

expression, only lately. Even after September 11, it seems that most of the Western World does not yet understand this weapon. It is a very potent psychological weapon. Its real direct impact is relatively minor. The total number of casualties from hundreds of suicide murders within Israel in the last three years is much smaller than those due to car accidents. September 11 was quantitatively much less lethal than many earthquakes. More people die from AIDS in one day in Africa than all the Russians who died in the hands of Chechnya-based Moslem suicide murderers since that conflict started. Saddam killed every month more people than all those who died from suicide murders since the Coalition occupation of Iraq. So what is all the fuss about suicide killings? It creates headlines. It is spectacular. It is frightening. It is a very cruel death with bodies dismembered and horrible severe lifelong injuries to many of the wounded. It is always shown on television in great detail. One such murder, with the help of hysterical media coverage, can destroy the tourism industry of a country for quite a while, as it did in Bali and in Turkey. But the real fear comes from the undisputed fact that no defense and no preventive measures can succeed against a determined suicide murderer. This has not yet penetrated the thinking of the Western World. The U.S. and Europe are constantly improving their defense against the last murder, not the next one. We may arrange for the best airport security in the world. But if you want to murder by suicide, you do not have to board a plane in order to explode yourself and kill many people. Who could stop a suicide murder in the midst of the crowded line waiting to be checked by the airport metal detector? How about the lines to the check-in counters in a busy travel period? Put a metal detector in front of every train station in Spain and the terrorists will get the buses. Protect the buses and they will explode in movie theaters, concert halls, supermarkets, shopping malls, schools and hospitals. Put guards in front of every concert hall and there will always be a line of people to be checked by the guards and this line will be the target, not to speak of killing the guards themselves. You can somewhat reduce your vulnerability by preventive and defensive measures and **by** strict border controls but not eliminate it and definitely not win the war in a defensive way. And it is a war. What is behind the suicide murders? Money, power and cold-blooded murderous incitement, nothing else. It has nothing to do with true fanatic religious beliefs. No Moslem preacher has ever blown himself up. No son of an Arab politician or religious leader has ever blown himself. No relative of anyone influential has done it. Wouldn't you expect some of the religious leaders to do it themselves, or to talk their sons into doing it, if this is truly a supreme act of religious fervor? Aren't they interested in the benefits of going to Heaven? Instead, they send outcast women, naive children, retarded people and young incited hotheads. They promise them the delights, mostly sexual, of the next world, and pay their families handsomely after the supreme act is performed and enough innocent people are dead. Suicide murders also have nothing to do with poverty and despair. The poorest region in the world, by far, is Africa. It never happens there. There are numerous desperate people in the world, in different cultures, countries and continents. Desperation does not provide anyone with explosives, reconnaissance and transportation. There was certainly more despair in

Saddam's Iraq then in Paul Bremmer's Iraq, and no one exploded himself. A suicide murder is simply a horrible, vicious weapon of cruel, inhuman, cynical, well-funded terrorists, with no regard to human life, including the life of their fellow countrymen, but with very high regard to their own affluent well-being and their hunger for power. The only way to fight this new "popular" weapon is identical to the only way in which you fight organized crime or pirates on the high seas: the offensive way. Like in the case of organized crime, it is crucial that the forces on the offensive be united and it is crucial to reach the top of the crime pyramid. You cannot eliminate organized crime by arresting the little drug dealer in the street corner. You must go after the head of the "Family". If part of the public supports it, others tolerate it, many are afraid of it and some try to explain it away by poverty or by a miserable childhood, organized crime will thrive and so will terrorism. The United States understands this now, after September 11. Russia is beginning to understand it. Turkey understands it well. I am very much afraid that most of Europe still does not understand it. Unfortunately, it seems that Europe will understand it only after suicide murders will arrive in Europe in a big way. In my humble opinion, this will definitely happen. The Spanish trains and the Istanbul bombings are only the beginning. The unity of the Civilized World in fighting this horror is absolutely indispensable. Until Europe wakes up, this unity will not be achieved.

The second ingredient is words, more precisely lies. Words can be lethal. They kill people. It is often said that politicians, diplomats and perhaps also lawyers and business people must sometimes lie, as part of their professional life. But the norms of politics and diplomacy are childish, in comparison with the level of incitement and total absolute deliberate fabrications, which have reached new heights in the region we are talking about. An incredible number of people in the Arab world believe that September 11 never happened, or was an American provocation or, even better, a Jewish plot. You all remember the Iraqi Minister of Information, Mr. Mouhamad Said al-Sahaf and his press conferences when the US forces were already inside Baghdad. Disinformation at time of war is an accepted tactic. But to stand, day after day, and to make such preposterous statements, known to everybody to be lies, without even being ridiculed in your own milieu, can only happen in this region. Mr. Sahaf eventually became a popular icon as a court jester, but this did not stop some allegedly respectable newspapers from giving him equal time. It also does not prevent the Western press from giving credence, every day, even now, to similar liars. After all, if you want to be an anti-Semite, there are subtle ways of doing it. You do not have to claim that the holocaust never happened and that the Jewish temple in Jerusalem never existed. But millions of Moslems are told by their leaders that this is the case. When these same leaders make other statements, the Western media report them as if they could be true. It is a daily occurrence that the same people, who finance, arm and dispatch suicide murderers, condemn the act in English in front of western TV cameras, talking to a world audience, which even partly believes them. It is a daily routine to hear the same leader making opposite statements in Arabic to his people

and in English to the rest of the world. Incitement by Arab TV, accompanied by horror pictures of mutilated bodies, has become a powerful weapon of those who lie, distort and want to destroy everything. Little children are raised on deep hatred and on admiration of so-called martyrs, and the Western World does not notice it because its own TV sets are mostly tuned to soap operas and game shows. I recommend to you, even though most of you do not understand Arabic, to watch Al Jazeera, from time to time. You will not believe your own eyes. But words also work in other ways, more subtle. A demonstration in Berlin, carrying banners supporting Saddam's regime and featuring three-year old babies dressed as suicide murderers, is defined by the press and by political leaders as a "peace demonstration". You may support or oppose the Iraq war, but to refer to fans of Saddam, Arafat or Bin Laden as peace activists is a bit too much. A woman walks into an Israeli restaurant in mid-day, eats, observes families with old people and children eating their lunch in the adjacent tables and pays the bill. She then blows herself up, killing 20 people, including many children, with heads and arms rolling around in the restaurant. She is called "martyr" by several Arab leaders and "activist" by the European press. Dignitaries condemn the act but visit her bereaved family and the money flows. There is a new game in town: The actual murderer is called "the military wing", the one who pays him, equips him and sends him is now called "the political wing" and the head of the operation is called the "spiritual leader". There are numerous other examples of such Orwellian nomenclature, used every day not only by terror chiefs but also by Western media. These words are much more dangerous than many people realize. They provide an emotional infrastructure for atrocities. It was Joseph Goebels who said that if you repeat a lie often enough, people will believe it. He is now being outperformed by his successors.

The third aspect is money. Huge amounts of money, which could have solved many social problems in this dysfunctional part of the world, are channeled into three concentric spheres supporting death and murder. In the inner circle are the terrorists themselves. The money funds their travel, explosives, hideouts and permanent search for soft vulnerable targets. They are surrounded by a second wider circle of direct supporters, planners, commanders, preachers, all of whom make a living, usually a very comfortable living, by serving as terror infrastructure. Finally, we find the third circle of so-called religious, educational and welfare organizations, which actually do some good, feed the hungry and provide some schooling, but brainwash a new generation with hatred, lies and ignorance. This circle operates mostly through mosques, madras's and other religious establishments but also through inciting electronic and printed media. It is this circle that makes sure that women remain inferior, that democracy is unthinkable and that exposure to the outside world is minimal. It is also that circle that leads the way in blaming everybody outside the Moslem world, for the miseries of the region. Figuratively speaking, this outer circle is the guardian, which makes sure that the people look and listen inwards to the inner circle of terror and incitement, rather than to the world outside. Some parts of this same outer circle actually operate as a result of fear from, or

blackmail by, the inner circles. The horrifying added factor is the high birth rate. Half of the population of the Arab world is under the age of 20, the most receptive age to incitement, guaranteeing two more generations of blind hatred. Of the three circles described above, the inner circles are primarily financed by terrorist states like Iran and Syria, until recently also by Iraq and Libya and earlier also by some of the Communist regimes. These states, as well as the Palestinian Authority, are the safe havens of the wholesale murder vendors. The outer circle is largely financed by Saudi Arabia, but also by donations from certain Moslem communities in the United States and Europe and, to a smaller extent, by donations of European Governments to various NGO's and by certain United Nations organizations, whose goals may be noble, but they are infested and exploited by agents of the outer circle. The Saudi regime, of course, will be the next victim of major terror, when the inner circle will explode into the outer circle. The Saudis are beginning to understand it, but they fight the inner circles, while still financing the infrastructure at the outer circle. Some of the leaders of these various circles live very comfortably on their loot. You meet their children in the best private schools in Europe, not in the training camps of suicide murderers. The Jihad "soldiers" join packaged death tours to Iraq and other hotspots, while some of their leaders ski in Switzerland. Mrs. Arafat, who lives in Paris with her daughter, receives tens of thousands Dollars per month from the allegedly bankrupt Palestinian Authority while a typical local ringleader of the Al-Aksa brigade, reporting to Arafat, receives only a cash payment of a couple of hundred dollars, for performing murders at the retail level.

The fourth element of the current world conflict is the total breaking of all laws. The civilized world believes in democracy, the rule of law, including international law, human rights, free speech and free press, among other liberties. There are naive old-fashioned habits such as respecting religious sites and symbols, not using ambulances and hospitals for acts of war, avoiding the mutilation of dead bodies and not using children as human shields or human bombs. Never in history, not even in the Nazi period, was there such total disregard of all of the above as we observe now.

Every student of political science debates how you prevent an anti-democratic force from winning a democratic election and abolishing democracy. Other aspects of a civilized society must also have limitations. Can a policeman open fire on someone trying to kill him? Can a government listen to phone conversations of terrorists and drug dealers? Does free speech protect you when you shout "fire" in a crowded theater? Should there be death penalty, for deliberate multiple murders? These are the old-fashioned dilemmas. But now we have an entire new set. Do you raid a mosque, which serves as a terrorist ammunition storage? Do you return fire, if you are attacked from a hospital? Do you storm a church taken over by terrorists who took the priests hostages? Do you search every ambulance after a few suicide murderers use ambulances to reach their targets? Do you strip every woman because one pretended to be pregnant and carried a suicide bomb on her belly? Do you shoot back at someone trying to kill you, standing deliberately behind a group of children? Do you raid

terrorist headquarters, hidden in a mental hospital? Do you shoot an arch-murderer who deliberately moves from one location to another, always surrounded by children? All of these happen daily in Iraq and in the Palestinian areas.

What do you do? Well, you do not want to face the dilemma. But it cannot be avoided. Suppose, for the sake of discussion, that someone would openly stay in a well-known address in Teheran, hosted by the Iranian Government and financed by it, executing one atrocity after another in Spain or in France, killing hundreds of innocent people, accepting responsibility for the crimes, promising in public TV interviews to do more of the same, while the Government of Iran issues public condemnations of his acts but continues to host him, invite him to official functions and treat him as a great dignitary. I leave it to you as homework to figure out what Spain or France would have done in such a situation. The problem is that the civilized world is still having illusions about the rule of law in a totally lawless environment. It is trying to play ice hockey by sending a ballerina ice-skater into the rink or to knock out a heavyweight boxer by a chess player. In the same way that no country has a law against cannibals eating its prime minister, because such an act is unthinkable, international law does not address killers shooting from hospitals, mosques and ambulances, while being protected by their Government or society. International law does not know how to handle someone who sends children to throw stones, stands behind them and shoots with immunity and cannot be arrested because he is sheltered by a Government. International law does not know how to deal with a leader of murderers who is royally and comfortably hosted by a country, which pretends to condemn his acts or just claims to be too weak to arrest him. The amazing thing is that all of these crooks demand protection under international law and define all those who attack them as war criminals, with some Western media repeating the allegations. The good news is that all of this **is** temporary, because the evolution of international law has always adapted itself to reality. The punishment for suicide murder should be death or arrest before the murder, not during and not after. After every world war, the rules of international law have changed and the same will happen after the present one. But during the twilight zone, a lot of harm can be done. The picture I described here is not pretty. What can we do about it? In the short run, only fight and win. In the long run - only educate the next generation and open it to the world. The inner circles can and must be destroyed by force. The outer circle cannot be eliminated by force. Here we need financial starvation of the organizing elite, more power to women, more education, counter propaganda, boycott whenever feasible and access to Western media, internet and the international scene. Above all, we need a total absolute unity and determination of the civilized world against all three circles of evil. Allow me, for a moment, to depart from my alleged role as a taxi driver and return to science.

When you have a malignant tumor, you may remove the tumor itself surgically. You may also starve it by preventing new blood from reaching it from other parts of the body, thereby preventing new

"supplies" from expanding the tumor. If you want to be sure, it is best to do both. But before you fight and win, by force or otherwise, you have to realize that you are in a war, and this may take Europe a few more years. In order to win, it is necessary to first eliminate the terrorist regimes, so that no Government in the world will serve as a safe haven for these people. I do not want to comment here on whether the American-led attack on Iraq was justified from the point of view of weapons of mass destruction or any other pre-war argument, but I can look at the post-war map of Western Asia. Now that Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya are out, two and a half terrorist states remain: Iran, Syria and Lebanon, the latter being a Syrian colony. Perhaps Sudan should be added to the list. As a result of the conquest of Afghanistan and Iraq, both Iran and Syria are now totally surrounded by territories unfriendly to them. Iran is encircled by Afghanistan, by the Gulf States, Iraq and the Moslem republics of the former Soviet Union. Syria is surrounded by Turkey, Iraq, Jordan and Israel. This is a significant strategic change and it applies strong pressure on the terrorist countries. It is not surprising that Iran is so active in trying to incite a Shiite uprising in Iraq. I do not know if the American plan was actually to encircle both Iran and Syria, but that is the resulting situation. In my humble opinion, the number one danger to the world today is Iran and its regime. It definitely has ambitions to rule vast areas and to expand in all directions. It has an ideology, which claims supremacy over Western culture. It is ruthless. It has proven that it can execute elaborate terrorist acts without leaving too many traces, using Iranian Embassies. It is clearly trying to develop Nuclear Weapons. Its so-called moderates and conservatives play their own virtuoso version of the "good-cop versus bad-cop" game. Iran sponsors Syrian terrorism, it is certainly behind much of the action in Iraq, it is fully funding the Hizbulla and, through it, the Palestinian Hamas and Islamic Jihad, it performed acts of terror at least in Europe and in South America and probably also in Uzbekistan and Saudi Arabia and it truly leads a multi-national terror consortium, which includes, as minor players, Syria, Lebanon and certain Shiite elements in Iraq. Nevertheless, most European countries still trade with Iran, try to appease it and refuse to read the clear signals. In order to win the war it is also necessary to dry the financial resources of the terror conglomerate. It is pointless to try to understand the subtle differences between the Sunni terror of Al Qaida and Hamas and the Shiite terror of Hizbulla, Sadr and other Iranian inspired enterprises. When it serves their business needs, all of them collaborate beautifully. It is crucial to stop Saudi and other financial support of the outer circle, which is the fertile breeding ground of terror. It is important to monitor all donations from the Western World to Islamic organizations, to monitor the finances of international relief organizations and to react with forceful economic measures to any small sign of financial aid to any of the three circles of terrorism. It is also important to act decisively against the campaign of lies and fabrications and to monitor those Western media who collaborate with it out of naivety, financial interests or ignorance. Above all, never surrender to terror. No one will ever know whether the recent elections in Spain would have yielded a different result, if not for the train bombings a few days earlier.

But it really does not matter. What matters is that the terrorists believe that they caused the result and that they won by driving Spain out of Iraq. The Spanish story will surely end up being extremely costly to other European countries, including France, who is now expelling inciting preachers and forbidding veils and including others who sent troops to Iraq. In the long run, Spain itself will pay even more. Is the solution a democratic Arab world? If by democracy we mean free elections but also free press, free speech, a functioning judicial system, civil liberties, equality to women, free international travel, exposure to international media and ideas, laws against racial incitement and against defamation, and avoidance of lawless behavior regarding hospitals, places of worship and children, then yes, democracy is the solution. If democracy is just free elections, it is likely that the most fanatic regime will be elected, the one whose incitement and fabrications are the most inflammatory.

We have seen it already in Algeria and, to a certain extent, in Turkey. It will happen again, if the ground is not prepared very carefully. On the other hand, a certain transition democracy, as in Jordan, may be a better temporary solution, paving the way for the real thing, perhaps in the same way that an immediate sudden democracy did not work in Russia and would not have worked in China. I have no doubt that the civilized world will prevail. But the longer it takes us to understand the new landscape of this war, the more costly and painful the victory will be. Europe, more than any other region, is the key. Its understandable recoil from wars, following the horrors of World War II, may cost thousands of additional innocent lives, before the tide will turn."

September 21, 2004

TO: Newt Gingrich
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: TRICARE

313

I asked for an update on your E-mail on transforming TRICARE. Here is a response – it appears they're hard at it.

Thanks for your help.

Regards,

DHR:ss
092104-2

.....
Please respond by _____

215ep04

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: June 6, 2004
SUBJECT: Electronic Health Records

Paul Butler

9/20

Here's some material on health transformation that Gingrich is working on. Is there anybody that can be helpful here at DoD? Do you have your head into those issues?

Thanks.

DHR/azn
060604D.02ts

Attach: Gingrich email 3.20.04 Re: Tricare

Please respond by:

~~6/23~~ 8/19/04

*Sir
Response attached
at Tab A.*

*V/R
Lt Col Lengyel 7/21*

OSD 14122-04

11-L-0559/OSD/44263

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1200

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 SEP 17 PM 5:0



HEALTH AFFAIRS

INFO MEMO

SEP 16 2004

9/20
11:30
Aui Butler
9/20
RWB

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: *William Winkenwerder, Jr.*
William Winkenwerder, Jr., MD, ASD (Health Affairs)

SUBJECT: Electronic Health Records

- You requested information regarding electronic health records.
- To answer your question, our heads are very much into the issues raised by Gingrich. I meet periodically with him and his staff to exchange ideas on electronic health records and health information technology. We have provided him demonstrations on the military electronic health record, as well as a number of other advanced technologies in use today within the Department of Defense.
- I admit to some bias, but based on my experience in the private sector, the Military Health System is pursuing information technology and its application to all phases of our business far more aggressively than the vast majority of private sector health organizations and companies. (See TAB A)

COORDINATION: TAB C

Attachments:
As stated

TSA SD	9/20
SRMA SD	
MA SD	9/20
EXI SD	M 9/20

Prepared by: Connie Gladding, IMT&R/IPI&EL, (b)(6) PCDOCS 69124,
69345,69892

OSD 14122-04

11-L-0559/OSD/44264

INFORMATION PAPER

DoD Health Transformation through Information Technology

The DoD is a leader in the use of health information technologies to improve health care access, quality, population health management and force health protection.

I have met with Mr. Gingrich on a periodic basis to exchange ideas on the electronic health record and health information technologies in general. My staff has shown Mr. Gingrich and his staff the military electronic health record and a number of advanced technologies in use today within DoD. Health information technologies are being used to facilitate DoD's health and business transformation include:

- **Composite Health Care System** – Provides an electronic health record at all military treatment facilities that includes laboratory, pharmacy and radiology computerized physician order entry and results retrieval, registration, appointing and scheduling, and documentation of the patient encounter capabilities.
- **TRICARE Online** – Provides health care benefits information, health and wellness information, a secure personal health journal and online appointing capabilities at over 300 military treatment facilities.
- **Telehealth** - Provides interactive consultations in radiology, mental health, dermatology, pathology and dental care between remote locations and medical referral centers.
- **Military Health System Data Repository** – A centralized data warehouse containing patient encounter information from military treatment facilities and private sector providers, financial data, demographics and other data. It is used in our strategic planning, performance monitoring, population health management and business management.
- **Pharmacy Data Transaction System** – A centralized data repository of all prescriptions processed for DoD beneficiaries, whether obtained in military treatment facilities, 50,000 retail pharmacies across the U.S., or through our mail order system. The system processes over 411,000 prescription transactions per day. It gives DoD amazing capability to know what is happening with all pharmaceutical services (over \$5B per year), and helps prevent tens of thousands of adverse drug reactions every year for our beneficiaries.
- **Joint Medical Asset Repository** – A web-based system that provides comprehensive information on the location, movement, status and quantity of medical equipment, supplies, pharmaceuticals and units of blood in the Military Health System.

- Defense Medical Logistics Standard Support – This system combines business process re-engineering with leading edge technologies to provide state-of-the-art capabilities supporting DoD medical logistics, electronic commerce and commercial best practices.
- Computer/Electronic Accommodations Program – Provides assistive technology and accommodations for DoD and other Federal employees with disabilities. It is available to employees, patients and family members, Pentagon survivors and wounded soldiers with visual, hearing, dexterity and cognitive disabilities.

Key to transforming health care is an enterprise architecture; data, security, communication and interoperable standards; and implementation of a robust computing and communication infrastructure. The Military Health System enterprise architecture is aligned with the DoD Business Enterprise Architecture and Federal Health Architecture. DoD is a leader in the Consolidated Health Informatics initiative to develop and adopt common health standards for all Federal agencies.

I fully support the President's Management Agenda on health care reform. DoD assisted the Department of Health and Human Services (Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology) in developing national strategies for transforming health care through the use of technologies such as the electronic health record. DoD, in response to a Presidential Executive Order, recommended approaches for providing affordable health information technologies to rural and medically underserved communities. DoD will continue to collaborate and share technology products, outcomes, benefits and lessons learned with HHS, other Federal agencies, and the private sector.

Electronic Health Record Snowflake

COORDINATION

MHS CIO	Concurred, 8/25/04
DASD (FHP&R)	Concurred, 8/30/04
DASD (C&PP)	Concurred, 9/1/04
Dir, Program Integration, TMA	Concurred, 8/26/04
Chief of Staff, TMA	Concurred, 9/8/04
Deputy Dir, TMA	Concurred, 9/9/04
Chief of Staff (HA)	<u>Concurred, 9/13/04</u>
APDASD (HA)	<u>N/A</u>

Electronic Health Record **Snowflake**

COORDINATION

USD (P&R)

DR. CHU

David L. Chu 175/10/04

Craddock, John J, Lt Gen, OSD

See with [unclear] Chu

Page 1 of 1 *Chu*

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com
Sent: Saturday, March 20, 2004 10:34 AM
To: (b)(6) Larry.DiRita@osd.pentagon.mil,
John.Craddock@OSD.Pentagon.mil; (b)(6) jack.patterson@osd.mil;
david.chu@osd.mil; william.winkenwerder@ha.osd.mil
Cc: john.jumper@pentagon.af.mil; peter.pace@js.pentagon.mil; damicorj@js.pentagon.mil
Subject: electronic health records and tricare-the aarp example-newt

for secdef, depsecdef
from newt 3/ 20/04

transforming tricare for greater member satisfaction and better health and lower cost (the trifecta of health transformation)

everything being described for an electronic health record below could apply even more to the military and military retirees and we could have an electronic health record up and running for the members to use as well as their doctors and hospitals by September one of this year

aarp is very excited about rolling out an electronic health record by January for the 2.2 million 65 year olds who will be getting the new Medicare benchmark physical exams in 2005.

building further on friday's lunch conversation

so we can explain why an electronic health record would be truly empowering for the new medicare benchmark physical:

it would be really helpful if aarp might have or develop the following data:

the new 65 year olds are different from their parents (remember your magazine cover with the model--60 is **30**, a little much, I think it is **45** and I am 60)

1. how many more years will the average 65 in 2005 probably live and how long will the longest probably live
2. how many of the 2.2 million will probably reach 80 and how many will probably reach 90 and the same for 100 (this lets **us** know that in 2020, 2030, and 2040 we will have this many people **still** using their electronic health records compared to the

3/20 2004

frequency of paper records being lost, copied, fedexed etc.)

3. **how** often will this generation of 65 year olds travel each year, how many will go out of **state**, how many will go *out* of country

this **explains** why accessing your records from anywhere on **the net is** so important

how many will actually move out of state to live somewhere else than where they are now

how many have children or grandchildren who live out *of* state

this kind of data would enable us to build an overwhelming case for starting in January with an electronic health record as a matter of convenience and safety for the health of "the new 65 year olds"

if you put all this together it might make a great article for the magazine along with a story about what England is actually doing (I met last night with the people from IDX who are partnering in two of the five English electronic health record regions **and** they were very very encouraging). you could also tie it into explaining your website development at aarp

thanks for helping with this
newt

3/20/2004

11-L-0559/OSD/44270

September 22, 2004

TO: GEN John Abizaid

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Gen. Pete Pace
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Presentation Additions

Iraq

Doug Feith and I were talking about your briefing at the Combatant Commander's Conference. The point you make about the fact that we are doing well and the enemy has not won any tactical engagements might be more persuasive if it were linked to some metrics. For example:

The enemy's goals are:

- To frighten away police recruits; but the fact is recruitment numbers for security forces are up.
- To frighten away Army recruits; but the fact is recruitment numbers are up.
- To scare folks to impede commerce; but the fact is commercial activity is up.
- To stop the political process; but the facts are:
 - The National Conference took place successfully this summer.
 - Work on an Afghan constitution continues.
 - Work on January elections continues.

22Sep04

In addition, it is important to address some of those points that are getting raised in the press, such as the arguments that:

- The enemies in Iraq seem to be growing in numbers.
- The enemies seem to be able to launch more attacks per day than in past months.
- The enemies seem to be increasing the casualties per week on the part of both Iraqi and Coalition forces.

Comments that address each of those arguments would be persuasive. When you get it pulled together, please send me a copy.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
092004-24

.....
Please respond by _____

September 22, 2004

TO: President George W. Bush
CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney
Honorable Colin Powell
Dr. Condoleezza Rice
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *[Signature]*
SUBJECT: Training Iraqi Security Forces

IRAQ

Mr. President,

Here is the biweekly update to the Iraqi Security Forces plan. Progress is being made. The key high level points are:

- We are "on track" with nearly 100,000 trained and equipped Iraqi Security forces on the ground performing their duties today.
- All are equipped with weapons and have completed a serious and well-run training regimen.

I know there is a great deal of data in the attached briefing. The pages I find useful are # 2, # 14, # 27, and # 33, which are summaries of progress and current status. For convenience, I have placed tabs on those charts.

I will continue to forward this information every two weeks or as things change significantly.

Respectfully,

Attach.
9/20/04 Iraqi Security Forces Update

DHR:ss
092204-6

OSD 14427-04

11-L-0559/OSD/44273

~~FOUO~~

225204

For Official Use Only

Iraqi Security Forces Update


20 September 2004

As of: 201100 Sep 04 EDT

11-L-0559/OSD/44274

Trained and Equipped Iraqi Security Forces

For Official Use Only



- Does not include 74,000 in Facilities Protection Service

Ministry of Interior Forces

Ministry of Interior Forces Projection – New Plan

For Official Use Only

Projected Percentage of Capable (Manned, Trained, Equipped) Policing Units on hand over time

Security Force Element	Objective		Timeline				
	Original Plan	Revised Plan	20 Sep 04	1 Oct 04	1 Nov 04	1 Dec 04	1 Jul 05
Regular Iraqi Police*	90K	135K	41%	43%	46%	50%	85%
Dept of Border Enforcement**	16K	32K	39%	44%	45%	45%	62%
Emergency Response Unit	270	270			55%	77%	100%
Special Police Regiments***	1,200 (2 Reg)	1,200 (2 Reg)					100%
Public Order Battalions***	3,600 (9 Bn)	3,600 (9 Bn)					100%

Notes

- * Police figures reflect trained and equipped individuals, not units
- ** Border Police are considered trained based on training by coalition forces, but capabilities are uneven across the force
- *** Special Police Regiments and Public Order Battalions equipping schedules are still being determined, and recruiting has just begun

Legend

- 70-100 % OF REQUIREMENT
- 40-69 % OF REQUIREMENT
- 39 % OR LESS OF REQUIREMENT

Ministry of Interior Forces Projection

For Official Use Only

Projected Percentage of Capable (Manned, Trained, Equipped) Policing Units on hand over time

	End state	20 Sep 04	1 Oct 04	1 Nov 04	1 Dec 04	1 Jul 05
Regular Iraqi Police*	135K police					56%
Dept of Border Enforcement**	32K	44%	45%	45%	46%	62%
Emergency Response Unit	270 police			55%	77%	100%
Special Police Regiments***	1,200 police (2 Regiments)					100%
Public Order Battalions***	3,600 police (9 Battalions)					100%

Notes

- * Police figures reflect trained and equipped individuals, not units
- ** Border Police are considered trained based on training by coalition forces, but capabilities are uneven across the force
- *** Special Police Regiments and Public Order Battalions equipping schedules are still being determined, and recruiting has just begun

Legend


- 70-100 % OF REQUIREMENT
- 40-69 % OF REQUIREMENT
- 39 % OR LESS OF REQUIREMENT

Iraqi Regular Police Training

For Official Use Only

Current Status	
Status	Number
Trained	38,921 (+3,626)
Training	3,065 (-414)
Untrained	42,964

 **Above Track to achieve projected goal by target date**
 **On Track to achieve projected goal by target date**
 **Below Track to achieve projected goal by target date**




Iraqi Police Service Procurement Status

For Official Use Only

Current Status	
Category	Number
Weapons	94,120 (+1,027)
Vehicles	5,985 (+62)
Radios	13,586 (+341)
Body Armor	43,766 (+1,275)
Police Trained and In Training	41,986 (+3,212)

↑	Above Track to achieve projected goal by target date
↔	On Track to achieve projected goal by target date
↓	Below Track to Achieve projected goal by target date

As of: 201100 Sep 04 EDT




Civil Intervention Force* Training

For Official Use Only

Current Status	
Status	Number
Trained	0
Training	0
Untrained	0

 Above Track to achieve projected goal by target date
 On Track to achieve projected goal by target date
 Below Track to achieve projected goal by target date



* **Mission: Provide a national level, high end, rapid response police capability to counter large scale disobedience and counterinsurgency.**


Civil Intervention Force Procurement Status

For Official Use Only



Current Status	
Category	Number
Weapons	0
Vehicles	0
Radios	0
Body Armor	0
Civil Intervention Force Trained and In Training	0

	Above Track to achieve projected goal by target date
	On Track to achieve projected goal by target date
	Below Track to achieve projected goal by target date




Emergency Response Unit* Training

For Official Use Only

Current Status	
Status	Number
Trained	<div style="display: flex; align-items: center; justify-content: center;"> ↔ <div style="text-align: left;"> <p style="margin: 0;">76</p> <p style="margin: 0;">(-7)</p> </div> </div>
Training	<div style="display: flex; align-items: center; justify-content: center;"> ↔ <div style="text-align: left;"> <p style="margin: 0;">0**</p> </div> </div>
Untrained	0

↑	Above Track to achieve projected goal by target date
↔	On Track to achieve projected goal by target date
↓	Below Track to achieve projected goal by target date

** Next basic training course begins on 25 September with 75 recruits




* **Mission:** Provide a special operations police capability in support of the Iraqi Police Service.

Emergency Response Unit Procurement Status

For Official Use Only

Current Status	
Category	Number
Weapons	↔ 500
Vehicles	↔ 0
Radios	↔ 300
Body Armor	↔ 270
ERU Forces Trained and In Training	76 (-7)

↑	Above Track to achieve projected goal by target date
↔	On Track to achieve projected goal by target date
↓	Below Track to Achieve projected goal by target date



Weapons Vehicles Radios Body Armor ER Units

As of: 201100 Sep 04 EDT

Border Enforcement Training


For Official Use Only

Current Status	
Status	Number
Trained	↔ 14,313
Training	↔ 463* (-22)
Untrained	↔ 1,375

 Above Track to achieve projected goal by target date
 On Track to achieve projected goal by target date
 Below Track to achieve projected goal by target date

* Current trainees were previously trained at unit level and are now retraining under the new program of instruction at the Jordan Academy

As of: 201100 Sep 04 EDT



*** Recruiting Projection: 2,000 per month until 32K force achieved end of May '05**
Training Throughput: 2,000 (800 recruits and 1,200 previously trained at unit level)
End State: Legacy and new border personnel trained to one established standard
(recycle of previously trained personnel to new standards by end of Oct '05)

Border Enforcement Procurement Status


For Official Use Only

Current Status	
Category	Number
Weapons	16,442
Vehicles	1,870 (+72)
Radios	1,627
Body Armor	4,000
Border Guards Trained and In Training	14,776 (-22)

 Above Track to achieve projected goal by target date

 On Track to achieve projected goal by target date

 Below Track to achieve projected goal by target date



As of: 201100 Sep 04 EDT

Ministry of Interior Forces: Man, Train, and Equip

For Official Use Only

		MANNING		TRAINING			EQUIPPING							
FORCE	COMPONENT	AUTH	ON DUTY	UN-TRAINED	IN TRAINING	TRAINED	WEAPONS		VEHICLES		COMMS		BODY ARMOR	
							REQ	O/H	REQ	O/H	REQ	O/H	REQ	O/H
Iraqi Police	IRAQI POLICE SERVICE	135K	84,950	42,964	3,065		213,185	↑ 94,120	22,395		67,565		135,000	
	CIVIL INTERVENTION FORCE	↑ 4,920		0	0		11,490		1,002		10,240		4,800	
	EMERGENCY RESPONSE UNIT	270		0	0		1,020	500	58		352		270	
Dept of Border Enforcement		32,000	↓ 16,151	1,375	463*	14,313	42,601		8,271		8,271		28,626	
TOTAL		172,190	↓ 101,177	44,339	3,528*		268,296	↑ 111,062	31,726		86,428		168,696	

- 70-100 % OF REQUIREMENT
- 40 - 69 % OF REQUIREMENT
- 39 % OR LESS OF REQUIREMENT

* DBE trainees have been previously trained, and are retraining under a new POI

** Some Radios on hand, but they are an interim capability only

(Does not include 73,992 personnel in Facilities Protection Service)



Ministry of Defense Forces

Iraqi Armed Forces Projection



Percentage of Capable (Manned, Trained, and Equipped) Units on hand over time

<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; display: inline-block; width: 30px; height: 30px; position: relative;"> Original Plan Revised Plan </div> Objective	1 Sep 04	1 Oct 04	1 Nov 04	1 Dec 04	1 Jul 05
18 Battalions (27,000 soldiers)					
9 Battalions (6584 soldiers)					
45 Bn 32K Soldiers					
65 Bn 62K Soldiers					
1 Battalion (828 soldiers)	50% / 50%	50% / 50%	55% / 55%	60% / 60%	95% / 95%
1 Special Mission Unit (451 soldiers)	25% / 25%	25% / 25%	25% / 25%	40% / 40%	70% / 70%

Legend	
	70-100 % OF REQUIREMENT
	40-69 % OF REQUIREMENT
	39 % OR LESS OF REQUIREMENT

Iraqi Armed Forces Projection

For Official Use Only

Projected Percentage of Capable (Manned, Trained, and Equipped) Units on hand over time

	End state	13 Sep 04	1 Oct 04	1 Nov 04	1 Dec 04	1 Jul 05
Iraqi Regular Army	18 Battalions (27,000 soldiers)				50%	100%
Iraqi Intervention Force	9 Battalions (6584 soldiers)				88%	100%
Iraqi National Guard	65 Battalions (62,000 soldiers)				42%	100%
Commando Battalion	1 Battalion (828 soldiers)	50%	50%	55%	60%	95%
Iraqi Counter Terrorism Force	1 Special Mission Unit (451 soldiers)				40%	70%


<u>Legend</u>	
	70-100 % OF REQUIREMENT
	40-69 % OF REQUIREMENT
	39 % OR LESS OF REQUIREMENT

Regular Army* Battalions

For Official Use Only

Current Status	
Status	Number of Battalions
Initial Training	↔ 6
Initial Capability	↔ 3
Independent Operations	0

 Above Track to achieve projected goal by target date
 On Track to achieve projected goal by target date
 Below Track to achieve projected goal by target date



*** Mission:**

- Defend Iraq against external threats.
- When directed, assist the Ministry of Interior in providing defense against internal threats to national security.


One Battalion=757 Soldiers

Regular Army Procurement Status

For Official Use Only

Current Status	
Category	Number
Weapons	↔ 15,432
Vehicles	↔ 1,768
Radios	↔ 1,034 (+13)
Body Armor	↔ 6,137
Trained and in Training Battalions	↔ 9

↑	Above Track to achieve projected goal by target date
↔	On Track to achieve projected goal by target date
↓	Below Track to achieve projected goal by target date



Iraqi Intervention Force* Battalions


For Official Use Only

Current Status	
Status	Number of Battalions
Initial Training	↔ 6
Initial Capability	↔ 3
Independent Operations	0

↑ Above Track to achieve projected goal by target date

↔ On Track to achieve projected goal by target date

↓ Below Track to achieve projected goal by target date



*** Mission:**


- To conduct operations in order to defeat anti-Iraqi forces in Iraq, with primary focus on urban areas
- To assist in the restoration of a secure and stable environment in which the Iraqi Police Services and Iraqi National Guard can establish and maintain law and order

One Battalion= 648 Soldiers

Iraqi Intervention Force Procurement Status

For Official Use Only

Current Status	
Category	Number
Weapons	↔ 3,300
Vehicles	↔ 152
Radios	↔ 1,593
Body Armor	↔ 2,741
Trained and In Training Bns	↔ 9



Weapons Vehicles Radios Body Armor Trained BNs

↑	Above Track to achieve projected goal by target date
↔	On Track to achieve projected goal by target date
↓	Below Track to Achieve projected goal by target date


As of: 201100 Sep 04 EDT

Commando* Battalion

For Official Use Only

Current Status	
Status	Number
Trained	↔ 467 (+33)
In training	↔ 0
Untrained	0

↑	Above Track to achieve projected goal by target date
↔	On Track to achieve projected goal by target date
↓	Below Track to Achieve projected goal by target date



* Mission: Support for Iraqi Counter Terrorism Force. Similar in organization, training, and mission to US Army Ranger Battalion


• One Battalion=828 Soldiers

Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Task Force* (ICTF)

For Official Use Only

Current Status	
Status	Number
Ttrained	↔ 114 (-27)
In training	↔ 75
Untrained	0

↑	Above Track to achieve projected goal by target date
↔	On Track to achieve projected goal by target date
↓	Below Track to achieve projected goal by target date



***Mission:** Direct action counter-terrorism similar in organization, mission, and training to US Special Operations Forces with counter-terrorism function


The Task Force is organized with 451 soldiers

Special Operations Forces* Procurement Status

For Official Use Only

Current Status	
Category	Number
Weapons	↔ 1049 (-225)
Vehicles	↔ 122(+55)
Radios	↔ 115
Body Armor	↔ 780 (+175)
Special Operations Force Trained and In Training	↔ 656(+5)

↑	Above Track to achieve projected goal by target date
↔	On Track to achieve projected goal by target date
↓	Below Track to achieve projected goal by target date



*Special Operations Forces procurement is a combination of Commando Battalion and the Counter-Terrorism Task Force


As of: 201100 Sep 04 EDT

Iraqi National Guard* Battalions

For Official Use Only

Current Status	
Status	Number of Battalions
Initial Training	↔ 0
Initial Capability	↔ 8
Recruiting / awaiting equipment	↔ 57

↑	Above Track to achieve projected goal by target date
↔	On Track to achieve projected goal by target date
↓	Below Track to achieve projected goal by target date




- *Mission:** **One Battalion=896 Soldiers**
- Conduct stability operations to support the achievement of internal security, including (as required) support to the Ministry of Interior.
 - Conduct Constabulary duties in support of internal security

Iraqi National Guard Procurement Status

For Official Use Only

Current Status	
Category	Number
Weapons 	37,635
Vehicles 	758 (+31)
Radios 	427*
Body Armor 	23,320**
Trained and In Training Bns 	8

	Above Track to achieve projected goal by target date
	On Track to achieve projected goal by target date
	Below Track to achieve projected goal by target date



* Radio delivery to units delayed by diversion of assets to recent contingency operations. More than 4,000 on hand and will be distributed starting this week.

**Body armor delivery delayed due to a contractor default; working with contracting office to speed delivery.

Ministry of Defense Forces: Man, Train, Equip

For Official Use Only

National Guard numbers reflect increased authorization for six division HQs, 20 brigade HQs, and 65 battalions

FORCE	COMPONENT	MANNING		TRAINING			EQUIPPING							
		REQ'D	O/H	UN-TRAINED	IN TRAINING	TRAINED	WEAPONS		VEHICLES		COMMS		BODY ARMOR	
							REQ	O/H	REQ	O/H	REQ	O/H	REQ	O/H
ARMY	IRAQI ARMY	27,000	12,699	0	7,910		23,606	15,432	2,298	1,788	3,596		20,949	
	IRAQI NATIONAL GUARD	61,904	41,405	0	2,744	38,661	68,760	37,635	2,142		11,208		62,032	
	IRAQI INTERVENTION FORCE	6,584		0	5,489		8,850		583		1,798	599	6,584	2,741
	IRAQI SPECIAL OPS FORCE	1,967		0	75		2,473	1,049	408		1,368		1,967	
AIR FORCE		502	206	0	39		383	0	34		21		502	
COASTAL DEFENCE FORCE		409		0	130	282	486	12	15	15	156		409	
TOTAL		98,366	62,795	0	16,387	46,408	104,558	57,428	5,480	2,819	18,147		71,152	32,988

Legend

- 70-100 % OF REQUIREMENT
- 40-69 % OF REQUIREMENT
- 39 % OR LESS OF REQUIREMENT

Note: Iraqi National Guard equipment "on hand" numbers are being reverified following the August Mahdi Militia uprising.

NATO Training in Iraq

Only

Training Implementation Mission assessment was submitted to Atlantic Council on 15 September

Atlantic Council decision delayed when France and Belgium
reference on 17 September

Atlantic Council proposal includes:

Coordination between NATO and MNF-I would best be achieved through
hat arrangement of the MNSTC-I Commander

ing NATO's engagement to a NATO supported Iraqi training,
ation and doctrine center

Continued provision of NATO advice and mentoring to Iraqi operational
strategic level HQ staffs

Assistance in the coordination of training and equipment offers


Provision of complementary out-of-country training

Coalition Contributors – MNF-I

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MNF-I = 33 Countries									
Albania	73	El Salvador	380	Korea	2,837	New Zealand	5	Tonga	51
Australia	388	Estonia	47	Latvia	133	Norway	9	Ukraine	1,610
Armenia	0	Georgia	162	Lithuania	114	Poland	2,493	United Kingdom	7,918
Azerbaijan	300	Hungary	288	Macedonia	31	Portugal	129	US	137,216
Bulgaria	475	Italy	3,352	Moldova	10	Romania	744		
Czech Rep.	92	Japan	800	Mongolia	132	Singapore	33		
Denmark	533	Kazakhstan	30	Netherlands	1,471	Slovakia	103		
								Total	161,959

Iraqi Forces On Hand- 163,972	
Police Service	84,950
Civil Intery. Force	0
Emer. Response Unit	76
Dept. of Border Enf.	16,151
<hr/>	
Army	12,699
National Guard	41,405
Intervention Force	7,417
Special Ops Force	656
Air Force	206
Coastal Defense Force	412



Facilities Protection Service 73,992

Significant Events Since Last Report

For Official Use Only

Man:

- 7,541 available and qualified recruits now awaiting shipment to training.
- ING Conference held in Baghdad to discuss manning and the authorization of 6 division HQs, 20 brigade HQs, and 65 battalions
- Baghdad IPS district-level meetings held at New Baghdad, Salhiyah, Karadah, and Mansour HQs
- Counterterrorism Unit, Emergency Response Unit, and Dignitary Protection demonstrations held for Iraqi Interim Government Prime Minister and Minister of State
- Facilitated an Iraqi Police Service – Iraqi National Guard Coordination Conference focused on Baghdad law enforcement
- CPATT continued work to coordinate a contracted Provincial SWAT team training plan

Train:

- 927 Highway Patrol members trained and on-duty
- 112 law enforcement students started specialized policing classes on 11 September:
 - Basic Criminal Investigation, Post-Blast Investigation, Kidnap Negotiation, Mid-Level Leadership, and Internal Controls at Adnon
- 1,101 law enforcement students graduated on 16 September:
 - Iraqi Police Service Basic Training at the Jordan International Police Training Center (976 grads)
 - Basic Criminal Investigation, Counter-Drug Investigation, Organized Crime, and Internal Controls at Adnon Palace (125 total grads)
- Next Basic Courses: 18 September at both Baghdad and Jordan Academies (max 2,500 students)
- New regional police academy opened in Sulaymaniyah for 250 students

Equip:

- Equipped 3rd Brigade (Regular Army) with for operations in 1 Infantry Division Area of Operations
- Issued the following equipment this week:
 - Iraqi Police Service: 1,027 Weapons, 62 Vehicles, 341 Radios, and 1,275 Body-Armor Vests
 - Department of Border Enforcement: 72 Vehicles

Significant Events Since Last Report

For Official Use Only

Build:

- 45 border forts are under construction or renovation, and 210 additional forts are under contract
- Began construction of three regional police academies
- \$3.1 million was obligated to reconstruct 24 police stations in Anbar Province
- Completed Baghdad Iraqi Police Service Main HQ Operations Room; Training is in progress (Ops Room IOC 30 September)

Mentor/Employ:

- CPATT CG and Iraqi Police Service Chief chaired a 15 September Civil Intervention Force Command Selection Board
- Mol Salary Team (CPATT and Mol staff) visited Basrah to help with an MND-SE Department of Border Enforcement Operations & Maintenance budget
- Iraqi Police Service Qualifying Committee data collection continued (2,500 complete and estimated completion date for Baghdad Region remains 30 September)
- Iraqi Air Force Seeker squadron conducted its first unsupervised operational flight on 15 Sept from Basrah
- 1st Brigade (-) redeployed from operations in An Najaf to Baghdad on 14 Sept 04 in order to begin reconstitution for follow on operations
- 3rd Brigade (-) (Brigade Tactical Assault Command Post and 7th Battalion) began deploying to forward operating bases vicinity Samarra for operations with 1st Infantry Division

Funding:

- Hearings conducted on IRRF realignment of \$1.8B into the Security Sector
- Congressional notification forwarded on 7 September for realignment of funds within the Security Sector for additional Iraqi National Guard equipment, the First Responder Network, and the Sulaymaniyah Academy
- Justification for Funding (\$210M) from the FY05 Defense Appropriation Bill forwarded to MNF-I on 16 Sept.

As of: 201100 Sep 04 EDT

11-L-0559/OSD/44304

31

Security and Law Enforcement Funding

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Development Fund for Iraq*

\$1.0B Funds Allocated

\$998.7M (95%) Obligated

\$1.0B (100%) Committed

\$1.3M Committed awaiting on J7 resolution

Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund**

\$2.417B Apportioned

\$1.374B (57%) Obligated

\$2.176B (90%) Committed

\$241.1M (10%) Uncommitted Balance--but "earmarked"
for known requirements

- **\$1.8B IRRF Realignment at Congress for decision**
- **\$210M FY05 Defense Appropriation Bill justification to MNF-I**

FORCE	COMPONENT	TRAINING	NUMBER TRAINED
IRAQI POLICE	Iraqi Police Service	3 Week TIP Training (Phased Out) 8 Week Academy	30,102 (TIP) 8,819 (Academy)
	Civil Intervention Force	6 Week Academy	0
	Emergency Response Unit	8 Week Academy	76
DEPT OF BORDER ENFORCEMENT		4 Week Academy	14,313
ARMY	Iraq Army	Cadre: 4 Weeks Basic Training: 4 Weeks Collective Training: 4 Weeks	4,789
	Iraqi National Guard	Basic Training: 3 Weeks Collective Training: Put into operations (over watched) at initial operations capability, generally 8 weeks; full operations capability follows (In progress)	38,661
	Iraqi Intervention Force	Cadre: 4 Weeks Basic Training: 4 Weeks MOU Training: 6 Weeks	1,928
	Iraqi Special Ops Force	Field Training Provided by USJSOTF (Ranger/SFOD Type Training)	581
AIR FORCE		Basic Training: 8 Weeks 4 Months Pilot Training (IP)	167
COASTAL DEFENSE FORCE		Basic Training: 8 Weeks followed by specialized Training at Umm Qasr (In progress)	282

September 22, 2004

NorthCOM

TO: Gen Ed Eberhart

cc: Paul McHale
Gen Dick Myers
Gen Pete Pace
Jim Haynes
ADM Vern Clark

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Maritime NORAD

We need to have a post-91 I arrangement that makes sense – like the one we have in the air. Essentially, we need a Maritime version of NORAD to deal with homeland security on the seas.

Top priority is fixing the air-to-ship capability right now.

I would like to see the interim report fast – by 10 October, please – then a fully considered plan shortly thereafter.

The ROE will be particularly important, as well as the relationship between Navy and Coast Guard.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
092204-4

.....
Please respond by 11/30/04

225904

September 23, 2004

TO: GEN John Abizaid

CC: Gen Dick Myers
Gen Pete Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Congressional Briefings

335 SD

You did nice work up on the Hill yesterday. Your comments incorporated just the right balance of quiet confidence in the long term outcome, with strong cautions about the tough fight ahead.

We all appreciate the difficult challenges you shoulder in CENTCOM. You're doing an excellent job.

DHR:ss
092304-7

.....

Please respond by _____

OSD 14476-04

2352104

9/27
1613

120

SEP 28 2004 9/27
E 9/30



ACQUISITION,
TECHNOLOGY
AND LOGISTICS

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

~~For Official Use Only - Pre-decisional~~ SEP 27 11:03:03
ACTION MEMO

September 22, 2004, 4:55 PM

Paul Butler
9/27

FOR: DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Michael W. Wynne, Acting US

SUBJECT: SECDEF Snowflake Tasking Regarding: C-130J Program History and a Letter to Senator McCain Addressing C-130J Safety

SEP 29 2004

452c

- I request your approval to ~~send~~ ^{dispatch} the attached letter (TAB A) in response to Senator McCain's concerns regarding the C-130J cost and capability, which he mentioned in recent 9-11 hearings. My letter seeks to assure Senator McCain that the Department will review the C-130J program to ensure we acquire a safe and mission-capable weapon system.
- Mr. Patterson prepared an info memo (TAB B) for you to send to the Secretary if you desire. It is an accurate assessment of the situation.

RECOMMENDATION: That Deputy Secretary of Defense sign and forward the info memo to SECDEF, and approve the response to Senator McCain, by initialing:

Approve SPW Disapprove _____
SEP 29 2004

COORDINATION: ARA, GC, LA, Compt, and AF (TAB C)

Attachments:
As Stated

Prepared By: Col Jim Edge, (b)(6) 200 1-2757-ATL

22 SEP 04

TSA SD	JL 9/27
SA DSD	Wynne 9/29 JCL 9/28
SRMA DSD	W 9/29
EXEC SEC	E 9/27



OSD 14693-04



ACQUISITION,
TECHNOLOGY
AND LOGISTICS

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

SEP 29 2004


The Honorable John McCain
Chairman
Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 205 10-0303

Dear Mr. Chairman,

In the recent 9-11 Commission hearings and in other correspondence, you raised concerns with Secretary Rumsfeld about the cost and capability of the C-130J aircraft. The Department has the C-130J program under review, including its ability to conduct its intended mission, the aspects of commercial procurement, and the associated recommendations of the Inspector General.

In coordination with the Deputy Secretary of Defense, I have identified the C-130J as a special interest acquisition program and I will continue my active engagement with organizations in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the U.S. Transportation Command, and customer representatives, such as the Marine Corps, Air Force, and Coast Guard. The Department stands ready to brief you or your staff on our progress to date, as well as the plan to achieve full C-130J operational capability.

Sincerely,


Michael W. Wynne
[Acting]



11-L-0559/OSD/44310



DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1010

~~For Official Use Only~~ – Pre-decisional
INFO MEMO

September 21, 2004, 9:42 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense  SEP 29 2004

SUBJECT: Snowflake Tasking Regarding: C-130J Program History and a Letter to Senator McCain Addressing C-130J Safety

Don,

Senator McCain's reference to the problems with the C-130J during your hearing before the SASC originates in a DoD IG July 23, 2004 report critical of the Air Force C-130J acquisition program. The report was prompted by allegations to the Defense Hotline concerning the Defense Contract Management Agency's oversight of Lockheed Martin's performance on the C-130J aircraft as well as F-22 and C-5 aircraft.

The IG report states that with regard to the C-130J, the Air Force "conditionally accepted 50 C-130J aircraft at a cost of \$2.6 billion even though none of the aircraft met commercial contract specifications or operational requirements." The report goes on to say that the Air Force paid Lockheed Martin "more than 99 percent of the C-130J aircraft's contracted price" for an aircraft that cannot perform its intended mission. The IG also concluded that the acquisition of the C-130J as a commercial item, without the benefit of certified cost or pricing data, was unjustified, and that the Air Force and OSD failed to manage and oversee the program effectively.

My initial look at the C-130J program reveals the following:

1. Lockheed Martin developed the C-130J with approximately \$1 billion of its own money for sale in the commercial market. The U.K. bought the aircraft before the U.S.
2. The C-130J program started with a contract in 1995 for two C-130J aircraft as a modification to an existing C-130H-model contract.
3. First delivery of two aircraft planned for 1997, did not deliver until 1999. But, in 1996 the government, with encouragement from Congress, signed a 5-year option contract which authorized us to purchase 35 C-130Js from FY 1997-FY2000.



11-L-0559/OSD/44311

4. The initial 35 aircraft could not meet the commercial contract specification, and Lockheed established a 3-phase block upgrade to bring the aircraft up to specification, at its own cost. The Air Force agreed.
5. In December 2000, the Air Force agreed to another 5-year option to purchase 20 additional aircraft from FY2001-FY2003.
6. You and the Secretary of the Air Force inherited a problem aircraft program.
7. The Air Force, again with Congressional support, in 2003 awarded Lockheed a 6-year multi-year contract for 60 more C-130Js.
8. The Air Force has made a great effort to correct deficiencies. The aircraft however, still has not been released to perform key missions such as: low level formation flight, formation flight in instrument meteorological conditions, heavy equipment airdrop, and weather penetration reconnaissance (“hurricane hunting”).
9. Bottom line: Senator McCain’s comments and the IG report raise valid concerns.

I have directed Mike Wynne to work with the Air Force to provide me a deficiency mitigation plan that includes:

- a) a history of the program, including what went wrong, how it’s going to be fixed, and
- b) execution milestones for fixing problems.

Additionally, I’ve asked Mike to provide a letter (**attached**) back to Senator McCain outlining what we are going to do to get the C-130J capable of meeting its operational mission requirements. I will provide you monthly progress reports.

COORDINATION: Acting USD(AT&L)

Attachment:
As Stated



ACQUISITION,
TECHNOLOGY
AND LOGISTICS

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-3010

The Honorable John McCain
Chairman
Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation
United States Senate
Washington, DC 205 10-0303

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In the recent 9-11 Commission hearings and in other correspondence, you have raised concerns about the cost and capability of the C-130J aircraft. The Department recognizes that we should review the C-130J program, including its ability to conduct its intended missions, the aspects of commercial procurement, and the associated recommendations of the Inspector General.

In coordination with the Deputy Secretary of Defense, I will review the program and will engage organizations within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the U.S. Transportation Command, and representatives from the Marine Corps, Air Force, and Coast Guard. I will share my findings with you.

Sincerely,

Michael W. Wynne
Acting



11-L-0559/OSD/44313

UNCLASSIFIED

**OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
The Military Assistant**

30 August 2004 - 0930 Hours

MEMORANDUM FOR: **USD AT&L**


SUBJECT: SecDef Snowflake on the "C-130 Issue"

Sir,

The DSD has asked that you please take the attached snowflake for action by providing a complete history on the C-130J program to include all the contract, performance and capability problems. Additionally, please provide:

1. A list of each deficiency that exists; a detailed plan for fixing the deficiency with milestones, and expected date for achieving operational capability.
2. What compensation is due the government for deficiencies and waivers'?
3. What is the breakout of investment by the government and investment by the contractor?
4. What did the government do differently to comply with the "commercial" approach to contracting for the C-130J?
5. A letter to Senator McCain that explains what the Air Force and Department of Defense are doing to ensure the Department is acquiring a safe **and** mission capable weapon system.

Very respectfully,



Stephen F. Ganyard
Colonel, USMC
Military Assistant to the
Deputy Secretary of Defense

Suspense: 3 September 2004

UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/44314

Re-coordination on Letter

LA	Mr. Stanley for Mr. Moore	September 16,2004	Concur
GC	Mr. Larsen	September 16,2004	Concur
AF	Dr. Sambur	September 20,2004	Concur
Compt	Mr. Henke	September 16,2004	Concur
ARA	Dr. Spruill	September 16,2004	Concur

SNOWFLAKE

~~FOUO~~

1800 19 Aug 04 -
JDP HC'd TO ATOL
FOR ACTION

17 Aug - 1105
S. W. H. H.

August 18, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: C-130 Issue

Senator McCain raised the question of a \$2-3 billion problem with a C-130 aircraft that cannot be used in combat. Please figure out **what** is going on with that, take care of it and **tell me what** you are doing.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
081804-6

.....
Please respond by 9/10/04

452 C

18 Aug 04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 14695-04



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000



2004 SEP 27 10 2 51

ACTION MEMO

September 20, 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Captain William P. Marriott, Executive Secretary

SUBJECT: Response to Snowflake#081504-5, "Thanks for Support to Troops"

- You stated, "I think I ought to get thank you notes off to all the people who visit our troops at the hospitals or do USO work, if they are doing any significant amount" (TAB A).
- A list of 25 individuals and 25 organizations, representing those who have significantly supported our troops and/or their families, are provided at TAB B. Details of their support are provided at TAB B 1 and TAB B2.
- An example letter has been prepared for your review/signature to one of the individuals (TAB C1) and one of the groups/organizations (TAB C2).
- If approved, I will prepare similar letters for all individuals and groups for your signature.

RECOMMENDATION: Approve the list of supporters and enclosed letters for your signature.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____ Other _____ *(Fixed)*

COORDINATION: TAB D

Attachments: As stated

9/26
Please Get a GP coord. (see SOCO)
Larry Di Pina
9/27
D, R, H

TSA SD	<i>9/22</i>
SRMA SD	
MA SD	
EXEC SEC	<i>M 9/21</i>

Prepared by CPT Thomas Burke, OSD/EXEC SEC (b)(6)

OSD 14715-04

INDIVIDUALS

Dennis Farina
Drew Carey
Gary Sinise
Henry Rollins
Joan Jett
Neal McCoy
Robin Williams
Toby Keith
Wayne Newton
World Wrestling Enterprise
David Bellamy
Howard Bellamy
Joe Diffie
David Lee Murphy
Lee Roy Parnell
David Clayton-Thomas
Mel Tillis
Deborah Allen
Heather Kinley-Mendenhall
Jennifer Kinley-Hughes
Michelle Wright
Patty Loveless
Charlie Daniels
Billy Ray Cyrus
Diamond Rio

ORGANIZATIONS

The Oak Ridge Boys
YMCA of the USA, Inc.
Armed Services YMCA of the USA, Inc.
Fisher House Foundation, Inc.
United Services Organizations, Inc
National Military Family Association, Inc.
Boys and Girls Clubs of America, Inc.
The Spirit of America Tour
Angels of Mercy
Camp Flashhh
Lindsay Project
Operation Interdependence
Handy Man Hotline Materials
USA Cares
Camp Wonderland
Operation Gratitude
Glory Boots
Pay it Forward
United Through Reading
Adoptaplatoon
Operation Hero
Family Support Center • School Supplies
Missoula Children's Theater
Cannon Enlisted Spouses Club
Andrews Home Educators

Groups and individuals who have performed for *Celebrities on Tour*:

DENNIS FARINA

c/o Kami Putnam

Gersh Agency

130 W. 42d St., Ste 2400 (23d & 24th Floors)

New York, NY 10036

Pacific Handshake – Japan, Okinawa – 21-30 Dec 03

Operation Starlight – Saudi Arabia, Bahrain – 22-30 Dec 01

Christmas Handshake – Europe, Norway – 21-30 Dec 02

DREW CAREY

c/o Messina Baker Entertainment

955 Carillo Drive Str 100

Los Angeles, CA 90048

Qatar, Afghanistan, Kuwait, Singapore, Diego Garcia – 19-23 Dec 02

Europe, Norway – 23 Nov-01 Dec 02

Kuwait, Iraq – 24-30 Sep 03

Saudi Arabia, Oman, UAE – 20-27 Jan 02

Oman, Bahrain – 19-24 Dec 01

Korea – 30 Jun-07 Jul 02

GARY SINISE

c/o Patrick Whitesell

Endeavor

9701 Wilshire Blvd.

Beverly Hills, CA 90212

UAE, Iraq, Kuwait – 17-23 Nov 03

Singapore, Diego Garcia, Korea – 16-27 Feb 04

Italy – 02-09 Jul 03

Italy, Germany – 02-05 Sep 03

HENRY ROLLINS

7615 Hollywood Blvd
Los Angeles, CA 90046

Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Qatar – 01-08 Dec 03
Kuwait, Iraq – 22-28 May 04
Honduras – 10-13 Aug 04

JOAN JETT

c/o Kenny Laguna
Blackheart Records Group
155 E. 55th St., Ste 6H
New York, NY 10022

Okinawa, Japan – 10-16 Oct 03
Puerto Rico, Guantanamo Bay – 22-26 Oct 01
Bahrain, Turkey – 28 Dec 01-06 Jan 02
Oman, Pakistan, Afghanistan – 22 Sep-02 Oct 02

NEAL McCOY

Neal McCoy Fan Club
c/o Patsy Williams
610 Standard Street
Longview, TX 75604

UAE, Iraq, Kuwait – 17-23 Nov 03
Bahrain, Kuwait – 25-29 Nov 02
Oman, Bahrain – 19-24 Dec 01
Germany, Hungary, Bosnia, Italy – 2-19 Nov 01

ROBIN WILLIAMS

MBST Entertainment
c/o Tanner Gibson
345 North Maple Drive, Suite 200
Beverly Hills, CA 90210

Turkey, Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan – 13-20 Oct 03
Iraq, Bahrain, Afghanistan, Kuwait – 14-19 Dec 03

TOBEY KEITH

T.K.O Artist Management
1107 17th Ave S. Wall Center
Nashville, TN 37212

Germany, Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Croatia – 23 May-05 Jun 02
Germany, Kuwait, Iraq, Kosovo, Afghanistan – 27 May – 06 Jun 04

WAYNE NEWTON

c/o Erin Miel, Inc.
6730 South Pecos Road
Las Vegas, NV 89120

UAE, Iraq, Kuwait – 17-23 Nov 03
Korea – 30 Jun-06 Jul 04
Bahrain, Kuwait – 25-29 Nov 02
Oman, Bahrain – 19-24 Dec 01
Korea – 30 Jun-07 Jul 02
Korea – 30 Jun-03 Jul 03
Germany, Hungary, Bosnia, Italy – 12-19 Nov 01

WORLD WRESTLING ENTERTAINMENT (WWE)

c/o Vincent K. McMahon
1241 East Main Street
Stamford, CT 06902

Iraq – 12-17 Dec 03
Korea – 29-30 Oct 02
Kuwait, Iraq – 15-20 Jul 03

Groups and Individuals who have performed, free of charge, for *Spirit of America*:

THE BELLAMY BROTHERS:

DAVID BELLAMY

Bellamy Brothers Partners
13917 Restless Lane
Dade City, FL 33525

HOWARD BELLAMY

Bellamy Brothers Partners
13917 Restless Lane
Dade City, FL 33525

US Coast Guard Training Center - March 14

MR. JOE DIFFIE

9435 Weatherly Drive
Brentwood, TN 37027

Keesler AFB - June 6

DAVID LEE MURPHY

PO Box 121682
Nashville, TN 37212

LEE ROY PARNELL

317 Jocelyn Hollow Circle
Nashville, TN 37205

Fort Polk - June 6

DAVID CLAYTON-THOMAS

Antoinette Music Prod. Ltd.

715 Route 304
Bardonia, NY 10954

Fort Lewis - June 9

MEL TILLIS

Mel Tillis Enterprises
PO Box 305
Silver Springs, FL 34489

Charleston AFB - June 19

Robins AFB - June 20

DEBORAH ALLEN

104 Broadley Court
Franklin, TN 37069

HEATHER KINLEY-MENDENHALL

5560 Quail Covey Trail
Pegram, TN 37143

JENNIFER KINLEY-HUGHES

6809 Bridgewater Drive
Nashville, TN 37221

MICHELLE WRIGHT

214 Lancelot Lane
Franklin, TN 37064

Submarine base New London - August 13

Langley AFB - August 14

MCAS New River - August 15

PATTY LOVELESS

c/o Mike Robertson Management
1227 17th Avenue South

Nashville, TN 37212

Wright-Patterson AFB - July 16

CHARLIE DANIELS CDB, Inc.

17060 Central Pike
Lebanon TN 37090

Dyess AFB - June 20

Mountain Home AFB - July 27

Fort Irwin - October 22

DIAMOND RIO:

MARTY ROE
GENE JOHNSON
BRIAN PROUT
DANA WILLIAMS
JIMMY OLANDER
DAN TRUMAN

c/o Modern Management, Inc.
1625 Broadway, Suite 600
Nashville, TN 37203

Fort Sill - September 12

THE OAK RIDGE BOYS:

DUANE ALLEN
JOE BONSALE
WILLIAM LEE GOLDEN
RICHARD STERBAN

The *Oak Ridge Boys*, Inc.
88 New Shackle Island Road

Henderson, TN 37075

Fort Leonard Wood - September 12
Fort Knox - October 7

BILLY RAY CYRUS

c/o Terry Elam
Fitzgerald-Hartley Company
1908 Wedgewood Avenue
Nashville, TN 37212

Wright-Patterson AFB - October 8

Non-profit Organizations Providing “Significant” Support during OEF/OIF

Mr. Ken Gladish,
National Executive Director,
YMCA of the USA, Inc.
101 N. Wacker Drive
Chicago, IL 60606

Provides support to Reserves and National Guard and their family who don't have access to support structures typically available on military installations. Support varies by the needs of the community and include free or reduced membership for using their facilities; counseling and mentoring programs; respite child care; summer camps; and generally reaching out to these military families across the country.

Frank Gallo, RADM, USN (Ret)
National Executive Director,
Armed Services YMCA of the USA, Inc.
6359 Walker Lane Suite 200
Alexandria, VA 22310

150 program centers throughout the world providing programs that complement those on military installations. Programs are targeted to junior enlisted personnel (who are single or married with families) and the Guard and Reserves. Programs are either free or at little cost and include childcare and school age care, counseling, youth and teen mentoring programs, and many national programs that focus on “building strong kids, strong families, and strong communities.” Nearly 250,000 people were provided services in 2003 that would have otherwise not been available or affordable.

Mr. David Coker
Executive Director
Fisher House Foundation, Inc.
1401 Rockville Pike Suite 600,
Rockville, MD 20852

There are 26 Fisher Houses adjacent to military medical centers and six houses near Veteran Affairs medical facilities. Annually, more that 7000 families of wounded and injured service member's stay in furnished Fisher House-provided living quarters while they are visiting.

In response to OIF/OEF...while the government funds one trip for two family members to visit their wounded loved one, the Fisher House recognized that the presence of family members, including spouses, children, and parents, are a key factor in the healing

process, and would require multiple airline trips. Since January, the Fisher House has distributed about \$300,000 in free airline tickets, donated by five airlines.

Mr. Edward Powell
President
United Services Organizations, Inc
211 Wilson Boulevard, Suite 22201
Arlington, VA 22201

At 125 locations, worldwide, the USO continues to provide touch of home services such as free Internet and e-mail access, recreation services, travel assistance, and family events. Celebrity entertainment continues to be hugely popular with troops and highly valued by commanders because it provides that needed morale boost. Recent entertainers volunteering their time and talent in Southwest Asia included Wayne Newton, Robin Williams, Ruth Pointer, Arnold Schwarzenegger, Gary Sinise, Drew Carey, Jessica Simpson, and Jay Leno.

USO has distributed more than 300,000 Operation USO Care Packages since the program began in September 2002 as a way for the American people to show their support. The packages include items such as prepaid international calling cards, disposable cameras, toiletries, snacks, and playing cards. The USO opened a center in Kuwait last December and recently opened centers in Qatar and Vicenza, Italy.

Ms. Candace A. Wheeler
President
National Military Family Association, Inc.
2500 North Van Dorn Street, Suite 102
Alexandria, VA 22303-1601

NMFA serves the seven uniformed services. In addition to their advocacy for military families through testimony, newsletters and legislative updates, NMFA had two significant projects during OEF/OIF. One is published research -*Sewing the Home Front: An Analysis of Military Family Support from September 11, 2001 through March 31, 2004*. A second major contribution was the initiation of "Operation Purple" in the summer of 2004. Operation Purple served more than 1000 youth at camps throughout the US and Guam. The residential camps were for military youth whose parent was deployed

Ms. Roxanne Spillett
President
Boys and Girls Clubs of America, Inc.

1230 W. Peachtree Street, NW
Atlanta, GA 30309

Continuing strong partnership with DoD with every military youth center belonging to B&GCA and participating in their exception staff training programs and other national contests and events. During OEF/OIF they provided two special programs. One is "Opening our Doors" in which they opened their hearts and their doors at Boys and Girls Clubs worldwide, for children and families impacted by deployment, including the Guard and Reserves. The second, "A Time for Smiles" was a large donation of toys and games to programs for military children. Additionally, DoD youth programs have received over \$2.5 million in B&GCA grants this past year.

Robert M. Rosenthal
The Spirit of America Tour
4444 Riverside Drive, Suite 303
Burbank, CA 91505

Mr. Rosenthal is a former entertainment industry attorney who founded a charitable foundation, called the Robert and Nina Rosenthal Foundation, dedicated to providing free celebrity entertainment to military installations in the Continental United States. This foundation provided free celebrity concerts at 18 US military installations in calendar year 2003 and will provide a total of 20 free celebrity concerts at US military installations during 2004.



FISHER HOUSE FOUNDATION, INC.

*"Dedicated to our greatest national treasure ...
our military service men and women and their loved ones"*

FOR RELEASE
On or After August 24, 2004

Contact: Jim Weiskopf
jweiskopf@fisherhouse.org

RECIPIENTS SELECTED FOR 2004 "NEWMAN'S OWN" AWARDS

PRESENTATION HELD IN PENTAGON ON AUGUST 24, 2004

The Honorable Charles S. Abell, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness), assisted in the presentation of \$50,000 in grants to 16 volunteer organizations for their innovative programs to improve military quality of life.

Mr. Abell joined Kenneth Fisher, Chairman, Fisher House Foundation; Tom Indoe, Chief Operating Officer of Newman's Own; and Dave Smith, Vice Resident, Military Times Media Group, in a August 24, 2004 ceremony at the Pentagon's Hall of Heroes where recipients of "The Newman's Own Awards" were announced.

"Angels of Mercy," sponsored by the American Legion Auxiliary Unit 270 of McLean, Virginia, is a program to support wounded and injured Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom (OIF/OEF) service members and their families. Auxiliary members visit patients at Walter Reed Army Medical Center at least once a week, bringing them clothing and comfort items, providing home cooked meals to OIF/OEF families, and hosting special events. It was judged as the best entry and will receive a \$10,000 grant. Fifteen other organizations shared \$40,000 in grants.

This is the fifth year that Newman's Own, Fisher House Foundation, and Military Times Media Group have jointly sponsored the program which seeks to reward ingenuity and innovation for volunteer organizations working to improve military quality of life. The challenge was straightforward: "Present an innovative plan to improve the quality of life for your military community and receive finding to carry out the plans."

A total of 64 entries were received. Six judges, two from each of the sponsoring organizations, evaluated each entry based on the organization's impact to the respective communities, creativity and innovation. To be eligible, each organization was required to certify that it was a private or non-profit organization operating with authority of a military installation commander. Every organization submitting an entry will receive a certificate of recognition from Paul Newman.

OVERALL WINNING ENTRY (\$10,000 GRANT)

"Angels of Mercy," sponsored by the American Legion Auxiliary Unit 270 of McLean, Virginia, is a program to support wounded and injured Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom (OIF/OEF) service members and their families. Auxiliary members visit patients at Walter Reed Army Medical Center at least once a week, bringing them clothing and comfort items, providing home cooked meals to OIF/OEF families and hosting special events. For further information, contact Marian T. Chirichella at (b)(6)

\$5,000 GRANTS

"Camp Flashhh," is a free program for children with special needs and their families at Camp Pendleton, CA, sponsored by the Camp Pendleton Armed Services YMCA. "Flashh" stands for "Families Laughing and Sharing Hugs, Hopes and Happiness," and it permits special needs families to experience new adventures, to escape from the daily routine, and provide a unique bonding experience. For further information, contact George Brown at gbrown@camppendletonsymca.org.

The **"Lindsay Project,"** sponsored by the Washington PAVE (Parents Advocating for Vocational Education) at Fort Lewis, WA, is a volunteer project named after a young child with Special needs who could not participate in community events. The program uses liaisons in each troop unit to reach out to families with children with special needs, with an emphasis on deploying units. The results have been decreased returns of deployed service members for family problems. For further information, contact Heather Hebdon at hhebdon@washingtonpave.com.

\$4,000 GRANTS

"Operation Interdependence@," a civilian-to-military delivery system@ administered by a Fallbrook, CA nonprofit organization streamlines the delivery of packages to deployed service members. Care packages were overwhelming the military distribution system, so by repackaging individual care packages into platoon sized boxes with 50 civilian rations (c-rats)@ and sending them in bulk, it has simplified the delivery process to individuals in deployed units. For further information, contact Albert R. Renteria at oi@arrenteria.com.

"Handy Man Hotline Materials," a program of the Connecticut National Guard Family Program, reduces stressors on families of deployed Guardsmen by having everyday household problems diagnosed and repaired, or referred to competent businesses at no cost for the labor. The Hotline is manned by volunteers, but funds are needed to purchase materials for the repair, or needed tools and equipment. For further information, contact Louis P. Preziosi at ctngfi@sbcglobal.net.

"USA Cares," a Radcliff, KY nonprofit, works to compliment an overburdened network of both information and financial support to service men and women and their families, while protecting the privacy and dignity of the individual. Rather than giving money to individuals, USA Cares pays utility companies or repair shops, or donates gift cards for food. The focus is on Reserve and National Guardsmen without a military installation or support network. For further information, contact Roger Stradley at rstradley@usacares.us.

"Camp Wonderland," sponsored by the Missouri National Guard Wonderland Foundation is a single one-week camp session for 95 special needs campers. Operated by volunteers, the organizers work in joint partnership with the Missouri Department of Mental Health's Division of Mental Retardation and Development Disabilities, focusing on mentally challenged family members of Missouri National Guardspersons. For further information, contact Wade Johnson at wade.johnson@mostlo.ang.af.mil.

\$3,000 GRANTS

"Operation Gratitude" is a California National Guard sponsored nonprofit, all-volunteer organization that has sent 21,150 care packages plus letters of support to service members deployed overseas. The organization obtains the names of service members through inquiries on its website, then sends packages as requests are received. For further information, contact Carolyn Blashek at (b)(6)

\$2,000 GRANTS

"Glory Boots" and **"Pay It Forward,"** are both programs of the Mothers of Military Support (MOMS) of the 81st Armor Brigade, Fort Lewis, WA. The group became a distributor of desert boots with sewn soles and ankle support that are sent to deployed unit members; and they became a conduit for the public to purchase gift cards that given anonymously to families of deployed service members. For further information, contact Elizabeth Johnston at (b)(6)

"United Through Reading," a program sponsored by the Family Literacy Foundation of San Diego, CA facilitates supportive relationships for children through families and friends reading aloud to them. Its focus is more than 150 deploying ships and Navy/Marine Corps units, permitting military parents and other family members to stay connected with their children by reading aloud on videotapes that are mailed home. For further information, contact Britta Justesen at britta@read2kids.org.

"Adoptaplatoon" a Kingston, NH nonprofit promotes morale lifting mail, care packages and other support measures to deployed service men and women through "platoon moms," and thousands of volunteers. The platoon mom ensures that each participating service member in a unit receives mail any special needs or requests. For further information contact Fran Dobson at fran@adoptaplatoon.org.

\$1,000 GRANTS

"Operation Hero" a program of the San Diego Armed Services YMCA is a free ten-week after school enrichment program for children of armed services personnel to help them succeed in school and to help them develop self-esteem through counseling from trained social workers and individualized homework assistance. The program targets dependents of deployment service members who are identified by school personnel as having difficulties. For further information, contact Blaine McCafferty at blaine@asymcasd.org.

"Family Support Center - School Supplies" a program of the Daughters of the American Revolution, Mt. Hood, OR Chapter, works with the children of the activated members of the 939th Air Refueling Wing and 304th Rescue Squadron based at the Portland, OR Air Base. The goal is to ease stress and tension experienced by military families who may lack some of the material items as other children. For further information, contact Robin Hammond at rhammond@camcoinc.com.

"Missoula Children's Theater" is the nation's largest children's theater program, and the sponsoring organization, the William T. Sampson Elementary School Parent Teachers Organization from the Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, has requested a grant to help pay for a team of actors/directors and their equipment to travel to Guantanamo to develop and produce a full-scale musical with 40-50 military children in the cast. For further information, contact Kathy Arlinghaus at (b)(6)

"Cannon Enlisted Spouses Club" is a group of enlisted spouses who share common Air Force bonds like deployments and family separation and adjusting to new places to live, promote fellowship and serve as a resource for others at Cannon Air Force Base. The group's projects include scholarships, childcare and meals, and welcome packets for newly arriving families. For further information, contact Kris Keick at (b)(6)

"Andrews Home Educators" is a nonprofit support group made up of home school families who are affiliated with Andrews Air Force Base (80 families with 192 children). The group coordinates the use of an base facilities for home school families and offers a full range of activities to improve the educational experience of the children. For further information, contact Debbie Sanzone at (b)(6)

David Bellamy
Bellamy Brothers Partners
1349 17 Restless Lane
Dade City, FL 33525

Dear Mr. Bellamy,

Thank you so much for all you have done to support our troops, both at home and overseas. Your ~~personal~~ *committed to* ~~interest in bringing~~ entertainment and comfort to ~~our~~ *bringing* men and women in uniform will not soon be forgotten. *fre*

All of us at the Department of Defense appreciate ~~everything you do, David, for our fine armed forces.~~ *what you* It is great work you are doing.

My best wishes and thanks for your inspiring work.

All the best,

Mr. David Coker
Executive Director
Fisher House Foundation, Inc.
1401 Rockville Pike Suite 600
Rockville, MD 20852

Dear Mr. Coker,

Thank you so much for all you and the Fisher House Foundation do on a daily basis to help ~~our~~ armed forces and their families. Your contributions bring comfort and much needed support to ~~our~~ proud men and women in uniform, and for that I am truly grateful.

All of us at the Department of Defense appreciate everything the Fisher House Foundation is doing for our fine armed forces. It is great work you are doing.

My best wishes and thanks for your inspiring work.

All the best,

11-L-0559/OSD/44333

~~FOUO~~

SECURITY

2004 SEP 27 PM 2:54
August 15, 2004 2:54

TO: Paul Butler
CC: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Thanks for Support to Troops

I think I ought to get thank you notes off to all the people who visit our **troops** at the hospitals or do USO **work**, if they are doing any significant amount.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
081504-5 (1s computer).doc

.....
Please respond by 8/27/04

335 SD

15 Aug 04

OSD 14715-04

September 27, 2004

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Views by Bill Schneider

Attached are the additional views Bill Schneider attached to the Scowcroft Report.
They are worth reading.

Attach.
12/31/01 Additional Views to the Scowcroft Report by William Schneider, Jr.

DHR:ss
092704-12

350.109

27-Sep-04

ADDITIONAL VIEWS

William Schneider, Jr.

While I share the views and recommendations of the Commission concerning the challenges and opportunities facing the Intelligence Community (IC) and our current and planned capabilities, I disagree with its recommendations concerning the reorganization of the IC (Task 4, *Organizing for Success*). If the Commission's reorganization recommendations were implemented, I believe that the ability of the IC to respond to the President's aspirations to transform the nation's national security posture could be sharply diminished.

The need to transform the IC to meet 21st century international security requirements

The international security environment of the 21st century no longer permits the United States to predict the nature of threats posed to its interests. **As** a result, the **US military** posture cannot be optimized against well-understood threats, **as** was the case during the Cold **War**. For **this** reason (among others), public policy aims to **transform US** military capabilities to those that are far more agile, flexible, and adaptable than the legacy force structure of the Cold **War**. To meet **this** requirement, intelligence must not simply be "good" or "better"; it must be exquisite. In the words chosen by the Commission to characterize the requirement, "US intelligence will not meet the demands of the future if our intelligence agencies continue with business **as** usual."

To permit the US national defense posture to adapt to new threats, the IC will need to provide deep insights into the nature of US adversaries, their capabilities, vulnerabilities, resources, infrastructure, personnel, and most closely held secrets. At the highest level of national policy, the transformation of the IC is needed to strengthen the hand of American diplomacy, and permit the national leadership to anticipate and act before future threats pose overwhelming problems for **US** security.

It is the tactical or operational requirements of the armed forces that pose the most compelling challenge for the transformation of the intelligence community. The impact of the military applications of information technology and the intelligence that supports that capability will be fundamental; Twenty-first century warfare requires **US** military forces to conduct operations within the decision cycle of its adversaries if it is to prevail in future conflict. Intelligence information to support military operations will need to be collected from multiple sources, processed and fused into an actionable form, and delivered to military users in a timely manner. This processed intelligence information will often need to be transmitted directly to the seeker in a weapon system to permit US forces to bring a fleeting target under attack in a matter of seconds, not minutes or hours or days as is now the case. Moreover, extraordinary precision in the location of targets will be required as well to permit discriminate targeting, and a reduction in the risk of unintended casualties from friendly fire and collateral damage to non-combatants. These demanding intelligence requirements for 21st century warfare are affirmed in the Joint Chiefs of Staff document, Joint Vision 2020.

Role of shared DCI-DoD responsibility for the management of IC

The responsibility for the management of IC is shared between the Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense. This unique managerial arrangement reflects the special circumstances surrounding the uses of intelligence information within the government. The DoD is both the collector and user of an overwhelming fraction of intelligence information – more than three fourths of all intelligence collected by the US government. Moreover, the DoD's need for timeliness and precision are unique and on a scale without parallel within the US government.

Notable IC difficulties during the 1990s in predicting crucial international developments have had powerful implications for US security. These difficulties included a failure to predict developments such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery in India, Iraq, Iran, Libya, North Korea, and Pakistan. This failure to predict these developments remind us that the IC must jointly serve both DoD and non-DoD interests as well.

The need to jointly serve the “national” or “strategic” intelligence requirements of the US government with the demanding “tactical” or “operational” DoD applications for the conduct of military operations establishes a need for shared management of the IC. The Department of Defense cannot transform its military capabilities to meet 21st century requirements without access to intelligence that meets its needs for timeliness and precision. Its interaction with elements of the IC most directly associated with producing such intelligence is intimate and routine, and led by personnel directly managed by the Secretary of Defense, but with shared responsibility for tasking and resource allocation with the DCI. This “creative tension” between intelligence collectors and users is a constructive managerial model for which there is strong empirical support.¹

The new administration has undertaken constructive measures that have mitigated some of the most damaging failures of the Secretary of Defense and the DCI to coordinate. The failure of the Secretary of Defense and the DCI to meet regularly during the late 1990s when some of the most egregious and damaging lapses in coordination took place has been replaced since January 2001 by frequent meetings between the Secretary of Defense and the DCI. The exigencies imposed by wartime intelligence demands have further strengthened this collaborative relationship.

¹ The tri-cornered relationship between the DCI and the Secretary of Defense and the Director of the NRO for the management of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) has been affirmed in the report of a recent statutory body, The National Commission for the Review of the National Reconnaissance Office. See *The Report of National Commission for the Review of the National Reconnaissance Office*, (Washington: Government Printing Office, November 2000), p 44. In the report, the Commissioners unanimously concluded that “the tri-cornered arrangement among the Secretary of Defense, the DCI, and NRO Director has at times provided great strength to the NRO because it has allowed the NRO Director to draw on the resources and benefit from the advocacy of two major forces in the Intelligence Community and the DoD.”

Limitations of the Commission's reorganization recommendations

The Commission has recommended that the authority to manage and appoint the leadership of the major DoD agencies in the IC (the National Reconnaissance Office, the National Security Agency, the National Imagery and Mapping Agency and other special programs) be shifted from the Secretary of Defense to the DCI.

Doing so would, in my view, perpetuate the IC's institutional weaknesses that have adversely affected its post-Cold War performance. Further, the proposed reorganization is likely to produce a result that is orthogonal to the modernization aspirations the Commission.²

1. The Commission's recommendation to centralize management of the IC agencies under the DCI would perpetuate the obsolete organizing principle of the IC around the *means* by which intelligence is collected rather than *ends* served **by** national intelligence.³ It is the flawed underlying organizational concept of the IC that focuses on collection disciplines that produces the performance problems for the IC from the perspective of the user of intelligence – not whether the DCI or the Secretary of Defense leads the collection management function. Moreover, centralizing the management of these important intelligence collection disciplines will greatly increase the “distance” of these organizations from the user. Such an outcome is precisely opposite to the underlying need for the modernization of the intelligence function. The example of the manner in which the *Predator* unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) is employed in support of **US** military operations in Afghanistan offers an informative example of the constructive interplay between **users** and producers of intelligence. In this case, intelligence collectors operating under the control of users collaboratively participate in meeting the needs of **users**. This model is more appropriate to the support of 21st century military operations than the supplier-user model that would be created if the major defense-related intelligence organizations **are** subordinate to the DCI.
2. The intense needs of the DoD to improve the timeliness and precision of intelligence information make the responsiveness of the IC crucial. By moving away from the constructive tension of shared responsibility for the IC between collector and user as the Commission proposes, the responsiveness of the IC to the warfighter is at risk. In practice, diminished responsiveness by the IC is likely to produce undesirable bureaucratic pathologies. It is likely that the DoD will be forced to create parallel capabilities to those controlled by the DCI within elements of the DoD that are not included in the National Foreign Intelligence Program to assure responsiveness to the immediate tactical requirements of the **armed** forces.

² The Commission seeks to create national intelligence that reflects “seamless integration across intelligence disciplines, operational agility, and analytic prowess that are necessary to support the President and the NSC in the 21st century.”

³ The Secretary of Defense has directed that the Defense Science Board establish a Task Force to study the concept of managing foreign intelligence by focusing on ends vice means to study the organizational and operational implications of such an organizing principle.

3. Institutionalizing the existing informal DoD-DCI collection management function (called the Collection Management Center in the report) would burden the IC by adding yet another coordinating bureaucracy to the excessively baroque existing structures with little value-added to the user of intelligence. The Commission's view of the coordination difficulties between the DoD and the DCI were influenced by an exceptional period in the late 1990s when the Secretary of Defense and the DCI never met. This practice has been reversed by the new administration. Similarly on a smaller scale, the informal coordination process between the Secretary of Defense, the DCI, and the Director of the NRO has been successfully maintained for nearly **40** years (apart from exceptional 1997-2001 period) when the DoD function was delegated to the Deputy Secretary of Defense. In this respect, it would be constructive for the DCI to participate more directly in the intelligence dimension of the Defense Planning Guidance process to better assess the intelligence implications of DoD modernization initiatives.
4. Appropriating funding to the DCI rather than to the Secretary of Defense jeopardizes the ability of the government to maintain the secrecy of patterns of resource allocation within the IC. Moreover, such a change does not address the most important problem – the allocation of resources within the IC to adjust to changes in priorities. The IC budget is assembled two years in advance of execution. The fast-breaking international security environment will not permit the IC to be effective unless its resources can be reallocated in a timely manner to respond to contingencies that could not have been anticipated when the budget was created. The DCI's authority should be strengthened by the repeal of the 1997 statutory provision in the Intelligence Authorization Act. The statutory provision prevents the DCI from reallocating funding within the IC without the agreement “of the Secretary or the head of the department which contains the affected element or elements.” The provisions of the 1997 legislation were insufficiently mitigated in Section 105 of the FY 2001 Intelligence Authorization Act.

Draft 02

31 December 2001

~~FOUO~~
TAB A

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2004 SEP 23 AM 8:55

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Tina Jonas
David Chu
Ken Krieg

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Force Level Memo

Do we have a process in place to track each of the items in this Force Level Memo?

Thanks.

Attach.
9/29/04 Force Level Memo

DHR:ss
090704-41

.....
Please respond by 9/14

320.2

7 Sep 04

~~FOUO~~

Tab A

OSD 14746-04

11-L-0559/OSD/44340



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2004 SEP 23 AM 8:55

INFO MEMO

CM-2086-04
27 September 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBM 9/27*

SUBJECT: Force Level Memo

- **Question.** "Do we have a process in place to track each of the items in this Force Level Memo?" (TAB A)
- **Answer.** Yes. OSD(P&R) has the Department of Defense lead using the process developed by OSD(Policy) last year. The Joint Staff uses the Joint Staff Action Processing system to manage actions for which it has the lead.
- **Analysis**
 - The Joint Staff will assist OSD(P&R) in developing its briefing and revising the action agenda. The current action agenda is attached (TAB B).
 - The OSD(PA&E) DOD Balanced Scorecard **risk** metrics and the Joint Staff/OSD(P&R) co-chaired Force Management Functional Capabilities Board also track force level initiatives.

COORDINATION: TAB C

Attachments:
As stated

copy to:
DUSD(P&R)

Prepared By: VADM Robert F. Willard, USN; Director, J-8 (b)(6)

~~FOUO~~
TAB A

TOP SECRET

2004 SEP 28 AM 8:55

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Tina Jonas
David Chu
Ken Krieg

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Force Level Memo

Do we have a process in place to *track* each of the items in this Force Level Memo?

Thanks.

Attach.
9/29/04 Force Level Memo

DHR:ss
09070441

.....
Please respond by 9/14

~~FOUO~~

Tab A

OSD 14746-04

11-L-0559/OSD/44342

WORKING PAPER

Version #6

September 7, 2004

SUBJECT: “Force Levels,” “End Strength” and “Stress on the Force”—Are current U.S. military forces sufficient in size and properly organized and managed to meet the challenges facing our country? What are ways DoD can reduce the stress *on* the force, maintain recruiting and retention targets, and make the Department more efficient and cost effective?

Summary: The **U.S.** can afford whatever military force level is determined to be necessary and appropriate for our nation’s security. The men and women in uniform are the Department’s most valuable asset. It is our people who distinguish the U.S. military from other forces. For the present, analysis by the Joint Chiefs indicates that the U.S. military currently has sufficient active and reserve forces to execute its assigned missions. If at any time that is not the case, it would be DoD’s responsibility to recommend to the President appropriate adjustments. Absent analysis that indicates that U.S. forces are not able to meet their assigned missions, it would be a mistake to increase the size of our forces. To the extent we increase our investment in force levels, we increase risk in other key areas, such as readiness, procurement and research and development.

Background: The operational tempo of U.S. forces during the two years after September 11, 2001 has been significant. In the aftermath of Operation Iraqi Freedom, some have called for an increase in the statutory “end strength” *of the* U.S. military, *but* have not explained how to pay for it. Although this may appear to be a straightforward solution, it is not cheap, easy or quick.

- The cost is substantial over the lifetime of a service member. A number of the most costly add-ons to military pay and benefits have been for retired, not active duty personnel.
- Increased end strength has second and third order effects. The more forces, the more force protection that is required; the more forces, the more infrastructure that is required; the more forces, the more pensions and healthcare for life that are required.
- It takes time to recruit, train and integrate new personnel into the Armed Forces. As a result, there is a lag between when the additional personnel are recruited and the costs begin, and when the added capability is available.

WORKING PAPER

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/44343

WORKING PAPER

- At present, the Services' recruiting and retention goals are being met or exceeded. Whether these favorable results will continue as we move through the coming months and years remains to be seen. These key indicators must be closely watched.

The current stress on the force is very likely a "spike," and we hope it will not be permanent. The Department is taking immediate actions to relieve this stress on the force in Iraq. There is a three-pronged strategy underway that is working to:

- Develop Iraqi capacity to conduct police and other security tasks;
- Increase international military participation in Iraq; and
- Increase actionable intelligence to disrupt attacks on coalition forces and other threats to stability.

In any event, the current stress, as well as respect for the taxpayers' dollars, requires DoD to make every effort to achieve the most efficient use of the forces. That same respect for the taxpayers' dollars mandates that we aggressively address the alternative contractor and civilian employee cost impacts as well.

Following is, I am sure, an incomplete but illustrative list of activities DoD is currently executing and/or examining for implementation in addition to those immediate actions listed above. As appropriate, we must exploit each of these areas to reduce stress on the force, both active and reserve. Though it may appear that some of these areas do not directly benefit end strength, nor assist in reducing stress on the force, in a variety of ways we believe they can have positive, indirect impact. To the extent we are successful in improving performance in these areas, it should relieve pressure on the force and likely reduce the current calls for end strength increases, or, at the minimum, reduce the size of any end strength increase that analysis might later indicate is necessary in the future.

1. Lessons Being Learned (J7 lead with J1/J3/J8/J5)

- Contingency Plans. DoD is currently reviewing and revising all contingency plans to take account of the lessons learned thus far in Afghanistan, Iraq and the Global War on Terror. Among the lessons is the need to take advantage of the tradeoffs between numbers of people and things—"mass"—versus the increased lethality from speed, agility, precision munitions and the leverage available in the information age. "Overmatching power" is replacing "overwhelming force."
- Jointness. DoD is achieving greater jointness worldwide, so combatant commanders should be able to tailor forces creatively among the

Tab A

WORKING PAPER

11-L-0559/OSD/44344

WORKING PAPER

Services to gain added synergy and lethality, as in the Iraq war. Coherently joint forces create power that exceeds the sum of individual military — US, and international—elements.

- Training and Exercises. Training matters; joint training matters more. It creates an asymmetric advantage for U.S. forces. Training and exercises need to take account of recent real world experience.
- Global Force Management. DoD is exploring methods of replacing the concept of “forces for a specific combatant commander” with a “Global Force Management Availability System,” which should lead to more efficient management of the forces and the process by which they are provided to Combatant Commanders in support of their essential missions.
- Reserve/Active Force Balance. DoD is rebalancing the reserve components with the active components to achieve the appropriate **mix** for the 21st century. The task **is** to avoid having to call up certain specialties repeatedly for tasks we know DoD is and will continue to be called upon to execute regularly (civil affairs, etc.). The new active-Reserve mix must also be designed to enable more immediate action, as appropriate.
- Realignment of Manpower Levels and Skill Sets. DoD will review active and reserve components to determine how the Department can best allocate manpower levels and specific skill sets, within existing end strength limits, to best satisfy the demands of the 21st century.
- Time on Operational Duty. For Reserve Components, DoD will **seek** ways to increase the ratio of the number of months out of the total period of activation/mobilization a unit is actually performing the mission for which it was called up. We can improve on those instances where it is as low as 6 months out of a 12-month call-up.
- Precision Weapons. Our use of precision weapons, with greater accuracy, can maintain lethality while reducing both the operational footprint and the logistics tail, thereby reducing force requirements.
- Deployments. The old Industrial Age process is broken. **An** approach that permits only peace or **war**, with little or no nuance, is out of date. The process is currently being streamlined to take less time and permit *more* nuanced management of mobilization and demobilization, deployment and redeployment, and recovery operations.

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Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/44345

WORKING PAPER

- Relief-in-Place. The Services need to establish a common definition of “relief-in-place” and then implement measures to shorten the relief in place system from 45 – 60 days to a shorter period, as appropriate.
- Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters. The world is moving so fast that Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters are necessary. If it takes one to three months to staff up a headquarters, the wars of the future may be over before the staff is in place. Where appropriate, we must invest in and sustain surge capability.

2. People (filled with JS/J3/J6)

- Military Out of Non-Military Jobs. DoD requires Congressional cooperation to pass the personnel reform legislation so it can get closure on the studies that suggest there are some 300,000 to 380,000 positions that military personnel are currently serving in that might be performed by civilians. Managers have to be freed **up** so they can make greater use of the civil service, rather than being forced to use military personnel or contractors because they cannot efficiently manage the DoD civilian workforce. If only one-sixth of those 300,000 positions were freed up for military duty, it would increase usable “end **strength**” by 50,000. We won’t know what can be achieved until the current analysis is completed.
- Core Competencies. OSD is aggressively working to move the military out of activities that are not core competencies or inherently governmental. For example, housing privatization has allowed DoD to get better value and speed modernization for the same expenditure of funds.
- Contract Employees. For shorter duration missions and missions that are not military core competencies, DoD will have to make more judicious use of contract employees. This will require that we organize so we have Congressional authority and the ability to properly engage contract assistance.
- Education. The Department is working to improve joint education to create a culture that empowers younger leaders to think beyond their parent Services for creative solutions to the challenges our nation faces.
- Coalition Forces. The U.S. must organize its alliances and relationships to increase the availability and readiness of coalition forces—the speed of their availability and the readiness of their equipment. This **will** require a diplomatic effort to substantially reduce the *current* restrictions

WORKING PAPER

and caveats many countries have that reduce the availability of their forces and also a long-term commitment from other countries to help finance less wealthy nations' ability to recruit, train, deploy and sustain their forces.

- Allies. We must assist treaty partners, where appropriate, to assume greater responsibility for their defense more rapidly.
- Backfill. During a crisis, we need to arrange for other countries to backfill for U.S. troops in some of our long-term commitments, such as the Sinai, Iceland, Bosnia, **Kosovo**, etc. Additionally, the U.S. will have to tackle the tough political challenge of ending some commitments.
- Indigenous Forces. The U.S. must organize and fund to be able to use more host nation security personnel in places like Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia, and Kosovo to ease the burden on coalition forces. This will require Congress approving DoD's proposed "train and equip" legislation.
- Reserve Forces. DoD has established a policy whereby it will, to the extent possible, first use Reserve forces that have not recently been mobilized.
- Volunteers. DoD **will** continue to use volunteers from the Reserve force, to the extent available.
- Holidays. To the extent possible, DoD force mobilizations will be respectful of major holidays.
- Call-ups. DoD is revising the process so as to protect the goal of 30 days' notice for mobilization of reserve units, if at all possible, and will consider a tiered arrangement whereby some reserve units might be compensated and trained to maintain a readiness level to be available and ready for prompt deployment with a shorter call-up.
- Incentives. DoD will consider offering incentives for extended deployments.
- Peace Operations. The USG is considering a "Peace Operations Initiative" with the goal of increasing the worldwide availability of peacekeepers, peacemakers, military police, constabulary, etc. for peacemaking and peacekeeping operations.

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Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/44347

WORKING PAPER

- Intelligence. DoD is working to strengthen actionable intelligence, and improve humint in key areas of interest, by prioritization of effort and by assuring seamless exchange of information among U.S. agencies.

3. Technology (J8 lead with J4/J5/J6)

- Information Age. DoD will accelerate use of new information technologies to reduce the need for forward deployed personnel and thereby reduce the rotation rate the Services require to support a deployed person.
- Logistics. DoD will continue to emphasize systems with smaller logistics requirements and footprint, simplified designs with fewer and more interchangeable parts.
- New Technologies. DoD **will** invest in technology to substitute for human force protection — sensors, intelligence, etc. Additionally, the Services will be encouraged to consider the approach the Navy is using to reduce personnel needed for ship manning (by **as much as** 50 percent in some cases) and invest in less manpower-intensive platforms (UAVs), and technologies and processes, **m** and out of the defense industry.
- Lethality. Services are working to lighten their footprint, while increasing lethality, to the extent possible.
- U.S. and Coalition Transformation. DoD will work to improve its interoperability with coalition partners through the Joint Forces Command.

4. Efficiency (J8 lead with J1/J2/J3/J4)

- Organization of Forces. In the 21st century one size doesn't fit all. DoD will modernize the Services' force organizations to achieve improved modularity, so combatant commanders can more readily organize units to task. This should allow commanders to build capability by adding modules and right-sizing the force to their missions. The goal is to achieve greater interchangeable and combined arms effects to increase flexibility. Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters are ideally suited to integrate and operate this approach. Interchangeable divisions could provide improvements in force allocation, force rotation, and employment flexibility.

WORKING PAPER

- Global reach back. DoD will organize to conduct more non-spear point activities for deployed forces back in the U.S., thereby reducing both the number of forces deployed as well as the rotation base multiple needed to maintain that number of troops forward-deployed. Organizing the Reserve Components to optimize reach back opportunities may yield significant personnel tempo savings.
- Force Allocation. OSD and the Joint Forces Command will work to be able to provide combatant commanders the joint force capabilities they need to achieve desired “effects” and “outcomes,” rather than simply responding to requests ~~for~~ numbers of things—troops or platforms.
- Procurement. DoD will continue to invest to achieve greater lethality per unit of force structure.
- Strategic Lift. DoD will continue investing in strategic lift to assure timely mobility, e.g., high speed transport. Leveraging new technologies in this area should also reduce the associated logistic footprint. Additionally, the Department must continue to support participation in the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) Act as a supplement to our national mobility capability.
- Rotation Ratio. The Services will work to find ways to reduce the rotation ratio and consider opportunities to transport crews to their equipment.
- Headquarters Layering. DoD components’ reduction in the number of headquarters will free up some of the manpower currently staffing those organizations. The flattening of headquarters hierarchies is desirable and viable given existing and planned communications technology.
- Best Practices. DoD will work to move best practices from inside and outside DoD throughout the Department.
- Planning Tools. DoD is developing tools to enable it to plan more rapidly to produce more refined force requirements, both in terms of numbers and timing of their movement and arrival.
- Operational Availability. DoD will implement the appropriate JROC “operational availability” studies’ recommendations.
- Strategic Warning. Intelligence capabilities will be tasked to see if it is possible and cost effective to increase strategic warning, thereby reducing the portion of the force that must be forward-deployed.

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- The Right Skills. DoD will develop the ability to more rapidly adjust forces in the field, so as to put the right capabilities in the right places at the right time and to be able to make rapid adjustments as circumstances change.
- Safety. DoD will move aggressively to reduce the number of mishaps as a means to protect our most valuable resources, our people.

5. Policy (JS lead with J3)

- U.S. Foreign Commitments. DoD will continue to work to **pare** down long-term U.S. commitments such as the Sinai, Iceland, Bosnia, Kosovo, etc. We will advise nations at the outset that deployments are not forever and that the **U.S.** requires the ability to redeploy for other contingencies and ease of transit. DoD will also use care in adding new commitments of forces.
- U.S. Non-Military Skills. The USG needs to strengthen the international capability to help countries establish and execute civil implementation tasks; only if we are successful will the U.S. and coalition forces be relieved of peace operations earlier than tends to be the case, such as in Bosnia.
- U.S. Worldwide Footprint. DoD will work to improve the flexibility and responsiveness of U.S. forces by adjusting U.S. forward-deployed forces in Europe and **Asia**, by repositioning and making greater use of pre-positioned equipment to improve our capabilities for rapid deployment from the U.S. and elsewhere, and by investing in necessary infrastructure where required. DoD will consolidate locations worldwide **to** reduce the number of troops required for support, including force protection and, in addition, will use host nation forces, where available, **to provide** protection for deployed U.S. forces.

Conclusion.

In a war—in this case, the Global War on Terrorism—it cannot be “business as usual.” During a crisis, when there is an understandable spike demand on U.S. forces, DoD cannot behave as though it is “business as usual.” It isn’t. DoD needs to act promptly to reduce or stop activities such as exercises and other “business as usual” activities, as appropriate.

The task of DoD is to manage the force within acceptable levels of stress. Key measurements are recruiting and retention metrics. We must monitor all activities to see that **we** achieve solid progress on each of the above tasks, before taking the

WORKING PAPER

easy and more expensive course ~~of~~ increasing force levels. We owe *the* American people no less.

DHR:dh
Current MFRs/ End Strength

WORKING PAPER

Tab A 2

11-L-0559/OSD/44351

TAB B
Final DRAFT Version 10 (as of 11 Oct)

ACTION AGENDA – REDUCING STRESS ON THE FORCE
(without increasing military end strength)

1. Lessons Being Learned

Action Item	Near-Term Action	Mid-term Action
a. Contingency plans	<p>USD(P) - Update Contingency Planning Guida to include action items from 18 Aug SECDEF “Operational Availability Action Items” memo (Sept 03).</p> <p>CJCS – Within 6 months of Contingency Planning Guidance publication, update Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. Direct Combatant CC’s to delineate forces required to seize the initiative, additional forces required to achieve SDTE objectives, and follow-on forces required to achieve objectives of win decisive.</p>	<p>USD(P) – Develop a plan for institutionalizing an Adaptive Planning process that encompasses the full spectrum of military operations. Brief recommendations to the SECDEF by 1 Feb 04.</p> <p>USD(P&R) – Implement a new Defense Readiness Reporting System that uses adaptive planning constructs for force readiness assessment (IOC in FY04)</p>
b. Jointness	<p>CDRJFCOM – Publish & oversee implementation of DoD’s Integrated Interoperability Plan as tasked in the Transformation Planning Guidance. (Nov 03)</p>	<p>CJCS - Develop DPG language supporting initiatives that improve jointness and add synergy to joint force operations. (Dec 03)</p> <p>USD(P&R) – Implement Defense Integrated Military Human Resource System to capture joint experience and training of military personnel. Ensure personnel systems uniformly define and track joint training qualifications and experiences for the selection of qualified personnel for joint assignments. (Oct 04).</p>

Action Item	Near-Term Actions	Mid-term Actions
<p>0. Training and Exercises</p>	<p>USD P&R – Update the Training Transformation Implementation Plan as appropriate to include lessons from recent real world experience (Jan 04).</p> <p>CDR JFCOM– Implement an initial Joint National Training Capability training event in FY04.</p>	<p>USD(P&R) – Evaluate progress on implementing the three enabling Training Transformation capabilities (Joint Knowledge Development and Distribution Capability, Joint National Training Capability, Joint Assessment and Enabling Capability), and recommend adjustments, if required, for POM 06. (Aug 04)</p> <p>CDR JFCOM - Create a Joint National Training Capability to routinely incorporate joint context into major Service training events (FY 04)</p>
<p>1. Global Force Management</p>	<p>CJCS – Develop an integrated apportionment, assignment and allocation methodology to include integrating the Joint Presence Policy into “Forces For” (Oct 03) (IAW 18 Aug SecDef OA Action Items Memo).</p>	<p>USD(P) – Oversee implementation of the Integrated Global Posture and Basing Study. (ongoing)</p> <p>CDR JFCOM – Develop capability to monitor and report to OSD the status of operational availability capability packages (immediate response forces, rapid response forces, and win decisive forces) (Jun '04) (IAW 18 Aug SecDef OA Action Items Memo).</p> <p>USD (P&R) – work with CJCS to implement capabilities-based force allocation into defense readiness assessment and planning (June 04)</p>

Action Item	Near-Term Actions	Mid-term Actions
<p>Reserve/Active Force Balance</p>	<p>Service Secretaries – Develop plans and propose program or budget changes (if appropriate) to implement the SECDEF “Rebalancing the Force” memo and the 18 Aug SECDEF Operational Availability memo (Oct 03).</p> <p>JSD(P&R) and Secretary of Army – work with PA&E to develop Army program changes that decrease reliance on the Reserve Component for “swiftly defeat” & high demand units. (Oct 03)</p>	<p>USD(P) – Work with USD(P&R), Service Secretaries and CJCS to develop manpower realignment DPG language to guide POM 06 development and QDR preparation. (Dec 03)</p> <p>CDR JFCOM: In conjunction with Service Component Commands (SCCs), identify and implement plans and procedures in support of JFCOM’s roles as the single Force Provider for the supported Combatant Commanders.</p>
<p>Realignment of Manpower Levels and Skill Sets</p>	<p>Service Secretaries – Brief SECDEF on actions taken to better align manpower skills with assigned missions and develop Budget Change Proposals, if appropriate, to initiate support of rebalancing the Force efforts. (Oct 03)</p>	<p>USD(P) – Work with USD(P&R), Service Secretaries and CJCS to develop manpower realignment DPG language to guide POM 06 development and QDR preparation (Dec 03)</p> <p>USD(P&R)- with USD(I) and CJCS, conduct a study of DoD’s organic language, regional, and cultural expertise skill requirements. Recommend options to realign skill sets to meet foreign language requirements. (Aug 04)</p> <p>CJCS: With Services, identify each Services need to provide support for other Service, allied, and coalition units in support of full spectrum operations. Determine if there is a need to realign manpower to support this mission area. (Jun 04)</p>

Action Item	Near-Term Actions	Mid-term Actions
g. Time on Operational Duty	Service Secretaries – Assess options to improve the ratio of the number of months out of the total period of activation that RC forces are actually performing the mission. Report progress to DepSecDef by Dec 03.	USD (P&R), CJCS, Service Secretaries – Develop action plan to improve the ratio of the number of months out of the total period of activation that RC forces are actually performing the mission (Aug 04). CDR, JFCOM: Identify actions, plans, methods and capabilities to track rotations of forces within the overall mobilization process. (Aug 04)
h. Precision Weapons		USD(AT&L) – with D, PA&E, CJCS and USD(P), develop plan for long-lead analysis needed to inform-QDR as to impact of current and projected precision weapons programs on logistics and manpower requirements. (Dec 03)
i. Deployments	CDR, JFCOM - Develop a new deployment process (Joint Deployment Process Owner) incorporating lessons learned from OIF. Report progress to DepSecDef by Dec 03.	USD(P&R) – with CJCS and Service Secretaries define interactions between manpower, personnel management, and training systems to ensure these systems and supporting deployment processes are integrated. (Oct 06)
j. Relief in Place	CJCS – work with Services and USD (P&R) to develop a common definition of “relief-in-place.” (Nov 03)	Service Secretaries - Develop and implement procedures to better execute relief-in-place operations, to include conducting the operations in less time and doing so using best practices learned across all Services (Dec '03)
k. SJFHQ		USD(P) – Identify next steps for SJFHQ implementation in DPG for POM 06 action. (Dec 03)

2. People

Action Item	Near-Term Actions	Mid-term Actions
a. Military Out of Ton-Military Jobs	USD(P&R) – Work through the Defense Human Resource Board to identify opportunities for civilian-military conversions. As appropriate, work with PA&E or Comptroller to develop a Program Review Issue or Budget Change Proposal on civilian-military conversions (Oct 03).	USD(P) – With USD(P&R) and USD(AT&L), develop Defense Planning Guidance to direct the Department’s efforts to aggressively move the military out of non-core mission areas, and out of activities that are not “military essential.” (Dec 03)
b. Core Competencies	Service Secretaries – Continue progress toward achieving the President’s Management Agenda (PMA) competitive sourcing initiative via the A76 process or divesture using a core competency approach (on going)	<p>USD(P) – With USD(P&R) and USD(AT&L), develop Defense Planning Guidance to direct the Department’s efforts to aggressively move the military out of non-core mission areas, and out of activities that are not “military essential.” (Dec 03)</p> <p>Service Secretaries – develop options for divesting non-core competency missions in POM 06-11, including plans for completing the required PMA review by FY09. (Aug 04)</p>
c. Contract Employees	USD(C) – Consider whether a legislative proposal is needed to allow DoD to more judiciously use contractors in an expeditionary role for short duration missions and for other missions that are not military core competencies. (Jan 04)	USD(P) – With USD(P&R) and USD(AT&L), develop Defense Planning Guidance to direct the Department’s efforts to aggressively move the military out of non-core mission areas, and out of activities that are not “military essential.” (Dec 03)
d. Education	CJCS – Complete/ implement Joint Professional Military Education initiatives	Dir, OFT – With USD P&R, develop options for a transformational education program for consideration in QDR. (Jan 05)

Action Item	Near-Term Actions	Mid-term Actions
e. Coalition Forces		<p>USD(P) – Ensure increased availability and readiness of coalitions forces is a key issue for the next Security Cooperation Guidance. (Jan 04)</p> <p>USD(P) – Develop an implementation plan for the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) with near term options focused on Africa. (Dec 03).</p>
E Allies	<p>USD(P) – Develop options for expanding the Train and Equip program (assuming legislation approved) (Jan 04)</p>	<p>USD(P) – integrate appropriate direction in the Security Cooperation Guidance on sharing transformation with allies and accelerating their ability to assume greater responsibility for their own defense. (Jan 04)</p> <p>USD(P&R) – Develop a plan to implement common training and readiness assessment with Allies. (Oct 04)</p>
g. Backfill		<p>USD(P) – Develop appropriate direction to Regional Component Commanders in the Security Cooperation Guidance. (Jan 04)</p> <p>USD(P) – Develop an implementation plan for the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) with near term options focused on Africa. (Dec 03).</p>
h. Indigenous Forces	<p>USD(P) – Develop a plan to expand the Train and Equip program (assuming legislation approved) (Jan 04)</p>	<p>USD(P) - Update the Security Cooperation Guidance (Jan 04) to direct Regional Component Commanders to increase the availability and capability of host nation security personnel.</p>

Action Item	Near-Term Actions	Mid-term Actions
Reserve Forces	<p>Service Secretaries – Review current policies and practices to ensure judicious and prudent use of reserve forces. Inform USD(P&R) of the results of this review. (Dec 03)</p>	<p>JSD(P&R) – Review and update appropriate Reserve Force Mobilization policy documents. (April 04)</p> <p>CDRJFCOM: Develop plan for a consolidated Joint Mobilization Process focused on engineering existing systems and plans for JFCOM's role as the single mobilization command,</p>
Reserve Force Volunteers	<p>Service Secretaries – Develop and implement initiatives that enhance unit and individual volunteerism per the 9 July SecDef “Rebalancing the Force” memo. Brief DepSecDef NLT Oct 03.</p>	<p>JSD(P&R) – Review and update appropriate Reserve Force Mobilization policy documents. (April 04)</p> <p>CDRJFCOM: Develop plans, systems and procedures to standardize coordination and command and control for Service Component Commands in the management and tracking of volunteers. (Aug 04)</p>
Reserve Component Holidays		<p>JSD(P&R) – Review and update appropriate Reserve Component mobilization policy documents. (April 04)</p>
Reserve Force Call Ups	<p>CDRJFCOM – Identify changes in Joint doctrine, policy, and law required for new deployment and mobilization process reform and recommend to SECDEF improvements to RC mobilization considering NE/OEF/OIF lessons learned. (Jan 04)</p> <p>USD(P&R) - In coordination with CDRJFCOM develop “Quick Wins” initiatives from OIF lessons learned for SECDEF consideration. Review and update appropriate Reserve Force Mobilization policy documents. (Sep 03)</p>	<p>JSD(P&R) – Review and update appropriate Reserve Force Mobilization policy documents. (April 04). Develop appropriate legislative proposals to implement deployment and mobilization process reforms. (Jan 04)</p>

Action Item	Near-Term Actions	Mid-term Actions
m. Incentives	USD(C) and USD(P&R) - assess options to offer incentives for extended deployments and develop a Budget Change Proposal or Management Initiative Decision as appropriate for DepSecDef consideration (Oct 03).	
n. Peace Operations Initiative		USD(P) – Revise Security Cooperation Guidance as appropriate to better focus security cooperation efforts on increasing the ability of allies and partners to participate in peace operations. (Jan 04) USD(P) – Develop an implementation plan for the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) with near term options focused on Africa . (Dec 03).
o. Intelligence	USD(I) – Identify desired capabilities and shortfalls in <i>our</i> ability to generate actionable intelligence, including a concrete interagency plan for improving horizontal integration of intelligence. (Dec 03)	USD(I) - Develop action plan to strengthen actionable intelligence (Aug 04)

3. Technology

Action Item	Near-Term Actions	Mid-term Actions
a. Information Age	ASD(NII) – Develop options to accelerate the implementation of the GIG and use of new information technologies and concepts to reduce the need for forward deployed personnel. (Nov 04)	ASD(NII) – with CJCS, conduct long-lead analysis for QDR of potential effects of C4 systems on reducing US.-based and deployed personnel. (Jan 05). See associated action in section 4.b.
b. Logistics	USD(AT&L) - Review all Major Defense Acquisition Programs to ensure they emphasize smaller logistics requirements and footprints. (Nov 03)	USD(AT&L) and Service Secretaries – Develop S&T priorities and metrics for new technologies to reduce logistics and support requirements. (Jan 04) CJCS – Consider the impact of improved systems on logistics, mobility and personnel requirements in <u>Operational Availability 04 Study</u> . (Mar 04)
c. New Technologies		USD(AT&L) and Service Secretaries - Develop S&T priorities and metrics for new technologies to substitute for human force protection. (Jan 04)
d. Lethality	Secretary of the Army - Complete fielding of Stryker Brigade Combat teams IAW PDMI, FY04-09. (1 st Stryker deploying to OIF in Oct 03, 2 nd Stryker BCT ready in mid-FY04).	USD(AT&L) and Service Secretaries – Develop S&T priorities and metrics for new technologies to lighten the deployed footprint while retaining lethality. (Jan 04)
e. U.S. and Coalition Transformation	CDRJFCOM – Develop a coalition experimentation plan to examine key interoperability needs of coalition partners. (Dec 03)	USD(P) - Update Security Cooperation Guidance to identify regional coalition transformation priorities. (Jan 04)

4. Efficiency

Action Item	Near-Term Actions	Mid-term Actions
a. Organization of Forces	Service Secretaries – Describe the capabilities required within each Service to drive modular design at appropriate levels and brief options for implementation by Dec 03.	CDRJFCOM – with CJCS and D, OFT, conduct long-lead QDR analysis of options for modular force organizations. (Jan 05)
b. Global Reach Back	Service Secretaries and Combatant Commanders – Identify capabilities that lend themselves to reachback. Propose near-term joint options to increase reliance on reachback to help reduce the forward footprint. (Dec 03)	USD(P) – With ASD (NI) and CJCS, develop “Global Reach Back” DPG direction for POM 06 development and QDR preparation, with emphasis on organizing the Reserve Component to optimize reachback opportunities. (Dec 03). See associated action in section 3.b.
c. Force Allocation	CJCS – Develop an integrated apportionment, assignment, and allocation methodology to include integrating the Joint Presence Policy into “Forces For” (Oct 03) (IAW 18 Aug SecDef OA Action Items Memo).	<p>CDRJFCOM – Develop capability to monitor and report to OSD the status of operational availability capability packages (immediate response forces, rapid response forces, and win decisive forces) (Jun '04) (IAW 18 Aug SecDef “Operational Availability Action Items” Memo).</p> <p>USD (P&R) – work with CJCS to capture capabilities-based assessments in defense readiness assessment and adaptive planning tools. (July 04)</p>
d. Procurement	Services – establish preferred munitions requirements prior to Service FY 06 POM development. (Jan 04)	<p>USD(AT&L) - Develop S&T priorities and metric for new technologies that achieve greater lethality per unit of force structure. (Jan 04)</p> <p>USD(P) – Develop Defense Planning Guidance direction for munitions funding priorities. (Dec 03)</p>

Action Item	Near-Term Actions	Mid-term Actions
d. Strategic Lift	<p>CJCS – Assess strategic lift requirements for warfighting scenarios specified in the Operational Availability '04 Study. (Mar '04).</p>	<p>Service Secretaries – Implement recommendations 2a and 2e from Secretary's 18 August "Operational Availability Action Items" memo in POM 06. (Aug 04)</p> <p>Service Secretaries. Initiate action on DepSecDef approved recommendations of the Advanced Mobility Concept Study (AMCS) for development of future strategic mobility capabilities (Aug 04).</p>
e. Rotation Ratio	<p>CJCS – develop an action agenda to implement SECDEF approved Elaborate Crossbow III initiatives. Continue to monitor and report progress achieved on relieving near-term stress on the force. (Oct 03)</p> <p>USD(P&R) – work with D,PJA&E and Services to develop options to reduce rotation ratio by transporting crews to their platforms. (Nov 03)</p>	<p>Service Secretaries - assess options for reducing rotation ratios and make necessary programmatic adjustments by POM 06 (Aug 04)</p>
g. Headquarters Layering	<p>CJCS, USD(P&R), USD(P) – Leveraging previous work, assess near-term ways to further reduce the number of headquarters and combine headquarters activities. Brief SLRG in Oct 03.</p> <p>USD(C), Service Secretaries, and CJCS – Implement near-term budget and program changes as directed in 14 Jul '03 SecDef Action Memo on "Manpower to Support Implementation of Unified Command Plan '02" (Dec 03)</p>	<p>USD(P) – with USD(P&R) and CJCS, develop Defense Planning Guidance that examines ways to further reduce DoD's headquarters staff structure. (Dec 03).</p> <p>CJCS – Conduct study of Combatant Command manpower utilization as directed in the 14 Jul '03 SecDef Action Memo on "Manpower to Support Implementation of Unified Command Plan '02" (Oct 04)</p>
h. Best Practices		<p>USD(P&R) – Propose options to establish a process to identify and move best Human Resource Management practices among DoD Components. (Jan 04)</p>

Action Item	Near-Term Actions	Mid-term Actions
i. Planning Tools	<p>USD(P&R) – Report to Deputy Secretary on progress in implementing new Defense Readiness Reporting System assessment tools (Nov 03).</p> <p>CDRJFCOM - Develop a new deployment process (Joint Deployment Process Owner) incorporating lessons learned from OIF and identify the capabilities need in planning tools to execute this new process. Report progress to DepSecDef by Dec 03</p>	<p>USD(P) – Develop a plan for institutionalizing an Adaptive Planning process. Brief recommendations to the SECDEF by 1 Feb 04.</p>
j. Operational Availability	<p>CJCS - develop a mechanism to track implementation of Operational Availability recommendations. Continue to monitor and report progress achieved on relieving stress on the force. (Sept 03)</p>	
k. Strategic Warning	<p>USD(I) – Identify Intelligence shortfalls impacting the ability to generate increased strategic warning. (Jan 04)</p>	<p>USD(I) – In preparation for QDR 05, assess options to mitigate strategic warning shortfalls (Jan 05).</p>
l. The Right Skills	<p>CJCS - develop a mechanism to track implementation of Operational Availability recommendations. (Sept 03)</p>	<p>USD(P&R) – with the Services, extend provisional unit concepts to capitalize on the skills of the Individual Ready Reserve and recent retirees.</p>
m. Safety	<p>USD(P&R) – Form a Defense Safety Oversight Council (DSOC) to govern the Department’s mishap reduction efforts (Sept 03)</p> <p>USD(P&R) – Develop an enterprise mishap reduction system to provide actionable data to DoD leadership (July 04)</p>	<p>USD(P&R) – Work with USD(AT&L) to develop DPG language guidance to direct the Department’s efforts to aggressively move on the 50% mishap reduction effort (Dec 03)</p>

5. Policy

Action Item	Near-Term Actions	Mid-term Actions
1. US Foreign Commitments	USD(P) - Develop prioritized list of long-term foreign commitments where US could reduce or discontinue its	USD(P) - Develop plan to pare down long-term US commitments (Apr 04).
1. U.S. Non-Military Skills		<p>USD(P) – Develop Defense Planning Guidance language on stability operations to guide POM 06 development. (Dec 03)</p> <p>USD(P) – Develop an implementation plan for the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) with near term options focused on Africa. (Dec 03).</p>
2. U.S. Worldwide Footprint		USD(P) - Oversee implementation of Global Posture (IGPBS) initiatives (ongoing)

TAB C

COORDINATION PAGE

OSD(Policy)	Col Kelly	10 September 2004
OSD(Personnel & Readiness)	Mr. Gallant	16 September 2004