcom	OFFICE:	Immediate Office of the Secretary of Defense
PHONE:	(b)(6)	COMM:	(b)(6)
FAX:	(b)(6)	UNCLASS:	(b)(6)
PAGES W/ COVER	3		

SUBJECT/REMARKS:

Gen Craddock,
 Passed to you sir from VADM Stavricis.

V/R
 (b)(6)

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The attached document(s) has been reviewed for classified information. I certify that no classified information is contained within and hereby authorize its release.

Releaser's Name

Date/Time



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

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CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

TO:	Gen Craddock	FROM:	VADM Stavridis
OFFICE:	Southcom	OFFICE:	Immediate Office of the Secretary of Defense
PHONE:	(b)(6)	COMM: DSN:	(b)(6)
FAX:		UNCLASS: DSN:	
PAGES W/ COVER	3		

SUBJECT/REMARKS:

Gen Craddock,
Passed to you sir from VADM Stavridis.

V/R
(b)(6)

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

The attached document(s) has been reviewed for classified information. I certify that no classified information is contained within and hereby authorize its release.

Releaser's Name

Date/Time

November 2, 2004

TO: Ray DuBois
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Energy Idea

463

George Shultz called on the topic of energy. He says there's an outfit that can take solar energy and ~~turn~~ it into electricity by a process that puts an ink spray on a thin foil. The panels that result from this process are cheap, about one-quarter the cost. The folks who discovered this are ready to build a factory. The military possibilities might be to use it in remote locations. You could take the ink and foil and operate a radio.

Shultz and a personal friend, Dr. Paul Berg, who is a Nobel Laureate in Chemistry, sat in on the presentation. When it was finished, Berg said the presenters (chemists) know what they are talking about. They use nanotechnology. They can make a nano-molecular membrane - designed with various orifices - and put it on a thicker membrane. The cost for desalination is in electric power. Their membrane apparently has so little resistance that it means dramatically reduced costs. There are, undoubtedly, other applications as well.

Shultz sent the attached white paper, including points of contact. I told Shultz you would get in touch with these folks and see whether anyone in DoD is interested.

Thanks.

Attach.

November 2004 Agua Via, LLC White Paper: "Nano-Molecular Membranes for Water Desalination and Purification"

DHR:ss
110204-8

.....
Please respond by 12/3/04

2 NOV 04

WHITE PAPER

Nano-Molecular Membranes for Water Desalination and Purification

November 2004

Agua Via, LLC

**agua: water
via: way, path**

**AGUA VIA, LLC
330 Beach Road
Burlingame, California 94010
Contact: Gayle Pergamit
Phone: 650/888-9373
gayle@aguavia.com**

AGUA: water

VIA: way, path

Based on research work which began in 1997, a novel filtration technology has been developed by mimicking the naturally occurring filtration mechanisms in the membranes of biologic cells. Desalination and water purification based on this Smart Membrane™ technology is anticipated to deliver the purest water **possible** at the lowest energy thermodynamically possible. Energy is the largest cost component of desalination. **By** cutting over 60% of energy required by current reverse osmosis membranes – and concomitantly eliminating high pressure pumps, energy recovery systems (little **wasted** energy to recover), certain pretreatment systems, and other maintenance costs – Smart Membranes may provide overall cost reductions of **up** to 60 or 70%. Smart Membranes are ideally suited to deliver pure water in settings **where** this **has** not been economically or technically possible, or to deliver pure water in a smaller, less energy intensive, less costly manner than any conventional system.

"Water, like energy in the late 1970s, will probably become the most critical natural resource issue facing most parts of the world by the start of this century."

- The Financial Times of London

Originally created for use in medical devices, Smart Membranes are now being adapted for use in desalination and water purification. It is estimated that purification applications using membranes will be demonstrable in 18 months, and desalination applications ready in an additional 18 months following adequate funding.

Smart Membrane technology is configurable in both performance and **scale** to the wide range **of** physical circumstances under which desalination **or** purification must be performed: point of use solutions **for** individuals in the field, small group systems, mobile systems on land or sea, and municipal sized systems in industrial, recreational, commercial, medical, agricultural, military, and municipal settings. At its simplest, a filtration cartridge at the bottom of a tube with a 27" head **of** water is sufficient to eliminate chemical, biologic and most radioactive hazards. With an additional component in place to handle osmotic gradient, the 27" tube is **also** sufficient for desalinate brackish water and seawater. **The** membrane is anticipated to be packaged in a variety of reliable, low maintenance, easy to use systems **designed** to produce high purity water in a full range of demanding environments.

EXAMPLES OF SMART MEMBRANE IMPACTS.

Calculations indicate that these membranes could produce 205 gallons **per** square foot per day (gfd) operating **at** **<1psi**, utilizing techniques other than **high** pressure to accommodate the osmotic gradient during desalination. At this filtration rate, high volume, high quality water purification and desalination **could** be provided within a small footprint: a Smart Membrane cube measuring **165mm** (6.5 **inches**) per side **could** produce 100,000 gallons per day at 1 psi. The implications **are**:

- reduction in **filtration** plant size, energy **requirements**, and **cost** The Office of Naval Research has the goal of using cutting edge conventional technologies to get a 300,000 gallon per day filtration system onto a flatbed truck. A Smart Membrane system would deliver **the** 300,000 gallons via 3 of the 6.5 inch cubes.

- useful where **small** size and low energy requirements are critical such as in emergency and military applications, or rural use off the **power grid**,
- useful in a range **of** scales: from municipalities down to individual use
- useful as a wide spectrum water purifier in military or terrorist-impacted environments: by filtering out all contaminants and leaving only safe water, water can **be** provided without identifying contaminants or **taking** special steps to **deal** with the contaminants' concentration or nature
- **sufficiently** low cost to be useful for waste water remediation, elimination of endemic biologic threats (**e.g.**, Giardia), toxic solutes or other contaminants.

Today, desalinization can cost over \$1,000US per acre-foot. Although Tampa Bay, Florida had hoped to desalinate water at a cost of only \$650US per acre-foot, much of the potential cost reduction was due to favorable financing terms and projected operating efficiencies which have fallen short of the goal by 50%.

Today, energy **is** a dominating cost of creating a gallon of clean water. In desalination, the most energy-intensive water treatment, annual energy costs equal or exceed total capital cost. The **final** stage of purification – separating water from salt – accounts for 99% of the energy. **Of** that energy, roughly **2/3rd** is spent overcoming 1) the length, and 2) the **tortuous** path of the pores **in** conventional membranes. Only 1/3rd is due to overcoming the osmotic gradient of the **salt**.

The **Smart** Membrane's extreme thinness (1 atomic layer thick) and complete **lack** of tortuous paths eliminates **both** length and tortuosity as factors in determining flow, **and so** eliminates **2/3rd** of the energy penalty experienced **by** conventional membranes. This reduction in energy translates to a major reduction in overall cost **of** desalinating water from energy savings alone.

Significant as a 66% energy cost reduction is, **the** impact of moving to a low-energy/low pressure mode ripples through the overall design of any water system, accounting for an additional reduction of capital cost and labor costs. For example, eliminating the high pressure pumps and energy recovery systems of Conventional **desalination** plants translates into further reduction in capital cost, system complexity, **and** maintenance costs. With capital costs alone for desalination plants running between \$40M and \$400M, the value from a **Smart** Membrane system could be regarded as significant.

Additional examples of reduced maintenance demands may be seen in fouling reduction. Fouling is a major **cause** of reduced performance and high maintenance **in** conventional membranes. The Smart Membrane is so thin that there is no ability for substances to get trapped in its pores, as is the case with thick, tortuous polymer membranes. A second cause of membrane fouling is **biofilm** formation by bacteria. Bacteria begin **biofilm** formation by establishing a beachhead on a surface through dropping glycoprotein-based grappling hooks. The Smart Membrane's pores are too small to **admit** these grappling hooks. The area surrounding the pore has the ability to be covered with surface molecules in a precise fashion to minimize bacterial attachments. This ability to cover the membrane surface in a discrete fashion **led**, in a biomedical setting, to a **powerful** strategy for implementation of biocompatibility. In water filtration and purification, this capability allows for developing surfaces with unique anti-fouling properties.

TECHNICAL BACKGROUND.

A Smart Membrane is the thinnest membrane physically possible (1 atomic layer thick) with the ability to have custom crafted pores which filter in or out virtually any class of substances desired. For example, by sizing down slightly from the pores suitable for filtering water, one could build membranes which act as a light weight, long-lived gas mask - filtering out nerve toxins (organic molecules) while allowing oxygen, carbon dioxide and nitrogen to pass freely. Rather than absorbing and quickly saturating in the manner of conventional carbon gas masks, the Smart Membrane would reflect undesired substances.

Smart Membranes result from the creation of a new class of extremely selective, biomimetic Smart Pores™ which assemble into thin (0.5nanometer-22nanometer) porous nanomembranes. These porous monolayer membranes have specific structures that provide a low energy barrier to the passage of water or specific solutes, while providing a high barrier to other solutes. This technology shows highly specific molecular filtration at the atomic scale and profound transport properties such as exquisite ion selectivity characteristics.

Because these membrane structures are so thin, it is **useful** to think about them in quantum mechanical terms rather than classical fluid mechanical terms. Dr. William Dean of MIT has described these pores as "orifices" offering no impedance to flow, rather than as conventional "pores." With a low pressure drop across a **nanomembrane** 0.5 nanometers thick, high flux is produced at very low pressure differential.

To date, Smart Pores and Smart Membranes have been targeted on difficult and novel medical filtration applications. In the **course** of this work, filtration abilities have been developed which were unprecedented and considered major advances in filtration capability.

Certain modifications, however, are necessary to meet the demands of water purification and desalination. For example, in order to meet **the** demanding medical criteria of biocompatibility, cost had not been a relevant factor in materials selection. Because a water filtration membrane must be rugged, low cost and able to tolerate a range of chemical insults, modifications are needed to replace the high cost biocompatible materials selected for the medical applications with more suitable ones. After the basic modifications for desalination and purification, additional modifications are planned for dealing with extreme water feedstocks, such as the cyanide-rich water resulting from mining operations.

APPLICABILITY.

The technology is anticipated to be applicable and superior for applications in:

- Purification applications with uses ranging from high purity drinking water through higher purity water for medical uses, such as Water for Injection.
- Desalination applications, including both seawater and brackish water.
- Remediation of both waste water and polluted ground water, producing ultra high quality water.


APPLYING SMART MEMBRANES TO WATER PURIFICATION.

Smart Membranes are anticipated to produce only good, potable water. Everything else is eliminated: bacteria, viruses, parasites, cysts, amoebas, chemical and biologic warfare agents, poisons, toxins, most radioactive agents, spores of pathogens, nitrogenous waste from commercial fertilizer or excrement, arsenic and other heavy metals, salts, etc. This addresses the full range of health problems caused by bacteria and viruses such as dysentery, typhoid, cholera, polio virus, or minerals such as arsenic and fluoride. Good water becomes available at low cost for all needs: drinking, sanitation, hygiene, waste water redemption and agriculture in the U.S. and overseas.

Eighty percent of all disease in developing countries is water borne, and awaits a simple, cost effective, low maintenance solution which Smart Membranes could deliver. But even within the U.S., water purity is a problem. Although involving a narrower range of biologic contaminants than tropical countries, U.S. problems range from arsenic to endemic problems with Giardia, and, recently, to contamination concerns relating to terrorist activity. According to the EPA, approximately 95% of all U.S. water municipalities are small systems serving populations of less than 5,000. These are mainly agricultural communities where bacterial contamination derives from livestock; they lack the resources to build sophisticated systems despite acute need.

Number of People at Risk From Arsenic Poisoning	
US	unknown
Mexico	400,000
Chile	437,000
Bolivia	6,000
Argentina	2,000,000
Hungary	20,000
Romania	36,000
India	1,000,000
Bangladesh	50,000,000
Thailand	7,000
Vietnam	millions
Taiwan	200,000
China	720,000
Nepal	unknown

Source - Jack Ng, University of Queensland, Australia



WHERE SMART MEMBRANES CAN BE USED FOR DESALINATION

Almost 40 per cent of the world's population (UNEP) lives within 60 kilometres of the coast, placing them within immediate reach of 97.5% of the world's available water. Inland, abundant saline aquifers often lie unused only a few feet below the surface. Because of the high energy cost of desalination, desalination is currently used only in places with abundant energy or wealth: Saudi Arabia alone has 24% of the world's desalination plants. Price elasticity effects from the introduction of the Smart Membrane's cost-reducing technology should enable desalination to flourish worldwide.

Much of world is either in or facing an imminent water crisis. General consensus among economists and scientists is that the world is coming to the end of **cheap groundwater**. Some examples:



- Wars driven by water shortages are predicted to escalate over the next decades. More than a dozen nations receive >50% of their fresh water from rivers that cross borders of hostile neighbors.
- According to the World Bank, the health and economies of more than 80 countries are threatened by current water shortages.
- With-Israel buying water via pipeline from Turkey and farm land in the Galilee turning saline, Shimon Perez has made desalination a goal of Israel's nanotechnology program.
- The aquifers underlying the western United States are fast depleting, with exhaustion predicted in 15-20 years.

The U.S. Government has provided small initial funding for programs to find a breakthrough in desalination to solve the U.S.'s approaching **drought**.

- A program driven by New Mexico's Senator Pete Domenici, whose state is acutely affected by the Ogallala aquifer water shortage, is funded within the Office of Naval Research.
- Wafer 2025, a Department of the Interior program, is seeking to develop technologies to avert water disaster in the western U.S. The chart on the left maps the drought probabilities for the U.S. by the year 2025. The chart on the right indicates the abundance of saline aquifers under the continental United States. This distribution is frequently found throughout the world. Therefore, by tapping these abundant saline aquifers, low cost desalination would make **fresh** water readily available to non-coastal populations. (Charts are from a presentation by the Director of the Water 2025 program.)

Ogallala Aquifer

Ninety-five percent of the United States' fresh water is underground. As farmers in the Texan High Plains pump groundwater faster than rain replenishes it, the water tables are dropping. North America's largest aquifer, the Ogallala, is being depleted at a rate of 72 billion cubic metres (bcm) a year. Total depletion to date amounts to some 325 bcm, a volume equal to the annual flow of 9 Colorado Rivers. The Ogallala stretches from Texas to South Dakota and waters one fifth of US irrigated land.
- The BBC



CONCLUSION

Through decades of creativity and diligence, scientists and engineers addressing water purification and desalination have made dramatic improvements in cost, quality and ability to address a range of water feedstocks. As a result, water purification and desalination are today based on mature technologies from which it is increasingly difficult to wring efficiencies, let alone breakthroughs.

Smart Membranes represent a new technology based on building materials which mimic the way nature performs filtration and selection. The benefits include operating in an ultra-low energy mode, operating in a small footprint, and producing highly pure and highly specific filtration **from virtually** any feedstock water, fresh or saline. Such characteristics suit Smart Membrane filtration to highly demanding applications such as total water recycling for space missions (low weight, **small** footprint, low energy, high purity), as well as to highly demanding military applications in hostile environments (rugged, simple, low cost, high purity, scalable, without regard to contaminant type or concentration, capable of processing salt water or fresh).

Smart Membrane technology holds **the** potential to provide significant benefit to the **U.S.** military and civilian populations. For the civilian population, adequate pure water represents our ability to continue agricultural **and** industrial productivity. For the military, better water technology lifts a logistic burden. Used as a tool for diplomacy, the technology could prevent water wars in developing countries, **and** with that allow better allocation of the U.S. military's resources.

#####

November 11, 2004

TO: David Chu
CC: Gen Dick Myers
Jim Roche
Gen John Jumper
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Air Force End Strength

320.2

What do you propose we do to get the Air Force end strength down faster?

Thanks.

Attach.

10/8/04 USAF slide: End Strength Glideslope, *SNOWFLAKE # 100704-12*

DHR:dh
111104-40

.....

Please respond by 12/3/04

11 NOV 04

October 7, 2004

TO: Jim Roche
Gen John Jumper

CC: Gen Dick Myers
David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: USAF End Strength

Please give me a monthly update on your efforts to reduce excess end strength, showing me how you are doing relative to the goals you have set for the months ahead.

It would be helpful for me to see the progress on a regular basis.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
100704-12

.....
Please respond by _____

Det 10/15


Sir,
Response attached.
These are numbers
as of 30 Sep 04.

v/r,
Lt Col Lengyel
10/15



U.S. AIR FORCE

End Strength Glideslope



* May 04 SecAF-to-SecDEF Memo citing lead time for Force Shaping to affect end strength

Integrity - Service - Excellence

11-L-0559/OSD/47713

8 Oct 04
Data a/o 30 Sep 04

November 11, 2004

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Iraqi Elections

IRAQ

Let's make sure everyone in the interagency and in Iraq understands the point Dick Myers makes in this memo, namely that the UN is doing a relatively small amount of the election effort, and if they move out it does not mean that the election cannot go forward.

Thanks.

Attach.
11/9/04 CJCS Memo to SecDef re: Iraqi Elections, *SADUS FLALB # 101904-11*

DHR:dh
111104-34



Please respond by 11/26/04

11 NOV 04

~~FOUO~~

TAB

OCT 31 2004

884

TO: Gen Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *TR*

SUBJECT: Iraqi Elections

I'm concerned that Prime Minister Allawi may be counting too heavily on UN participation in the upcoming elections. If the UN pulls out, I think the elections should still go forward.

I wonder what we should do about GEN Casey and Amb Negroponte beginning the process of working them on that, so it doesn't just stop if the UN gets skittish

Thanks.

DHR:m
101904-14

.....
Please respond by 10/29/04

Sir,
Response attached.

✓R
Lt Col Lengyel
10/10

10 OCT 28 4 51 02

~~FOUO~~

Tab

OSD 17924-04

A-27-2

20 11/11



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-3000

CH-2172-04
9 November 2004

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBM 11/7*

SUBJECT: Iraqi Elections

- **Issue.** "I'm concerned that Prime Minister Allawi may be counting too heavily on UN participation in the upcoming elections...I wonder what we should do about GEN Casey and Amb Negroponte beginning the process of working them on that, so it doesn't just stop if the UN gets skittish." (TAB)
- **Conclusion.** General Casey, Commander, Multinational Forces in Iraq (MNF-I), and Ambassador Negroponte should reinforce to Prime Minister Allawi the US commitment to sustain support for the Iraqi elections and stress that while the UN presence is important, it is not a requirement. Mr. Allawi and other key leaders of the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) have been consistent and public about the importance of executing the national elections in January 2005. In coordination with the US Embassy and the IIG, MNF-I has developed detailed plans for support.
- **Discussion.** MNF-I's plans include security for distribution of materials, key officials and polling places. The Joint Staff, USCENTCOM and MNF-I are also working with the UN leadership on the ground in Baghdad and in New York to demonstrate US commitment to the elections and the security of UN personnel and facilities. The United Nations has a small number of election officials in Iraq, with plans to expand over the next several months. While important, their presence would not be the deciding factor in the success of the elections; in the end, it is Iraqi participation that will decide that outcome.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:
As stated

Prepared By: LTG Walter L. Sharp, USA; Director, J-5; (b)(6)

TSA SD	X
SRMA SD	
MA SD	<i>F 11/10</i>
EXEC SEC	<i>M 11/7</i>

USD 17924-04

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

A-27-3

A-27

From: Lt Col Lengyel

To: SECDEF

November 11, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Rollout Plan for NDS and NMS

381

Here is the rollout plan for the National Defense Strategy and the National Military Strategy.

I think you should take over the rollout. I ~~am~~ not going to inform the SecState and NSA by telephone of the imminent release. It should be done by memo. You ought to decide how it ought to be handled and execute it.

Thanks.

Attach.
Undated Policy paper: Rollout Plan for the 2004 NDS and NMS

DHR:dh
111104-29

.....

Please respond by 11/16/04

111104

Rollout Plan for the 2004 National Defense Strategy (NDS) and the National Military Strategy (NMS)



Gold
PW

Office of the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy



Interagency

O The NDS and NMS have important USG audiences (e.g. Dept of Homeland Security, State Department, NSC)

➤ State, NSC, HLS are aware of some, but not all elements of the Defense and Military Strategies

P Approach:

- 5 Nov - Secretary informs SecState and NSA of the imminent release of the strategies during the morning phone call
- 5 Nov - Secretary calls Secretary Ridge to inform him of the release of the Strategies
- Mid-Nov - PDUSD-P/J-5 conduct appropriate staff briefings

No Memo



Congress

OThe Congress will be in session for a very narrow window during second and third weeks of November

➤Background:

- *Representative Skelton asked the DepSecDef about the status of the NMS during his testimony in August*
- *Congressional Staffers have inquired regularly about the release of both strategies*

Approach:

- *Week of 8 Nov - Briefings to SASC, HASC, SAC-D, and HAC-D staffs by DASD-Strategy and J-5 Staff*
- *Mid- Nov - Formal written notification to majority and minority leadership of the SASC, HASC, SAC-D, and HAC-D*



Public Affairs

- **Coordinated public affairs effort that balances Strategic level guidance of the NDS and the operational character of the NMS**

➤ **Approach:**

- ***Press release and briefings to accompany rollout of the Strategies***
- ***Targeted venues for the Secretary, DSD, CJCS, USD-P, and PDUSD-P for presentation of main strategic themes***
 - e.g. Council on Foreign Relations (DC, NY, and National Series);
 - Chairman at War College Foundation Events; and
 - Radio and Print Press interviews
- ***Articles by key foreign policy and military affairs experts***
- ***Brief Defense Policy Board members***



International

- Draw on the strategies as DoD promotes a Common Global Security Assessment with foreign allies and partners

➤ Approach :

- . *USDP-led “road show” on the Common Global Security Assessment which will cover:*
 - United States assessment of the global and regional security environments;
 - NDS & NMS; and
 - Evolving Posture
- . *PDUSD-P and J-5 briefings to:*
 - The State Department Coalition Group;
 - The foreign press corps; and
 - 8 Nov - Transmit Diplomatic Cables with country tailored talking points
- . *Outreach briefings in appropriate venues e.g. the Foreign Officers attending U.S. War Colleges*



Internal DoD

□ **Previously we have not done a good enough job in informing Department components of changes in defense strategy**

➤ **Approach:**

- *Transmit a formal combined notification message for NDS & NMS release directing components to web links for the strategies, and associated briefings and talking points*
- *DASD-Strategy and J-5 staff briefings to:*
 - **Department Principals;**
 - **Combatant and Component Commands; and**
 - **Advisory groups to the Joint Staff and Services**
- *PDUSD-P/DASD-Strategy and the J-5 conduct several Town Hall presentations which can be taped and transmitted to AFRTS*
- ***SD, DSD, USD-P, CJCS, and VCJCS** conduct interviews with AFRTS on themes from the new strategies*

November 11, 2004

TO: Doug Feith
c c : Gen Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Southern Command

Attached is Tom Hill's farewell statement on Southern Command. He has a lot of important points here that I think we need to think through and develop action plans on.

I hope you'll get your folks working it.

Thanks.

Attach.
11/9/04 Commander, SOUTHCOM memo to SecDef: Opportunities and Challenges in the US Southern Command Area of Responsibility

DHR:dh
111104-12

.....
Please respond by 12/10/04

SOUTHCOM

11 Navy



REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER
3511 NW 91ST AVENUE
MIAMI, FL 33172-1217

SCCC

9 November 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, 1000 Defense Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-1000

SUBJECT: Opportunities and Challenges in the US Southern Command Area of Responsibility

1. Sir, as I relinquish command of USSOUTHCOM, I want to thank you for your leadership, guidance and trust over the past two years and three months. Command of such an important and diverse unit has enriched my life and deepened my appreciation for the greatness of our nation. As I depart, I'd like to highlight a few opportunities and challenges that I see in the Southern Command AOR.

2. Although I do not see a current or potential conventional military threat in the AOR, Latin America has become the most violent region in the world. I see the issues of violence and poverty as two sides of the same coin: the rampant violence impedes the economic growth necessary to pull up the **43%** of the population who live below the poverty line. The poverty and hopelessness foment discontent, creating ready recruits for gangs, narco-terrorists and other illegal armed groups. The issue of gangs has the potential to be, over the next **five** to ten years, the greatest destabilizing force in the AOR. Gangs are currently most prevalent in Central America and Brazil, but the problem will spread if we do not address the threat quickly. The size, transnational nature and financial power of the gangs has outstripped the region's police. The fact that gangs are considered a law enforcement issue prevents the military from confronting the threat in most countries. The security forces of the **AOR** must change in order to combat the current array of threats. We must help our partner nations find a solution that makes sense, respects human rights and recognizes the historic mistrust of uniformed military acting in a police role. In order to do so, we must transform ourselves and readdress our current restrictions against training police. This will require DoD leadership in the interagency and within the Congress.

3. Islamic Radical Group (**IRG**) activity in the AOR is concentrated on fundraising and logistical support for worldwide terrorism. We do not see in our AOR operational cells of IRG terrorists staging for an attack on the United States. I take no comfort in that fact, however, since what we don't know about the IRG activity in the region greatly outweighs what we do know. We are vulnerable to an airborne threat because our outdated laws on aerial interdiction limit our actions and prevent our neighbors from taking action. We now have the technology to be able to detect and monitor an airplane that takes off from Panama, flies through all the countries of Central America and Mexico and crashes into a key target in the southern extreme of the United States and we will have done nothing about it because the current policy assumes that the worst thing that plane could be carrying is drugs. September 11th showed us the fallacy of this policy and we must **fix** it regionally for it to be effective. The regional approach is critical in Central America

SOUTHCOM

9 NOV 04

11 NOV 04

due to the short flight time required to fly from the airspace of one country into the airspace of another. Regional airbridge denial is a sensitive and controversial issue across the interagency, and I believe that only you will be able to take this on effectively.

4. You can be proud of what the men and women of Southern Command do to support the Government of Colombia. The armed forces of Colombia, for the first time since the 1960s, are conducting sustained offensive operations in the old "*despeje*" region, which previously gave sanctuary to narco-terrorists. Those efforts are beginning to bear fruit as we are seeing greater numbers of desertions and decreased activity on the part of the illegal armed groups. We must stay the course in Colombia by continuing to provide logistical, intelligence and planning assistance to the Colombian military while interdicting the illicit trafficking that sustains the narco-terrorist groups. We must seek to regionalize our support, especially to Perú, Ecuador and Bolivia, whose fragile democracies must be shored up or we risk pushing the problem out of Colombia and into her neighbors. Again, DoD leadership is essential, both in the interagency and on the Hill.

5. In 1978, sixteen of the countries in this hemisphere had communist or totalitarian governments. Today, all of Latin America and the Caribbean, save Cuba, have made the shift to democracy and the militaries in the region are supporting democracies. USSOUTHCOM has played a key role in this maturation by close, continuous, personal interaction with the armed forces of the AOR. This engagement is necessary if we are to assist in the transformation of Latin American security forces to meet 21st century threats and it is vital to our continued understanding of the realities on the ground in the AOR. I am seeing the effects of the negative impact of ASPA sanctions on our engagement, especially in terms of IMET. Several of our key partners are already looking to Europe and China to fill the gap that ASPA is creating in Professional Military Education and exchange programs. Current limits on information sharing, security clearances and access are at cross-purposes with our professed goals of regional cooperation. The SOUTHCOM staff is working on ways to ameliorate the impact of these limitations. We must overcome these barriers if we are to continue to be the security partner of choice for the nations in this hemisphere.


6. Disenchantment with failed institutions and unfulfilled economic promises in Latin America and the Caribbean have resulted in tremendous social upheaval in the region. One manifestation of the dissatisfaction with the existing political institutions is the fact that several presidents in the AOR find themselves in the presidency as their first elected public office. As a result of the latest referendum in Venezuela, President Chávez appears to be a fixture in the region. From a strictly military point of view, I am concerned that President Chávez is turning his armed forces into a highly politicized praetorian guard, which will choose loyalty to him over loyalty to the constitution. On a larger scale, I am concerned about the exportation of his "Bolivarian Revolution" to countries in the AOR where governments can ill afford added instability. I urge the pursuit of an interagency consensus around a policy designed to limit the detrimental impact that Chávez is likely to have on the region.

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~

7. I have seen the ongoing suffering of Haiti first hand, both under the UN mandate back in 1994 and as commander of our more recent efforts there. Until the Haitian people are able to lift themselves from abject misery to at least dignified poverty and develop some semblance of working institutions, Haiti's problems will continue to haunt the United States. Short of a comprehensive long-term international effort to support Haiti, we will always be just one step away from the next migration crisis or political collapse. DoD has a leadership role to play in Haiti and must find a way to support Haiti's security forces.

8. The stabilization of SOUTHCOM Headquarters stands without resolution. As you are well aware, I remain convinced, as did my predecessors, that Miami is the right location for the headquarters from a strategic point of view. The recent proposal by the Governor of Florida presents us with an opportunity to make a sound fiscal decision as well. I strongly encourage DoD to consider the Governor's proposal as a means to resolve the command's stabilization in Miami. We should come to closure on this issue for both the strategic and fiscal reasons I mentioned as well as for the quality of life of our people.

9. I thank you again for the opportunity to have served as the Commander of United States Southern Command. I have been privileged to work shoulder to shoulder with great patriots and I have been blessed by having known some of the most brilliant leaders of this hemisphere. I thank you for your steadfast leadership in this critical phase of our country's history. I am enthusiastic and optimistic about USSOUTHCOM's role in helping the people of the Americas fully enjoy the fruits of democracy and economic opportunity.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "J/T Hill". The signature is stylized with a large "J" and "T" and a cursive "Hill".

JAMES T. HILL
General, US Army
Commander

CF:
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/47728

November 8, 2004

TO: COL Steve Bucci

CC: VADM Stavridis
Cathy Mainardi

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Meeting on Rotations

DONE

2004

I need to have a meeting with the Army, the Joint Staff and the Chairman to talk about this memo on rotation periods and what we are facing.

Thanks.

Attach.
10/1/04 Memo to SecDef re: Army Rotation Lengths

DHR:ss
110804-9

.....
Please respond by 12/5/04

8 Nov 04

September 16, 2004

TO: Les Brownlee
Gen. Schoomacher

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Gen. Pete Pace
David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Army Tour Lengths

At our recent discussion of deployment rules with David Chu, you said you would get back to me with a view of how we might be able to reduce Army tour lengths from 12 months down toward 9 or even 6-7 months, like the Marines.

I know these are very difficult choices in the short term, but I am very curious how that analysis is going, and I look forward to hearing from you about it fairly soon.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
091604-15

.....
Please respond by _____


11/8
Sir,
Response attached.
Yr
Lt Col Lengyel
10/5



~~FOUO~~

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON, DC 20310

OCT 1 2004



DA

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT Army Rotation Lengths

In response to your September 16, 2004, memo, while the **Army** would prefer to reduce deployment durations to **six** or nine months, the increased deployment tempo generated by shorter rotation lengths would have a negative impact on the force at this time.

Army studies and operational experience have shown that in a perfect world, six **months** is the optimal deployment length, allowing the **Army** to balance its operational requirements to provide trained and ready forces to the combatant commanders against the **stresses** separation generates on our volunteer force. However:

- There is insufficient depth within the **Army's** Combat Support and Combat Service **Support** capabilities to reduce rotation lengths below **12 months** without producing significant dwell time and remobilization violations.
- Shorter rotation lengths would affect the **Army's** ability to meet **CENTCOM's** total requirements for combat forces as well. For instance, at current commitment levels, reducing the **Army's** combat unit deployment length to nine **months** could generate a 21 brigade combat team shortfall over the next two years. This problem would only be exacerbated by **shortening** unit rotations to six months in duration.

Even under the current **12-month** rotation policy, meeting **CENTCOM's** requirements for Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom 04-06 will require the remobilization of 18 Reserve Component units and the premature redeployment of 61 Active Component units - measures which will impact approximately 4,000 Soldiers, **This** number is projected to increase to approximately 10,000 Soldiers for Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom **05-07**.

PETER J. SCHOOMAKER
General, US Army
Chief of Staff

R. L. Brownlee
Acting Secretary of the Army

~~FOUO~~

40903166



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, G-3
400 ARMY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20310-0400



G-35-SSW

23 SEP 2004

MEMORANDUM THRU ~~DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, G-3~~ *AC*
~~VICE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMY~~ *AC*
~~CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMY~~ *2/1.10.04*

FOR ACTING SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

SUBJECT: Army Rotation Lengths - ACTION MEMORANDUM

1. Purpose: Reply to the September 16, 2004 **SECDEF** memo on the length of Army deployment rotations.

2. Discussion:

a. There is insufficient depth within CS/CSS capabilities to reduce rotation lengths below 12-months without significant dwell ~~time~~ and remobilization violations.

b. While it is possible to shorten the rotation lengths for the Active Component Maneuver Brigades and still maintain the Army's Campaign Plan, doing so would require maintaining an increased level of Reserve Component participation.

c. While shorter unit rotations may provide the Army with potential retention and quality of life advantages, the increased operational tempo would have a negative impact on *the* force. Disadvantages of **9-month** rotations are:

- An increased role of the Reserve Component
- An increase in number of units that become dwell violators
- An increase in number of units that become remobilization violators
- Less **time** available for units to conduct professional development, **training**, and maintenance before redeploying
- An increased burden upon strategic **air/sea lift**

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SUBJECT: Army Rotation Lengths

d. These disadvantages are only exacerbated under 6-month rotations.

3. (U) Recommendation: Acting SECARMY approve information memorandum for the SECDEF.

End



KEITH W. DAYTON
Major General, *CS*
Director of Strategy,
Plans and Policy

CPT KELLY L. WEBSTER (b)(6)

OFFICE OF THE
SECURITY ASSISTANT
DEC 10 2004
2005 MAR -3 AM 9:07

TO: Paul McHale
CC: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: 9/11 Commission Report Item

000.5

Do we have a piece of paper that explains who is responsible for defending us at home that is clear, succinct and bullet pointed? I notice this from the 9/11 Commission Report, which is really an amazing lack of knowledge for a commission that is being widely praised.

Shouldn't we write the members of the commission a note referencing this page in their report, and explaining the answer to the question?

Thanks.

Attach.
9/11 Commission Report (ref. page 26)

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Please respond by _____

12 Dec 04

agency will **not** solve America's problems in collecting and **analyzing** intelligence within the United States. We do not **recommend** creating one.

- We propose the **establishment** of a specialized and **integrated** national security workforce at **the FBI**, consisting of agents, **analysts**, linguists, and surveillance specialists who are **recruited**, **trained**, rewarded, and retained to **ensure** the development of an institutional culture imbued with a deep expertise in intelligence and national **security**.

At **several points** we asked: Who **has** the **responsibility** for defending us at home? **Responsibility** for America's **national** defense is **shared** by the Department of **Defense**, with its new Northern Command, and by the Department of Homeland Security. They must **have** a clear delineation of roles, missions, and **authority**

- The Department of **Defense** and its oversight committees should **regularly** assess the **adequacy** of Northern Command's **strategies** and planning to defend against **military** threats to **the** homeland.
- The Department of **Homeland Security** and its oversight committees should **regularly** assess the **types** of **threats** the country faces; in order to determine the adequacy of the government's plans and the **readiness** of the **government** to **respond** to those *threats*.

* * *

We call on the American people to **remember** how **we** all felt on 9/11, to **remember** not **only** the unspeakable horror but **how** **we** came together as a nation—one nation. **Unity** of **purpose** and unity of **effort** are the way **we** will defeat **this** enemy and make America **safer** for our children and grandchildren.

We look forward to a **national** debate on the merits of what **w e** have **recom-** mended, and **we** will participate vigorously in that debate.

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*Get Rev.
7 pages*

THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT

**Final Report of the
National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks Upon the United States**

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

WE PRESENT THE NARRATIVE of this report **and** the **recommendations that flow** from it to the President of the United States, the United States **Congress**, and the American people **for their** consideration. **Ten** Commissioners—five **Republicans and five Democrats** chosen **by** elected leaders from our nation's capital at a time of great partisan division—have come together to present this report without **dissent**.

We **have** come together with a **unity of purpose** because our **nation** demands it. September 11, 2001, **was a day** of unprecedented **shock and** suffering in the history of the United States-The **nation** was unprepared.

A NATION TRANSFORMED

At 8:46 on the morning of September 11, 2001, the United States became a **nation** transformed.

An airliner traveling at hundreds of **miles** per hour and **carrying** some 10,000 **gallons of** jet fuel plowed into the **North Tower** of the World Trade Center in Lower Manhattan. At 9:03, a second airliner hit the **South Tower**. **Fire** and smoke billowed upward. Steel, **glass**, ash, and **bodies** **fell** below. The Twin Towers, where up to 50,000 people worked each **day**, **both** collapsed less **than 90 minutes** later.

At 9:37 that same **morning**, a third airliner slammed into the western face of the **Pentagon**. At 10:03, a fourth airliner **crashed in a field in southern Pennsylvania**. It had been aimed at the United **States** Capitol or the White House, and **was** forced **down** by heroic passengers armed with the knowledge that America **was** under attack.

More than 2,600 people died at the **World Trade Center**; **125** died at the

Pentagon; 256 died on the four planes. The death toll surpassed that at Pearl Harbor in December 1941.

This immeasurable pain was inflicted by 19 young Arabs acting at the behest of Islamist extremists headquartered in distant Afghanistan. Some had been in the United States for more than a year, mixing with the rest of the population. Though four had training as pilots, most were not well-educated. Most spoke English poorly, some hardly at all. In groups of four or five, carrying with them only small knives, box cutters, and cans of Mace or pepper spray, they had hijacked the four planes and turned them into deadly guided missiles.

Why did they do this? How was the attack planned and conceived? How did the U.S. government fail to anticipate and prevent it? What can we do in the future to prevent similar acts of terrorism?

A Shock, Not a Surprise

The 9/11 attacks were a shock, but they should not have come as a surprise. Islamist extremists had given plenty of warning that they meant to kill Americans indiscriminately and in large numbers. Although Usama Bin Ladin himself would not emerge as a signal threat until the late 1990s, the threat of Islamist terrorism grew over the decade.

In February 1993, a group led by Ramzi Yousef tried to bring down the World Trade Center with a truck bomb. They killed six and wounded a thousand. Plans by Omar Abdel Rahman and others to blow up the Holland and Lincoln tunnels and other New York City landmarks were frustrated when the plotters were arrested. In October 1993, Somali tribesmen shot down U.S. helicopter, killing 18 and wounding 73 in an incident that came to be known as "Black Hawk down." Years later it would be learned that those Somali tribesmen had received help from al Qaeda.

In early 1995, police in Manila uncovered a plot by Ramzi Yousef to blow up a dozen U.S. airliners while they were flying over the Pacific. In November 1995, a car bomb exploded outside the office of the U.S. program manager for the Saudi National Guard in Riyadh, killing five Americans and two others. In June 1996, a truck bomb demolished the Khobar Towers apartment complex in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, killing 19 U.S. servicemen and wounding hundreds. The attack was carried out primarily by Saudi Hezbollah, an organization that had received help from the government of Iran.

Until 1997, the U.S. intelligence community viewed Bin Ladin as a financier of terrorism, not as a terrorist leader. In February 1998, Usama Bin Ladin and four others issued a self-styled fatwa, publicly declaring that it was God's decree that every Muslim should try his utmost to kill any American, military or civilian, anywhere in the world, because of American "occupa-

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tion" of Islam's holy places and aggression against Muslims.

In August 1998, **Bin Ladin's** group, **al Qaeda**, carried out near-simultaneous **truck** bomb attacks on the **U.S.** embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and **Dar es Salaam**, Tanzania. The attacks killed **224** people, including **12** Americans, and wounded **thousands more**.

In December 1999, Jordanian police foiled a plot to **bomb** hotels and other sites frequented by American **tourists**, and a U.S. Customs agent arrested Ahmed Ressam at the U.S. **Canadian** border as he was smuggling in explosives intended for an attack on **Los Angeles International Airport**.

In October 2000, an **al Qaeda** team in Aden, Yemen, used a motorboat filled with explosives to blow a hole in the side of a destroyer, the **USS Cole**, almost **sinking** the vessel and **killing** 17 American **sailors**.

The 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were far more elaborate, precise, and destructive **than any** of these earlier assaults. But by September 2001, the executive branch of the U.S. government, the **Congress**, the **news** media, and the American public had received clear warning that Islamist terrorists meant to **kill** Americans in high numbers.

Who Is the Enemy?

Who is this enemy that created an **organization** capable of **inflicting** such horrific damage on the United **States**? We now know that these attacks were **carried** out by various groups of Islamist extremists. The 9/11 attack was driven by Usama **Bin Ladin**.

In the 1980s, young Muslims from around the world went to Afghanistan to **join** as volunteers in a jihad (or holy struggle) against the Soviet Union. A wealthy Saudi, **Usama Bin Ladin**, was one of **them**. Following the defeat of the **Soviets** in the late 1980s, **Bin Ladin** and **others** formed **al Qaeda** to **mobilize** jihads elsewhere.

The history, culture, and **body** of beliefs from which **Bin Ladin** shapes and spreads **his** message are largely **unknown** to many Americans. Seizing on symbols of Islam's past greatness, he promises to restore pride to people **who** **consider** themselves the victims of successive foreign masters. **He uses** cultural and **religious** allusions to the holy **Qur'an** and some of its interpreters. He **appeals** to people disoriented by cyclonic change as **they** confront modernity and **glob-**alization. **His** rhetoric selectively draws from multiple sources—Islam, history, and the **region's** political and economic malaise.

Bin Ladin also stresses grievances against the United States widely shared in the **Muslim** world. He inveighed against the presence of U.S. mops in Saudi Arabia, which is the home of Islam's **holiest** sites, and against **other U.S. policies** in the Middle **East**.

Upon this political and ideological **foundation**, Bin Ladin built over the course of a decade a dynamic and lethal **organization**. He built an **infrastructure and organization** in Afghanistan that could attract, train, and use recruits against ever **more** ambitious **targets**. He **rallied** new zealots and new **money** with each demonstration of al Qaeda's **capability**. He had **forged** a close alliance with the **Taliban**, a regime providing **sanctuary** for al Qaeda.

By September 11, 2001, al Qaeda possessed

- leaders able to evaluate, approve, and supervise the planning and **direction** of a major **operation**;
- a personnel system that could recruit candidates, indoctrinate them, vet **them**, and give them the necessary training;
- communications sufficient to enable planning and direction of **operatives and those who would** be helping **them**;
- **an** intelligence **effort** to gather **required information** and form assessments of enemy **strengths and weaknesses**;
- the ability to move people **great distances**; and
- the ability to raise **and move** the **money** necessary to **finance an attack**.

1998 to September 11, 2001

The August 1998 bombings of **U.S.** embassies in Kenya and Tanzania established al Qaeda as a potent adversary of the United **States**.

After launching cruise missile strikes **against** al Qaeda **targets** in Afghanistan and Sudan in **retaliation** for the embassy bombings, the Clinton **administration** applied diplomatic pressure to **try to persuade** the Taliban regime in Afghanistan to expel Bin Ladin. The administration **also** devised **covert operations** to use CIA-paid foreign agents to capture or kill Bin Ladin and his chief lieutenants. **These actions** did not stop Bin Ladin or **dislodge** al Qaeda from its sanctuary.

By late 1998 or early 1999, Bin Ladin and his advisers had agreed on an idea brought to **them** by Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM) called the "planes operation." It would eventually culminate in the 9/11 attacks. Bin Ladin and his chief of operations, Mohammed Atef, occupied undisputed leadership positions atop al Qaeda. Within al Qaeda, **they** relied heavily on the ideas and enterprise of **strong-willed field commanders**, such as KSM, to **carry out** worldwide terrorist operations.

KSM claims that his **original** plot was even grander than those carried out on 9/11—ten planes would attack **targets** on both the East and West **coasts** of the United States. This plan was **modified** by Bin Ladin, KSM said, owing to its scale and complexity. Bin Ladin provided KSM with four **initial operatives** for suicide plane **attacks** within the United States, and in the fall of 1999 **training**

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port the Taliban's enemies. The CIA also produced a plan to improve intelligence collection on al Qaeda, including the use of a small, unmanned airplane with a video camera, known as the Predator.

After the October 2000 attack on the USS *Cole*, evidence accumulated that it had been launched by al Qaeda operatives, but without confirmation that Bin Ladin had given the order. The Taliban had earlier been warned that it would be held responsible for another Bin Ladin attack on the United States. The CIA described its findings as a "preliminary judgment"; President Clinton and his chief advisers told us they were waiting for a conclusion before deciding whether to take military action. The military alternatives remained unappealing to them.

The transition to the new Bush administration in late 2000 and early 2001 took place with the *Cole* issue still pending. President George W. Bush and his chief advisers accepted that al Qaeda was responsible for the attack on the *Cole*, but did not like the options available for a response.

Bin Ladin's inference may well have been that attacks, at least at the level of the *Cole*, were risk free.

The Bush administration began developing a new strategy with the stated goal of eliminating the al Qaeda threat within three to five years.

During the spring and summer of 2001, U.S. intelligence agencies received a stream of warnings that al Qaeda planned, as one report put it, "something very, very, very big." Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet told us, "The system was blinking red."

Although Bin Ladin was determined to strike in the United States, as President Clinton had been told and President Bush was reminded in a Presidential Daily Brief article briefed to him in August 2001, the specific threat information pointed overseas. Numerous precautions were taken overseas. Domestic agencies were not effectively mobilized. The threat did not receive national media attention comparable to the millennium alert.

While the United States continued disruption efforts around the world, its emerging strategy to eliminate the al Qaeda threat was to include an enlarged covert action program in Afghanistan, as well as diplomatic strategies for Afghanistan and Pakistan. The process culminated during the summer of 2001 in a draft presidential directive and arguments about the Predator aircraft, which was soon to be deployed with a missile of its own, so that it might be used to attempt to kill Bin Ladin or his chief lieutenants. At a September 4 meeting, President Bush's chief advisers approved the draft directive of the strategy and endorsed the concept of arming the Predator. This directive on the al Qaeda strategy was awaiting President Bush's signature on September 11, 2001.

Though the "planes operation" was progressing, the plotters had problems of

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gration **regulations**. In late August, officials in the intelligence community realized that the terrorists spotted in Southeast Asia in January 2000 had arrived in the United States.

These cases did not prompt urgent action. No one **working** on these late leads in the **summer** of 2001 connected them to the **high** level of threat **reporting**. In the **words** of one **official**, no **analytic work** foresaw the **lightning** that could connect the thundercloud to the ground.

As **final preparations** were under way during the summer of 2001, **dissent** emerged among al Qaeda leaders in Afghanistan over whether to proceed. The Taliban's chief, **Mullah Omar**, opposed attacking the United States. Although facing opposition from **many** of his senior lieutenants, Bin Ladin effectively overruled **their objections**, and the attacks went **forward**.

it was not communicated to the pilots. In short, while leaders in Washington believed that the fighters circling above them had been instructed to "take out" hostile aircraft, the only orders actually conveyed to the pilots were to "ID type and tail."

Like the national defense, the emergency response on 9/11 was necessarily improvised.

In New York City, the Fire Department of New York, the New York Police Department, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, the building employees, and the occupants of the buildings did their best to cope with the effects of almost unimaginable events—unfolding furiously over 102 minutes. Casualties were nearly 100 percent at and above the impact zones and were very high among first responders who stayed in danger as they tried to save lives. Despite weaknesses in preparations for disaster, failure to achieve unified incident command, and inadequate communications among responding agencies, all but approximately one hundred of the thousands of civilians who worked below the impact zone escaped, often with help from the emergency responders.

At the Pentagon, while there were also problems of command and control, the emergency response was generally effective. The Incident Command System, a formalized management structure for emergency response in place in the National Capital Region, overcame the inherent complications of a response across local, state, and federal jurisdictions.

Operational Opportunities

We write with the benefit and handicap of hindsight. We are mindful of the danger of being unjust to men and women who made choices in conditions of uncertainty and in circumstances over which they often had little control.

Nonetheless, there were specific points of vulnerability in the plot and opportunities to disrupt it. Operational failures—opportunities that were not or could not be exploited by the organizations and systems of that time—included

- not watchlisting future hijackers Hazmi and Mihdhar, not trailing them after they traveled to Bangkok, and not informing the FBI about one future hijacker's U.S. visa or his companion's travel to the United States;
- not sharing information linking individuals in the Cole attack to Mihdhar;
- not taking adequate steps in time to find Mihdhar or Hazmi in the United States;

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- not linking the arrest of Zacarias Moussaoui, described as interested in flight training for the purpose of using an airplane in a terrorist act, to the heightened indications of attack;
- not discovering false statements on visa applications;
- not recognizing passports manipulated in a fraudulent manner;
- **not** expanding **no-fly lists** to include names from terrorist watchlists;
- not searching airline passengers identified by the computer-based CAPPS screening system; and
- not hardening aircraft cockpit doors or taking other measures to prepare for the possibility of suicide hijacking.

GENERAL FINDINGS

Since the plotters **were** flexible and resourceful, **we** cannot **know** whether **any** single step or series of steps would **have** defeated them. What **we can say** with confidence is that none **of** the measures adopted **by the U.S. government** from 1998 **to** 2001 disturbed **or** even delayed the progress **of** the al Qaeda plot. Across the government, there were failures **of** imagination, policy, capabilities, and **management**.

Imagination

The most important **failure was** one **of** imagination. **We do not believe leaders** understood the **gravity** of the threat. The terrorist danger from Bin Ladin and al Qaeda was not a major topic **for policy** debate among the **public**, the media, **or** in the Congress. Indeed, it barely came up **during the 2000** presidential campaign.

Al Qaeda's **new** brand of terrorism presented **challenges to U.S. governmental institutions** that they were not **well-designed** to meet. Though top officials all told **us** that they understood **the** danger, **we** believe there was uncertainty **among** them as to whether this was just a new and especially venomous version **of** the ordinary terrorist threat the United States had lived **with** for decades, or it was indeed radically **new, posing a** threat beyond any yet experienced.

As late as September 4, 2001, Richard Clarke, the White House staffer **long** responsible **for** counterterrorism **policy** coordination, asserted **that** the government had not yet made up its mind **how** to answer the question: "Is al Qida a big deal?"

A week later came the answer.

Policy

Terrorism was not *the* overriding national security concern for the U.S. government under either the Clinton or the pre-9/11 Bush administration.

The policy challenges were linked to this failure of imagination. Officials in both the Clinton and Bush administrations regarded a full U.S. invasion of Afghanistan as practically inconceivable before 9/11.

Capabilities

Before 9/11, the United States tried *to solve* the al Qaeda problem with the capabilities it had used in the last stages of the Cold War and its immediate aftermath. These capabilities were insufficient. Little was done to expand or reform them.

The CIA had minimal capacity to conduct paramilitary operations with its own personnel, and it did not seek a large-scale expansion of these capabilities before 9/11. The CIA also needed to improve its capability to collect intelligence from human agents.

At no point before 9/11 was the Department of Defense fully engaged in the mission of countering al Qaeda, even though this was perhaps the most dangerous foreign enemy threatening the United States.

America's homeland defenders faced outward. NORAD itself was barely able to retain any alert bases at all. Its planning scenarios occasionally considered the danger of hijacked aircraft being guided to American targets, but *only* aircraft that were *coming* from overseas.

The most serious weaknesses in agency capabilities were in the domestic arena. The FBI did not have the capability to link the collective knowledge of agents in the field to national priorities. Other domestic agencies deferred to the FBI.

FAA capabilities were weak. Any serious examination of the possibility of a suicide hijacking could have suggested changes to fix glaring vulnerabilities—expanding no-fly lists, searching passengers identified by the CAPPS screening system, deploying federal air marshals domestically, hardening cockpit doors, alerting air crews to a different kind of hijacking possibility than they had been trained to expect. Yet the FAA did not adjust either its *own* training or training with NORAD to take account of threats other than those experienced in the past.

Management

The missed opportunities to thwart the 9/11 plot were also symptoms of a broader inability to adapt the way government manages problems to the new challenges of the twenty-first century. Action officers should have been able to

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draw on all available knowledge about al Qaeda in the government. Management should have ensured that information was shared and duties were clearly assigned across agencies, and across the foreign-domestic divide.

There were **also** broader management issues with respect to **how** top leaders set priorities and allocated resources. For instance, on December 4, 1998, DCI Tenet issued a directive to several **CIA officials** and the DDCI for **Community Management**, stating: "We are at war. I want no resources or people spared in this effort, either inside CIA or the Community." The memorandum had little overall effect on mobilizing the CIA or the intelligence community. This episode indicates the limitations of the DCI's authority over the direction of the intelligence community, including agencies within the Department of Defense.

The U.S. government did not find a **way** of pooling intelligence and using it to guide the planning and assignment of responsibilities for joint operations involving entities as disparate as the CIA, the FBI, the State Department, the military, and the agencies involved in homeland security.

SPECIFIC FINDINGS

Unsuccessful Diplomacy

Beginning in February 1997, and through September 11, 2001, the U.S. government tried to use diplomatic pressure to persuade the Taliban regime in Afghanistan to stop being a sanctuary for al Qaeda, and to expel Bin Ladin to a country where he could face justice. These efforts included warnings and sanctions, but they all failed.

The U.S. government also pressed two successive Pakistani governments to demand that the Taliban cease providing a sanctuary for Bin Ladin and his organization and, failing that, to cut off their support for the Taliban. Before 9/11, the United States could not find a mix of incentives and pressure that would persuade Pakistan to reconsider its fundamental relationship with the Taliban.

From 1999 through early 2001, the United States pressed the United Arab Emirates, one of the Taliban's only travel and financial outlets to the outside world, to break off ties and enforce sanctions, especially those related to air travel to Afghanistan. These efforts achieved little before 9/11.

Saudi Arabia has been a problematic ally in combating Islamic extremism. Before 9/11, the Saudi and U.S. governments did not fully share intelligence information or develop an adequate joint effort to track and disrupt the finances of the al Qaeda organization. On the other hand, government officials of Saudi Arabia at the highest levels worked closely with top U.S. officials in major initiatives to solve the Bin Ladin problem with diplomacy.

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Lack of Military Options

In response to the request of policymakers, the *military* prepared an array of limited strike options for attacking Bin Ladin and his organization from May 1998 onward. When they briefed policymakers, the military presented both the pros and cons of those strike options and the associated risks. Policymakers expressed frustration with the range of options presented.

Following the August 20, 1998, missile strikes on al Qaeda targets in Afghanistan and Sudan, both senior military officials and policymakers placed great emphasis on actionable intelligence as *the* key factor in recommending or deciding to launch military action against Bin Ladin and his organization. They did not want to risk significant collateral damage, and they did not want to miss Bin Ladin and thus make the United States look weak while making Bin Ladin look strong. On three specific occasions in 1998–1999, intelligence was deemed credible enough to warrant planning for possible strikes to kill Bin Ladin. But in each case the strikes did not go forward, because senior policymakers did not regard the intelligence as sufficiently actionable to offset their assessment of the risks.

The Director of Central Intelligence, policymakers, and military officials expressed frustration with the lack of actionable intelligence. Some officials inside the Pentagon, including those in the special forces and the counterterrorism policy office, also expressed frustration with the lack of military action. The Bush administration began to develop new policies toward al Qaeda in 2001, but military plans did not change until after 9/11.

Problems within the Intelligence Community

The intelligence community struggled throughout the 1990s and up to 9/11 to collect intelligence on and analyze the phenomenon of transnational terrorism. The combination of an overwhelming number of priorities, flat budgets, an outmoded structure, and bureaucratic rivalries resulted in an insufficient response to this new challenge.

Many dedicated officers worked day and night for years to piece together the growing body of evidence on al Qaeda and to understand the threats. Yet, while there were *many* reports on Bin Laden and his growing al Qaeda organization, there was no comprehensive review of what the intelligence community knew and what it did not know, and what that meant. There was no National Intelligence Estimate on terrorism between 1995 and 9/11.

Before 9/11, no agency did more to attack al Qaeda than the CIA. But there were limits to what the CIA was able to achieve by disrupting terrorist activities abroad and by using proxies to try to capture Bin Ladin and his lieutenants in Afghanistan. CIA officers were aware of those limitations.

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many problems in national security and domestic agencies that became apparent in the aftermath of 9/11.

So long as oversight is undermined by current congressional rules and resolutions, we believe the American people will not get the security they want and need. The United States needs a strong, stable, and capable congressional committee structure to give America's national intelligence agencies oversight, support, and leadership.

Are We Safer?

Since 9/11, the United States and its allies have killed or captured a majority of al Qaeda's leadership; toppled the Taliban, which gave al Qaeda sanctuary in Afghanistan; and severely damaged the organization. Yet terrorist attacks continue. Even as we have thwarted attacks, nearly everyone expects they will come. How can this be?

The problem is that al Qaeda represents an ideological movement, not a finite group of people. It initiates and inspires, even if it no longer directs. In this way it has transformed itself into a decentralized force. Bin Ladin may be limited in his ability to organize major attacks from his hideouts. Yet killing or capturing him, while extremely important, would not end terror. His message of inspiration to a new generation of terrorists would continue.

Because of offensive actions against al Qaeda since 9/11, and defensive actions to improve homeland security, we believe we are safer today. But we are not safe. We therefore make the following recommendations that we believe can make America safer and more secure.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Three years after 9/11, the national debate continues about how to protect our nation in this new era. We divide our recommendations into two basic parts: What to do, and how to do it.

WHAT TO DO? A GLOBAL STRATEGY

The enemy is not just "terrorism." It is the threat posed specifically by Islamist terrorism, by Bin Ladin and others who draw on a long tradition of extreme intolerance within a minority strain of Islam that does not distinguish politics from religion, and distorts both.

The enemy is not Islam, the great world faith, but a perversion of Islam. The

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enemy goes beyond al Qaeda to include the radical ideological movement, inspired in part by al Qaeda, that has spawned other terrorist groups and violence. Thus our strategy must match our means to two ends: dismantling the al Qaeda network and, in the long term, prevailing over the ideology that contributes to Islamist terrorism.

The first phase of our post-9/11 efforts rightly included military action to topple the Taliban and pursue al Qaeda. This work continues. But long-term success demands the use of all elements of national power: diplomacy, intelligence, covert action, law enforcement, economic policy, foreign aid, public diplomacy, and homeland defense. If we favor one tool while neglecting others, we leave ourselves vulnerable and weaken our national effort.

What should Americans expect from their government? The goal seems unlimited: Defeat terrorism anywhere in the world. But Americans have also been told to expect the worst: An attack is probably coming; it may be more devastating still.

Vague goals match an amorphous picture of the enemy. Al Qaeda and other groups are popularly described as being all over the world, adaptable, resilient, needing little higher-level organization, and capable of anything. It is an image of an omnipotent hydra of destruction. That image lowers expectations of government effectiveness.

It lowers them too far. Our report shows a determined and capable group of plotters. Yet the group was fragile and occasionally left vulnerable by the mar- &, unstable people often attracted to such causes. The enemy made mistakes. The U.S. government was not able to capitalize on them.

No president can promise that a catastrophic attack like that of 9/11 will not happen again. But the American people are entitled to expect that official will have realistic objectives, clear guidance, and effective organization. They are entitled to see standards for performance so they can judge, with the help of their elected representatives, whether the objectives are being met.

We propose a strategy with three dimensions: (1) attack terrorists and their organizations, (2) prevent the continued growth of Islamist terrorism, and (3) protect against and prepare for terrorist attacks.

Attack Terrorists and Their Organizations

- **Root out sanctuaries.** The U.S. government should identify and prioritize actual or potential terrorist sanctuaries and have realistic country or regional strategies for each, utilizing every element of national power and reaching out to countries that can help us.

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- Strengthen long-term U.S. and international commitments to the future of Pakistan and Afghanistan.
- Confront problems with Saudi Arabia in the open and build a relationship beyond oil, a relationship that both sides can defend to their citizens and includes a shared commitment to reform.

Prevent the Continued Growth of Islamist Terrorism

In October 2003; Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld asked if enough was being done "to fashion a broad integrated plan to stop the next generation of terrorists." As part of such a plan, the U.S. government should:

- Define the message and stand as an example of moral leadership in the world. To Muslim parents, terrorists like Bin Ladin have nothing to offer their children but visions of violence and death. America and its friends have the advantage—our vision can offer a better future.
- Where Muslim governments, even those who are friends, do not offer opportunity, respect the rule of law, or tolerate differences, then the United States needs to stand for a better future.
- Communicate and defend American ideals in the Islamic world, through much stronger public diplomacy to reach more people, including students and leaders outside of government. Our efforts here should be as strong as they were in combating closed societies during the Cold War.
- Offer an agenda of opportunity that includes support for public education and economic openness.
- Develop a comprehensive coalition strategy against Islamist terrorism, using a flexible contact program of leading coalition governments and fashioning a common coalition approach on issues like the treatment of captured terrorists.
- Devote a maximum effort to the parallel task of countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
- Expect less from trying to dry up terrorist money and more from following the money for intelligence, as a tool to hunt terrorists, under-

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sion of how they are used, including a new board to oversee the implementation of the guidelines needed for gathering and sharing information in these new security systems.

- Base federal funding for emergency preparedness solely on risks and vulnerabilities, putting New York City and Washington, D.C., at the top of the current list. Such assistance should not remain a program for general revenue sharing or pork-barrel spending.
- Make homeland security funding contingent on the adoption of an incident command system to strengthen teamwork in a crisis, including a regional approach. Allocate more radio spectrum and improve connectivity for public safety communications, and encourage widespread adoption of newly developed standards for private-sector emergency preparedness—since the private sector controls 85 percent of the nation's critical infrastructure.

HOW TO DO IT? A DIFFERENT WAY OF ORGANIZING GOVERNMENT

The strategy we have recommended is elaborate, even as presented here very briefly. To implement it will require a government better organized than the one that exists today, with its national security institutions designed half a century ago to win the Cold War. Americans should not settle for incremental, ad hoc adjustments to a system created a generation ago for a world that no longer exists.

Our detailed recommendations are designed to fit together. Their purpose is clear: to build unity of effort across the U.S. government. As one official now serving on the front lines overseas put it to us: "One fight, one team."

We call for unity of effort in five areas, beginning with unity of effort on the challenge of counterterrorism itself:

- unifying strategic intelligence and operational planning against Islamist terrorists across the foreign-domestic divide with a National Counterterrorism Center;
- unifying the intelligence community with a new National Intelligence Director;

A-7-26

- unifying the many participants in the counterterrorism effort and their knowledge in a network-based information sharing system that transcends traditional governmental boundaries;
- unifying and strengthening congressional oversight to improve quality and accountability; and
- strengthening the FBI and homeland defenders.

Unity of Effort: A National Counterterrorism Center

The 9/11 story teaches the value of integrating strategic intelligence from all sources into joint operational planning—with both dimensions spanning the foreign-domestic divide.


- In some ways, since 9/11, joint work has gotten better. The effort of fighting terrorism has flooded over many of the usual agency boundaries because of its sheer quantity and energy. Attitudes have changed. But the problems of coordination have multiplied. The Defense Department alone has three unified commands (SOCOM, CENTCOM, and NORTHCOM) that deal with terrorism as one of their principal concerns.
- Much of the public commentary about the 9/11 attacks has focused on “lost opportunities.” Though characterized as problems of “watch-listing,” “information sharing,” or “connecting the dots,” each of these labels is too narrow. They describe the symptoms, not the disease.
- Breaking the older mold of organization stovepiped purely in executive agencies, we propose a National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) that would borrow the joint, unified command concept adopted in the 1980s by the American military in a civilian agency, combining the joint intelligence function alongside the operations work.
- The NCTC would build on the existing Terrorist Threat Integration Center and would replace it and other terrorism “fusion centers” within the government. The NCTC would become the authoritative knowledge bank, bringing information to bear on common plans. It should task collection requirements both inside and outside the United States.

- The NCTC should perform joint operational planning, assigning lead responsibilities to existing agencies and letting them direct the actual execution of the plans.
- Placed in the Executive Office of the President, headed by a Senate-confirmed official (with rank equal to the deputy head of a cabinet department) who reports to the National Intelligence Director, the NCTC would track implementation of plans. It would be able to influence the leadership and the budgets of the counterterrorism operating arms of the CIA, the FBI, and the departments of Defense and Homeland Security
- The NCTC should *not* be a policymaking body. Its operations and planning should follow the policy direction of the president and the National Security Council.

Unity of Effort: A National Intelligence Director

Since long before 9/11—and continuing to this day—the intelligence community is not organized well for joint intelligence work. It does not employ common standards and practices in reporting intelligence or in training experts overseas and at home. The expensive national capabilities for collecting intelligence have divided management. The structures are too complex and too secret.

- The community's head—the Director of Central Intelligence—has at least three jobs: running the CIA, coordinating a 15-agency confederation, and being the intelligence analyst-in-chief to the president. No one person can do all these things.
- A new National Intelligence Director should be established with two main jobs: (1) to oversee national intelligence centers that combine experts from all the collection disciplines against common targets—like counterterrorism or nuclear proliferation; and (2) to oversee the agencies that contribute to the national intelligence program, a task that includes setting common standards for personnel and information technology.
- The national intelligence centers would be the unified commands of the intelligence world—a long-overdue reform for intelligence comparable to the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols law that reformed the organization of national defense. The home services—such as the CIA, DIA,



Unity of Effort in Managing Intelligence

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

0-4-25

NSA, and FBI—would organize, train, and equip the best intelligence professionals in the world, and would handle the execution of intelligence operations in the field.

- This National Intelligence Director (NID) should be located in the Executive Office of the President and report directly to the president, yet be confirmed by the Senate. In addition to overseeing the National Counterterrorism Center described above (which will include both the national intelligence center for terrorism and the joint operations planning effort), the NID should have three deputies:
 - For foreign intelligence (a deputy who also would be the head of the CIA)
 - For defense intelligence (also the under secretary of defense for intelligence)
 - For homeland intelligence (also the executive assistant director for intelligence at the FBI or the under secretary of homeland security for information analysis and infrastructure protection)
- The NID should receive a public appropriation for national intelligence, should have authority to hire and fire his or her intelligence deputies, and should be able to set common personnel and information technology policies across the intelligence community.
- The CIA should concentrate on strengthening the collection capabilities of its clandestine service and the talents of its analysts, building pride in its core expertise.
- Secrecy stifles oversight, accountability, and information sharing. Unfortunately, all the current organizational incentives encourage overclassification. This balance should change; and as a start, open information should be provided about the overall size of agency intelligence budgets.

Unity of Effort: Sharing Information

The U.S. government has access to a vast amount of information. But it has a weak system for processing and using what it has. The system of "need to know" should be replaced by a system of "need to share."

- The President should lead a government-wide effort to bring the

major national security institutions into the information revolution, turning a mainframe system into a decentralized network. The obstacles are not technological. Official after official has urged us to call attention to problems with the unglamorous "back office" side of government operations.

- But no agency can solve the problems on its own—to build the network requires an effort that transcends old divides, solving common legal and policy issues in ways that can help officials know what they can and cannot do. Again, in tackling information issues, America needs unity of effort.

Unity of Effort: Congress

Congress took too little action to adjust itself or to restructure the executive branch to address the emerging terrorist threat. Congressional oversight for intelligence—and counterterrorism—is dysfunctional. Both Congress and the executive need to do more to minimize national security risks during transitions between administrations.

- For intelligence oversight, we propose two options: either a joint committee on the old model of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy or a single committee in each house combining authorizing and appropriating committees. Our central message is the same: the intelligence committees cannot carry out their oversight function unless they are made stronger, and thereby have both clear responsibility and accountability for that oversight.
- Congress should create a single, principal point of oversight and review for homeland security. There should be one permanent standing committee for homeland security in each chamber.
- We propose reforms to speed up the nomination, financial reporting, security clearance, and confirmation process for national security officials at the start of an administration, and suggest steps to make sure that incoming administrations have the information they need.

Unity of Effort: Organizing America's Defenses in the United States

We have considered several proposals relating to the future of the domestic intelligence and counterterrorism mission. Adding a new domestic intelligence

N-4-31

agency will not solve America's problems in collecting and analyzing intelligence within the United States. We do not recommend creating one.

- We propose the establishment of a specialized and integrated national security workforce at the FBI, consisting of agents, analysts, linguists, and surveillance specialists who are recruited, trained, rewarded, and retained to ensure the development of an institutional culture imbued with a deep expertise in intelligence and national security.

At several points we asked: Who has the responsibility for defending us at home? Responsibility for America's national defense is shared by the Department of Defense, with its new Northern Command, and by the Department of Homeland Security. They must have a clear delineation of des, missions, and authority

- The Department of Defense and its oversight committees should regularly assess the adequacy of Northern Command's strategies and planning to defend against *military threats* to the homeland.
- The Department of Homeland Security and its oversight committees should regularly assess the types of threats the country faces, in order to determine the adequacy of the government's plans and the readiness of the government to respond to those threats.

* * *

We call on the American people to remember how we all felt on 9/11, to remember not only the unspeakable horror but how we came together as a nation—one nation. Unity of purpose and unity of effort are the way we will defeat this enemy and make America safer for our children and grandchildren.

We look forward to a national debate on the merits of what we have recommended, and we will participate vigorously in that debate.

A-4-32

SECRET
November 2, 2004

2005 MAR -3 AM 9:30

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Photo in Kazakhstan

Please have the photographers find a copy of a photograph of me taken in Kazakhstan where I have on a coat and hat like Ivanov does – preferably a photo with this same person, the Kazakh Minister of Defense. I want to send a copy of my photograph to Sergey.

Thanks.

Attach.
Ivanov photos

DHR:dh
110204-1



Please respond by 11/12/04

06050

honor

October 18, 2004
2005 MAR -3 AM 9:43

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Note from Jay Garner

(Handwritten circled 'D')

37324

Please take a look at this note from Jay Garner and tell me what you think I ought to do with it.

Thanks.

Attach.
10/15/04 Letter to SecDef from Jay Garner

DHR:ss
101804-10

.....
Please respond by 10/29/04

18 OCT 04

OCT 26 2004

Gen Cartwright, et. al, are briefing you on the issues associated with missile defense engagements.

I believe the timelines for engagement are so short that pre-delegated authority for specified events is essential.

We'll all be better educated in the next few weeks.

15 OCT 04

OSD 04280-05

VIA
FAX

OFFICE OF THE
~~NOVEMBER 1, 2004~~
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2005 MAR -3 AM 9:49

TO: Jay Garner
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Missile Defense

Thanks for the heads up on missile defense. We are working with General Cartwright and Steve Cambone on it, and I think we are making headway.

Regards,

DHR:dh
110104-7

373.24

1 NOV 04

15 OCT 04

OSD 04280-05

4

October 15, 2004

Mr. Secretary,

In the next several weeks you will be asked to make decisions regarding the Ground Based Mid-Course Missile Defense System. Among them is the decision to delegate Weapons Release Authority (WRA).

In the case of launches against either Hawaii or the Aleutians, the timelines are so short (around 5 min or less) and the engageable Battlespace so small that any delays to weapons release could result in a failure to engage.

As you know this is an incredibly complex issue and my impression is that some have attempted to relate this to Noble Eagle scenarios which should not be done as they are completely different.

If we are wrong in execution of Noble Eagle there are enormous political implications. If we are wrong in our decision to launch the GMD Missile, we will expend a missile in the exoatmosphere.

For your consideration.

Thanks

Jay (Garner)

373.24

15 Oct 04

OSD 04280-05

November 1, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Gen Dick Myers
Gen Pete Pace
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Iraq Info Memo

Attached is a piece on Iraq that is of interest.

Thanks.

Attach.
10/21/04 DIA Info Memo to SecDef

DHR:ss
110104-2

.....
Please respond by _____

Iraq

1 Nov 04

OSD 04281-05



UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20340-

INFO MEMO



U-0790/DR

21 October 2004

FOR: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE

FROM: *L. E. Jacoby* L. E. Jacoby, Vice Admiral, USN, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: (U) Iraqi Public Anger Toward Coalition/Interim Iraqi Government

This IM is the response to a question I asked last week of one of our senior civilians who is a retired USMC Arab FAO, about why the Iraqi public was not becoming angry at the perpetrators of the car bombings which have killed so many civilians: **"The onlookers were uniformly angry at the US, but more specifically at their government for not being able to protect them and prevent such attacks. Nobody seemed angry at the attackers. I don't know what polling shows about public disgust with these attacks, but calling upon your days as a FAO and in the IO cell, what would you suggest that we/IIG do to focus anger on the perpetrators and enlist the public to rise up against the violence? Is there anything reasonable that could be done, or is there a cultural underpinning here that I don't understand?"**

Why do they blame us, not the terrorists? The role of government in Islamic-- particularly Arab--society is "to promote the good and prevent the evil." This is a fundamental concept articulated by Islamic political thinkers over the centuries. Accordingly, when we went into Iraq and took on the task of governance, we also took on the responsibility of protecting the population from threats, whether it be from crime, terrorism or foreign invasion. The general perception on the street is that we have failed at this very basic duty of government. That is why we are blamed.

At the street level, criminals, terrorists and insurgents pose a threat to the public, and it is the function of government to protect the populace. To do so, Islamic political philosophers over the years have condoned authoritarian measures in order for the government to do its job. Several medieval Islamic political philosophers even went so far as to make the case that bad (Islamic) government is better than anarchy or "the imposed government of a non-Muslim invader, such as the Crusaders or the Mongols with whom the Arab world had rather distasteful experiences in medieval times."

11- L-0559/OSD/47763

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

These old established attitudes were reinforced by the experience of British and French colonialism in the 19th-20th centuries. Accordingly, one can make the case that this is why Muslims have been willing to support bad government and helps explain not only why Arabs have accepted authoritarian leaders like Saddam, Nasser, Asad, Qadhafi, Mubarak and hosts of emirs, kings and sultans over the years. Moreover, in order to rule with an effective mandate, these leaders all exaggerated the foreign threat which made their authoritarian rule more palatable.

At the cultural level, within the Arab world – where immediate and extended family, then tribe, characterizes the basic social units and identification – people see government as a distant and alien institution. There is a high degree of “anomie” within the population; governments are only embraced when they are seen as promoting one's interests. This is why the streets are so filthy and so much doesn't get done. Opposite from our sense of civic pride and duty, their refrain is: “That's the government's job.” Employment as a public servant is not held in any degree of esteem, and more particularly, police and the functions they are supposed to enforce are widely derided as unwanted and unsanctioned infringements on the personal freedoms that the Koran extols for the faithful.

Given the population's cultural predisposition, then, to see government's role as promoting the good and proscribing the evil, we have failed them. Not only are many people in the Sunni triangle unemployed and poorer since regime change, but they have to cope with violent competing centers of power (resurgent tribal rivalries, Islamic guerillas, former regime insurgents, Iraqi police and security, and Coalition forces). At the street level, this anarchical environment is frightening. Then somebody explodes a car bomb, killing dozens of relatives, friends or neighbors who just happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time. Who do the survivors and relatives blame? The faceless/nameless terrorists or the people whose job it is to protect society? Bad guys are simply doing their job; government, in not protecting the population, is failing in its duties. Finally, a veneer over all of this is the long-recognized characteristic within Arab culture of not accepting responsibility for one's actions or one's fate. It is always a case of others, whether individuals or nations, being at fault for the misfortune of those particular Arabs who feel they have been treated unjustly. This is pervasive throughout Arab society and its history.

Perhaps the case of Palestine best portrays this tendency. For nearly 60 years Palestinians and Arab loyalists have incessantly blamed Israel and the US for the Palestinian problem. One never hears any Arab spokesman or Arab admit that the Palestinians had an opportunity in 1948 to claim a substantial portion of Israel/Palestine but they refused to accept what was offered them at that time. Instead we only hear that they had it taken away illegally or their human and political rights were violated. What we are witnessing in Iraq is yet another example of Arabs refusing to admit who has been responsible for the casualties their own population have been suffering...the Iraqi

insurgents, Baathists and terrorists who live among them. It is the cultural norm to blame the outsider rather than expose oneself to shame, criticism or ridicule by admitting one's weaknesses and failures which are exposed when one admits responsibility.

What to do about it? This is a policy question. The best I can give are observations.

Saddam ran a police state which believed it was better to arrest nine innocent men to ensure security than to let one guilty man go free. We have the opposite approach. Also, our forces never quite understood the operational environment...language, customs and cultural do's and don'ts, power structure and brokers, etc., and when they figured it out, they PCS'd and a new group came in. The compromise move is to beef up the Iraqi security forces, which is being done already; but this will still take years to accomplish, especially if we don't want to empower a coup force for the bad guys who have been trying to infiltrate the security services and armed forces.

Aside from ensuring security, major improvements in the economy...or more accurately a jobs program that takes young men (65% of Iraq's population is under 25) off the streets would make an impact. These are the same young men who have grown up lionizing Palestinian suicide bombers and see firing AK-47s and RPGs at enemies as cool and macho. Lots of young Iraqi males have joined the resistance because they can make a few hundred bucks a month and fire weapons. If you are 18, high on testosterone, and too poor to get married, being a Mujahed isn't a bad life. Get them off the street and you will have reduced the pool of insurgents. A pre-war suggestion to create a Civilian Conservation Corps-type organization where lots of cheap labor is thrown at projects to rebuild Iraq was not pursued. Maybe it was the security situation that precluded it, but this would have had the effect of getting lots of bored young men off the streets, putting some money in their pockets, providing remittances to their families, and conducting a large-scale public works campaign--that actually might change engrained cultural attitudes about civic pride.

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
November 8, 2004
2005 MAR -3 AM 10: 12

TO: COL Steve Bucci
c c : Cathy Mainardi
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Lunch with John Kasich

I want to have lunch with John Kasich in early December. He'll be coming down from Ohio.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
110804-13

.....
Please respond by 12/5/04

000,71 SD

8
2
04

~~FOUO~~

March 1, 2005
I-05/003021
ES-2488

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Gen Dick Myers
Steve Cambone
FROM: " " "
SUBJECT: Sam Bodman

I think we probably ought to get Sam Bodman over sometime and talk to him, so that we've at least had an initial discussion on nuclear matters. We should have the right people in the room.

We need to see **if** he wants any briefings or whatever we can do to help.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
022805-75

OSD 04308-05

.....
Please respond by 3/24/05

3/1/05
→ SD
I'll get this organized.
I'm friendly with Sam.
Doug Feith

OSD 04308-05

~~FOUO~~

March 1, 2005

I-051003021

ES-2488

TO: Doug Feith
cc: Gen Dick Myers
Steve Cambone
FROM: "
SUBJECT: Sam Bodman

I think we probably ought to get Sam Bodman over sometime and talk to him, so that we've at least had an initial discussion on nuclear matters. We should have the right people in the room.

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DHR:dh
022805-75

OSD 04308-05

.....
Please respond by 3/24/05

3/1/05
→ SD
I'll get this organized.
I'm friendly with Sam.
Doug Feith

OSD 04308-05

MAR 04 2005

TO: Stephen Hadley
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Public Diplomacy and Communications

I think it would be a good idea if the Deputies Committee were to take on the issue of Public Diplomacy as a priority for our government.

It would help to empanel some persons with expertise from the outside to help us think this through.

People in the Departments and agencies are spinning on this subject, but that work may benefit from a more structured approach, with terms of reference we develop and agree to, and a work plan that leads to measurable improvements in our performance.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
030305-10

334 nsc Dep

4mar 05

~~FOUO~~
TAB A

FEB 15 2005

954

TO: Gen Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Replacement Forces in Iraq

How do we train the military that are replacing the forces currently in Iraq not to fill every vacuum?

Thanks.

DHR:ss
021405-16

.....
Please respond by 2/24/05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 04405-05

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/47770

OFFICIAL USE ONLY
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

~~FOUO~~

TAB A

2005 MAR 23 PM 4:40

March 7, 2005

981

IRAQ

TO: Gen Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Replacement Forces in Iraq Memo

I looked at your response to this memo. I thought you said I was going to speak to the Commanders when Casey had them gathered.

Thanks.

Attach.
2/14/05 SecDef to CJCS

DHR:ss
030705-23

.....
Please respond by 3/17/05

7 MAR 05

Tab A

~~FOUO~~

OSD D44 05-05

15 Feb 05



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-0000
 INFO MEMO

OFFICE OF THE
 SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

PH
3/7

2005 MAR -4 AM 10:42
 CH-2358-05
 4 March 2005

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS

792M 5/3

SUBJECT: Replacement Forces in Iraq (SF 954)

- **Answer.** In response to your question (), US forces deploying to Iraq conduct predeployment **training** based on **lessons** learned **from** previous deployments **as well as** training on their pending mission in accordance with current USCENTCOM priorities and **intent**. Additionally, deploying forces conduct combined operations with the **units** they are replacing prior to transfer of authority.
- **Analysis**
 - GEN Abizaid and I have discussed the importance of this topic and share your concern. His commander's intent is **to** assist Iraq transition **to** self-reliance. **This** goal is disseminated to the lowest levels. Clearly, the success-oriented mentality of **US** forces will continue, but not in a manner that handicaps Iraqi development. We apply the following **steps** to ensure US forces do not fill all vacuums.
 - Tasks associated **with** US forces supporting Iraqi **Security Forces (ISFs)** at the tactical level are incorporated into mission rehearsal exercises at the stateside **training centers**. Such **tasks** are taught with role players in event-driven, realistic scenarios **to cultivate** troop skills and teach the rules of engagement essential to facilitate **ISF** development.
 - Additionally, once **units** arrive in theater, we use the right-seat-left-seat-ride concept that allows deploying troops the opportunity to plan and conduct **missions** with the **outgoing units**. During these transitions, the commander's intent to aid Iraq's transition **to** self-reliance is thoroughly reinforced.

COORDINATION: **TAB B**

Attachments:
 As stated

MA SD	SMA DSD	<i>3/7</i>	
ISA SD	SA DSD		
EXEC SEC	<i>M 3/4</i>		
ESR MA	<i>7873 4/15</i>		

Prepared By: Lieutenant General J. T. Conway, USMC; Director, J-3; (b)(6)

Tab A

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~ OSD 04405-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47772



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999
INFO MEMO

CM-2358-05
4 March 2005

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS

RBM/3

SUBJECT: Replacement Forces in Iraq (SF 954)

- **Answer.** In response to your question (TAB A), US forces deploying to Iraq conduct predeployment training based on lessons learned from previous deployments as well as training on their pending mission in accordance with current USCENCOM priorities and intent. Additionally, deploying forces conduct combined operations with the units they are replacing prior to transfer of authority.
- **Analysis**
 - GEN Abizaid and I have discussed the importance of this topic and share your concern. His commander's intent is to assist Iraq transition to self-reliance. This goal is disseminated to the lowest levels. Clearly, the success-oriented mentality of US forces will continue, but not in a manner that handicaps Iraqi development. We apply the following steps to ensure US forces do not fill all vacuums.
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COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: Lieutenant General J. T. Conway, USMC; Director, J-3; (b)(6)

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~ OSD 04405-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47773

~~FOUO~~
TAB A

FEB 15 2005

954

TO: Gen Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Replacement Forces in Iraq

How do we train the military that are replacing the forces currently in Iraq not to fill every vacuum?

Thanks.

DHR:ss
021405-16

.....
Please respond by 2/24/05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 04405-05

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/47774

UNCLASSIFIED

TAB B

COORDINATION PAGE

Agency	Name	Date
USA	COL Chappell	18 February 2005
USMC	Col Van Dyke	18 February 2005
USN	CAPT Goldacker	18 February 2005
USAF	Col Ball	18 February 2005
USCENTCOM	COL Kanewski	22 February 2005

UNCLASSIFIED

Tab B

11-L-0559/OSD/47775

~~FOUO~~

March 1, 2005

TO: Dan Dell'Orto
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Story about Air Force General

Please take a look at the Business section of the *Washington Post* from Saturday, February 26. There is an article by Babcock about a retired Air Force general who said Air Force lawyers told him not to worry about restrictions on employment.

Thanks.

DHRdh
022805-53

.....
Please respond by 3/10/05

~~FOUO~~

O5D 04414-05

11-L-0559/O5D/47776



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1600



INFO MEMO

March 3, 2005 (2:42pm)

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Daniel J. Dell'Orto, Principal Deputy General Counsel

SUBJECT: GAO Opinion Implying Ethics Violation by Retired Air Force General

- You asked about the February 26, 2005, Washington Post story on the GAO decision to re-open the small-diameter bomb contract. The story states that Brig. Gen. Randall K. Bigum, USAF (now retired) was told by his Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) "not to worry about" post-Government employment restrictions.
- General Bigum received post-government employment counseling from the Air Combat Command's SJA office before leaving active duty. As part of the pleadings in the GAO protest action, Gen Bigum submitted an affidavit that, on its face, would indicate he had not violated any post-government employment restrictions.
- The GAO decision, which did not turn on this issue, recommended that further investigation be conducted into whether General Bigum may have violated post-government employment restrictions.
- The Air Force General Counsel referred the matter to the Air Force IG on February 24, 2005, and asked for a timely response, but in any event within 30 days.
- I will forward you the results of the investigation when I receive them.

COORDINATION: None

Prepared by Steve Epstein

(b)(6)



OSD 04414-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47777

~~FOUO~~

2005 MAR 1 10:00 AM
2005 MAR 1 10:00 AM

March 1, 2005

TO: Dan Dell'Orto
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Story about Air Force General

Please *take* a look at the Business section of the *Washington Post* from Saturday, February 26. There is an article by Babcock about a retired Air Force general who said Air Force lawyers told him not to worry about restrictions on employment.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
022805-53

.....
Please respond by 3/10/05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 04414-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47778



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Little Worry Shown Over Job Conflict, General Says

By Charles R. Babcock
Washington Post Staff Writer
Saturday, February 26, 2005; Page E01

A retired Air Force general questioned over a possible conflict for work on a small-diameter-bomb program at Lockheed Martin Corp. testified last month that Air Force lawyers told him "not to worry about" restrictions on his employment after he had been out of government for a year.

The Air Force is reviewing the general's conduct after the Government Accountability Office expressed concern about his role in Lockheed's effort to win a contract for the small-bomb program. Sources who would speak only on the condition of anonymity because of the pending review identified the officer as retired Brig. Gen. Randall K. Bigum.

The review comes as the U.S. attorney in Alexandria has announced an initiative to combat procurement fraud, including an examination of potential conflicts by military officials who have gone on to work for defense contractors.

The general's role was discussed in a GAO hearing on the Air Force's decision to award the small-bomb contract to Boeing Co. Lockheed protested the award after Darleen A. Druyun, a top Air Force procurement official, pleaded guilty to negotiating a \$250,000-a-year job for herself at Boeing while overseeing several contracts it

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was bidding on.

At the GAO hearing, lawyers defending Boeing pointed to the general having been involved in the small-bomb program both in the service and later at

Lockheed, according to a GAO report on the matter released yesterday.

The GAO recommended Feb. 18 that the Air Force hold a new competition for \$1.7 billion of the \$2.7 billion small-bomb program.

The GAO's report said Druyun had "significant involvement" in deciding to delete a requirement in the contract that the bomb hit moving targets, a capability considered a strength of Lockheed's bid and a weakness for Boeing's. It also described confusion in the Air Force procurement office over who was in charge of the program.

The report recounted the general's role, without naming him, citing concerns including his having participated in an "acquisitions strategy" meeting for the program with Druyun before he retired.

Bigum declined to comment yesterday. Air Force and Lockheed spokesmen said that, contrary to the description in the GAO report, both take the "revolving door" rules seriously.

A Lockheed spokesman, Tom Jurkowsky, said "the gentleman in question worked on the bomb program on the requirements side" while he was in the Air Force, and his role was limited to defining the military's needs.

Bigum's biography on the Pentagon Web site shows that before he retired on Oct. 1, 2001, he was director of requirements at the Air Combat Command at Langley Air Force Base, Va. He went to work for Lockheed, and in October 2002 was appointed vice president of the company's strike weapons business, including the small-diameter bomb, in Orlando.

Federal law says former government officials can't try to influence their former agency on any subject for one year, or for two years on any matter pending under their responsibility during their last year in the government. There is a lifetime ban on representing a new employer on any specific matter an official worked on directly.

The GAO report said the general testified he had asked for a letter from Air Force lawyers before he retired, outlining post-government-employment restrictions. He said he was subsequently advised by Air Force lawyers that he had to deal only with the one-year restriction and not to worry about the longer-term ones, which the letter said might apply to him. He said he was told those were cited by the attorneys only to "cover their butt."

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Doug **Karas**, a spokesman for the **Air Force**, said that description "is absolutely not a reflection of **Air Force** attitude or policy."

The general also testified, the **GAO** said, that he couldn't recall Lockheed requesting that he identify the particular matters he worked on before his retirement. Jurkowsky said, "We are confident we fully complied with all applicable post-government-employment regulations."

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11- L-0559/OSD/47781



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
 WASHINGTON HEADQUARTERS SERVICES
 1155 DEFENSE PENTAGON
 WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1155



Executive Services and
 Communications
 Directorate

ACTION MEMO

March 23, 2005

FOR: THE MILITARY ASSISTANT TO THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Jimmy L. Sherrod, Executive Services Directorate *[Signature]*

SUBJECT: Approval to Sign Letter

- Representative Conyers wrote to the SecDef on 4 March (Tab 63) expressing his displeasure with Lt Gen Boykin due to comments he made during speaking engagements. He quoted from the Inspector General's report which recommended that the **Army** "take appropriate corrective action with respect to L.G. Hoykin." The draft response indicates that appropriate action was taken and this case is considered closed.
- We (ESD) tasked the Under Secretary for Intelligence to prepare a letter for the SecDef's signature.
- Col Bucci received the attached letter from **Sarah** Nagleman (USI) which they prepared for the DepSec's signature to answer Representative Conyers. *(Tab 6)*

RECOMMENDATION: That The Special Assistant Secretary approve SOMing of DEPSECDEF signature on letter at TAR A to close this action.

APPROVED _____ DISAPPROVED _____ OTHER _____

COORDINATION: None required

Attachments:
 As stated

Prepared by Jimmy L. Sherrod, (b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/47782

000.3

23 MAR 05

4 MAR 05

04416-05



THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

The Honorable John Conyers, Jr
Ranking Member
Committee on the Judiciary
U. S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-6216

Dear Representative Conyers:

I received your letter dated March 4, 2005 in which you recommend that LTG Boykin "be relieved of his very important and sensitive duties."

As you are aware, the Inspector General has done a complete investigation and has made its findings known to the acting Secretary of the Army **and** me. The Army has taken appropriate action, and considers the matter closed.

Sincerely,

F.

11-L-0559/OSD/47783

March 7, 2005

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Conyers Letter

000.3

Are you in charge of responding to this Conyers letter?

Thanks.

Attach.
3/4/05 Letter from Cong John Conyers to SecDef

DHR:ss
030705-16

.....
Please respond by 3/10/05

7 Mar 05

4 Mar 05

OSD 04416-05

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March 4, 2005

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, D. C. 20301

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld:

I am in receipt of the Inspector General's Report from the Department of Defense concerning Lieutenant General William G. Boykin. In brief, they find that Lieutenant General Boykin's speaking appearances "violated applicable DoD regulations, because: (1) he failed to clear the content of his speeches with appropriate DoD security and public affairs personnel; (2) he failed to issue the required disclaimer on several occasions; and (3) he failed to report his receipt of one travel payment from a non-Government source on his 2002 Public Financial Disclosure Report."

In addition, the IG raised very serious issues concerning General Boykin's wearing government uniform while making private and controversial remarks, and his use of government-funded travel. These findings of wrongdoing are above and beyond the actual incendiary substance of the General's remarks, which as you know many find insulting to Muslim's and highly inappropriate, since the IG believed his "fitness for duty and judgment are subjective issues for consideration solely by appropriate management officials." Indeed, the IG confirms that there were "negative reactions" and "a national and international interest, generated by [Boykin's] remarks." The IG further recommends that the Army "take appropriate corrective action with respect to L.G. Boykin." Based on my review of these findings and the IG's report, it is now clear to me that General Boykin should be relieved of his very important and sensitive duties in the Armed Forces, and I would urge you to immediately do so.

I need not remind you of the highly controversial and charged statements by General Boykin made while under your command, including remarks that Islamic extremists hate the United States because we're a Christian nation," that "our spiritual enemy will only be defeated if we come against them in the name of Jesus," that President Bush "is in the White House because

OSD 04416-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47785

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld

Page 2


March 3, 2005

God put him there," and that Boykin's "god was a real god and [the Muslim god] **was** an idol." In the first attachment to the report, the Inspector General confirms that in every one of these instances (and in many others) General Boykin wore his official uniform.

Remarks of this nature disparage the **very people we** need to work with to win the war against terror. The fact that when making these remarks General Boykin violated several applicable DoD regulations make it all the more clear that the Armed Forces needs to act forcefully and quickly to demonstrate that this type of improper tolerance is not acceptable. We simply cannot afford to have such an extremist speaking on behalf of our nation and our military in violation of DoD rules.

Thank you for your attention to this important matter. I would ask that you respond to me through my committee staff at 2142 Rayburn Building, Washington, D.C. 20515, tel. 202-225-6504, fax 202-225-4423.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "John Conyers, Jr." in a cursive style.

John Conyers, Jr.
Ranking Member

OFFICE - TELER
SECRET **March 1, 2005**

2005 WFO -4 00 12: 00

TO: Ray DuBois
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Loss of Bank Tapes

The television said that most of the people whose identities were lost by the Bank of America were working for the Pentagon. How can that be?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
022805-81

OSD 04421-05

.....
Please respond by 3/17/05

March 4, 2005

TO: The Honorable Dr. Condoleezza Rice

CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney
Stephen J. Hadley

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Afghanistan Parliamentary Elections

I believe the delay in Afghanistan's Parliamentary elections is harmful. It has gone from April to June, and today I heard it might be September. I think it is wrong from the standpoint of Afghanistan. I know it is wrong from the standpoint of our force management. We ought not to be thinking about bringing more U.S. Forces in for their elections, if they keep changing the date. We simply cannot manage our force rotations in that manner.

What do you propose?

DIR:ss
030305-16

Afghanistan

4 Mar 05

March 4, 2005

TO: The Honorable Dr. Condoleezza Rice

CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney
Stephen J. Hadley

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Afghanistan Parliamentary Elections

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What do you propose?

DHR:ss
030305-16

~~FOUO~~

March 4, 2005

TO: The Honorable Dr. Condoleezza Rice

CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney
Stephen J. Hadley

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Afghanistan Parliamentary Elections

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What do you propose?

DHR:ss
030305-16

~~FOUO~~

OSD 04472-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47790

March 4, 2005

TO: Stephen J. Hadley
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*
SUBJECT: December 14 Memo

Attached is a memo I sent Condi on December 14. I need some help.

Thanks.

Attach.
12/14/05 SecDef Memo to Dr. Rice

DHR:ss
030405-1

Iceland

4 Mar 05

~~FOUO~~

December 14, 2004

TO: Dr. Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Iceland

Condi,

I'm ready to go and start the process on Iceland, along the lines of the memo I gave you. I need a yes or no. It is \$281 million/year, and we just had our budget reduced by \$10 billion.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
121404-4

~~FOUO~~

OSD 20124-04

11-L-0559/OSD/47792

2/16/05

~~FOUO~~

Mrs. McGinnis - copy
Mr. Abell's copy

February 16, 2005

TO: David Chu

CC: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Language Initiative between State, Defense and Education

Condi Rice and the new Secretary of Education, Margaret Spelling, want to do a language initiative among our three Departments. You should contact Condi's Chief of Staff, and once you get the lay of the land and what you think we might be able to do, we will decide who ought to be the person to participate in the three Department working group.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
021605-8

.....

Please respond by 3/1/05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 04486-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47793



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

INFO MEMO

March 4, 2005, 3:30 PM

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense (P&R) *David S. C. Chu*
4 Mar 05

SUBJECT: Language Initiative among State, Defense, and Education--
SNOWFLAKE (attached)

- I talked with Brian Gunderson (Secretary Rice's Chief of Staff). Dr. Rice wants to replicate for Arabic what the United States did to encourage the study of Russian during the Cold War. She especially wishes to improve the flow of students with foreign language ability into government service.
- We met with Education and State this week. They discussed the likely need for legislative action and the possibility of an eventual Presidential Summit. State Department staff indicated interest in convening an NSC Deputies Meeting. Doug Feith's office is assisting these discussions.
- As you know, we have been working with other federal agencies, academia, and interested national associations on a similar effort since last summer.
 - We hosted a major national conference to stimulate a national language agenda.
 - I will be discussing the White Paper that resulted with Chief Human Capital Officers of federal agencies, focusing on how we can best meet our collective needs.
- Specific actions are already underway. For example:
 - Our National Security Education Program is establishing a "pipeline" program to teach Chinese from kindergarten through college.
 - We will be using our Dependent School system to establish a model program.
- Education will have the major piece of this initiative. It is not currently funded for this purpose.
- We will ensure that we coordinate the Defense Language Transformation Roadmap, on which the Deputy reported to you, with this new initiative.

Prepared by Mrs. Gail McGinn, DUSD (Plans), (b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/47794

OSD 04486-05



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000



ACTION MEMO

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

March 3, 2005, 8:00 PM

FOR: DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense (P&R)

David S. C. Chu
4/1/05

SUBJECT: Defense Foreign Language Transformation Roadmap

- The Secretary asked you "what to do next" to roll out the Defense Language Transformation Roadmap (TAB B).
- The proposed memo to the Secretary (TAB A) reiterates the Roadmap goals and provides recommendations to the Secretary to help bring the necessary focus and action to the Roadmap:
 - Direct the Roadmap be included as an agenda item at the March COCOM conference;
 - Incorporate key parts of the Roadmap into his speeches as they are relevant;
 - Approve a quotation to include in an immediate press release about the Roadmap:

"At the heart of the Roadmap is institutional change. As we learn to value foreign languages and other cultures, our soldiers, sailors, Marines, and airmen will develop a new way of viewing, assessing, and responding to situations that are culturally different from their own--they will "think" differently. No technology delivers this capability; it is a truly human skill that our forces must have to win. The Roadmap is a commitment to our men and women that they will have that skill".

RECOMMENDATION: Sign the memorandum at TAB A.

COORDINATION: None

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared by **Dr.** Susan Kelly, OSD (P&R/Plans), (b)(6)

091,4
3 Mar 05
2 Mar 05



PENDING DSD ACTION AS OF: 5/18/2005

CONTROL#	OCN AGENCY DOC	SUBJECT	ACTION ToDSD	REPLY TO	STATUS
OSD 14252-04	OTE	STRATEGIC PLANNING GUIDANCE SPG TASK FOR JOINT TESTING IN FORCE TRANSFORMATION ROADMAP	10/05/2004 0816		10/12, PER DSD MARINO, SENT BACK TO OTE TO INCORPORATE USA COMMENTS, JB.
OSD 19189-04	SN	PROPOSED SECDEF LETTER TO GOVERNOR SCHWARZENEGGER REGARDING CALIFORNIA STATE ANTI-ENCROACHMENT LEGISLATION	12/06/2004 1608		12/8/04 0900, FROM MA/DSD LTC NAGL TO EXSEC (PATTERSON REQUESTS OGC COORD). BSC - PKG RETN FOR OGC COORD: RD-- 1/15/04 RETURNED TO THE NAVY WITH A COMMENT FROM GC TO "NOT SEND THE LETTER." JS - 1/21/05 1000, REC'D. ORIGINAL PKG; FWD TO ESR. BSC - REC'D REVISED COVER MEMO FROM SN; TO ESR 030805, 1530 RUN.
OSD 08771-05	SN	DUAL ABSENCE COMMANDANT AND ASSISTANT COMMANDANT MARINE CORPS ON 060905 - 061305	05/09/2005 1711		
OSD 07128-05	UPR	CELEBRATING THE VALUE OF MILITARY SERVICE	04/15/2005 1605		
OSD 18677-04	UPR	MILITARY RECRUITING IN HARVARD LAW SCHOOL	11/23/2004 0906		12/01/04 SEE QUESTIONINOTE: RD--
OSD 18960-04	UPR	RESPONSIBILITY FOR FEDERAL VOTING ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (FVAP)	02/09/2005 1801		02/14/05 TO ES FOR REVIEW: RD--02/14/05 SEE QUESTIONINOTE:RD--
OSD 04494-05	UPR	DEFENSE FOREIGN LANGUAGE TRANSFORMATION ROADMAP	03/08/2005 1521		

CLOSE → OBE

CLOSE OBE

CLOSE - SEE ATTACHMENT

CLOSE



DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1 010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1010



ACTION MEMO

March 4, 2005, 8 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: **Dr.** Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense _____

SUBJECT: Defense Language Transformation Roadmap

- You asked what you could do next to help roll out The Defense Language Transformation Roadmap to expedite its implementation and help reach our goals to:
 - 1) Create foundational language and regional area expertise;
 - 2) Create the capacity to surge;
 - 3) Establish a cadre of highly skilled personnel (3/3/3 in reading/listening/speaking) and build the necessary training;
 - 4) Establish tracking of accession, separation, and promotion rates of military personnel with language skills and our FAOs (your memo is at TAB A).
- I recommend you:
 - Direct the Roadmap be included as an agenda item at the March COCOM conference;
 - Incorporate key parts of the Roadmap into your speeches, as relevant. We will work with your speechwriters to this end;
 - Approve the following quotation to include in an immediate press release about the Roadmap:
 - “At the heart of the Roadmap is institutional change. As we learn to value foreign languages and other cultures, our soldiers, sailors, Marines, and airmen will develop a new way of viewing, assessing, and responding to situations that are culturally different from their own--they will “think” differently. No technology delivers this capability; it is a truly human skill that our forces must have to win. The Roadmap is a commitment to our men and women that they will have that skill”.
- I will continue to work with David Chu on a complete media campaign for the Roadmap.

RECOMMENDATION: As stated above.

COORDINATION: None

Prepared by Dr. Susan Kelly, OSD (P&R/Plans) (b)(6) susan.kelly@osd.mil

091.4

4 Mar 05

2 Mar 05

PENDING DSD ACTION AS OF: 5/18/2005

CONTROL#	OCN AGENCY DOC	SUBJECT	ACTION ToDSD	REPLY TO	STATUS
OSD 14252-04	OTE	STRATEGIC PLANNING GUIDANCE SPG TASK FOR JOINT TESTING IN FORCE TRANSFORMATION ROADMAP	10/05/2004 0816		10/12, PER DSD MARINO, SENT BACK TO OTE TO INCORPORATE USA COMMENTS, JB.
OSD 19189-04	SN	PROPOSED SECDEF LETTER TO GOVERNOR SCHWARZENEGGER REGARDING CALIFORNIA STATE ANTI-ENCROACHMENT LEGISLATION	12/06/2004 1608		12/8/04 0900, FROM MA/DSD LTC NAGL TO EXSEC (PATTERSON REQUESTS OGC COORD). BSC - PKG RETN FOR OGC COORD: RD-- 1/15/04 RETURNED TO THE NAVY WITH A COMMENT FROM GC TO "NOT SEND THE LETTER." JS -- 1/21/05 1000, REC'D. ORIGINAL PKG; FWD TO ESR. BSC - REC'D REVISED COVER MEMO FROM SN; TO ESR 030805, 1530 RUN. JL -
OSD 08771-05	SN	DUAL ABSENCE COMMANDANT AND ASSISTANT COMMANDANT MARINE CORPS ON 060905 - 061305	05/09/2005 1711		
OSD 07128-05	UPR	CELEBRATING THE VALUE OF MILITARY SERVICE.	04/15/2005 1605		
OSD 18677-04	UPR	MILITARY RECRUITING IN HARVARD LAW SCHOOL	11/23/2004 0906		12/01/04 SEE QUESTION/NOTE: RD--
OSD 18960-04	UPR	RESPONSIBILITY FOR FEDERAL VOTING ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (FVAP)	02/09/2005 1801		02/14/05 TO ES FOR REVIEW: RD--02/14/05 SEE QUESTION/NOTE: RD--
OSD 04494-05	UPR	DEFENSE FOREIGN LANGUAGE TRANSFORMATION ROADMAP	03/08/2005 1521		

~~FOUO~~

2 Mar - 11:00
Scanned

March 2, 2005

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Memo on Defense Language Transformation Roadmap

I received your memo on Defense Language Transformation and I agree with it. I don't know what to do next.

Thanks.

Attach.
2/25/05 DSD Action Memo to SecDef (OSD 03611-05)

DHR:ss
030205-4

.....
Please respond by 3/17/05

091.4

2 Mar 05

~~FOUO~~

~~FOUO~~

February 25, 2005

TO: Dan Stanley
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: GITMO Question

I need **an** answer to that question of whether we are building a permanent facility in Guantanamo.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
022505-18

.....
Please respond by _____

~~FOUO~~

OSD 04538-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47800



LEGISLATIVE
AFFAIRS

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

March 4, 2005 5:00 PM

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM Daniel R. Stanley, Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Legislative Affairs (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Response to SECDEF Snowflake # 020505-18

- You requested a response to the following question: ...whether we are building a permanent facility in Guantanamo?
- OSD/I&E/Joint Staff/J-5 coordinated response follows: two MILCON Projects:

Camp 6 Detention Facility REQUIREMENT

- Project # 62596, \$36M and Planning and Design \$0.95M
- Imperative to have the appropriate facilities to hold a population of detainees until the end of hostilities of GWOT.
- This facility allows the US government to address some of the humanitarian and operational concerns identified by GWOT Allies and the ICRC.
 - o Addressing these concerns is of the utmost importance to the National Command Authority.
 - o If these concerns are not addressed, it will impact our public and diplomatic relations with our close allies, as well as, their willingness to cooperate and support GWOT.

Radio Range Perimeter Security Fence REQUIREMENT

- Project # 61839, \$4.4M and P&E \$0.45M
- A new fence is required for security around new facilities. This fence is an electronic "smart fence" to detect, deter and assess potential intrusions around the perimeter of the detainee compound, without the need for an infantry Battalion.
- Project approved by Principals Committee after briefing by BG Hood, CDR JTF-GTMO. **Frees up 196 personnel for combat operations in support of GWOT.**

Attachments:
SECDEF Snowflake 020505-18

11-L-0559/OSD/47801

OSD 04538-05

February 25, 2005

TO: Dan Stanley
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: GITMO Question

I need an answer to that question of whether we are building a permanent facility in Guantanamo.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
022505-18

.....
Please respond by _____

~~FOUO~~

March 7, 2005

TO: Larry Di Rita

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Gen Dick Myers
Doug Feith
GEN John Abizaid
GEN George Casey

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Response to Iraq Incident

Be sure you don't say anything beyond expressing condolences with respect to the Italian security person in Iraq, until the investigation is completed. We ought to express condolences, our grief that the terrible incident happened, and that a full investigation is underway.

I think anything we say is going to get contrasted with anything the Italians say, and will just add fuel to the fire. So, let's be very careful, and let's be sure our military people around the world do the same thing.

Also, let me know when you think the investigation will be complete.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
030705-54

.....
Please respond by _____

3/17/05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 04547-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47803

March 7, 2005

TO: Larry Di Rita

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Gen Dick Myers
Doug Feith
GEN John Abizaid
GEN George Casey

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Response to Iraq Incident

Be sure you don't say anything beyond expressing condolences with respect to the Italian security person in Iraq, until the investigation is completed. We ought to express condolences, our grief that the terrible incident happened, and that a full investigation is underway.

I think anything we say is going to get contrasted with anything the Italians say, and will just add fuel to the fire. So, let's be very careful, and let's be sure our military people around the world do the same thing.

Also, let me know when you think the investigation will be complete.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
030705-54

.....
Please respond by

3/17/05

March 7, 2005

TO: GEN John Abizaid
cc: Gen Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Memo from Newt Gingrich

Attached is a memo from Newt Gingrich on training and equipping in Iraq you may want to act upon.

Thanks.

Attach.
3/4/05 Gingrich Memo to SecDef

DHR:ss
030705-24

.....
Please respond by 3/31/05

(b)(6) CIV, OSD

DU
3/7

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com

Sent: Friday, March 04, 2005 5:13 PM

To: (b)(6)@OSD.Mil; Larry.DiRita@osd.pentagon.mil; (b)(6)
jack.patterson@osd.mil; james.stavridis@osd.mil

cc: peter.pace@js.pentagon.mil; paula.thornhill@js.pentagon.mil

Subject: sophisticated policing for Iraq-newt

From Newt
March 4, 2005

a sophisticated model of fighting family based crime and terrorist organizations

Giovanni De Gennaro, head of the national police and close friend of Ambassador Mel Sembler, spent an hour Sunday evening and two hours on Monday briefing me on the Italian police system and its experiences with the Mafia in Sicily and with other (and in some ways more difficult) family based organized crime systems in Calabria and Naples.

De Gennaro believes he could undertake training up to 50 Iraqi police officers into the systems and methods they use against family based systems that practice Omerta (the code of silence).

Since the Italians also had very practical experience in going after the Red Brigades they have a lot to offer in developing the kind of specialized and sophisticated approaches which allow law enforcement to cope with and ultimately defeat sophisticated organized crime and terrorism.

Having a direct relationship between the Iraqi police and the Italian national police would create the kind of longterm liaison relationships that might be very very helpful to the Iraqi government.

De Gennaro believes it would work best if a few Italian police went to Iraq to analyze the problems and then hosted about 50 police for a number of months so they can literally mentor them and have them observe actual Italian organized crime police work.

He cannot make a policy decision on this matter but indicated that he would be delighted to cooperate if his government said yes and he thought his government would say yes if we and the Iraqis were interested.

3/1/05

March 1, 2005

240

TO: David Chu

CC: Dan Stanley

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Question from Jones

How should I handle the Jones question, where he says he wants me to make a public statement if your statement was accurate. What do you propose?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
022805-52

.....
Please respond by 3/10/05

5010M8



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

INFO MEMO

March 8, 2005 - 2:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FROM: DR. DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY (P&R)
David S. C. Chu 8 March 05
SUBJECT: Representative Jones' Question: (SNOWFLAKE-attached)

- Representative Jones' questions refer to a Wall Street Journal interview, requested by Public Affairs, in which I summarized two points we have discussed in the SLRG:
 - Over the last six years Congress has added new, unrequested benefits for those who have completed full military careers. These are not effective in recruiting and retaining younger personnel.
 - Their fiscal effect is to shift funds from the procurement to the operating accounts of the Department. Each program may be meritorious on its own, but collectively they require a substantial transfer, undercutting modernization.
- You offered a stalwart defense of my record in the hearing, for which I'm most grateful. It is not clear that a further response is required. Should the issue arise again, I recommend you state that these are serious issues on which we look forward to working with the Congress. We are beginning to achieve some appreciation for these points by Congressional staff, and even a few members.

Attachment:
As stated

Prepared by: Captain Stephen M. Wellock, (b)(6)

240

8 MAR 05

1-eros



OSD 04602-05

3/1/05

March 1, 2005

TO: David Chu
CC: Dan Stanley
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Question from Jones

How should I handle the Jones question, where he says he wants me to make a public statement if your statement was accurate. What do you propose?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
022805-52

.....
Please respond by 3/10/05

SENSITIVE

MAR 09 2005

TO: Stephen J. Hadley
CC: THE HONORABLE DR. CONDOLEEZZA
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Iran Document

Referencing page two (top line) of the Iran document you faxed me, the sentence finishes
“..discussion has covered inter alia Al Qaeda and MKO.”

My recommendation is you insert the following after MKO:

“It is of crucial importance that Iran **work** with the international community to prevent further Al Qaeda attacks, including those by Al Qaeda members under their control. Iran should also stop Al Qaeda from transiting or using Iranian territory.”

That is my suggestion.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
030805-2S

OSD 04610-05

SENSITIVE

11-L-0559/OSD/47810

SENSITIVE

MAR 09 2005

TO: Stephen J. Hadley
CC: **THE HONORABLE DR. CONDOLEEZZA RICE**
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Iran Document

Referencing page two (top line) of the Iran document you faxed me, the sentence finishes
“..discussion has covered inter alia Al Qaeda and MKO.”

My recommendation is you insert the following after MKO:

“It is of crucial importance that Iran work with the international community to prevent further Al Qaeda attacks, including those by Al Qaeda members under their control. Iran should also stop Al Qaeda from transiting or using Iranian territory.”

That is my suggestion.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
030805-2S

SENSITIVE

11-L-0559/OSD/47811

SECRET
December 15, 2004

2005 12 15 11:00 AM

TO: Jim Haynes
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Outside Look at Sentencing Equity

Please come back ~~to me~~ with a proposal on having an outside look at sentencing equity, if in fact we *think* it might be worthwhile.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
121504-23

.....
Please respond by 1/13/04



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1600

2005 MAR -7 PM 1:50

INFO MEMO

March 4, 2005; 1:00 P.M.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Daniel J. Dell'Orto, Principal Deputy General Counsel

DJ Dell'Orto
3/8/05

SUBJECT: Outside **Look** at Sentencing Equity in Courts-Martial

- In answer to your question, at Tab A, I do not recommend **an** outside look at establishing a system to enhance sentencing equity in courts-martial.
- In 1984, Congress exempted the military justice system when it established the Federal Sentencing Guidelines system.
 - o The U. S. Supreme Court recently held unconstitutional certain mandatory provisions of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, making them advisory only, because they conflicted with a defendant's "jury trial" rights.
 - o Congress is expected to direct a review of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines system.
- By contrast, Congress created the military judicial system to be separate and distinct from its civilian counterpart in order to recognize and maintain the military's specialized requirements for good order and discipline in widely varying environments and circumstances.
 - o Discretion in command actions and broad sentencing considerations apply in order to tailor sentences to both the needs of the Service and the accused.

RECOMMENDATION: Stay the course.

COORDINATION: None.

Prepared By: Robert E. Reed, (b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/47813

OSD 04702-05

March 9, 2005

TO: Stephen J. Hadley
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Public Diplomacy on NSC Schedule

334NSC

Given the President's interest in public diplomacy and given the urgent need for our country to improve, why don't you put the subject of public diplomacy on the NSC schedule once a month, so that State and other agencies involved can brief on the subject? It will help to force the issue and make us more aware of what we are, and what we are not, doing or doing well.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
030905-8

9MAR05

OSD 04705-05

~~FOUO~~

March 9, 2005

TO: Stephen J. Hadley
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Public Diplomacy on NSC Schedule

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Thanks.

DHR:ss
030905-8

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/47815

~~FOUO~~

TAB

February 25, 2005

2005 FEB 25 10:03 AM

968

TO: Gen Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: SASC Committee Request

What should we do about the Senate Committee's request to have General Luck's report presented to them?

Thanks.

DHR:ss
022406*5

.....
Please respond by

3/3/05

Tab

~~FOUO~~

OSD 04722-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47816



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

CM-2367-05

9 March 2005 11:02

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBMyers*

SUBJECT: Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) Briefing on the Iraq Security Assessment (SF 968)

- **Answer.** In response to your question (TAB), Lieutenant General Odierno should brief the SASC on the results of the assessment.
- **Analysis.** As the Deputy Team Leader, he is cognizant of all facets of the assessment and can easily answer any questions the Committee might have. Commander, USCENTCOM, and Commander, Multi-national Forces-Iraq, can follow up on the briefing as needed.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:

As stated

Prepared By: LTG Raymond T. Odierno, USA; Assistant to the CJCS: (b)(6)

OSD 04722-05

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/47817

~~FOUO~~

105/003644
ES-2627

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

March 11, 2005

2005 MAR 14 AM 9:23

TO: Peter Rodman
CC: Doug Feith
FROM: [redacted]
SUBJECT: Letter to Portugal's MOD

Please prepare (by Tuesday) a warm, thoughtful letter to the MOD of Portugal.
Let me see the draft when you have finished it.

Thanks.

Attach.
2/21/05 Letter from MoD Portugal to SecDef

DHR:ss
031105-8

.....
Please respond by 3/15/05

~~FOUO~~

05-03-14 10:07 OUT
OSD-04764-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47818


N.20

March 8th, 2005

Dear Mr. Secretary,

I am pleased to enclose herewith the original of a letter addressed to you by the Minister of Defense of Portugal, Mr. Paulo Sacadura Cabral Portas.

I avail myself of this **opportunity** to renew to you, Mr. Secretary of Defense, the assurances of my highest consideration.


Pedro Catarino
Ambassador of Portugal

The Honorable
Donald H. Rumsfeld
U.S. Department of Defense
Washington, DC

OSD 04764-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47819

MINISTÉRIO DA DEFESA NACIONAL

© Ministro

Lisbon, 21 February 2005

Dear Donald,

As my mandate as Minister of State, National Defence and Sea Affairs comes to an end, allow me to thank you very warmly for all your support and friendship.

I must say that, three years running, I was fast becoming one of the veteran Defence Ministers!

It is personally reassuring to see that, during this time, when so many far-reaching transformations occurred in the security and strategic environment, Portugal was able to follow up and build on the modernisation and rationalisation drive that followed.

We set ourselves on course for progressive growth in defence expenditure. The Portuguese Armed Forces are now fully professional, the major re-equipment programmes are on track and we will keep on sharing the burden of peacekeeping responsibilities in NATO, the EU and the UN, on a balanced fashion.

Despite well known budget constraints, Portugal has worked hard, namely in NATO and the EU, to meet force generation expectations, to honour its commitments and to make a positive contribution with partners and allies for a safer world.

It has been very rewarding to have witnessed together with you, both in the organisations our countries belong to and bilaterally, our efforts to address all these challenges.

MINISTÉRIO DA DEFESA NACIONAL

o Ministro

I feel that the dialogue and trust between our **two** countries helped us throughout these changes and compelling debates, as I am sure that **ow** strong bilateral relationship, based on mutual understanding, will be a key asset in the forthcoming years.

I am also convinced that you may continue to count on the wholehearted cooperation and support of my country.

Wishing you every success, please accept, dear friend, the assurances of my highest consideration

*and personal
friendship ! You're great !*



Paulo Sacadura Cabral Portas
Minister of State and National Defence

The Honourable
Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defence of United States of America

Policy Executive Secretariat Note

SECRET

MAR 15 2005

2005 MAR 15 08 09 00

I-05/003644/ES-2627
OSD 75515-05 & 04764-05

Reference: 031 105-8, "Letter to Portugal's MOD

Captain Marriott,

Please find attached a March 1 SecDef letter to the MOD of Portugal.

Although signed and sent prior to receipt of the snowflake and Ambassador Portas' February 21 letter, we believe the March 1 letter answers the snowflake/incoming letter and do not recommend that SecDef send an additional letter.

June Bartlett

June Bartlett
Deputy Director
Policy Executive Secretariat

Attachments

1. SecDef Letter to Portuguese MOD, March 1, 2005
2. Cable to USDAO Lisbon, 0222392 Mar 05

OSD 04764-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47822

~~FOUO~~

1105/003644
ES-2627

SECDEF

March 11, 2005

2005 MAR 15 01 23

TO: Peter Rodman
CC: Doug Feith
FROM:
SUBJECT: Letter to Portugal's MOD

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Attach.
2/21/05 Letter from MoD Portas to SecDef

DHR:ss
031105-8

.....
Please respond by 3/15/05

~~FOUO~~

05-07-14 10:01
OSD 04764-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47823

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
EMBAIXADA DE PORTUGAL
2005 MAR 10 AM 11:07 WASHINGTON

N.20

March 8th, 2005

Dear Mr. Secretary

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I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to you, Mr. Secretary of Defense, the assurances of my highest consideration.



Pedro Catarino
Ambassador of Portugal

The Honorable
Donald H. Rumsfeld
U.S. Department of Defense

11-L-0559/OSD/47824

MINISTÉRIO DA DEFESA NACIONAL

© Ministro

Lisbon, 21 February 2005

Dear Donald,

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It has been very rewarding to have witnessed together with you, both in the organisations our countries belong to and bilaterally, our efforts to address all these challenges.

MINISTÉRIO DA DEFESA NACIONAL

© Ministro

I feel that the dialogue and trust between our **two** countries helped us throughout these changes **and** compelling debates, as I am sure that our strong bilateral relationship, based on mutual understanding, will be a key asset in the forthcoming years.

I am also convinced that you may continue to count on the wholehearted cooperation and support of my country.

Wishing you every success, please accept, dear friend, the assurances of my highest consideration

*and personal
friendship ! You're great !*



Paulo Sacadura Cabral Portas
Minister of State and National Defence

The Honourable
Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defence of United States of America

11-L-0559/OSD/47826



7 |

USP

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

MAR 1 2005

His Excellency Paolo Sacadura Cabral Portas
Minister of Defense
Lisbon, Portugal

Dear Mr. Minister:

As you prepare to leave your position as Minister of Defense, I want to express my deep appreciation for the leadership you provided to the Portuguese armed forces, the U.S.-Portuguese defense partnership, and the NATO Alliance.

Your efforts to transform the Portuguese military and your support of the global war on terror were major achievements. The Portuguese deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq helped secure the peace and freedom necessary for the historic elections that took place in those countries.

I wish you the best of luck in your next endeavors and look forward to our continued friendship.

Sincerely,

Let me know
when you will be in
Washington, D.C.



OSD 75515-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47827

3-3
JP
ISP

RAAUZYUW RUEWMFUS816 0612239-UUUU--RUEKNMA.
ZNR UUUUU ZUI RUEKJCS5816 0612239
R 022239Z MAR 05
FM SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
TO RUEKLI/USDAO LISBON PO
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//FILE/USDP ISP/USDP EUR POL/
CHAIRS//
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
BT
UNCLAS

2

SUBJ: SECDEF LETTER TO PORTUGUESE MOD

CORRECTED COPY

PLEASE TRANSLATE AND FORWARD THE FOLLOWING SECDEF CORRESPONDENCE TO
MOD PORTAS TO THE APPROPRIATE OFFICIALS.
ORIGINAL COPY WILL FOLLOW.

(BEGINTEXT)

HIS EXCELLENCY PAOLO SACADURA CABRAL PORTAS
MINISTER OF DEFENSE
LISBON, PORTUGAL

DEAR MR. MINISTER:

(PARA) AS YOU PREPARE TO LEAVE YOUR POSITION AS MINISTER OF DEFENSE,
I WANT TO EXPRESS MY DEEP APPRECIATION FOR THE LEADERSHIP YOU
PROVIDED TO THE PORTUGUESE ARMED FORCES, THE U.S.-PORTUGUESE DEFENSE
PARTNERSHIP, AND THE NATO ALLIANCE.

(PARA) YOUR EFFORTS TO TRANSFORM THE PORTUGUESE MILITARY AND YOUR
SUPPORT OF THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR WERE MAJOR ACHIEVEMENTS. THE
PORTUGUESE DEPLOYMENTS TO AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ HELPED SECURE THE
PEACE AND FREEDOM NECESSARY FOR THE HISTORIC ELECTIONS THAT TOOK
PLACE IN THOSE COUNTRIES.

(PARA) I WISH YOU THE BEST OF LUCK IN YOUR NEXT ENDEAVORS AND LOOK
FORWARD TO OUR CONTINUED FRIENDSHIP.

SINCERELY,
//DONALD H. RUMSFELD//

POST SCRIPT: LET ME KNOW WHEN YOU WILL BE IN WASHINGTON, D.C.
(END OF TEXT)

BT

***** CORRECTED COPY *****

OSD - SECDEF CABLE DISTRIBUTION:

SECDEF: _____ DEPSEC: _____ EXECSEC: _____
C&D: _____ CCD: _____ CABLE CH: _____ FILE: _____
USDP: _____ DIA: _____ OTHER: _____
USDI: _____ PER SEC: _____ COMSEC: _____

*** UNCLASSIFIED ***

~~FOUO~~

MAR 10 2005

TO: GEN George Casey
cc: Gen Dick Myers
Gen John Abizaid
Dan Stanley
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Information on Graves Found in Iraq

IRAQ

Please forward me the information on the 30 or so graves found in Iraq. I was asked about it at today's Senate Ops Intel briefing.

Thanks.

DHRSS
030905-22

.....
Please respond by 3/11/05

10M9005

~~FOUO~~

OSD 04802-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47829

~~FOUO~~

MAR 10 2005

TO: GEN George Casey
CC: Gen Dick Myers
Gen John Abizaid
Dan Stanley
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Information on Graves Found in Iraq

Please forward me the information on the 30 or so graves **found** in Iraq. was asked about it at today's Senate Ops Intel briefing.

Thanks.

DHRss
030905-22

.....
Please respond by 3/11/05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 04802-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47830

January 26, 2005

2005 MAR 13 PM 2:19

TO: VADM Jim Stav
FROM: Donald R. *DR*
SUBJECT: Arabic or Mid East Center

Do we have an Arabic Center or a Mid East Center?

DHR:ss
012605-13

OSD 04840-05

.....
Please respond by 1/31/05

January 26, 2005

2005 JAN 17 PM 2:12

TO: VADM Jim Stavridis
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Arabic or Mid East Center

Do we have an Arabic Center or a Mid East Center?

DHR:ss
012605-13

OSD 04840-05

.....
Please respond by 1/31/05

1/26 *add*
1/28/05

SIR —

- This is the
- NESAC - "Near East/ South Asia" center
- Like Marshall center
- Does significant outreach, teaching, & interaction in region
- Needs new director. Steve Bucci is applying.


OSD 04840-05

- Ryan Henry runs all these for you. *NIR ja*



DoD Regional Centers

Areas of Responsibility



Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies

Africa Center for Strategic Studies

Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies

Near East-South Asia Center for Strategic Studies

★ = RC Location

at NDU

(DELIBERATIVE DOCUMENT: For discussion purposes only. Draft working papers. Do not release under E.O. 13526)



DoD Regional Centers Background

POLICY


Regional Center	Year Est.	Exec Agent	Principal COCOM	FY04 Budget	FY04 Participants	Number of Participant Days (FY04)	Dollars Spent per Participant Day (FY04)
Marshall Center	1993	—	EUCOM	\$26.9M	2,304	64,566	\$416
Asia-Pacific Center	1995	Navy	PACOM	\$13.8M	1,012	27,732	\$498
Center for Hemispheric Defense	1997	NDU	SOUTHCOM	\$5.5M	862	5,953	\$924
Africa Center	1999	NDU	EUCOM	\$10.3M	905	2,913	\$3,530
Near East-South Asia Center	2000	NDU	CENTCOM	\$6.8M	1,458	5,543	\$1,227
Total				\$63.3M	5,940	106,000	

Handwritten initials

FY04 Budget

FY04 Participants

FY04 Participant Days



DELIBERATIVE DOCUMENT: For discussion purposes only. Draft working papers. Do not release under FOIA)

205 11 11 01 2: 12

JAN 31 2005
I-05/001457
ES-2187

TO: Ryan Henry
CC: Doug Feith
FROM:
SUBJECT: DoD Regional Centers

I just looked at **this** Regional Centers paper. It **looks** to me like the Marshall Center has too much money. Asia-Pacific, Hemispheric Defense **and** the Near East-South Asia Center have too little. I've penciled in some thoughts. You might want to begin a reallocation at some point. I recognize it may take you a year **or two**, or three to get there.

Please come back to me with a **plan as** to what you propose.

Thanks.

Attach.
1/263/05 SecDef Memo to VADM Stavridis
DoD Regional Centers Background Sheet

DHR:ss
012805-2

.....
Please respond by 3/24/05

OSD 04842-05

Policy Executive Secretariat Note

2005 MAR 25 AM 9:32

MAR 24 2005


1-05/001457/ES-2187

Reference: 012805-2, "DoD Regional Centers" (Tab 1)
102904-7, "Regional Centers" - Policy
Executive Secretariat Note of March 9 (Tab 2)

Captain Marriott,

Subsequent to my earlier note of March 9, Ryan Henry's office informed me that an oral answer was provided to SecDef on the "DoD Regional Centers" action.

Ryan informed his Military Assistant **CAPTAIN** Hendrickson that he spoke with SecDef and discussed Regional Center funding. Snowflake action closed.


June Bartlett
Deputy Director
Policy Executive Secretariat

Attachments:

1. 012805-2, "DoD Regional Centers"
2. 102904-7, "Regional Centers" with note of March 9, 2005

352 RDB

241 MIA 05

31 Jan 05

11-L-0559/OSD/47836

OSD 04842-05

JAN 31 2005
I-05/001457
ES-2187

TO: Ryan Henry
CC: Doug Feith
FROM:
SUBJECT: DoD Regional Centers

I just looked at this Regional Centers paper. It looks to me like the Marshall Center has too much money. Asia-Pacific, Hemispheric Defense and the Near East-South Asia Center have too little. I've penciled in some thoughts. You might want to begin a reallocation at some point. I recognize it may take you a year or two, or three to get there.

Please come back to me with a plan as to what you propose.

Thanks.

Attach.
1/263/05 SecDef Memo to VADM Stavridis
DoD Regional Centers Background Sheet

DHR:ss
012805-2

.....
Please respond by 3/24/05

CSW 04842-05

January 26, 2005

TO: VADM Jim Stavridis
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Arabic or Mid East Center

Do we have an Arabic Center or a Mid East Center?

DHR:ss
012605-13

.....
Please respond by 1/31/05

1/26 *DR*
1/28/05


SIR _____

- This is the
- NESAC - "Near East/ South Asia" center
- Like Marshall center
- Does significant outreach, teaching, & interaction in region
- Needs new director. Steve Bucci is applying.
- Ryan Henry runs all these for you. *NIR ja*



DoD Regional Centers

Areas of Responsibility



Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies

Africa Center for Strategic Studies

Near East-South Asia Center for Strategic Studies

Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies

★ = RC Location

(DELIBERATIVE DOCUMENT: For discussion purposes only. Draft working papers. Do not release under EOIA)

11-L-0559/OSD/47839

at NDH




DoD Regional Centers Background

POLICY

Regional Center	Year Est.	Exec Agent	Principal COCOM	FY04 Budget	Number of Participants (FY04)	Number of Participant Days (FY04)	Dollars Spent per Participant Day (FY04)
Marshall Center	1993	Army	EUCOM	\$26.9M -14	2,304	64,566	\$416
Asia-Pacific Center	1995	Navy	PACOM	\$13.8M 16	1,012	27,732	\$498
Center for Hemispheric Defense	1997	NDU	SOUTHCOM	\$5.5M 10	862	5,953	\$924
Africa Center	1999	NDU	EUCOM	\$10.3M 10	905	2,913	\$3,530
Near East-South Asia Center	2000	NDU	CENTCOM	\$6.8M 13.3	1,458	5,543	\$1,227
Total				\$63.3M	5,940	106,000	

[Handwritten signature]



(DELIBERATIVE DOCUMENT: For discussion purposes only. Draft working papers. Do not release under FOIA)

Policy Executive Secretariat Note


MAR 09 2005

I-04/0014563/ES-1233

Reference: 102904-7, "Regional Centers"

Captain Marriott,

The October 29 "Regional Centers" snowflake is overtaken by SecDef s desire to have plan to reallocate Regional Centers funds over a period of time addressed in the January 31 "DoD Regional Centers" snowflake (012805-2). Policy is working to develop the plan.


June Bartlett
Deputy Director
Policy Executive Secretariat

Attachments:

- 1. 102904-7 "Regional Centers"**
- 2. 012805-2 "DoD Regional Centers"**

OSD 02201-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47841

October 29, 2004
I-04/014563
ES-1233

TO: Doug, Feith
FROM:
SUBJECT: Regional Centers

I just looked at this page on the Regional Centers. I think over a 3-4 year period we ought to migrate:

- The Marshall Center down from \$26.9M to \$11M.
- The Asia Pacific from \$13.8M up to \$16M
- The Center for Hemispheric Defense from \$5.5M up to \$8M
- The Africa Center from \$10.3M up to \$11M
- The Near East South Asia Center from \$6.8M up to \$17M.


Why don't you consider that, see me about it, and let's think about refining it and then getting a program to move in that direction.

Thanks.

Attach.
DOD Regional Centers Background

DHR:ss
102904-7

.....
Please respond by 11/27/04



DoD Regional Centers Background

*Person
participate
4/16*

fix


POLICY

Marshall Center	1993	Army	EUCOM	\$26.9M	<i>211</i>	2,304	64,566
Asia-Pacific Center	1995	Navy	PACOM	\$13.8M	<i>216</i>	1,012	27,732
Center for Hemispheric Defense	1997	NDU	SOUTHCOM	\$5.5M	<i>18</i>	862	5,953
Africa Center	1999	NDU	EUCOM	\$10.3M	<i>11</i>	905	2,913
Near East-South Asia Center	2000	N	CENTCOM	\$6.8M	<i>17</i>	1,458	5,543
Total				\$63.3M		5,940	106,000

FY04 Budget

FY04 Participants

FY 04 Participant D



(DELIBERATIVE DOCUMENT: For discussion purposes only. Draft working papers. Do not release under FOIA)

11-L-0559/OSD/47843

~~FOUO~~

March 10, 2005

TO: Stephen J. Hadley
cc: The Honorable Dr. Condoleezza Rice
The Honorable Porter Goss
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld. *DR*
SUBJECT: Principles for Iraq

IRAQ

Regarding the paper I gave you on Principles for Iraq that we prepared, and the need to communicate those principles to the Iraqis who are negotiating for positions in the new Iraqi Transitional Government, I think it would be useful to get some feedback from our folks. It would be helpful to know what Ambassador Negroponte, etc. have done to see that those principles are understood by the Iraqis, and what their reactions to the principles might be.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
031005-7

~~FOUO~~

OSD 04875-05

OSD 04875-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47844

~~FOUO~~

March 10, 2005

TO: Stephen J. Hadley
c c : The Honorable Dr. Condoleezza Rice
The Honorable Porter Goss
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Principles for Iraq

Regarding the paper I gave you on Principles for Iraq that we prepared, and the need to communicate those principles to the Iraqis who are negotiating for positions in the new Iraqi Transitional Government, I think it would be useful to get some feedback **from** our folks. It would be helpful to know what Ambassador Negroponte, etc. have done to see that those principles are understood by the Iraqis, and what their reactions to the principles might be.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
031005-7

~~FOUO~~

OSD 04875-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47845

~~FOUO~~

March 10, 2005

TO: Stephen J. Hadley
CC: The Honorable Dr. Condoleezza Rice
The Honorable Porter Goss
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Principles for Iraq

Regarding the paper I gave you on Principles for Iraq that we prepared, and the need to communicate those principles to the Iraqis who are negotiating for positions in the new Iraqi Transitional Government, I think it would be useful to get some feedback from our folks. It would be helpful to know what Ambassador Negroponte, etc. have done to see that those principles are understood by the Iraqis, and what their reactions to the principles might be.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
031005-7

~~FOUO~~

OSD 04875-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47846

~~FOUO~~

March 10, 2005

TO: Marc Thiessen
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Piece by Doug Feith

350,001

Here is an interesting speech written by Doug Feith. You might want to be aware of it.

Attach.
3/3/05 Speech by Doug Feith to Kennedy School of Government


DHR:ss
031005-3

10 MAR 05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 04888-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47847



U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

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Civil Liberties, Civil Society and Civility by Douglas J. Feith

Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
Remarks at John F. Kennedy School of Government
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts
Thursday, March 3, 2005



Author: Douglas J. Feith

Good evening. It's good to be back at Harvard. As you've heard, I went to school here, at the College. I want to reassure the students in the audience: a Harvard degree does not have to be a liability. In conservative political circles, I've found, it may require some explaining, but many conservatives are open-minded and others **are** forgiving. As an example of this generosity of spirit, I'll tell you a true story:

Nearly thirty years ago, I had a piece of foreign policy juvenalia published in the journal of a conservative think tank. The biographical squib mentioned my recent college degree. A reader sent me a fan letter, asserting as a compliment that I must have slept through my political science courses at Harvard to have written so sensible an article.

So much for right-wing humor.

Actually, I stayed rather attentive in my government classes in college - without much ill effect. As it happens, some of what I read in a "gov" course on political philosophy has had some bearing on work I've done at the Pentagon, some of which I'll discuss this evening.

Two concepts I studied here are particularly relevant to the US strategy for the war on terrorism.

The first is civil liberties, and how to think about the balance between individual freedom and the powers of government. The second is the local character of governmental institutions, and whether they measure up to principles that are said to be universal.

As much civil liberty as possible

In the United States, national security refers to more than protecting territory or people. The United States is not just a country; it's a country that lives in a certain way. The word "American" proclaims not an ethnic identity, but an association with a community regulated by our Constitution. That's why, though one cannot instantly change one's ethnicity, millions of people have, by taking an oath, become not just American citizens, but Americans.

All of this is to say that civil liberties are not just a feature of life here, they are what defines us as a nation. The civil liberties of the American people therefore are what we aim to *secure* when we work on national *security*

policy.

Part of my education here at Harvard was reading John Stuart Mill, who championed the ethical and practical benefits of liberal principles, principles that respect the worth of individuals and their equality under the law. In his writings, including his 1859 essay *On Liberty*, Mill argued that humane and sensible societies allow their people as much individual freedom as is consistent with “self-protection” or public safety.

Much of what makes Americans happy – their political freedom, economic prosperity, domestic tranquility and opportunity to better themselves – derives from the liberal and democratic nature of our society and the degree of mutual trust – sometimes referred to as social capital – that such a society engenders. It’s hard to overstate the moral and material benefits that are rooted in that social capital, in that trust, in our freedom.

9/11 and the War

This, we should all appreciate, is what’s at stake in the war on terrorism. Beyond the cost in lives and property, the 9/11 attack – or rather our reaction to it – exposed a far-reaching element of the threat posed by terrorism: To protect ourselves physically, we might feel compelled to change fundamentally the way we live, sacrificing our society’s openness for hoped-for safety.

Because of our historical good fortune, we Americans enjoyed for a long time a high degree of public safety and so became accustomed to thinking that the liberal openness of our way of life is not only sacred but immutable. But a community’s freedom depends on circumstances. Societies inevitably adjust to allow the state to fulfill its most basic duty: providing security. As noted, even such uncompromising champions of liberty as Mill bow to the exigencies of public safety. Our Constitution and the judges that interpret it often seem to be saying that our freedoms are absolute, but when danger becomes oppressive, people are wont to recall the quip that the Constitution is not a suicide pact.

In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, concerned that another attack may be in the works, our government took actions to eliminate vulnerabilities that the hijackers had turned to their advantage.

- We shut down air travel throughout the U.S. When it resumed, we intensified airport security measures and folks now have to remember to wear duly mended socks when they plan to fly.
- At the same time, the government restricted the issuance of visas, thus affecting not only the freedom of foreigners to travel, but the freedom of Americans to host them.
- And new legislation allowed intelligence and law enforcement agencies to share information more readily.

These were steps deemed prudent, indeed necessary, in the light of what we knew – and what we didn’t know – at the time. My interest here is not to defend particular measures. Rather, it’s to stress that, beyond the human and material costs it imposes, terrorism takes advantage of and thereby endangers the openness and trust that allow us to enjoy freedom and prosperity.

If another 9/11 happened, especially an attack involving the use of nuclear or biological weapons, who **could** doubt that our society would respond by increasing further the powers of government, affecting our freedoms? As has happened over and over again for the last 35 years or so, since the era of airplane hijacking got into full swing, security measures that once seemed outrageous could over time become routine.

Such thoughts weighed on President Bush and his advisers as they considered, in the period immediately after 9/11, how to prevent the next attack against the United States. If the strategy for preventing that next attack were to be solely or even primarily defensive, it would require a wholesale clamping down, not just at our borders but throughout the country.

President Bush early on recognized that 9/11 was an act of war, not merely a law enforcement matter and that the

enemy is not a single group, but a network of extremists and their state and non-state supporters. The President declared that our war aim is to defeat terrorism as a threat to our way of life as a free and open society. We could not achieve that aim – for we could not maintain a free and open society – with a solely defensive strategy. To preserve civil liberties, the President had to adopt a strategy of disrupting terrorist networks abroad, where they do much of their planning, recruiting and training. He had to adopt a strategy of initiative and offense. I put it this way: The President decided that, in dealing with the terrorists, he either had to change the way *we* live, or change the way *they* live.

Taking the war to the enemy has been necessary, but not sufficient. Many months ago, in one of his famous “snowflake” memoranda (which leaked to a newspaper), Secretary Rumsfeld asked: Are we capturing or killing terrorists faster than our enemies can recruit new terrorists? Now, the Secretary knows that attacking enemy networks keeps the terrorists off balance and can deprive them of what they need to operate. What the Secretary wanted to highlight was that such action cannot produce victory in the war so long as those networks can regenerate themselves.

Countering Ideological Support for Terrorism

To defeat our enemies in this war, we’ll have to do more than disrupt and attack; we’ll have to counter their ideology. It’s the attractiveness of extremist ideology to certain segments of the Muslim world that motivates people to join or help the terrorist groups. As the 9/11 Commission noted, the US aim, in addition to attacking the terrorist groups, should be to “prevail[. . .] in the longer term over the ideology that gives rise to Islamist terrorism.”

The first part of this “battle of ideas” is the effort to de-legitimize terrorism. The purposeful targeting of ordinary people going about their lives in offices, markets and such places is not a political method that deserves credit or pardon from decent people. This is what President Bush is driving at when he says that US policy aims to make terrorism like the slave trade, piracy, or genocide – activities that nobody who aspires to respectability can condone, much less support. It’s an ambitious goal to change the way millions of people think.

But it can be done. History yields examples of successful ideological campaigns. Particularly noteworthy, in my view, is Britain’s effort in the 19th century to suppress the international slave trade. It was a protracted, multifaceted, far-flung enterprise. The British Navy had a leading role, as did the Church. Journalists, diplomats and university figures all worked for the cause. The effort took more than fifty years, succeeding ultimately not only in suppressing to a large extent that sad commerce, but in de-legitimizing it. At the end of the 19th century, the civilized world didn’t justify or excuse the slave trade, as had commonly been done when the century began. The British effort changed the way millions of people thought, talked and acted.

Britain’s fight against the slave trade involved – in today’s phrase – all instruments of national power. It used “hard” (that is, military) power and “soft.” It tapped the energies of the government and of society at large.

Similarly, non-governmental institutions today – universities, think tanks, other NGOs – have a role to play in the ideological struggle against terrorism. Such institutions can in various ways wage the battle of ideas in the war on terrorism more effectively than can our government. Government policy makers have the task of finding proper and effective means to encourage that effort.

De-legitimizing terrorism is but one component of the strategy to counter ideological support for our extremist enemies. President Bush, in recent speeches has been emphasizing another: promotion of civil society, political

freedom and self-government. As he said in his Second Inaugural address:

The survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands. The best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in all the world.

America's vital interests and our deepest beliefs are now one.

This has produced controversy. I'll deal here with two lines of criticism that I find particularly interesting. One is that the President is too ambitious, in that he should not expect to be able to implant democracy in what is said to be unfertile soil. The other is that the President is not ambitious enough in pressing certain countries to implement principles of liberal democracy.

The Burkean Critique

The first line of criticism – that he is too sanguine about promoting democracy – might be labeled “Burkean,” as in Edmund Burke, one of the philosophers to whom I was introduced here at Harvard. In college and since, I read and re-read his works with admiration and profit. Burke teaches that successful political institutions are rooted in local soil. They grow organically, as it were, out of the culture, situation and historical experience of particular people. Burke warns of the catastrophes that can result from arrogant rationalists using philosophical abstractions for the revolutionary remaking of societies.

Burke's arguments have power not only because they are elegantly articulated, but because they were vindicated so bloodily in the French Revolution, in the course of which he wrote some of his greatest work, and then vindicated again repeatedly over the next two centuries in the Bolshevik Revolution and in other murderous projects of grand social engineering. If the test of a theory is that it predicts, then Burke's writings deserve high grades and careful consideration.

I see President Bush's promotion of human freedom not as arrogance or naïve and rampant Wilsonianism. The President starts, I believe, from the well-grounded observation that societies with free political institutions provide their people with greater personal liberty and prosperity than do societies without such institutions. He observes that the rejection of tyranny and the aspiration for freedom are not peculiar to our particular culture. As he said in his Second Inaugural: “America will not pretend that jailed dissidents prefer their chains, or that women welcome humiliation and servitude, or that any human being aspires to live at the mercy of bullies.”

At the same time, the President has made a point of *not* urging, let alone imposing, American-style political institutions on other countries.

He doesn't believe that there's a single model of democratic governance that can function everywhere. Actually, he has said the opposite: “As we watch and encourage reforms in the [Middle East], we are mindful that modernization is not the same as Westernization. Representative governments in the Middle East will reflect their own cultures. They will not, and should not, look like us.” The President, I submit, is here voicing the modest prudence of Burkean restraint.

Democracies on a Spectrum of Liberality

So we come to the second line of criticism – not that the Administration is trying to impose our ideas of democracy on unwilling or unready Afghans or Iraqis, but rather the opposite: that the Administration is tolerating political institutions in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere that don't count as democratic because they don't measure up to American standards.

The critics here commonly focus on the new Afghan Constitution and Iraq's interim constitution, known as the Transitional Administrative Law. Both refer to Islam as the state religion.

Neither document, to be sure, would pass muster by US constitutional law standards. But are these freshly produced constitutions therefore undemocratic?

Both documents state protections for rights of non-Muslims. The Afghan Constitution says that "Followers of other religions [other than Islam] are free to perform their religious rites within the limits of the provisions of law" and that the Afghan "state shall abide by ... the Universal Declaration of Human Rights."

The Iraqi interim constitution painstakingly balances Islam's official status with the rights of non-Muslims:

Islam is the official religion of the State and is to be considered a source of legislation. No law [may] contradict[...] the universally agreed tenets of Islam, the principles of democracy, or the [individual] rights cited in [the interim constitution]. ... [The interim constitution] guarantees the full religious rights of all individuals to freedom of religious belief and practice.

Among the individual rights referred to here **are** those in the following provision:

Each Iraqi has the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religious belief and practice. Coercion in such matters shall be prohibited.

Are such provisions incompatible with a decent political order, with human freedom or with democracy?

Before we answer, we should consider the rather wide spectrum of liberality across which are ranged the world's democratic countries. The more individualist democracies, generally the countries of "new settlement," are on the liberal side of the spectrum. On the other are those democracies, generally countries with national histories that reach back into antiquity, that are comfortable giving legal recognition to religious or ethnic groups.

In some countries, democracy might not be workable if it were not possible to take into account the interests of these groups **as groups**, however un-American that concept is. As illiberal as it is to give groups **as groups** legal rights and privileges, it has been deemed necessary in some democratic countries, where historical experience has made it impossible for members of various groups to relate to each other simply **as fellow-citizens**.

Now, on this spectrum of democracies, the United States is ensconced at the liberal end. We pride ourselves on laws that respect the liberty and political equality of individual citizens. Our political institutions (the US Senate and the Electoral College being notable anomalies) stand on the principle of one man, one vote. We have no king and no established church and our Constitution (since the Civil War, in principle, and since the civil rights movement, in fact) disallows invidious recognition of race, religion or ethnic identity.

But, as I've noted, fundamental as these features are to the **American** political system, they are by no means universal among the world's democracies.

- The heads of state of such venerable democratic countries as Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom are hereditary monarchs.
- The UK and Denmark have established churches.
- In a number of democracies, such as France and Germany, the state pays clerics.
- Many democracies have religious symbols on their flags - for example, Switzerland and Norway each have a cross; on the UK flag there are two crosses.
- Even in liberal and tolerant Canada, there are laws concerning the font sizes in which store-front signs must announce their wares in French and in other languages.

And democracies differ from one another also regarding other matters of civil liberties:

- British libel laws are much stricter than those in the United States. Germany and France make the uttering of

- 4 certain opinions (for example, denial of the Holocaust) a criminal offense. Such laws would be regarded in the United States as violations of freedom of speech.
- Finally, police search powers differ widely among democratic states. Many European states give their police powers that would, in the United States, be regarded as unreasonable infringements on privacy.

Given the variety of political institutions even among the advanced industrial democracies of the West, no one should be surprised if and when new democracies in other parts of the world emerge looking quite different from our own. As more and more societies achieve self-government, they will evolve institutions and practices that fit their own cultures and circumstances.

Conclusion: Democracy and Debate

One of the impressive things about the Afghan and Iraqi constitutions I've been discussing is that they were created through democratic debate, not dictatorial fiat. Indeed, orderly, reasoned and respectful debate of controversial subjects is crucial for the functioning of democratic government. It may even have a place at American universities.

As you've heard, I'm a fan of Edmund Burke. At the end of his "Reflections on the Revolution in France," he claims that he is someone "in whose breast no anger durable or vehement has ever been kindled, but by what he considered as tyranny." This strikes me as a kind of gold standard for those who would enter the public debate in a democracy.

In a similar vein, J. S. Mill, though hardly an ally of Burke on most issues, notes with respect to democratic debate: "The worst offence ... which can be committed by a polemic, is to stigmatize those who hold the contrary opinion as bad and immoral men."

Indeed, as Mill points out:

In the case of any person whose judgment is really deserving of confidence, how has it become so? Because he has kept his mind open to criticism of his opinions and conduct. Because it has been his practice to listen to all that could be said against him; to profit by as much as was just and expound to himself, and upon occasion to others, the fallacy of what was fallacious.

In both Afghanistan and Iraq democratic debate is in its infancy. We hope that tolerance and compromise will become habitual there and make possible – though the process will likely be long and tumultuous – the creation of prosperous democratic societies. We may even be seeing early signs that political progress in those countries is having benign influence on others in the region, including the Palestinians and the Lebanese.

This has been an exciting time to be in government and to witness, encourage and perhaps help enable the blossoming of humane ideas of liberty and Self-government, the exposition of which one had the good fortune not to sleep through many years earlier in a Harvard classroom.

Thank you.

The Philosophy of John Stuart Mill, Page 197, Modern Library 1961.

9/11 Commission Report, p. 363.

Remarks At The 20th Anniversary Of The National Endowment For Democracy, November 6, 2003.

Articles 2 and 7.

Article 7(A).

Article 13(F).

Burke, *Rejections on the Revolution in France*, (Penguin Books, 1968), p. 376.

The *Philosophy of J. S. Mill*, ed., Marshall Cohen (New York: Modern Library, 1961), p. 247.

The *Philosophy of J. S. Mill*, ed., Marshall Cohen (New York Modern Library, 1961), pp. 208-09.

Mr. Feith is Undersecretary of Defense for Policy.

Please read [Privacy and Security Notice](#)



TAB A
~~FOUO~~

311

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2005 MAR 11 AM 9:51 **March 1, 2005**

TO: Gen Dick Myers
CC: ~~Don~~ Stanley
Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*
SUBJECT Explosives at Al-Qaqa

Maybe we've already answered the attached letter. If we have, let me **see** the answer that went out and who it was from.

If we have **not** answered it, please develop an answer and respond on behalf of the Department to **this** letter **from** these Senators. You're the one who always in the **Q&As**.

I think it **ought** to be a powerful argument. I would like to see it, and Larry Di Rita should **see** it before it goes. It **seems** to me that **might** put this to rest.

Thanks.

Attach.
10/28/04 Letter from Senators re: Explosives at Al-Qaqa

DHR:sh
022605-89

.....
Please respond by 3/10/05

~~FOUO~~

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/47855

OSD 04921-05



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

SEC 1
CM-2370-05 2005 MAR 11 01 2: 51
10 March 2005

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBM 3/10*

SUBJECT: Explosives at Al-Qaqaa (SF-974)

- **Answer.** In response to your issue (TAB A), attached is the reply (TAB B) to Senator Feinstein and five other Senators regarding their inquiry into missing explosives from Al-Qaqaa.
- **Analysis.** The unclassified answer to the Senators' query included a summary of initial combat actions in vicinity of Al-Qaqaa, the amount of ammunition secured by Coalition forces at the Al-Qaqaa facility, and additional Coalition efforts to secure, destroy or demilitarize over 400,000 tons of captured enemy ammunition.
 - Coalition forces have discovered more than 10,000 weapons cache sites in Iraq; all known weapons caches have been consolidated into six guarded depots.
 - While any missing explosive material is a serious matter, the alleged missing explosives from Al-Qaqaa comprised less than a .1 percent of the total munitions found.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: Lieutenant General J.T. Conway, USMC; Director, J-3 (b)(6)

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~ OSD 04921-05

11-L-0559/OSD/47856

March 1, 2005

11 7 9:51

TO: Gen Dick Myers
CC: Dan Stanley
Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Explosives at Al-Qaqaa

Maybe we've already answered the attached letter. If we have, let me see the answer that went out and who it was from.

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Thanks.

Attach.

10/28/04 Letter from Senators re: Explosives at Al-Qaqaa

DHR:dh
022805-89

.....
Please respond by 3/10/05

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

October 28, 2004

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
The Pentagon
Washington, D. C. 20301

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld:

We are writing to express deep concern about the disappearance of 380 tons of powerful explosives from the Al-Qaqaa munitions and weapons site in Iraq. Given President Bush's announcement that a U.S. military investigation is underway to determine the cause of this massive security breach, we would seek your immediate cooperation in providing Congress with information regarding the scope and seriousness of the loss of munitions.

In our view, this incident represents a serious lapse of military planning and execution, and it is critical that we determine the breadth of the security failure, not only at Al-Qaqaa but at other sites in Iraq. In that regard, we would request the following from the Department of Defense:

- A complete list of the major weapons sites in Iraq;
- Specific steps taken by the US military to secure weapons, ammunition, explosives and related materials at each site;
- Whether any of these sites remain unguarded at the present time by US military forces;
- How many explosives have been demolished;
- How much remains to be demolished;
- How much is believed to have gotten into the hands of insurgents or terrorist Organizations and steps now being taken to prevent their use against U.S. troops;
- How many of the weapons and munitions have been turned over to the Iraqi army;
- How much the U.S. has spent to guard and destroy these weapons sites;
- How much more money is needed to complete this effort and how these new expenditures will be used;

Tab A


11-L-0559/OSD/47858


- Whether additional U.S. troops should be deployed for **this mission;**
- A specific timeline of (1) **when DoD first** learned that explosives were **missing from Al-Qaqa,** (2) which Pentagon officials were notified, **and** (3) the time White House officials were told about the missing explosives.


We are profoundly disappointed that carelessness and lack of attention to these munitions and weapons sites have now significantly escalated the dangers for our troops on the ground,

Thank you for your attention to this request, and we look forward to your reply.

Sincerely,



DIANNE FEINSTEIN (D-CA)


FRANK LAUTENBERG (D-NJ)


JON S. CORZINE (D-NJ)


DANIEL AKAKA (D-HI)


BARBARA BOXER (D-CA)


RICHARD DURBIN (D-IL)

Tab A

TAB B

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CORRESPONDENCE ACTION REPORT			
This form must be completed and forwarded to the Correspondence Control Division CCD, WHS Room 3A948, Suspense Desk (b)(6) FAX Number (b)(6)			
(b)(6) Email: Surpmse Lkk@cd.whr.mil	Action Agency JCS	Suspense Date 11/17/2004	
1. ACTION TAKEN (Check one)			
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	a. ACTION HAS BEEN COMPLETED (Copy attached)		
<input type="checkbox"/>	b. REQUEST EXTENSION OF SUSPENSE DATE TO _____ (Justify below)		
<input type="checkbox"/>	c. INTERIM REPLY HAS BEEN SENT (Copy attached) EXTEND SUSPENSE TO _____ (Justify below)		
<input type="checkbox"/>	d. REQUEST CANCELLATION (Justify below)		
<input type="checkbox"/>	e. REQUEST TRANSFER TO _____ (Justify below /include POC Name & Phone Number)		
<input type="checkbox"/>	f. REQUEST DOWNGRADE TO _____ (Justify below)		
2. JUSTIFICATION			
<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; min-height: 150px;"> JCS sent letters to Senators Feinstein, Akaka, Boxer, Coning, Durbin, and Lautenberg </div>			
3. REPORTING AGENCY			
a. ACTION AGENCY JCS	e. APPROVING AUTHORITY (Service Secretary/Under Secretary/ASD/Military/Executive Assistant Level)		
b. NAME OF ACTION OFFICER Anthony M. Bennett	Signature 	Date Signed 12/3/04	
c. TELEPHONE NO. (b)(6)	5. ACTION TAKEN (For EXSEC/Correspondence Control Division Use Only)		
d. DATE _____	a. EXT <input type="checkbox"/> Approved <input type="checkbox"/> Disapproved		
	h. CANX <input type="checkbox"/> Approved <input type="checkbox"/> Disapproved		
	e. DWNCRD <input type="checkbox"/> Approved <input type="checkbox"/> Disapproved		
	d. TRANSFER <input type="checkbox"/> Approved <input type="checkbox"/> Disapproved		
4. CCD CONTROL # OSD 17345-04	e. OTHER (Specify) _____		
	Signature _____	Date Signed _____	



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20316-9999

1 December 2004

The Honorable Dianne Feinstein
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Senator Feinstein,

The Secretary of Defense asked that I respond to your letter regarding missing explosives in Al Qa Qaa, Iraq.

Coalition efforts to secure, destroy or demilitarize the enormous quantity of captured enemy ammunition have been very successful. Coalition forces discovered over 10,000 weapons cache sites in Iraq. All known weapons caches have been consolidated into six guarded depots. Over 400,000 tons of munitions have been discovered in Iraq. While we regard any missing explosive material as a serious matter, the alleged missing explosives from Al Qa Qaa comprises less than .1 percent of the total munitions found to date.

The Al Qa Qaa facility was one of dozens of ammunition storage points the 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized) encountered during the rapid advance toward Baghdad. When US forces arrived, the facility gates were found open. Fedayeen Saddam, Special Republican Guard and other Iraqi military units were firing from inside, defending the facility. US forces engaged them, eliminated the resistance and set up a defensive position in the facility in order to secure the adjacent bridge. The only checks made for munitions at that time were those necessary to establish the defensive position. The next day, the division continued the advance to Baghdad.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) tagged and inventoried 201 tons of munitions inside bunkers at Al Qa Qaa on 14 January 2003. The agency acknowledged that it could not account for 32 tons of high melting-point explosive (HMX) and accepted Saddam's claims that the missing explosives were used for industrial purposes.

Prior to combat operations, the Iraqi Ministry of Science and Technology alleged, in April 2003, that 340 tons of high explosives were stored at Al Qa Qaa. US forces discovered and removed over 400 tons of munitions and explosives between April and June 2003. Units involved in the removal of the material found indications of looting and stated that none of the bunkers were under JAEA or UN seals. The facility currently has no munitions.

Tab B

11-L-0559/OSD/47861


There is insufficient data to assess if material used in improvised explosive devices can be traced chemically to specific **HMX** produced at the Al Qa Qaa facility. For the same reason, it is not possible to determine if any munitions from the facility have been recovered through the discovery and exploitation of the thousands of caches found throughout Iraq.

Over 260,000 tons of munitions have been destroyed. Approximately 145,000 tons remain to be destroyed. Destruction is taking place at a rate of about 600 tons per day. We expect to complete destruction or transfer to Iraq security forces all munitions at two of the **six** depots in January 2005.

As of September 2003, there were over 6,000 Soldiers dedicated to securing, transporting, guarding and destroying captured enemy munitions. In September 2003, this mission transitioned to US contractors. The three contractors employ approximately 2,000 workers, of which 600 are US workers and 1,400 local nationals. Approximately \$460 million out of approximately \$580 million budgeted has been spent on ammunition destruction efforts.

On behalf of our men and women in uniform, thank you for your continued concern and support.

Sincerely,



RICHARD B. MYERS
Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

1 December 2004

The Honorable Daniel Akaka
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Senator Akaka,

The Secretary of Defense asked that I respond to your letter regarding missing explosives in Al Qa Qaa, Iraq.

Coalition efforts to secure, destroy or demilitarize the enormous quantity of captured enemy ammunition have been very successful. Coalition forces discovered over 10,000 weapons cache sites in Iraq. All known weapons caches have been consolidated into **six** guarded depots. Over 400,000 tons of munitions have been discovered in Iraq. While we regard any missing explosive material as a serious matter, the alleged missing explosives from Al QaQaa comprises less than .1 percent of the total munitions found to date.

The Al QaQaa facility was one of dozens of ammunition storage points the 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized) encountered during the rapid advance toward Baghdad. When US forces arrived, the facility gates were found open. Fedayeen Saddam, Special Republican Guard and other Iraqi military units were firing from inside, defending the facility. US forces engaged them, eliminated the resistance and set up a defensive position in the facility in order to secure the adjacent bridge. The only checks made for munitions at that time were those necessary to establish the defensive position. The next day, the division continued the advance to Baghdad.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) tagged and inventoried 201 tons of munitions inside bunkers at Al Qa Qaa on 14 **January** 2003. The agency acknowledged that it could not account for 32 tons of high melting-point explosive (HMX) and accepted Saddam's claims that the missing explosives were used for industrial purposes.

Prior to combat operations, the Iraqi Ministry of Science and Technology alleged, in April 2003, that 340 tons of high explosives were stored at Al Qa Qaa. US forces discovered and removed over 400 tons of munitions and explosives between April and June 2003. Units involved in the removal of the material found indications of looting and stated that none of the bunkers were under IAEA or UN seals. The facility currently has no munitions.

Tab B

11-L-0559/OSD/47863


There is insufficient data to assess if material used in improvised explosive devices can be traced chemically to specific HMX produced at the Al Qa Qaa facility. For the same reason, it is not possible to determine if any munitions from the facility have been recovered through the discovery and exploitation of the thousands of caches found throughout Iraq.

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On behalf of our men and women in uniform, **thank** you for your continued concern and support.

Sincerely,



RICHARD B. MYERS
Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

1 December 2004

The Honorable Barbara Boxer
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Senator Boxer,

The Secretary of Defense asked that I respond to your letter regarding missing explosives in Al Qa Qaa, Iraq.

Coalition efforts to secure, destroy or demilitarize the enormous quantity of captured enemy ammunition have been very successful. Coalition forces discovered over 10,000 weapons cache sites in Iraq. All known weapons caches have been consolidated into *six* guarded depots. Over 400,000 tons of munitions have been discovered in Iraq. While we regard any missing explosive material as a serious matter, the alleged missing explosives from Al Qa Qaa comprises less than .1 percent of the total munitions found *to date*.

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Tab B

11-L-0559/OSD/47865