



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CM-1345-03

12 November 2003

2003 NOV 12 PM 4:47

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBM/10*

SUBJECT: Commercial Aircraft

- **Question.** "Someone said to me that they thought there was a possibility that, rather than having to intercept a hijacked airplane, one might be able to control the autopilot from the ground. He wondered if the autopilot could be controlled remotely, either from an aircraft or from the ground. Why don't you have someone look into it, and let me know if it is a possibility?" (TAB A)
- **Answer.** It is technologically possible to use radio frequency transmissions from a ground or airborne transmitter to provide inputs to an aircraft's autopilot system.
- **Analysis.**
  - While possible, this capability is hindered by the fact that pilot input to the aircraft controls can manually override current commercial autopilot systems. In addition, it is unlikely support could be garnered for an autopilot system that could not be overridden by pilot inputs, due to flight safety considerations.
  - There are currently no remote autopilot control systems under development by DOD for this application.
  - In 2002, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) considered investigation of remote autopilot control as a means to increase security onboard commercial aircraft. Instead, TSA decided to concentrate its security efforts on increased ground flight crew and passenger security screening measures, as well as measures to preclude the takeover of the cockpit, like hardened cockpit doors, the Federal Air Marshal program and arming of commercial pilots.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: MG J. F. Peterson, USA; Vice Director, J-3;

(b)(6)

U18731\*/03

11-L-0559/OSD/17376

TAB A

October 6, 2003

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Commercial Aircraft

Someone said to me that they thought there was a possibility that, rather than having to intercept a hijacked airplane, one might be able to control the autopilot from the ground. He wondered if the autopilot could be controlled remotely, either from an aircraft or from the ground.

Why don't you have someone look into it, and let me know if it is a possibility.

Thanks.

DHR:dr  
100603-19

.....  
Please respond by 11/7/03

U18755 /03

Tab A

TAB B

COORDINATION PAGE

NORAD

Colonel Coleman

28 October 2003

11-L-0559/OSD/17378

Tab B

SECRET  
NOV 12 2003



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

INFO MEMO

PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel & Readiness)

*David S. C. Chu*

SUBJECT: Charging Smokers More for Healthcare

- You asked if smokers should have different healthcare charges due to more health problems. (TAB A)
- Currently, the only differential in costs for TRICARE benefits is based on beneficiary category.
  - Tobacco cessation is not a covered benefit under TRICARE at this time, but is being considered as a benefit in the future. The Military Health System does advocate tobacco avoidance. The MHS is considering education and training for healthcare personnel to assist beneficiaries who want to quit tobacco use. Also, the MHS is evaluating methodologies to target tobacco users and get them into the MHS for education on how to make healthy lifestyle choices to include tobacco avoidance.
  - According to the TRICARE Management Activity, 75% of private health plans had a tobacco cessation benefit, rider, or corporate product (2002).
- In the civilian healthcare setting, increased life insurance premiums for smokers are common; however, there is limited use of increased healthcare premiums for tobacco users. We will look at this issue as part of our overall review of compensation generally, and healthcare financial management specifically, for consideration in the FY06 budget cycle.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments:  
As stated

*William Winkenwerder, Jr.*

NOV 12 2003

Prepared by: William Winkenwerder, Jr, MD

(b)(6)

PCDOCS 53951, 54349



11-L-0559/OSD/17379

U18753/03

**TAB**

**A**

(b)(6)

OSAGEI/MR/KD

001

8/19/03

OSD HA

August 18, 2003

TO: David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Charges for Healthcare

Please take a look at the attached memo and tell me what you think.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Draft memo

DHR:dh  
081803-22

.....

Please respond by 9/12/03

*9/25/03*

(b)(6)

Should there be different healthcare charges for people in the Department of Defense if they smoke, given the fact that people who smoke have more health problems?

**TAB**

**B**

CHARGES FOR HEALTHCARE

COORDINATION

DASD, C&PP	Dr. David Tornberg	10/9/03
CoS, HA	Ms. Diana Tabler	11/12/03
PDASD, HA	Mr. Ed Wyatt	10/20/03
DUSD, MPP	Mr. Bill Carr	11/12/03
PDUSD, P&R	Mr. Charles S. Abeil	10/23/03
USD, P&R	David S. C. Chu	_____

(b)(6)

8/19/03

OSD HA

August 18, 2003

TO: David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Charges for Healthcare

Please take a look at the attached memo and tell me what you think.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Draft memo

DRR:dh  
08/18/03

701

.....

Please respond by 9/12/03

*9209*

(b)(6)

18 AUG 03

Should there be different healthcare charges for people in the Department of Defense if they smoke, given the fact that people who smoke have more health problems?

TAB A

October 6, 2003

USAA

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
 SUBJECT: Commercial Aircraft

Someone said to me that they thought there was a possibility that, rather than having to intercept a hijacked airplane, one might be able to control the autopilot from the ground. He wondered if the autopilot could be controlled remotely, either from an aircraft or from the ground.

Why don't you have someone look into it, and let me know if it is a possibility.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
 100603-19

.....  
 Please respond by 11/7/03

U18755 /03

60CT03

Tab A

EF-7480  
03/015575-ES

November 7, 2003

TO: Doug Feith  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Polish Officer KIA

W  
W

I should get something to the Polish MoD about losing the first officer since World War II.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
110703-17

.....  
Please respond by 11/10/03

OK  
Send it  
[Signature]

COMPLETED

NOV 10 2003

Child

Original response  
routed through C&D.

vr/  
CDR Nosury  
11/10/03

11/10/03

10-11-03 15:54 IN

U18834 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/17388

11/10/03  
[Handwritten notes]

May 5, 2003 2:29 PM

006

TO: Jaymie Durnan  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Memorial Day

*Time: ?*

*✓*

*J*

Am I supposed to do anything on Memorial Day?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
050503-48

.....  
Please respond by 5/9/03

5MAY03

U18873 /03

TO: SecDef  
FROM: Tone Clarke  
DATE: May 9, 2003  
SUBJECT: Memorial Day

SD:  
Jaymie w/Tonia  
  
Jaymie Durnan  
79

You asked what you were doing on Memorial Day. I recommend:

\* \* Message to the troops transmitted via Armed Forces Radio and Television/  
DefenseLink/DefendAmerica

Agree \_\_\_\_\_ Disagree \_\_\_\_\_ See Me \_\_\_\_\_

\* \* Participate in Memorial Day ceremony at Arlington National Cemetery with  
POTUS.

Agree \_\_\_\_\_ Disagree \_\_\_\_\_ See Me \_\_\_\_\_

\* \* An event (with Mrs. Rumsfeld) at Arlington with families of personnel killed in  
OEF/OIF following Memorial Day ceremony.

Agree \_\_\_\_\_ Disagree \_\_\_\_\_ See Me \_\_\_\_\_

\* \* Scroll of those who died in the Global War on Terrorism at press briefing.

Agree \_\_\_\_\_ Disagree \_\_\_\_\_ See Me \_\_\_\_\_

\* \* Op-Ed in British paper, thanking them for support and sacrifices.

Agree \_\_\_\_\_ Disagree \_\_\_\_\_ See Me \_\_\_\_\_

\* \* SecDef Op-Ed for major domestic paper, recognizing sacrifice and reaffirming  
"Guidelines to Consider when Committing U.S. Forces."

Agree \_\_\_\_\_ Disagree \_\_\_\_\_ See Me \_\_\_\_\_

(while it's our  
Mem day -  
it would be  
good to  
continue  
the  
friendship)

May 5, 2003 2:41 PM

33350

TO: Jaymie Durnan  
 LTG Craddock

CC: Col. Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Asia Trip

I think we better focus on the Asia trip at the end of this month and kind of get it nailed down tight. Are you sure that Singapore is going to go ahead with that event, given the SARS problem?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
 050503-50



Please respond by 5/9/03

*LTG Craddock  
 Col Bucci  
 Col Galvin*

*let's have an  
 internal*

5 MAY 03

U18874 . /03

May 5, 2003 2:46 PM

33350

TO: Jaymie Durnan  
 LTG Craddock

CC: Col. Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Brussels Trip

If I go to the Brussels ministerial, I think I will be there quite briefly, and not make a career out of it.

I would like to have someone take a look at what I ought to do before, and why the trip over there is worthwhile, besides the Brussels meeting.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
050503-51



Please respond by 5/16/03

5 MAY 03

U18875 /03

May 5, 2003 2:52 PM

350.001 SD

TO: Jaymie Durnan  
 LTG Craddock

CC: Col. Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Remarks and Prep for SOCOM Conference

I should probably see some remarks for the May 21 SOCOM Commander's Conference soon, preferably by the evening of May 12.

I think it is important that that get worked carefully, because for me it is going to be a major policy statement, and I am going to want to have thought it through rather carefully and have some meetings about it. Please think through how I have those meetings and how we get the text right. It is not something Marc Thiessen can just wing.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
050503-52

.....  
Please respond by 5/9/03

5 MAY 03

U18876 /03

OUTBOX  
5/6

May 5, 2003 9:51 AM

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Iceland

Iceland

Where do we stand on getting out of Iceland? *Also, under what authority was any instruction given to Iceland re our policy? (Per 5/6 round table)*  
Thanks.

DHR.dh  
050503-1

.....

Please respond by 5/7/03

U18877 /03

MAY03

May 5, 2003 3:21 PM

TO: Jaymie Durnan  
CC: *Mac Throssen*  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Naval Academy Remarks

I would like to see the first draft of my remarks for the Naval Academy speech no later than the morning of May 13. I have to get ahead of the curve—there is just too much stuff coming up here, and if we wait until the end, we are in trouble.

Thanks.

DHR:db  
050503-54

.....  
Please respond by 5/9/03

350.0015D

SMAY03

U18878 /03

May 5, 2003 4:05 PM

TO: Jaymie Durnan  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Schedule for Draft Remarks

Please do a layout on the calendar and circle all the presentations I have to make. Then put on the calendar when I will have the draft of the remarks for each of the presentations.

I need to do that, because when I get home at night, I simply cannot do all this work. There is not a second to do it during the day. Therefore, I have to get these remarks in time for me to have a Sunday when I can dig into them.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
050503-59

.....

Please respond by 5/9/03

350.0015D

SMAX03

U18879 /03

May 5, 2003 10:35 AM

33550

TO: MSG (b)(6)  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Coins and Key Chains

I need about ten of my coins for the government side of my desk here. Please put them in my in box with this note.

I need about 30 key chains—the ones with the SecDef seal on one side and signature on the other. I want to buy 15 for my side of the desk and get about 15 for the government side of the desk

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
050503-6

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

SECDEF HAS SEEN

5/5/03

Sir,

MA: 050503

Here are the ten coins per your request. I have placed 30 key chains - 15 on government side and 15 on your side of the desk.

V/R

(b)(6)

U18880 /03

5 MAY 03

11-L-0559/OSD/17397



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

11 NOV 2003  
17 NOV 2003

INFO MEMO

CM-1359-03  
17 November 2003

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS <sup>For</sup> *VRJ/K* <sub>15 Nov 03</sub>

SUBJECT: Ideas from Senator Alexander

- **Question.** "Attached is a letter I received from Lamar Alexander with some very good ideas. Let's think about them." TAB A
- **Answer.** The suggestion to rename the effort "Operation Iraqi Democracy" has merit. Doing so indicates delineation between major combat operations and stability operations. Freedom from the Hussein regime has been achieved. Setting a timetable for withdrawing American forces is not recommended as it plays into the hands of our enemies. With regard to metrics for success, our staffs have developed the weekly "Iraq Status Brief" (TAB B), with classified and unclassified versions for the appropriate audiences. The "Iraq Status Brief" covers most of the metrics suggested by Senator Alexander.
- **Analysis.** A few of the metrics proposed by Senator Alexander (timetable for an Iraqi constitution, unemployment rate) are not yet available. When available, metrics on governance or unemployment could be added.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared By: LTG Walter L. Sharp, USA; Director, J-5; (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/17398

U18919 / 03

TAB A

October 23, 2003

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
Gen. Pete Pace  
Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith

CC: Powell Moore

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Ideas from Senator Alexander

Attached is a letter I received from Lamar Alexander with some very good ideas.

Let's think about them.

Thanks.

Attach.

10/22/03 Sen. Alexander ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh  
102303-1

.....  
Please respond by 11/6/03

03 OCT 27 AM 9:21

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/17399

✓  
10/23

# United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

SECRET  
NO FORN DISSEM

October 22, 2003

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
Department of Defense  
1300 Defense Pentagon  
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Don,


Thank you very much for your letter of the 16<sup>th</sup> and the copy of the one pager you are working on to explain the administration's plan to win the peace.

The one-pager is moving in the right direction. Fully developed, it should persuade Americans of our goal, our plans and our progress toward the goal.

Since you asked, here are my suggestions:

1. Set a clear overall goal: Operation Iraqi Democracy.
2. Set a timetable for accomplishing the goal and withdrawing most American forces: for example, January 1, 2005 or 2006.
3. Establish a set of measurable objectives which, taken together, add up to a plan to meet the goal. These should specify pre-war levels, post-war levels, today's levels, today's goal, and the goal for January 1, 2005 (or 2006). I've appended a list of suggested measurable objectives that are easy to understand.
4. Report publicly on the objectives once a week.
5. In every speech you, the President, Vice-President, Secretary Powell, Dr. Rice and other key officials make, refer briefly to that week's progress report: "As our weekly progress report on our plan to build democracy in Iraq showed, electricity before the war was at 3300 megawatts, our goal for January 1, 2005(or 2006) is 6000 megawatts, we are at 4217 megawatts today which is 1217 more than before the war, and right on schedule for our goal; on crude oil production, etc.

Sincerely,



U17594 /03

**Suggested objectives (should be measurable and simply presented):**

- ✓ Electricity (megawatts produced, % of Iraqis w/ power)
- ✓ Schools (# of schools open, % of boys & girls attending)
- ✓ Health care (# of hospitals operating, % receiving services)
- ✓ Governance (timetable to a constitutional democracy)
- ✓ Crude oil production (barrels produced, shipped)
- ✓ Police (# in training, # serving)
- ✓ Militia (# in training, # serving)
- ✓ Water (gallons of water available, # of Iraqis w/ fresh water access)
- ✓ Prisons (# of prisons, # of beds for prisoners, # of prisoners)
- ✓ Iraq Troops (# in training, # serving)
- ✓ Troops from other countries (# of troops, # of countries)
- ✓ US Troops (overall #, reserve, and active duty)
- ✓ Food (# of malnourished Iraqis, amount of food available)
- ✓ Unemployment (# and/or %)
- ✓ TV/Radio (# of stations, # of Iraqis receiving)
- ✓ Etc.

Tab A

**Iraq Fact Sheet**

**23 Oct 2003**

	Pre War	Post War	Current	Goal
Power	3300 MW	200 MW	4417 MW	4400 MW
Oil – Production	2.500 M BPD		2.030 M BPD	3.000 M BPD
Oil - Export		0.20 M BPD June '03	1.2 M BPD Oct '03	2.079 MBPD
Education	13,597 K-12 schools		1,628 schools rehabed 5.5 M students in school 393 ongoing school rehabs 1500 school rehabs(by Iraqis in progress) 5,600 grads of univ/tech schools	1,000 school rehabs
Health Care			100% prewar level care achieved	EOY 03 70-80% immunization for children 100% of prewar levels by 10/03
Security			85,500 Iraqi 24,000 Coalition 11,100 Iraqis in training	170,300 Iraqis 0 Coalition

MW= Megawatts; M BPD=Millions of barrels per day;

**Governance**

- Committee. submits (Oct) three options for constitutional convention; favors direct election of reps
- Council of Judges established. (04 Oct).
- UNSC resolution (16 Oct) invites GC to submit timetable for drafting new constitution & holding elections
- 108 Iraqi Delegates attend (17 Oct) Madrid Donors' Conference

**Economics**

*Financial Markets*

- Rafidain & Rasheed Banks reopen 280+ branches
- Central bank begins currency auction
- Satellite voice & data systems for banks installed (30 Oct) to 80 locations

*Private Sector*

- World Bank proposes small business development facility --. \$30 M for tech assist & \$70-100M for investment
- CPA to award \$15M for National Micro & Small Enterprise Credit Program

*Currency Exchange*

- Ongoing to approx. 250 banks
- Began 15 Oct; completion- 15 Jan 04; 2 billion banknotes to exchange

Tab A

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

*As of 04 0830 EST Nov 03*



# ***DRAFT WORKING PAPERS Iraq Status***

This briefing is classified

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

Derived from: Multiple Sources

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

11-L-0559/OSD/17403



# Highlights

## CPA Priorities:

- **Essential Services**
- **Security**
- **Governance**
- **Economy**

## CPA Intermediate Objectives:

- **Repair electric power infrastructure**
- **Rebuild the telecomms system**
- **Successful Constitutional Convention**
- **Implement new media strategies**

## Weekly Highlights:


- **Iraq National Power Production reached a high of 4,005 MW this past week**
- **First successful international calls through Iraqi telephone system**
- **27 Oct: University of Mosul Law School holds first symposium on separation of power and concept of federalism**
- **Iraqi Media Network contract bidder conference to be held in Amman this week**



# TF Restore Iraqi Electricity (RIE) Overview

Goal 01 Oct 03: 4,400 MW  
Production and Transmission

Goal 01 Jun 04: 6,000 MW  
Production and Transmission




- Autumn Overhaul / Outage Program began 13 Oct 03 and ends Mar 04. The planned power production is based on CPAs overhaul / maintenance plan
- Coalition Forces began transitioning security duties for 20 electrical facilities to the Ministry of Electricity (MOE) security forces. Transition of authority will be complete by the end of Nov
- The Iraqi MOE entered into a joint project with Jordan to construct an electrical distribution grid shared by the two countries. This is a long term project

N/P



# Crude Oil Production

Mid-Term Target (Dec 03): 2.1 MBPD (Pre-War Average for 2002)




**WEEKLY AVERAGE OF 2.16 MBPD EXCEEDS MID-TERM TARGET OF 2.1 MBPD**

- Long Term Target (Dec 04): 3.1 MBPD (Pre-War Capacity)
- Pre-War Peak: 2.5 MBPD in Feb 03
- Post-war Peak: 2.185 MBPD on 28 Oct 03
- Weekly average of crude exports: 1.4 MBPD

N/P



# Diesel Supply




- Supply currently 70% of goal
- Multiple pipeline breaks due to sabotage, wear, and parts/equipment failures have hampered refined product production and delivery over past week

N/P

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~



# Kerosene Supply



■ Production ■ Import


- Kerosene imports began 05 Oct. Initial goal = 2.0M liters / day
- Current supply 67% of total goal



# Gasoline / Benzene Supply

M Liters /  
Day

Goal: 18 M Liters




• Current supply 73% of goal

N/P



# Liquid Propane Gas Supply



- Southern LPG plant has stable power, will begin processing once NGL delivery starts; NGL processing delayed by pipe rupture in propane cooling system of NGL Plant
- Current supply 75% of goal

N/P



# Essential Services - Education

## Educational Enrollment

- School registration and attendance stabilizing at approximately 3.6 million primary and 1.5 million secondary students
- Record 97,000 Freshmen applications for 03-04 academic year (63,000 last year)
  - 22 Major Universities, 43 Technical Schools

## Current Activities

- Ministry of Education (MOE) establishes universal school ID number to provide student and teacher management and more accurate budgets
- MOE survey supports planning and helps establish teacher and staff salaries
- MOE being equipped with the Education Management Information System (EMIS)

K-12 School Buildings In Iraq	13,597
Rehabilitations Completed by 10/14	1,628
Rehabilitation goal by 10/1	1,000
Ongoing school rehabilitations	393

Includes repair / replacement of doors, windows, restroom facilities; generally no major reconstruction or new construction

N/P



## Essential Services - Healthcare

### Milestones

- Oct 03: Achieve 100% of pre-war level of healthcare throughout Iraq
- EOY 03: 70-80% national coverage for children's immunizations
- FY 04: Update medical technologies and fix infrastructure / equipment

### Current Activities

- Ministry of Health (MOH) is developing a strategic plan for a sustainable healthcare system for 2005 and beyond
- Spanish Brigade completed newly built wing of 8 rooms accommodating 6 beds for the hospital in MND CS

### Compared to life under Saddam's rule:

- Public health spending has increased 26 times
- Doctor's salaries are eight times higher
- Pharmaceutical distribution and child vaccination programs dramatically increased in size and effectiveness



## Essential Services - Water

### Water Supply and Sewage Treatment Milestones (in Liters)

	Pre-War	Post-war	Jun 04	Nov 04
Potable Water Availability	12.9 Million	4.0 Mil	13.4 Mil	21.3 Mil
Sewage System Coverage	6.2 Million		85% cap	

#### Current Activities

- 1.6M people benefit from rehabilitation of six water treatment plants in Babil, Diyala, and Baghdad governorates
- 103 rural water treatment plants rehabilitated in five central and southern governorates (serve 272,000)
- Water treatment plant in al Hillah repaired (serves 550,000)
- Bechtel continues dredging at the first section of the two-part reservoir at Basrah end of the Sweet Water Canal

Irrigation Canals	Km (est)
Total Irrigation Canals in Iraq	27,000
Canals needing clearance May 03	20,000
Canals cleared as of 27 Sept	15,000
Canals being cleared per week	500

Ministry currently estimates 85% completion toward pre-war levels for water, sanitation and municipal services

N/P

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~



# Essential Services - Telecommunications

## TELECOM Connections

Type	Pre-War	Sept 2003	Jan 2004 Goal
Landline	1,100,000	850,000	1,100,000
Wireless	0	0	50,000
Internet	4,500	4,900	50,000

- **Milestones**
- **Sep 03: Internet connectivity established to 15 of 18 governates**
- **Oct 03: Cell phone contract awards to Asia-Cell (N), Orascom (C), Atheer (S)**
- **Oct 03: Issue regulations encouraging competition and wireless Internet**
- **23 Oct: First successful international calls**
- **5 Nov: All active subscribers to have access to the international gateway**
  - **Two of thirteen switches installed**
  - **250,000 consumer lines can then be restored to service**
- **Dec 03: Begin cell phone service**
- **Dec 03: Restore nationwide landline connectivity**




## Essential Services - Transportation

- **Iraqi Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) sent 27 Air Traffic Controllers (ATC) to Jordanian Queen Noor aviation college for a four-week course**
  - **Important first step towards recertification as accredited controllers**
- **Ministry of Transportation (MOT) is working with Iraqi Airways to formulate a plan to fly the Hadj (end of Jan through first days of Feb 04)**
  - **Iraqi Airways has never failed to fly the Hadj**
  - **MOT views it as a service of national and religious importance**
- **Iraqi Republic Railways (IRR) is negotiating a contract with the Turkish Railway for transportation of petroleum products**
  - **Trains of partially refined crude will be transported to Turkey, where the tanker cars will be cleansed.**
  - **Returning train will transport gasoline**
- **Bechtel Railroad team held pre-bid meetings for subcontract to provide crush and transport ballast and subcontract for workshop construction and loading of IRR trains**



# Total Security Forces in Iraq

(x1000)



- US
- Other Coalition
- Iraqis Operating w/ Coalition
- Additional Iraqi Recruits

- Iraq Security Force casualties (since 01 Jun): 86 KIA, 153 WIA
- US Forces decreasing as a percentage of total forces



# Stability Contributors

## Countries with forces in Iraq

**32**

**TOTAL ~25,000**

Albania  
 Azerbaijan  
 Bulgaria  
 Czech Rep  
 Denmark  
 Dom Rep  
 El Salvador  
 Estonia  
 Georgia  
 Honduras  
 Hungary  
 Italy  
 Kazakhstan  
 Korea  
 Latvia  
 Lithuania

Macedonia  
 Moldova  
 Mongolia  
 Netherlands  
 New Zealand  
 Nicaragua  
 Norway  
 Philippines  
 Poland  
 Portugal  
 Romania  
 Slovakia  
 Spain  
 Thailand  
 Ukraine  
 UK

## Countries considering decision to provide forces for Iraq

**14**

**TOTAL TBD**

**46 Countries**  
 Potentially Supporting  
 Iraqi  
 Stability and  
 Humanitarian Relief



## Governance - National

### MILESTONES

- **14 Jul: GC established**
- **11 Aug: Constitutional Prep Committee appointed**
- **01 Sep: Highly qualified interim cabinet ministers appointed**
  - 9 PhDs, remainder with advanced degrees
  - 2 physicians, 1 attorney, numerous engineers
- **10 Sep: Governor of Central Bank named**
- **19 Sep: Council of Judges established to supervise judicial and prosecutorial systems - provides independent judiciary**
- **Oct: Constitutional Prep Committee submits options to choose Convention**
- **15 Dec: Deadline to establish constitutional process and timeline**
- **Challenges:**
  - Capacity for elections
  - Method to choose qualified reps to Constitutional Convention



# Governance - International Recognition

## MILESTONES

- 08 Sep: Arab League grants seat to GC
- 12 Sep: GC members seated at UN session
- 20 - 21 Sep: GC - Ministerial delegation attended WB / IMF Dubai
- 24 Sep: Iraqi delegation attends OPEC meeting
- 22 Sep - 03 Oct: 13 GC members attend UN sessions
- 02 Oct: GC President Chalabi addresses UN GA
- 08 Oct: GC reps attend OIC Kuala Lumpur meeting
- 16 Oct: UNSC approves resolution inviting GC to submit by timetable for drafting new constitution and holding democr
- 21 - 23 Oct: Iraqi delegates attend Madrid Donors' Conferer

N/P

11-L-0559/OSD/17419



## Governance - Local

- **255 municipal councils mostly in urban areas**
  - **100% of Iraqis represented by a council at municipal or level**
- **Baghdad has one city, 88 neighborhood, and 9 district cou**
  - **First time in 35 years people of Baghdad have direct, m in community affairs**
- **27 Oct: 300 women attend Sulimaniya University forum on participation in politics and government**
- **27 Oct: University of Mosul Law School held symposium o issues entitled "Human Rights and Democracy"**
  - **Focused on separation of powers; human rights within and concept of federalism**
  - **Later sessions will target general public to raise awarer governance issues and produce a better informed electo**
- **Challenges:**
  - **Increasing involvement of women (75 of 800 representa various levels)**
  - **Enhancing credibility of local councils**

N/P

11-L-0559/OSD/17420



## **Economics - Financial Market Structures**

- **Central Bank Governor announced six foreign banks to be licensed to operate in Iraq in the next five years**
  - **Request for Application to be issued within weeks**
  - **Banks should put up minimum capital of \$25 million and concentrate on high-tech and e-banking services**
- **UN transfers additional \$1 billion to Development Fund for Iraq from Oil For Food escrow account**
- **Currency exchange is proceeding well**
  - **Over 2.25 billion banknotes positioned in Iraq**
  - **Expect over 1.5 billion notes to be exchanged directly for old dinars**
  - **Central Bank conducts currency auctions to set market exchange rate (Oct 22 auction market settlement rate = 1,920 old dinars to \$1)**



## **Economics - Private Sector Development**

- **Six legal experts to review key commercial laws relate trade, investment, and commercial activity**
  - **Determine extent to which legislation promotes or private investment and private sector growth and de**
  - **Make recommendations re legislation that creates friendly, market-driven economic legal framework**
- **National Employment Program in public works sector generate 100,000 jobs per quarter**
  - **Pilot program already generated 9100 jobs**
- **CPA is developing privatization plan for 150 of 190 State Enterprises (SOEs)**
  - **Minister of Industry and Minerals proposes leasing foreign concessionaires for 5 to 10 years**



## Economics - Donors' Conference

- **Madrid Donors Conference attended by 73 countries, 1 International Organizations and 13 Non-Government Organizations**
- **United Nations, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund estimate costs to build Iraqi infrastructure: \$50 - 75B**
- **\$20.3B Supplemental covers 27 - 40% of the estimate**
- **Conference brings in \$13 billion in new pledges**
  - **\$4.9 billion are outright grants**
  - **Loans account for the balance**


N/P

11-L-0559/OSD/17423



# Iraq Funds Status (\$ Millions)

Total Available \$9,662  
Total Committed \$6,804



N/P

TAB A

October 23, 2003

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
Gen. Pete Pace  
Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith

CC: Powell Moore

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Ideas from Senator Alexander

*ITAG*

Attached is a letter I received from Lamar Alexander with some very good ideas.  
Let's think about them.

Thanks.

Attach.  
10/22/03 Sen. Alexander ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh  
102303-1

.....  
Please respond by 11/6/03

17:00:27 OCT 27 2003

*23 OCT 03*

Tab A

U18920 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD/17425

✓  
10/23

# United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

October 22, 2003

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
Department of Defense  
1300 Defense Pentagon  
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Don,


Thank you very much for your letter of the 16<sup>th</sup> and the copy of the one pager you are working on to explain the administration's plan to win the peace.

The one-pager is moving in the right direction. Fully developed, it should persuade Americans of our goal, our plans and our progress toward the goal.

Since you asked, here are my suggestions:

1. Set a clear overall goal: Operation Iraqi Democracy.
2. Set a timetable for accomplishing the goal and withdrawing most American forces: for example, January 1, 2005 or 2006.
3. Establish a set of measurable objectives which, taken together, add up to a plan to meet the goal. These should specify pre-war levels, post-war levels, today's levels, today's goal, and the goal for January 1, 2005 (or 2006). I've appended a list of suggested measurable objectives that are easy to understand.
4. Report publicly on the objectives once a week.
5. In every speech you, the President, Vice-President, Secretary Powell, Dr. Rice and other key officials make, refer briefly to that week's progress report: "As our weekly progress report on our plan to build democracy in Iraq showed, electricity before the war was at 3300 megawatts, our goal for January 1, 2005(or 2006) is 6000 megawatts, we are at 4217 megawatts today which is 1217 more than before the war, and right on schedule for our goal; on crude oil production, etc.

Sincerely,



Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/17426

**Suggested objectives (should be measurable and simply presented):**

- ✓ Electricity (megawatts produced, % of Iraqis w/ power)
- ✓ Schools (# of schools open, % of boys & girls attending)
- ✓ Health care (# of hospitals operating, % receiving services)
- ✓ Governance (timetable to a constitutional democracy)
- ✓ Crude oil production (barrels produced, shipped)
- ✓ Police (# in training, # serving)
- ✓ Militia (# in training, # serving)
- ✓ Water (gallons of water available, # of Iraqis w/ fresh water access)
- ✓ Prisons (# of prisons, # of beds for prisoners, # of prisoners)
- ✓ Iraq Troops (# in training, # serving)
- ✓ Troops from other countries (# of troops, # of countries)
- ✓ US Troops (overall #, reserve, and active duty)
- ✓ Food (# of malnourished Iraqis, amount of food available)
- ✓ Unemployment (# and/or %)
- ✓ TV/Radio (# of stations, # of Iraqis receiving)
- ✓ Etc.

Tab A



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

SECRET  
2003 NOV 13 11:17

INFO MEMO

November 17, 2003, 5:00 PM

COMPTROLLER

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim 

SUBJECT: Money for the AOR Combatant Commanders (COCOMs)

- This responds to your follow-on note of October 21 on AOR COCOMs.
- Funding for COCOM operations comes in three ways:
  - **First** – the funding for the COCOM operational forces (i.e., air, naval, and ground components) is provided by the respective Military Departments.
  - **Second** – the COCOM administrative and operations costs are provided annually through the budgets of their assigned Military Department Executive Agent.
    - Budgets range from \$90 million to \$200 million annually depending on the size and mission of the COCOM. The administrative budget funds rents, civilian salaries, contracts, and other headquarters logistics costs.
    - COCOM budgets will vary due to unique circumstances. For example, the FY 2003 EUCOM budget rose to \$192 million because it included one-time costs for Kosovo, Bosnia, and Southwest Asia. In FY 2004, EUCOM's budget returns to a normal level of approximately \$129 million.
  - **Third** – COCOMs seek additional funds for special items or new missions through their Executive Agent.
    - These requests are first forwarded to the respective Service. The Service may disagree with the need or priority of the requirement, or propose that DoD should fund the requirement.
    - If a request is denied by the Service, the COCOM Commander may forward the request to the Joint Staff (J8) and to my office.
    - These unresolved issues are addressed during the Program/Budget Review, and decided in the Program/Budget process.
- A Program Budget Decision (PBD) to address unfunded COCOM issues is being coordinated with OSD staff, the Services, and the Joint Staff. Raising these issues through the budgeting process allows you to make decisions on the COCOM's unresolved funding requirements. We worked with the Joint Staff to identify the most critical requirements. However, for many of the proposed funding increases, neither the COCOM nor the Executive Agent complied with guidance to provide offsets.

COORDINATION: None

Prepared By: John M. Evans

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/17428

U18943 / 03

received 10/22  
3:28pm

October 21, 2003

TO: Dov Zakheim  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Money for AOR COCOMs

I cannot understand your memo of September 5. If I do understand it, I am uncomfortable.

Please have someone work on it, and send it back to me so I can know precisely what is going on.

Thanks.

Attach.

9/5/03 USD(C) memo to SecDef re: Money Allocated for AOR Combatant Commands (COCOMs) [U14879/03]

DHR:dh  
102103-11

.....  
Please respond by 11/21/03

received 10/22  
2:20pm

October 21, 2003

TO: Dov Zakheim  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Money for AOR COCOMs

I cannot understand your memo of September 5. If I do understand it, I am uncomfortable.

Please have someone work on it, and send it back to me so I can know precisely what is going on.

Thanks.

Attach.

9/5/03 USD(C) memo to SecDef re: Money Allocated for AOR Combatant Commands (COCOMs) [U14879/03]

DHR:dh  
102103-11

.....  
Please respond by 11/21/03

322

21 OCT 03

U18945 /03

Shewflake

2:43 AM

TO: Gen. John Abizaid

CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Dr. Condoleezza Rice  
Steve Hadley

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: November <sup>17</sup>~~12~~ 2003

SUBJECT: NSC

The National Security Council has developed a pattern of tasking you, Sanchez and individuals in your combatant command directly for participation in meetings, for information and the like. I have advised them that all such contacts with your combatant command should be through John Craddock.

If you receive direct requests, please refer them to LTG John Craddock for handling.

Thanks.

DHR/azm  
111203.05P

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_

*334 NSC*

*17 Nov 03*

U18948 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/17431

10:28 PM

TO: Admiral Giambastiani  
 CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
 DATE: November <sup>n</sup>~~11~~, 2003  
 SUBJECT:

Attached is a note from Geoff Hoon suggesting trilateral exercises with the UK, Australia and the US. Sounds like a reasonable idea to me. Why don't you have someone pursue it.

*U  
A*

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
 11/20/03

*Attach: 11/11/03 letter from Hon. Geoffrey Hoon*

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_ *11/30/03*

*19 NOV 03*

U18952 / 03

11/12/2003 11:11

(b)(6)

PALLASSUE

PAGE 02  
NO. 557 0002

12/11/2003 09:04



SECRETARY OF STATE

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
ROOM 208, OLD WAR OFFICE BUILDING  
WHITEHALL, LONDON SW1A 2EU

(b)(6)

MO 6/20/03  
MO 6/18/03

11 November 2003

*Joe Donald*

EXERCISING: US, UK & AUSTRALIA

During my visit to Australia earlier this year, Robert Hill and I were discussing lessons identified from recent coalition operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. We were both struck by the fact that, while the United States, United Kingdom and Australia each have extensive bilateral exercise programmes, we very rarely exercise together trilaterally. Given that forces from all three nations have recently fought together in high intensity coalition operations, we agreed that there would be some merit in exploring whether we could exercise together more often in future.

My intention is not to dilute the very valuable bilateral exercises we all have with each other, but perhaps to fine tune them in such a way that we could introduce a trilateral element at the beginning or end of pre-planned bilateral US/Australian and UK/Australian exercises. One example might be to adjust UK and Australian participation in Exercise RED FLAG so that we could exercise at or around the same time.

The Hon Donald Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
United States of America



11/12/2003 11:11

(b)(6)

PALLASSUE

PAGE 03  
NO. 007 VOL. 000

12/11/2003 07:44

If you agree, perhaps our officials could explore this issue in more detail and develop more detailed proposals for consideration.

I am copying this letter to Robert Hill.

*Yours sincerely,*  
*Geoff*  
GEOFFREY HOON



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

SECRET  
27 OCT 2003 10:02

PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

**INFO MEMO**

October 30, 2003 3:00 PM

**FOR:** SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSecDef Action \_\_\_\_\_

**FROM:** Dr. David S. C. Chu, USD(P&R)

*David S. C. Chu 17 Nov 03*

**SUBJECT:** Snowflake — AT&T

- You requested information on AT&T prepaid phone card rates (**Attached**). AT&T won a competitive bid as the contractor for all unofficial phones.
- US Central Command provides two phone services that enable Service members to call anywhere in the world — *Health, Morale and Welfare* (HMW) calls using official phone lines and *unofficial telecommunications* provided by Armed Services Exchanges.
- Service members are responsible for commercial charges they incur with HMW calls and unofficial calls. Payments can be made by using prepaid phone cards, telephone calling cards, credit cards, or collect calls. HMW callers may use any prepaid phone card; however, the unofficial callers may only use AT&T prepaid calling cards.
- The cost per calling minute is more expensive for unofficial calls than for HMW calls. HMW calls to the United States are charged U.S. domestic rates, while unofficial calls are charged at various international rates.
- The multiple billing rates for different phone services have led to confusion and complaints among Service members. Rates range from \$.32/per minute to \$1.00/per minute.
- On November 13, PDUSD(P&R) will meet with Mr. Louis Addeo, President - AT&T Government Solutions, to discuss the company's communication support to Service members serving in the OEF and OIF theaters.

**RECOMMENDATION:** None. For Information Only

**COORDINATION:** None

**ATTACHMENTS:**

As stated

**PREPARED BY:** George McNamara, Resale Activities & NAF Policy, ODUSD (MCFP)

(b)(6)

*for [signature]*  
11/12/03



U18953 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD/17435

**COORDINATION**

PDUSD(P&R)

Charles S. Abell

CSA 11-6-03

October 20, 2003

TO: David Chu  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: AT&T

At a town hall at Fort Carson, I was asked about the AT&T prepaid phone cards in Iraq. Some of the Servicemen complained about the rates.

Here is a letter I received from AT&T. I have not read it.

Please advise.

Thanks.

Attach.  
10/16/03 Addeo (AT&T) ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh  
102001-33

.....  
Please respond by 11/7/03

11-L-0559/OSD/17437



Louis E. Asano  
President - AT&T Government Solutions

Suite 800  
1800 Gallows Road  
Vienna, VA 22182

(b)(6)

October 18, 2003

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld  
Secretary  
U.S. Department of Defense  
The Pentagon  
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Mr. Secretary,

On Wednesday, October 7 at a Fort Carson Town Hall Meeting you were asked about the AT&T prepaid card rates for U.S. soldiers stationed in Baghdad. I would like to meet with you to answer any questions you may have and to discuss what AT&T is doing to assure that our troops receive the best value and most reliable service while they are serving in Iraq.

As you may know, AT&T is an official provider of personal telecommunications services to members of the U.S. Military through competitively-bid contracts with AAFES. Since mid-December 2002, AT&T teams have been working around the clock to meet the growing needs of our forward-deployed troops, first in Kuwait and Afghanistan, and now in Iraq and Kyrgystan. AT&T offers military service members personal telephone service through satellite technology. We have been working to make communications accessible in an environment where, as you know, there is virtually no telecommunications infrastructure.

For example, AT&T has taken the following steps in partnerships with military organizations to provide communications capability to our troops in Iraq:


- Distributed more than 600 mobile satellite phones to military units
- Established five Calling Centers, with 48 telephones each, in various locations in Iraq

- Working to establish 14 additional calling centers to req per orders received in September
- Donated 160,000 prepaid phone cards valued at \$1.1 million to the USO in April, in addition to other donations of prepaid cards to military hospitals and military aid societies.

AT&T is proud to serve the military. We believe this issue is central to the quality of life for the men and women serving our country. We would like to meet with you at your convenience to discuss the AAFE contract, military communications for service members calling from OEF/OIF and to describe steps that DOD and AT&T can take together to best serve the interest of the troops.

Thank you for your time. I can be reached at (b)(6) and would welcome the opportunity to discuss this matter.

Sincerely,



October 20, 2003

TO: David Chu  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR  
SUBJECT: AT&T

At a town hall at Fort Carson, I was asked about the AT&T prepaid phone cards in Iraq. Some of the Servicemen complained about the rates.

Here is a letter I received from AT&T. I have not read it.

Please advise.

Thanks.

Attach.  
10/16/03 Addeo (AT&T) ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh  
102003-33

.....  
Please respond by 11/7/03

311.1

DR OCT 03

U18954 /03



Louis M. Adesso  
President - AT&T Government Solutions

Suite 600  
1800 Galloway Road  
Vienna, VA 22182

(b)(6)

October 16, 2003

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld  
Secretary  
U.S. Department of Defense  
The Pentagon  
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Mr. Secretary,

On Wednesday, October 7 at a Fort Carson Town Hall Meeting you were asked about the AT&T prepaid card rates for U.S. soldiers stationed in Baghdad. I would like to meet with you to answer any questions you may have and to discuss what AT&T is doing to assure that our troops receive the best value and most reliable service while they are serving in Iraq.

As you may know, AT&T is an official provider of personal telecommunications services to members of the U.S. Military through competitively-bid contracts with AAFES. Since mid-December 2002, AT&T teams have been working around the clock to meet the growing needs of our forward-deployed troops, first in Kuwait and Afghanistan, and now in Iraq and Kyrgystan. AT&T offers military service member personal telephone service through satellite technology. We have been working to make communications accessible in an environment where, as you know, there is virtually no telecommunications infrastructure.

For example, AT&T has taken the following steps in partnerships with military organizations to provide communications capability to our troops in Iraq:


- Distributed more than 600 mobile satellite phones to military units
- Established five Calling Centers, with 48 telephones each, in various locations in Iraq

- Working to establish 14 additional calling centers toraq per orders received in September
- Donated 160,000 prepaid phone cards valued at \$1 million to the USO in April, in addition to other donations of prepaid cards to military hospitals and military aid societies.

AT&T is proud to serve the military. We believe this issue is central to the quality of life for the men and women serving our country. We would like to meet with you at your convenience to discuss the AAFE contract, military communications for service members calling from OEF/OIF and to describe steps that DOD and AT&T can take together to best serve the interest of the troops.

Thank you for your time. I can be reached at (b)(6) and would welcome the opportunity to discuss this matter.

Sincerely,



Snowflake

NOV. 17. 2003 5:21PM

NO. 199 P. 6

*Chiller*

EF-7176

03/014311-ES  
October 15, 2003

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM:  
SUBJECT: Olympics in Greece

Instead of the U.S. giving help to Greece for the Olympics, I think we ought to consider having the NATO Response Force do it.

Thanks.

DPH:ab  
101502-44

.....  
Please respond by 11/14/03

3538

*Response Attached  
COL B  
11/17*

1502T03

2



SECRET  
2003 NOV 18 PM 3:24

COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY  
BAGHDAD

November 18, 2003

TO: Secretary Rumsfeld  
FROM: Ambassador Bremer  
SUBJECT: Increasing Funding for Iraqi Security Forces

The \$1 billion that was recently transferred from the UN's Oil for Food Program Escrow Account to the Development Fund for Iraq (not the "Defense" Fund for Iraq) has been long awaited and is a vital part of the on-going Iraqi national budget. This money, and other anticipated transfers of OFF money, is already fully committed to fund the Iraqi government's 2004 budget (for example assuring that there are sufficient stocks of food and fuel).

The training and equipping of Iraqi security forces is underway on an urgent basis. We are poised to overcome any funding problems that might arise. I have asked my staff to be in touch with both DoV and OMB to get an allocation of funds out here from the Supplemental to do what needs to be done. Funds for training and equipping of Iraqi security forces are included in the Supplemental which the President recently signed. We have authority to expend up to 20% of the Supplemental (over \$3.6 billion) prior to submitting our formal plan to the Congress.

Your request of John for a report on funding plans for security forces may stem from a misunderstanding regarding funding sources and responsibilities. In our recent talks in Washington we agreed to the transfer of executive responsibility for CMATT, but we also stipulated that the responsibility and authority for the funding of the NIA would remain with CPA. We are proceeding on that understanding

Cc: Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz  
Under Secretary Zakheim  
General Myers  
General Abizaid

SECRET CABLES DISTRIBUTION				
SECDEF	DEPSEC	SPL ASST	EXECSEC	USDP
USDI	CAD	CCD	CABLE CH	FILE
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>				
CICS		Abizaid		

11-L-0559/OSD/17444

U18994 / 03

TAB A

592

October 29, 2003

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
 SUBJECT: Rebalancing of Forces

I would like to see the rebalancing of the Active and Reserve forces before it goes final with the Services.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
102903-10

.....  
Please respond by 11 ~~29~~ / 03

Address

- Why have all of anything in the Reserve
- Need to take some skills and put them in the Active -- what are these
- Do we have excess capacity in some areas; we could take and turn them into HO/LOs.
- What should/shouldn't we have to subsidize

L.C.

320.2

29 OCT 03

U18999 03

Tab A

TAB A

October 30, 2003

593

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith  
Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

D.

SUBJECT: Interrogations

I do need good information on what is taking place with interrogations. I am blind on the subject. I am blind in GTMO, I am blind in Afghanistan, I am blind in Iraq.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
103003-12

.....  
Please respond by

11/10/03

383.6

3005 03

Tab A

U19000 03

TAB B

COORDINATION PAGE

USD(I)	Mr. R. C. Porter	12 November 2003
ASD(SO/LIC)	Mr. O'Connell	12 November 2003



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

CM-1365-03

18 November 2003

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCIS <sup>FOR</sup> *VR/A 18 Nov 03*

SUBJECT: Interrogations

- **Question.** I do need good information on what is taking place with interrogations. I am blind on the subject. I am blind in GTMO, I am blind in Afghanistan, I am blind in Iraq (TAB A).
- **Answer.** We will improve the information flow on interrogations in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO), Afghanistan and Iraq by building upon established US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) processes. The program includes a weekly report from Joint Staff J-2 and a twice monthly Secure Video Teleconference (SVTC) chaired by the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)), both of which began on 14 November. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict) (ASD(SO/LIC)) will also continue to chair a twice monthly Detainee Policy SVTC.
- **Analysis.** The Department of Defense and the Joint Staff will increase visibility of detainee interrogation information through the following actions:
  - USSOUTHCOM provides weekly JTF-GTMO interrogation updates to Joint Staff J-2 and ASD(SO/LIC). Joint Staff J-2 will compile this report with additional information from US Central Command (USCENTCOM) and the Iraq Security Group into a weekly interrogation summary to be distributed every Friday.
  - USD(I) will chair a twice monthly Detainee SVTC to bring together USCENTCOM, USSOUTHCOM, ASD(SO/LIC), Office of the General Counsel, the Joint Staff and the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence to increase cross-talk and review policy issues related to interrogations.
  - OASD(SO/LIC) Detainee Policy Group provides a twice monthly Detainee Update Slide on GTMO detainee transfer and release issues, and will coordinate with your Military Assistants to improve this product.

383.6

18 Nov 03

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared By: MG Ronald L. Burgess, Jr., USA; Director, J-2

(b)(6)

U19001\* 03

11-L-0559/OSD/17448

TAB A

October 30, 2003

593

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith  
Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.*

SUBJECT: Interrogations

I do need good information on what is taking place with interrogations. I am blind on the subject. I am blind in GTMO, I am blind in Afghanistan, I am blind in Iraq.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
103003-12

.....  
Please respond by 11/10/03

Tab A

U19000 03

11-L-0559/OSD/17449

TAB B

COORDINATION PAGE

USD(I)

Mr. R. C. Porter

12 November 2003

ASD(SO/LIC)

Mr. O'Connell

12 November 2003



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000



2003 NOV 17 11:09:23

PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

INFO MEMO

November 3, 2003 – 11:00 A.M

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DR. DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
(PERSONNEL AND READINESS) *David S. C. Chu 18 Nov 03*

SUBJECT: Reserve Affairs Policy Board -- Snowflake, dated October 20, 2003

- I have discussed with the Joint Staff engaging the Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB) in the process of balancing the active force with the reserve force (Tab A). The Board has been involved in the past, but I am inviting it to work with us on initiatives that will provide a further contribution to "rebalancing the force" (Tab B). I believe the Board will make a positive contribution, and will keep you apprised of our progress.

RECOMMENDATION: Information Only

COORDINATION: *T. D. Keating 11/14*  
Joint Staff

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared by: T.F. Hall, ASD/RA (b)(6)

cc:  
Chairman, JCS



October 17, 2003

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
CC: David Chu  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Reserve Affairs Policy Board

There is a Reserve Affairs Policy Board; Al Zapanta is the head of the Board. My understanding is that it has General Blum and seven three-stars on it, one for each of the Reserve elements, plus the Coast Guard.

It seems to me that it would be smart to engage them in this process of balancing the active force with the Reserve force.

Would you please think through how that might be done and put it in motion, or else let's discuss it.

Thanks.

DHR dh  
101703-12

.....  
*Please respond by* 11/21/03



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000  
NOV 18 2003



PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, RESERVE FORCES POLICY BOARD

SUBJECT: Reserve Forces Policy Board Agenda

*OK* —

We are engaged in balancing the active and Reserve forces as part of the Department's overall effort to ease the stress on the Total Force. I believe that our rebalancing strategy to enhance early responsiveness, resolve stressed career fields, and provide innovative management practices for mitigating stress, will result in the judicious and prudent use of the Guard and Reserve.

While many of the members of the Reserve Forces Policy Board serve in positions within the Department in which they have been at the forefront of the force rebalancing effort in their respective Services, I believe that the Board itself could make a singular contribution to advancing our strategy. There are four specific areas that I would like the Board to review:

- Are there additional opportunities for "associate" or "blended" units in the various services?
- Can interservice/joint solutions resolve stressed reserve career fields, i.e. construction, Intel, medical?
- How can we improve individual augmentee support to combatant commanders' staff during surge operations?
- Will changes to the Individual Ready Reserve relieve stress on the force?

Accordingly, I would like you to present a plan for approval to Assistant Secretary Hall within sixty days of the date of this memorandum that details how you intend to proceed with the review and a timeline for completion. Your proposal should examine whether, in the opinion of the Board members, any of these areas will result in a better balance between the active and reserve forces. If any can relieve the stress on force, provide concrete suggestions for change, giving consideration to any funding, policy, milestone, implementation or other pertinent issues. The final product will be a report and brief to me.



11-L-0559/OSD/17453

Since this is such a pressing problem for the Department, I would like you to consider it your primary emphasis area over the next 6-8 months and devote the board's time, travel schedules and efforts toward implementing your approved plan.

With the tremendous capacity, background and expertise possessed by the RFPB, I believe you will be able to help significantly with this most pressing problem. I look forward to reviewing the results of your work.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "David", with a horizontal line underneath.

David S. C. Chu

October 17, 2003

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
 CC: David Chu  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
 SUBJECT: Reserve Affairs Policy Board

334 RFPB

There is a Reserve Affairs Policy Board; Al Zapanta is the head of the Board. My understanding is that it has General Blum and seven three-stars on it, one for each of the Reserve elements, plus the Coast Guard.

It seems to me that it would be smart to engage them in this process of balancing the active force with the Reserve force.

Would you please think through how that might be done and put it in motion, or else let's discuss it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
101703-12

.....  
 Please respond by 11/21/03

17 Oct 03

U19018 /03

OB  
5/20

May 5, 2003 11:01 AM

SUBJECT: Talk to AMB Bremer

I want to talk to Jerry Bremer about clearing with me anyone he is going to hire.

DHR:dh  
050503-7

ORO CPA

U19029 /03

5 May 03

May 5, 2003 2:33 PM

333 SD

TO: Jaymie Durnan  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Kissinger's Birthday May 27

I have to decide pretty soon if I am going to go to Kissinger's birthday dinner in New York City on May 27. I certainly would not want to go up there unless there were other things to do. Would you please check with Torie to see if there are things I ought to do up there?

It is possible that I should just go straight to Asia from there, although with a plane full of people, I suppose that is not a good idea. Joyce will probably leave for Chicago and Taos the day I leave for Asia.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
050503-49

.....

Please respond by 5/9/03

5 May 03

U19030 /03

~~OBE~~

May 5, 2003 2:55 PM

TO: Jaymie Duman  
LTG Craddock  
CC: Col. Bucci  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Defense Attaché Reception

OO: 11 SD

Who is hosting the Attaché Reception on May 22 at the State Department?

I have been to that a couple of times, and I think I may want to skip it this year. It is on a Thursday night, and I don't see any reason why Joyce and I should do that. Why don't you think about Paul doing that.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
050503-53

.....  
Please respond by 5/9/03

5 May 03

U19031 /03

May 5, 2003 4:01 PM

TO: Jim Haynes  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Healthcare

02050

Please talk to your ethics person and see if I should be paying a tax on imputed income for the healthcare I receive from Dr. Baxter.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
050503-58

.....  
Please respond by 5/16/03

5 May 03

U19032 /03

May 6, 2003 8:14 AM

*ADVANCE*  
*Done 5/6*  
*copy sent*

02050

TO: Jaymie Durnan  
Col. Bucci

CC: (b)(6)

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Kennerly Event

On calendar, the night of the Kennerly event on Thursday, May 8, I would like to see if we could go from the White House to that function early, at 5:30 p.m. In other words, we would go back, change our clothes and then pick up Joyce and Cathy Franks.

Then the four of us could go to eat, maybe at The Palm restaurant, at 6:30 or 6:45 p.m. We would have to invite Tom and Cathy and see if they would like to do that. I would like to do it, but I would like to make it an early evening.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
050603-11

.....

Please respond by 5/7/03

6 May 03

U19033 /03

May 6, 2003 7:00 PM

000.7 SD

TO: Torie Clarke  
CC: (b)(6)  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Cartoon

Please see if you can get a copy of this cartoon by Horsey, and make sure we thank the person.

MSG (b)(6) I would like to get it framed when it comes in.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Horsey cartoon

DHR:dh  
050603-16



Please respond by 6/2/03

6 May 03

U19034 /03



May 6, 2003 6:34 PM

000.7 SD

TO: Torie Clarke

CC: (b)(6)  
MSG (b)(6)

ADVANCE COPY SENT (ORIGINAL (b)(6))

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Thank You Letters for Cartoonists

I hope someone is making sure we thank these people who send the cartoons in after we ask for them. For example, Catalino sent a note in on the attached cartoon.

I would like to get it framed, but I want to make sure whenever this happens that we thank the person.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Catalino cartoon

DHR:dh  
050603-15



Please respond by 5/9/03

6 May 03

U19035 /03

May 3, 2003 10:14 AM

TO: Torie Clarke  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Cartoon

Sir:  
Attached.  
T.C.  
D.R.

Please see if you can get this cartoon by Catalino.

Thanks.

Attach.  
4/17/03 *Washington Times*, p. A19

DHR dh  
050303-4



Please respond by 6/6/03

U182-80-03

Creteberg -  
Great Job!  
Ken Catalini



May 6, 2003 12:55 PM

TO: Jaymie Durnan  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Minesweeper Engines

*TO: Pete Aldridge  
Can you get SD an answer  
4716 9/16*

MoD Martino gave me the attached paper on Isotta Fraschini minesweeper engines. I don't know what it is about. I have not read it. He says it could in fact save the country a lot of money.

*Thank*

Please take a look at it, and report back to me what you think ought to be done with it.

Thanks.

*Jaymie*  
*Jaymie Durnan*  
*5/16*

Attach.  
Undated "Isotta Fraschini Minesweeper Engines"  
4/15/03 VCJCS ltr to Isotta Fraschini Motori

DHR:dh  
050603-14

.....  
Please respond by 5/23/03

*6 May 03*

U19037 /03

**Subject: Isotta Fraschini Minesweeper Engines**

**Overview:** The U.S. Navy is seeking to replace Isotta Fraschini engines on its mine-hunter and mine-sweeping ships with either German or American-made engines (MTU or Caterpillar).

This would be a costly mistake. New engines are not needed. The Navy has unaccountably refused to look at engine improvement solutions offered by Isotta which have demonstrated very high levels of engine performance. Moreover, the Isotta proposal will save the Navy as much as \$500 million, and keeping Isotta in the U.S. fleet supports the strong industrial and political relationship between Italy and the United States.

**Gulf War II:** U.S. Minesweepers were an important part of the action in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Isotta supplied an on-board technician to assure perfect service during the hostilities. The performance of Isotta's engines was unflawed, and Isotta earned high praise from the theater commanders and from the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. The superior performance of the product improved engines proved that the Navy does not need replacements.

**Background:** Isotta began supplying diesel engines to the U.S. Navy in the mid-1980's. Its special non-magnetic engines for minesweepers are regarded as the best in the world. Unfortunately, the Navy did not upgrade the engines with product improvements as suggested by Isotta, as new life-extending technology came on line. Isotta is now offering the Navy a very good, low cost product improvement solution for its mine-hunter and minesweeper ships. Most NATO countries, including Italy, use Isotta engines. Australia is using the Isotta engines on its Huon class mine hunters, which were built between 1999 and 2002. The U.S. has long supported commonality among its allies -keeping the Isotta engine in the U.S. fleet supports longstanding U.S. policy as logistical support is available worldwide.

**Proposal:** Expedite the evaluation of Isotta Fraschini's proposal to the U.S. Navy and halt efforts to replace the Isotta engine on U.S. navy minesweepers and mine hunters.

TO MR. KAMAL



VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-0000

15 April 2003

Mr. G. P. Riganti, President  
Mr. Upi Kamal, Vice President-Operations  
Isotta Fraschini Motori S.P.A.  
Sede Legale-Direzione E Stabilimento  
70123 Bari - Italia  
Via Francesco De Blasio - Zona Ind.

Dear Mr. Riganti and Mr. Kamal,

Thank you for your letter. I greatly appreciate the additional effort that you and the people of Isotta Fraschini - FDGM have taken to support the U.S. Navy's mine warfare ships during this time of high operational tempo. Your superb assistance has illustrated the strength of the relationship between Italy and the United States.

Best wishes for your continued success.

Sincerely,

PETER PACE  
General, United States Marine Corps  
Vice Chairman  
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TO: GEN John Abizaid

CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Gen. Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: November 18, 2003

RE: **Afghanistan**

*Afghanistan*

The attached letter from Dostum is worrisome. If he is correct that the Taliban are in control of that many areas within Afghanistan, it is news to me. Please let me know what your assessment is and what you intend to do.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
111803.11

*Attach: 11/7 Letter to SecDef*

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_ 11/30

*18 Nov 03*

U19042 /03

7 November 2003

His Excellency  
Donald Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
United States Department of Defense  
Washington, DC

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I would like to send my and my people's best wishes to you and the American people. We have been friends in the struggle against terrorism and extremism and you can always count on us in this regard. However, I would like to bring to your immediate attention our growing concern about the situation in Afghanistan, particularly the growing threat of the Taliban, Al-Qaeda and Hezb-I-Islami actions not only in the South and East of Afghanistan but in the North. The following are some of the disturbing events and facts about this increasing threat:

- The strength and momentum of the reorganization of the Taliban-Al Qaeda and Hezb-I-Islami has increased significantly. They are in active control of most of Helmand, Kandahar, Paktia, Paktika, and Khost. They are also in significant control of Zabul and part of Ghazni and Urozgan. In Ghazni and Urozgan, the frontlines are very clear, dividing between Hazaras and Pashtuns, where the Pashtuns are Taliban.
- The fusion of terrorists and narcotic traffickers is significantly increasing, bringing additional resources to fund the continuation of their terror activities.
- There is a concerted disinformation campaign by many leaders from these above-mentioned provinces, where Taliban shadow authorities are in power, to confuse and undermine US military efforts.
- Of great concern to us in the North is the growing intelligence we have been receiving of cooperation between certain members of the Afghan Central Government and the Taliban.
- Specifically, at a time when the Government is seeking unilateral disarmament in the North we have received information that three million dollars was sent by the ministry of interior to Kandahar to arm Kandaharis, many of whom are supporters of the Taliban, and some of whom are Taliban.
- A tactic of Taliban supporters in the Government has been to consistently downplay or ignore the Taliban reorganization and this has undermined efforts to resist their advances.
- Those who fought the Taliban have been discriminated and denied posts by the Government while many former Taliban are being given sensitive and important positions. This creates distrust particularly in areas, such as the North, Northeast, West and Hazarajat where the people were brutalized by the Taliban and Al-Qaeda.
- Among the so called neutral police deployed to Mazar are many former Taliban, some of whom have committed atrocities in Mazar under Taliban occupation. We

have also received information that these police have been acquiring further weapons and arming particular Taliban and Hezb-i-Islami supporters in the area. We believe these actions will set the stage for new Taliban, Al-Qaeda and Hezb-i-Islami terror activities in the North.

- We are concerned about a growing perception in the North that the British PRT favors Pashtuns over other groups. This damages not only their image but that of America. We believe American forces were much more balanced. We urgently request the return of a small US military team to the region or at least a military attaché who can advise on anti-terror issues.

We urgently ask that you take these concerns into account. We believe that we are about to enter a period of significantly increased Taliban-Al-Qaeda and Hezb-I-Islami terrorist activity throughout the country directed particularly at US and international targets as well as the leaders and followers of those who fought the Taliban.

Mr. Secretary, make no mistake: we are in a war still with the extremists. It is a fight that we share together. For our people, it is nothing less than our survival. Rest assured that we shall do everything in our power to prevent or block such terrorist activities and actions. We have no intention of allowing these terrible groups to return without fully resisting them. But we ask for your and your governments understanding of the complexity of Afghanistan. We ask that you review some of policies that may be hurting those who stand with you against the extremists. Please do not forget the battle against terrorists and extremists in Afghanistan.

Sincerely,

Abdul Rashid Dostum

OB  
6/2

May 6, 2003 7:43 AM

SUBJECT: Benchmarks

I want to talk to the Round Table about having the benchmarks, so we can show them to President Bush and brief him.

DHR:dh  
050603-5

030 505

EMag 03

U19046 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/17472

Hsra Pacific  
Lawlers

EX-5231 05/28

May 6, 2003 12:50 PM

TO: Doug Feith  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Diesel Electric Submarines

5603

Jaymie Durn  
5/23

Martino gave me the attached paper on submarines.

He said they have some diesels they are going to be getting rid of. They cannot move them directly to Taiwan, but they could move them to us, and then we could possibly move them to Taiwan.

I don't know anything about it. Please take a look at it and then report back to me. When I say report back to me, I mean it. I would like to know what happens on it.

Paul Wolfowitz was involved in the submarine issue with Taiwan last year.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Undated "Submarines for ROC (Taiwan)"

DHR:dh  
050603-13

RECEIVED

MAY 9 2003

Please respond by 5/23/03

RESPONSE ATTACHED

5/19  
6 May 03

U19048 /03



Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense  
Asian and Pacific Affairs

SECRET

MAY 21 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary of Defense

May 17, 2003

CC: Doug Feith                      RE: Italian Subs for Taiwan  
Peter Rodman  
Peter Flory

Sir,

Negotiations between the U.S. and Taiwan navies on new submarines have been at an impasse for many months due to disagreements over Taiwanese funding of the program decision process and the feasibility of the contending submarine options. The realities of the program delays inherent in the new-build submarine option (10-15 years) and the high cost of such a program are now causing Taiwan to reconsider its focus on the new-build option.

We believe that this Italian option may be a way to resolve the problem, assuming the Taiwanese come to favor the solution adopted by the Singaporean Navy (the purchase of refurbished Swedish attack submarines).

With frustrations building on both sides of this issue, I have this past week raised this issue with senior Taiwanese national security officials. I suggested that they must make a near term decision as to which way they want to go (the 15 year, \$6 billion new-build sub program or the 4-6 year, less expensive, refurbished unit option). To achieve such a consensus Taiwan must elevate this decision to its highest policy level, and I have asked them to do so.

I will engage the U.S. Navy's International Program Office on this issue the early part of next week. Taiwan's Vice Chief of Naval Operations is in town the latter part of next week, and the submarine program is first on his agenda.

We'll keep you up to date on our progress.

Richard P. Lawless

11-L-0559/OSD/17474

MAY - 5 2003

**Subject:** Submarines for ROC (Taiwan)

**Overview:** The President has promised to supply the ROC (Taiwan) with up to 8 modern diesel electric submarines for ROC security needs. This promise, made more than one year ago, has not been fulfilled because (a) European suppliers have been reluctant to license diesel electric submarine technology to the U.S. and (b) indigenous solutions are extraordinarily expensive and carry high risk.

**An Alternative Solution:** Italy is in the process of retiring 8 Sauro class submarines, which were built in the 1980's and 1990's. These submarines can be upgraded significantly and could form an alternative to the search for a submarine manufacturing license or a "from scratch" solution. While Italy cannot sell these submarines directly to the customer, the submarines can be sold to the U.S. Navy by the Italian Navy and upgraded by a U.S. contractor supported by Italy as necessary.

**Advantages:** The key advantages for the customer are (1) early acquisition of modern submarines; (2) far lower cost of acquisition; (3) full functionality against the threat. The Sauro re-conversion can be fashioned as an interim solution for the end user.

**Proposal:** The U.S. needs to rapidly decide whether it wants to pursue this option and inform Italy. Due to pressure from domestic manufacturers, the end user has not been briefed by the U.S. Navy on the availability of this option or the possibility of an interim solution.

May 6, 2003 8:33 AM

OB

TO: Jaymie Durnan  
Col. Bucci  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Meeting w/Roche

ADVANCE  
COY SEAT

I will need to see Secretary Roche sometime before I leave this week.

*[Signature]*

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
050603-12

Cathy, please  
Schedule.

Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*[Handwritten mark]*

050603-12

6 May 03

U19050 /03

OUTBOX

May 6, 2003 8:08 AM

TO: Torie Clarke  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *TR*  
SUBJECT: Rebuttal

*028 of 104*

Please take a look at this article from the *San Diego Union*. Again, they said that I "undermined Shinseki's authority by naming his replacement 15 months before the end" of his tour. I think you ought to get a letter and tell them it is not true.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Caldwell, Robert J. "Rumsfeld vs. the Army," *San Diego Union-Tribune*, May 4, 2003.

DHR:dh  
050603-10

.....  
Please respond by 5/16/03

*6 MAY 03*

U19051 /03

San Diego Union-Tribune  
May 4, 2003

## Rumsfeld Vs. The Army

### *Military needs reform, but smaller isn't necessarily better*

By Robert J. Caldwell

For Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, America's victory in the three-week Iraq war counted as a double triumph. With U.S. military forces scoring a decisive victory in record time with minimal loss of life, Rumsfeld's controversial strategy and his futuristic vision of a transformed military seemed vindicated. Conversely, Rumsfeld's numerous critics among the armed service's uniformed leadership were undercut.

This does not, however, end the Pentagon's roiling controversy over military reform and transformation. Far from it.

Nowhere in the armed forces is that conflict over modernization more bitter and unresolved than in the U.S. Army.

The Army in particular was dissatisfied with the Iraq war plan, which abandoned the Desert Storm doctrine of using overwhelming force. Senior Army planners wanted more troops and more tanks on the ground in Iraq to assure a rapid victory and minimal casualties. Rumsfeld wanted to rely on air power, precision weapons, special operations forces and a "rolling start" with the three available Army and Marine divisions that could be reinforced later if necessary.

The arguably risky rolling start strategy carried the day in Washington and then won big in Iraq.

Score a major win for Rumsfeld in his struggle to transform America's military.

But the Iraq victory does little or nothing to ease the professional fears among top Army leaders. They worry that the U.S. military's senior service is being shunted aside by civilian theoreticians, meaning Rumsfeld and his deputies. Rumsfeld, for his part, is known to believe that much of the Army remains stuck in Cold War-era thinking, tolerating a force structure too heavy and too slow for the revolution in warfare now occurring.

The Rumsfeld-Army friction shows in mutually destructive ways.

When Rumsfeld cancelled the Army's cherished Crusader mobile artillery system last year, Army Chief of Staff Gen. Eric Shinseki and Secretary of the Army Thomas White balked. The Army brass infuriated Rumsfeld by lobbying Congress behind his back (unsuccessfully) to restore the Army's top priority artillery program, then ready for production.

Rumsfeld compounds this atmosphere of mistrust by treating Shinseki, a decorated combat veteran who lost part of a foot in Vietnam, with ill-disguised disdain. Rumsfeld undermined Shinseki's authority by naming his replacement 15 months before the scheduled end of Shinseki's

tour. On April 25, Rumsfeld summarily fired the conscientious Army Secretary White, whose chief offense was to side with the Army's uniformed leadership.

This is about more, much more, than simply whether the Army will modernize – that was never in doubt. It is how that modernization will occur and how much further the Army will be reduced in size that is at stake.

The Army has already been radically downsized. From 18 active duty combat divisions in the 1980s, it was reduced in the 1990s to 10 combat divisions. Rumsfeld is widely believed to favor cutting two or even three more Army divisions from the active duty force. That could shrink the Army from today's 480,000 troops (down from nearly 800,000 a decade ago) to fewer than 400,000 soldiers on active duty. That would be the smallest Army in more than half a century.

The Army is fully committed to modernization. It wants the lighter, more mobile combat forces appropriate to the technology-driven revolution in military affairs. Shinseki organized the Army's revolutionary new light armored brigades built around the 20-ton Stryker armored vehicle, which is two-thirds lighter than the Army's M1A1 main battle tank. These new 3,500 soldier brigades equipped with 300 Strykers each can be deployed overseas in days compared to the months needed for a heavy armored division.

Similarly, the Army is eagerly embracing all of the new technology that is remaking warfare. The Army's use of drone reconnaissance aircraft, night-vision gear, precision munitions, information warfare and communications, and combined arms operations were all on brilliant display in Iraq.

What the Army's leadership fears, and with good reason, is any doctrinal decision to de-emphasize ground combat forces. Cutting two or three more combat divisions out of the remaining force of 10 Army divisions amidst the continuing war against terrorism would certainly suggest just such a doctrinal leap in the dark.

For all the high-tech gadgetry on display in the Iraq campaign, it was still the Army's M1A1 Abrams tanks, Bradley Fighting Vehicles and 155mm self-propelled field artillery that occupied an enemy country, overran his capital city and consummated the U.S. victory. Without American boots on the ground, there could have been no triumph in Iraq or Afghanistan.

Army leaders also wonder what happens if – or more likely, when – the United States goes up against a heavily armed enemy whose army will fight. Does North Korea come to mind? In that grim event, an American victory would require more than a few Stryker brigades, special forces and air power.

An Army already stretched from the Balkans to Iraq to Korea cannot get any smaller without unacceptable risks to America's global security interests. This should be especially obvious amidst a continuing war against terrorism that has already produced two shooting wars in 19 months.

Nor is this the right time to retire the Army's most lethal firepower even if it does take longer to reach the battlefield. Just ask Iraq's Republican Guards.

*Caldwell is a editor of the Insight section.*

5/9  
1700  
Snowflake

May 7, 2003 4:50 PM

TO: LTG Craddock  
Jaymie Durnan

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA

SUBJECT: Scheduled Phone Calls w/Bremer

I would like to have a phone call every other day with Jerry Bremer, in a very small group, like I did with Franks.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
050703-8

.....  
Please respond by 5/13/03

020 CPA

COL Buccini:  
let's set  
this up  
separate from  
Garner!

7 May 03

Jaymie Durnan

5/9

OB  
6/3

May 7, 2003 4:56 PM

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Bob Kerrey

I am a little worried about Bob Kerrey, now that I see this note in here where he is criticizing the Administration. It is not clear we ought to send him over there if that is the case.

360 04

Thanks.

Attach.  
Hersh, Seymour M. "Selective Intelligence," *New Yorker*, May 12, 2003.

DHR:dh  
050703-10



Please respond by 5/16/03

50 Rumsfeld

U19053 /03

I.N.C. continued to provoke fights within the Bush Administration. The Pentagon flew Chalabi and hundreds of his supporters, heavily armed, into Iraq, amid tight security, over angry objections from the State Department. Chalabi is now establishing himself in Baghdad. His advocates in the Pentagon point out that he is not only a Shiite, like the majority of Iraqis, but also, as one scholar put it, "a completely Westernized businessman" (he emigrated to England with his parents in 1958, when he was a boy), which is one reason the State Department doubts whether he can gain support among Iraqis.

Chalabi is not the only point of contention, however. The failure, as of last week, to find weapons of mass destruction in places where the Pentagon's sources confidently predicted they would be found has reanimated the debate on the quality of the office's intelligence. A former high-level intelligence official told me that American Special Forces units had been sent into Iraq in mid-March, before the start of the air and ground war, to investigate sites suspected of being missile or chemical- and biological-weapon storage depots. "They came up with nothing," the official said. "Never found a single Scud."

Since then, there have been a number of false alarms and a tip that weapons may have been destroyed in the last days before the war, but no solid evidence. On April 22nd, Hans Blix, hours before he asked the U.N. Security Council to send his team back to Iraq, told the BBC, "I think it's been one of the disturbing elements that so much of the intelligence on which the capitals built their case seemed to have been so shaky."

There is little self-doubt or second-guessing in the Pentagon over the failure to immediately find the weapons. The Pentagon adviser to Special Plans told me he believed that the delay "means

nothing. We've got to wait to get all the answers from Iraqi scientists who will tell us where they are." Similarly, the Pentagon official who works for Luti said last week, "I think they're hidden in the mountains or transferred to some friendly countries. Saddam had enough time to move them." There were suggestions from the Pentagon that Saddam might be shipping weapons over the border to Syria. "It's bait and switch," the former high-level intelligence official said. "Bait them into Iraq with weapons of mass destruction. And, when they aren't found, there's this whole bullshit about the weapons being in Syria."

In Congress, a senior legislative aide said, "Some members are beginning to ask and to wonder, but cautiously." For now, he told me, "the members don't have the confidence to say that the Administration is off base." He also commented, "For many, it makes little difference. We vanquished a bad guy and liberated the Iraqi people. Some are astute enough to recognize that the alleged imminent W.M.D. threat to the U.S. was a pretext. I sometimes have to pinch myself when friends or family ask with incredulity about the lack of W.M.D., and remind myself that the average person has the idea that there are mountains of the stuff over there, ready to be tripped over. The more time elapses, the more people are going to wonder about this, but I don't think it will sway U.S. public opinion much. Everyone loves to be on the winning side."

Weapons may yet be found. Iraq is a big country, as the Administration has repeatedly pointed out in recent weeks. In a speech last week, President Bush said, "We've begun the search for hidden chemical and biological weapons, and already know of hundreds of sites that will be investigated." Meanwhile, if the American advance hasn't

uncovered stashes of weapons of mass destruction, it has turned up additional graphic evidence of the brutality of the regime. But Saddam Hussein's cruelty was documented long before September 11th, and was not the principal reason the Bush Administration gave to the world for the necessity of war.

Former Senator Bob Kerrey, a Democrat who served on the Senate Intelligence Committee, has been a strong supporter of the President's decision to overthrow Saddam. "I do think building a democratic secular state in Iraq justifies everything we've done," Kerrey, who is now president of New School University, in New York, told me. "But they've taken the intelligence on weapons and expanded it beyond what was justified." Speaking of the hawks, he said, "It appeared that they understood that to get the American people on their side they needed to come up with something more to say than 'We've liberated Iraq and got rid of a tyrant.' So they had to find some ties to weapons of mass destruction and were willing to allow a majority of Americans to incorrectly conclude that the invasion of Iraq had something to do with the World Trade Center. Overemphasizing the national-security threat made it more difficult to get the rest of the world on our side. It was the weakest and most misleading argument we could use." Kerrey added, "It appears that they have the intelligence. The problem is, they didn't like the conclusions."

St. Louis Post-Dispatch  
May 5, 2003

### 17. Observers Differ On Latest Leadership Shakeups At Pentagon

By Philip Dine, Post-Dispatch

WASHINGTON - Even as the military basks in its overwhelming victory in Iraq, there are signs of leadership

turmoil at the Pentagon, where the services - Army, Navy and Air Force - are being hit with an unusual degree of turnover at the top.

The planned switch of Air Force Secretary James Roche to run the Army, disclosed Friday, is the latest major personnel change in works at the upper reaches of the Defense Department, but it's far from the only one.

The Army job is open because Thomas White was fired a week earlier by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, following months of open friction.

Meanwhile, a permanent replacement has yet to be found for former Navy Secretary Gordon England, who left in January. The Navy has had three secretaries in four months, the last two serving in an acting capacity, and has had no undersecretary, the No. 2 civilian post, for that entire period.

The turmoil doesn't stop with the civilian leaders. The Army's top uniformed man, Gen. Eric Shinseki, is set to leave in June, at the end of his four-year term.

"Flux? I'd call it an exodus," said military analyst Loren Thompson, chief operating officer at the Lexington Institute. "Everybody is thinking of clearing out."

Several factors are at work here, military analysts and sources say:

Rumsfeld is trying to quicken the pace of reform in a time of terrorist threat.

Success in Iraq and Afghanistan has given him added stature to do much of what he wants.

Some members of the high-powered team assembled two years ago to run the military services have chafed over what they perceive as minor roles.

Retired Maj. Gen. William Nash, the first commander of U.S. forces in Bosnia, said Rumsfeld is "moving while the iron's hot."

May 7, 2003 5:02 PM

TO: Jaymie Durnan  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Vin Weber

*230-01*

Please check to see what the White House's impression is of Vin Weber. I may want to talk to him ~~along the lines we discussed today~~ if they are comfortable with him.  
*about coming to P.O.D.*

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
050703-12



Please respond by 5/16/03

*Jaymie 03*

U19055 /03

THE DENVER POST

1560 Broadway  
Denver, CO 80202  
(303) 820-1010

DEAR SECRETARY RUMSFELD,  
GLAD YOU LIKED THE  
CARICON!

- Mike Keefe  
1964 OZARK AAU  
(MISSOURI AND SOUTHERN  
ILLINOIS)  
142 LB WRESTLING  
CHAMP

Frame?

yes

no

Please advise -

Thank you,  
am

May 7, 2003 5:11 PM

TO: (b)(6)  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Cartoon

*ADVANCE COPY SENT*

*000052*

Please let me know if we have thanked Mike Keefe for this cartoon. I need to know that someone has written a thank you note to him.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Keefe ~~cartoon~~ and note

DHR:dh  
050703-14

.....  
Please respond by 5/9/03

*7 May 03*

U19056 /03

May 7, 2003 5:15 PM

TO: Torie Clarke  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: European MPs

220

Here is an allegation in the press that I decided "no MPs." Gen. Myers, the Joint Staff and I cannot figure that out.

Please write a letter rejecting it and saying it is not true.

Thanks.

Attach.

Alter, Jonathan. "Smugness Is Our Greatest Enemy," *Newsweek*, April 28, 2003.

DHR:dh  
050703-15



Please respond by 5/23/03

7 May 03

U19057 /03

15/6  
#413

April 22, 2003 8:12 AM

TO: Gen. Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: European MPs

Here is an article from *Newsweek* that says I refused to have European MPs. I have no recollection of anything like that. Do you?

Please get me the facts.

Thanks.

Attach.

Alter, Jonathan. "Smugness Is Our Greatest Enemy," *Newsweek*, April 28, 2003, p. 35.

DHR:dh  
042203-2

.....

Please respond by 5/1/03

*5/6/03*  
CJCS RESPONSE ATTACHED  
*v/r*

#413



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9990

INFO MEMO

CM-929-03  
5 May 2003

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS

*RBM 5/5*

SUBJECT: European Military Police (MPs)

- In response to your question regarding a 28 April *Newsweek* magazine article concerning MPs not being deployed from Europe to Iraq, the following is provided.
- A review conducted by my staff, USCENTCOM, USEUCOM and the Department of the Army has been unable to identify a request that is likely to have been the basis of the allegation.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: Lt Gen N. A. Schwartz, USAF; Director, J-3;

(b)(6)

Jonathan Alter

# Smugness Is Our Greatest Enemy

*Handwritten initials*

**I** KNOW IT'S A COMMON COMPLAINT, BUT WHY CAN'T PEOPLE EVER admit that their side might be wrong? The doves can't admit they were wrong about the rightness of freeing 24 million Iraqis, however chaotic the aftermath. And the hawks can't admit that they are wrong about the go-it-alone occupation, including a boneheaded Pentagon decision I came across that helped open the door for the looting of some of civilization's treasures. Both sides are more dug in than the Third Infantry Division at Baghdad International Airport.

Let's be clear about the doves. They never said the United States wouldn't win militarily; their objection was based on other factors (rejection of "preventive" war, botched diplomacy, etc.). And they may be proved right: history's jury will be out a long time. Even so, I can't get over how churlish the left has become. When did the liberals take the "lib" out of liberation? This was a totalitarian regime we're talking about, with a boot on the face of the Iraqi people. The same folks who led the charge against fascism in Europe; who rightly spoke up against the U.S. government about "disappearances" in El Salvador and Guatemala; who carried high the banner of human rights—now they yawn at revelations of mass graves in Iraq and argue that the Iraqis will be no better off than before. Freedom's just another word that liberals have figured out how to lose.

The explanation is partly partisan politics. Many Democrats are so blinded by their loathing of George W. Bush that they can't think straight. In their hearts, they don't see Bush as the legitimately elected president, just as Tom DeLay and the right-wing attack machine tried to deny President Clinton's legitimacy from the outset, without even a Florida rationale. In both cases, this thinking can take you right over the cliff. (See Gingrich, N.)

Today too many Democrats are playing Charlie Brown to Bush's Lucy. Just as they started talking about a quagmire, the war was won. Next football to be snatched away: WMD. At the precise moment this week or next that the liberals proclaim that Iraq has no chemical weapons after all, they'll finally turn up in Syria or some bunker. Promise. Republicans, meanwhile, remind me of Chris Rock's foe in "Head of

ministering their occupations. This crowd is more Kiplingesque.

Smugness can kill. It may be satisfying to say "Screw you" to the United Nations, and the United States got away with it during the war. But in an occupation, it's not smart. Isn't it about time the DOD started playing some defense? Which is the more likely target of suicide bombers: a barracks full of American soldiers or a barracks full of peacekeepers—including Muslim troops—from around the world? You'd think we could figure out how to run the occupation without presenting such a fat target.

In short, the fighting was brilliant; the immediate "follow-on" a failure. Donald Rumsfeld was right to have a light, speedy war plan. Another division wasn't necessary. But the "retired officers embedded in TV studios" (to quote our draft-deferment vice president about former generals Barry McCaffrey and Wesley Clark, who have four Silver Stars between them) were not entirely wrong. I learned last week that many Army officers wanted to airlift in 3,000 MPs (military police) from Europe



TAKING CHARGE: Franks exults in Baghdad

## Today, many Democrats are playing Charlie Brown to Bush's Lucy. Just as they were talking about a quagmire, the war was won.

State." His slogan is "God Bless America—and no place else." Ari Fleischer says the White House can't keep the Rev. Franklin Graham, who has called Islam "a very evil and wicked religion," from performing Good Friday services in Baghdad and trying to Christianize the country. How about a phone call from his good friend the president (at whose Inaugural he spoke)?

Then there are those images all over the Arab world of Gen. Tommy Franks & Co. smoking cigars and getting comfortable in Saddam's presidential palace, as if they were the pigs in George Orwell's "Animal Farm" celebrating their revolution by moving into the farmer's house. Doesn't look too good to the other animals—or the Iraqi people. Gens. Douglas MacArthur and Lucien Clay took great pains to understand Japanese and German society before ad-

to protect supply lines and police Baghdad. That would have aided the drive to the capital and helped to protect institutions like hospitals and museums once forces arrived there. As it was, the main hospital wasn't even secured until an officer was alerted to the looting by New Yorker reporter Jon Lee Anderson.

But Rumsfeld apparently decided: no MPs. The European MPs would have had to be replaced by reservists. And if more reservists had been called up in the middle of the war, it would have reinforced the criticism that Rumsfeld hadn't sent enough troops. When the real history is written, we may find out that some of the world's oldest treasures were lost to looters in part because someone at the Pentagon suffers from the oldest of human sins—pride.

11-L-0559/OSD/17490

TAB B

COORDINATION

US Army	COL Chappell	29 Apr
USCENTCOM	Col Halverson	29 Apr
USEUCOM	CAPT Cragg	29 Apr
USJFCOM	Col Day	29 Apr

May 7, 2003 4:18 PM

TO: LTG Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: POTUS Speech

DONE

I am supposed to be getting a speech that the President is giving on Friday. I haven't received it yet. Condi said it would be sent over this morning. Has it come in?

Thanks.

DFIR:dh  
050703-3

.....  
Please respond by 5/8/03

20030507

2 May 03

U19058 /03

September 23, 2003

240

TO: David Chu  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Food Stamps

I would like to know how many people in the 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division actually are on food stamps at any given time.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
092203-54

.....  
Please respond by 10/10/03

23 Sep 03

U19075 /03

May 7, 2003 4:52 PM

TO: (b)(6)  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Certificate for Amb. Bremer

Please tickle a note for three weeks from now that we want to get a certificate for Ambassador Bremer showing he is a Presidential Envoy.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
050703-9



Please respond by 5/30/03

*020 CPA*

*7 May 03*

U19077 /03

May 8, 2003 8:40 AM

TO: Torie Clarke  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Cartoon

*OSD 7 52*

Please see if you can get this cartoon, suitable for framing.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Cartoon

DHR:dh  
050803-5




Please respond by 6/2/03

*8 May 03*

U19078 /03



Brookings Brookings Times Dispatch  
9/10/03



11-L-0559/OSD/17496

OWEN V. FRISBY  
PUBLIC AFFAIRS CONSULTANT

(b)(6)

TELEPHONE

(b)(6)

FACSIMILE

(b)(6)

May 7, 2003

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld  
Secretary Of Defense

Dear Don:

Congratulations on THE BEST EDITORIAL SUPPORTING YOUR LEADERSHIP that I have seen so far in the RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH yesterday.

I am faxing this editorial along with two new cartoons.

Also enjoyed your speech recently at the COUNCIL FOR NATIONAL POLICY DINNER. I had hoped to come by and say hello at the reception prior to dinner but just missed you by a couple of minutes.

Sincerely,



Owen V. Frisby

11-L-0559/OSD/17497

May 8, 2003 9:55 AM

TO: (b)(6)

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*

SUBJECT: POTUS Memo

Make sure you let Gen. Myers, Gen. Pace, Gen. Franks, Paul Wolfowitz and Doug Feith read my memo to the President after I returned from the Gulf, but I don't think we ought to leave it with people.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
050803-7

.....  
*Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_*

May 9, 2003  
3:10 PM

Mr. Secretary—

The trip memo to POTUS was taken, in sequence, to each office for the principals to read and then return. They were asked to not make copies.

V/R

(b)(6)

*Peterian Feith*

*SMay 03*

U19079 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/17498

*5/9*

May 8, 2003 8:56 AM

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: POTUS Bremer Letter

I think Colin Powell, Condi Rice, George Tenet and Tom Franks all ought to see a copy of the final letter the President signs to Jerry Bremer. After it is signed

*OSD CPA*

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
050803-9

.....

Please respond by 5/16/03

*8 May 03*

U19080 /03

EF-5230  
ISA 5/28

May 8, 2003 9:29 AM NEST

TO: Bill Luti  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA  
SUBJECT: Qatar

Jaymie Durnan  
5/27

QATAR

I take it you are going to follow up on the meeting with the Amir of Qatar.

We do need to fashion language that describes our relationship that we can use publicly. We ought to have a higher-level strategic look, and then reconnect with the foreign minister, so it gets worked out.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
050803-11

Please respond by 5/23/03  
USDP Luti has for action 5/12  
Will follow up w/hand written note

update 5/12  
Bill Luti  
JL

RESPONSE ATTACHED 5/21  
v/R

*Don't know*  
cc: SSD  
CTCS

Jaymie Durnan

U19081 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/17500

Qatar 03

5/28

SJZ  
17501

OSD/ISA/NESA  
21 May 03

To: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

From: William J. Luti

Subject: Qatar

You asked us to relook our relationship with Qatar commensurate with the Qatari's request to have a strategic dialogue. You also asked us to fashion language that describes our relationship that can be used in public.

- We are going to raise the lead for our bilateral Military Consultative Commission from my level to the Assistant Secretary-level.
  - Peter Rodman will chair the US side.
  - We will add a "Strategic Dialogue Subcommittee" to be headed by Peter Rodman and the Qatari co-chair.
- And DoD will participate in State's new broad strategic dialogue framework [FM Hamad recently sent a request for this to SecState].
- Attached is draft language we can use to describe our relationship to the Qataris in public.

## **Draft Public Description of U.S.-Qatari Relationship**

The United States and Qatar share a broad, substantial, and growing partnership as exemplified by our mutual vision for regional security and stability, and peace.

Qatar has consistently proven a steadfast friend, and the United States remains prepared to confront threats to our friends.

The United States and Qatar will continue to work together and with others to destroy international terror.

We continue to share commitment to achieve a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

The United States and Qatar are optimistic about the future, and look forward to advancing our mutual interests.

May 9, 2003 8:10 AM

TO: Jaymie Durnan  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Feedback

*ADVANCE  
COPY SENT*

*Durnan*  
**Jaymie Durnan**

*720*

*230.02*

Please call Heather Wilson, the Congresswoman from New Mexico. She is very positive on Barbara Barrett, the person we are looking at for Air Force secretary.

Also call John Kyl and get a debrief from him, or have Paul do it. Let him know I have left town. We want to find out what Kyl has against Barbara Barrett. He feels she is not a good choice for the Air Force.

I would like a report on this after you have talked to both those people.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
050903-12

.....

Please respond by 5/14/03

*9 May 03*

U19082 /03

May 9, 2003 8:05 AM

TO: Jaymie Durnan  
CC: Powell Moore  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Budget

110.01

Ted Stevens asked me if we are going to need a supplemental or amendments to '04. I don't have any idea what he was talking about.

Thanks.

Don ZAKheim:  
Help!

DHR:dh  
050903-11

.....  
Please respond by 5/14/03

Jc

low

U19083 /03

May 9, 2003 7:42 AM

TO: Powell Moore  
CC: Jaymie Durnan  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Illinois Group—Ray LaHood

*Done*

237

Jaymie Durnan

Congressman Ray LaHood (R-Illinois, said on May 19 and 20 he will be having  
15 or 20 folks from Illinois in town. We might want to give them a tour of the  
Pentagon, and let them come in so I can say hello to them.

*5/20*

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
050903-5

.....  
Please respond by 5/16/03

*by M... 5/9*

U19084 /03

May 9, 2003 8:33 AM

TO: Jaymie Durnan  
LTG Craddock

CC: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Lunch for Ivanov

*Done*  
Jaymie Durnan  
*5/20*  
*Russia*

I probably ought to have a lunch for Sergei Ivanov when he is in on either 21 or 22 May. Condi is going to have a dinner for him, and I am not going to go.

Thanks.

*cc: [redacted] Done 5/12*  
*(b)(6)*

DHR:dh  
050903-18

.....  
Please respond by 5/16/03

*9 May 03*

U19085 /03

May 9, 2003 8:18 AM

TO: Jaymie Durnan  
LTG Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Cunningham Medal of Honor Board

*5/20*

*260.1*

Please take a look at this note Duke Cunningham gave me concerning the Medal of Honor review board. After you have it figured out, please come and explain it to me.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Cunningham note to SecDef

DHR:dh  
030903-15

.....  
Please respond by 5/20/03

*David Chu  
preparing a  
note for you to  
send to Duke.*

*J/R  
5/14/03*

U19086 /03

Jaymie Dur  
*5/20*

~~FYI~~

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS  
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

SECDEF HAS SEEN

MAY - 9 2003

FROM Duke Cunningham  
TO SECDEF FYI 1007  
SUBJ Medal of Honor Review Board

1. MR SEC THE SUBJECT BOARD IS CURRENTLY MEETING TO REVIEW THE ORIGINAL Medal of Honor Rec.
2. DUCUN HONOR obtained all the original records with Gen Billy Norris.
3. All the following signatures including CAG AND THE VA & VF COMMANDING OFFICERS FROM THE USS CONNOR SIGNED AND ENDORSED THE AWARD.

write the award rec

- ADAM HUTCH COOPER CTF-77
- CAPT ID WARR CO USS CONNOR
- CAPT COS Egger CAG
- ALL VF - VA COMMANDING OFFICER (MOST ON THE JOINT MISSION)

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS  
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

CONTRACT

COMSERVFLT

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF (ENDORSED)

\* FOUR NAVY CAPTAINS BOARD, DOWN-  
GRADED A00H TO NAVY CROSS -  
SEN JOHN WARNER (SEC NAV)  
SUPPORTS A00H AWARD

Very Respectfully  
Duke Cunningham

**Durnan, Jaymie, CIV, OSD**

---

**From:** Chu, David, CIV, OSD-P&R  
**Sent:** Friday, May 16, 2003 5:53 PM  
**To:** Durnan, Jaymie, CIV, OSD  
**Cc:** Abell, Charles S., CIV, OSD-P&R  
**Subject:** Cunningham Medal of Honor

Jaymie:

Per your request, I have checked on the status of Representative Cunningham's nomination. It is being considered by the Board for the Correction of Naval Records, under the rubric of new and compelling information that he has submitted. I recommend we abide by the Board's findings, once these are received. (Board has not yet rendered its decision.)

I can offer further detail if you wish, at your convenience.

David

May 9, 2003 9:06 AM

TO: Jaymie Durnan  
CC: Col. Bucci  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Meeting Daily

ADVANCE  
COPY

337

I keep asking you to see me each day, and you don't do it. We never have a chance to talk.

We simply have to change the calendar. I have too much stuff to dump on you, and I am not getting it dumped.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
050903-23



Please respond by 5/12/03

Cathy

!  
Thanks!  
Jaymie Durnan  
19

6 MAY 03

U19087 /03

May 12, 2003 2:25 PM

TO: Doug Feith  
CC: *Jim Oberlander/Terry Jones*  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Doug Sears

Here is some information on a fellow who might be able to help with education in Iraq.

Thanks.

Attach.  
E-mail to Mrs. Rumsfeld

DHR:dh  
051203-9

.....  
Please respond by 5/23/03

*over I*

*12/20/03*

U19088 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/17512

**Joyce Rumsfeld**

*DR  
about in Iraq education*

**From:** (b)(6)  
**To:** (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Saturday, April 26, 2003 9:03 PM  
**Subject:** Ed Delattre

**SECDEF HAS SEEN**

**MAY 12 2003**

Dear Joyce,

I left this resume only in an envelope at the house when you were sick but I thought you might like to see the whole letter from Ed. So nice they see (b)(6) so often and I hope his cysts are healing.

Love,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

I learned earlier this week that Don Rumsfeld and the Pentagon are looking for suitable people from the United States to advise the Education Ministry in Iraq. Obviously, the worst thing we could do is send the kinds of educators from the education establishment here at home who have ruined so much of our own public education with fads and fashions and phony research and political correctness and educationist prejudices. But such people, along with their associations and advocacy groups always jump in and try to corner such opportunities.

So, I thought it might be useful to put forward a man who would be ideally suited to serving in such an advisory capacity to the Ministry in Iraq. His resume is attached below, and I am also sending you a copy, along with a copy of this message, by FEDEX.

The man is Doug Sears. He served with distinction in the U.S. Foreign Service in the 1980s, earned a Ph.D. in political science from Penn State in 1987, and became John Silber's Chief of Staff here at BU just before 1990. In 1995, we named him Superintendent of Schools in the Boston University/Chelsea Partnership; in 2000, we named him chairman of the management team of the partnership (a position he still holds); and, on my recommendation in which John Silber concurred, Doug has now succeeded me as Dean of our School of Education.

Doug is a man of great practical wisdom, intellectual refinement, integrity, and tact when it is needed. He knows the facts of life in international politics and has no naivete in him; and he understands that some issues cannot be settled honorably or prudently by compromise. He and his wife (b)(6) are very close to (b)(6) and me, and their daughters (b)(6) (14) and (b)(6) (9) bring much joy to us.

4/28/2003

Don would be able to trust Doug as thoroughly as I do, and education in Iraq would benefit profoundly from Doug's service. Please do let me know of anything else I should do to bring Doug to Don's attention. I hope you will convey (b)(6) and my fond and respectful regards to Joyce and Don.

With love from (b)(6) and me,  
(b)(6)

>I still have the hard copy of the resume-

4/28/2003

11-L-0559/OSD/17514

12  
May 8, 2003 7:51 AM

TO: Powell Moore  
CC: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Congressman Lantos *DN*

*Syria*

I want to see Congressman Lantos when I get back. He wants to brief me on his visit to Syria. We should have Doug Feith and whoever handles Syria in the meeting.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
050903-6

.....  
Please respond by

*5/16/03*

*T 6/29*

*12 May 03*

U19089 /03

May 9<sup>12</sup>, 2003 8:12 AM

TO: Jaymie Durnan  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Racetrack Invitations

*Col Bucci 2*  
*001.15D*

I was invited to a car racetrack down somewhere in Richmond and somewhere in Alabama, and we accepted but it never happened. Could you please find out what happened and why I didn't go?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
050903-13

.....

Please respond by 2/16/03

*12MAY03*

U19091 /03

May 12, 2003 7:56 AM

Singapore

TO: *R. Lawler*  
~~Jan Brzezinski~~  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Singapore Training and Exercises

I take it we are going to talk to Singapore about expanding training and exercises and focus in on the question of the releasability of equipment.

I don't know what the admiral who is the new defense minister was referring to. We need to think through how we can help them defend themselves.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
050903-8

.....

Please respond by 5/30/03

U19092 /03

12MAY03

May 9, 2003 8:03 AM

TO: Jaymie Durnan  
CC: Powell Moore  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Bechtel

091

Ted Stevens says that Bechtel is giving the subcontracts to all overseas suppliers, and not to Home Depot. He wonders why we are doing that and not to countries who helped in the coalition.

Please get back to me.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
050903-10

.....

Please respond by 5/16/03

12MAY03

U19094 /03

May 9, 2003 7:17 AM

TO: Powell Moore  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Cong. Davis

000.715D

I think I ought to have Cong. Tom Davis down to breakfast, lunch or a cup of coffee sometime.

Thanks.

*CC: CATY M*

DHR:dh  
050901-1

.....

Please respond by 5/30/03

12MAY03

U19095 /03

May 9<sup>12</sup>, 2003 7:20 AM

000.9150

TO: Powell Moore  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Senator Ensign

Please call Senator Ensign. He wanted to talk to me, and I was racing out. Please find out what he wanted to talk with me about. He wants to give some feedback on something, and I would like to get it. He could come down for a cup of coffee sometime, or we can set up a phone appointment.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
050903-4

.....  
*Please respond by* 5/16/03

U19096 /03

12MAY03

May <sup>12</sup> 8, 2003 8:52 AM

Afghanistan

TO: Jaymie Durnan  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA  
SUBJECT: Taylor

Please check out this guy Taylor who is in Afghanistan with Eikenberry and others, and see how good he is. Colin is thinking of having him be the ambassador to Afghanistan.

Please get back to me with a report.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
050903-19

.....

Please respond by 5/23/03

12MAY03

U19097 /03

12  
May 9, 2003 11:21 AM

000.7

TO: Torie Clarke  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Article on Carlyle

You should be aware of this reference to me in this Carlyle article.

I am a friend of Carlucci's. We were on the wrestling team in college together and he worked for me at OEO. On the other hand, he and I have both been very careful since I came back as Secretary of Defense. We have had no business discussions whatsoever. He has been invited when I have former Secretaries of Defense and State in. He has been careful. I have been careful.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Smith, Peter. "A Probe into Carlyle's 'Access Capitalism,'" *Financial Times*, May 8, 2003, p. 9.

DHR:dh  
050903-20

.....

Please respond by 5/23/03

U19098 /03

18 MAY 03

# A probe into Carlyle's 'access capitalism'

Peter Smith assesses a new account of the (very) private equity group



Brought to book: Frank Carlucci, the former US secretary of defence, comes under scrutiny

In the secretive world of private equity, getting under the skin of a large buy-out house is a difficult task at the best of times. Writing an unauthorised account of Carlyle, whose roster of high-profile political and intelligence figures has made it more secretive than most, was always going to be uphill task.

Dan Briody, a journalist who fell foul of Carlyle after an article on the group for Red Herring magazine, has a fair stab at explaining its role in *The Iron Triangle*. Coined as a phrase by Dwight D. Eisenhower as a warning against the dangers of a "military-industrial complex", its choice for the title casts a sinister shadow.

Briody accuses Carlyle, based in Washington DC, of questionable connections with the heart of the US administration and alleges corporate cronyism, war profiteering, CIA cover-ups and secret arms deals.

The roles of George Bush, former US president, and Frank Carlucci, former secretary of defence, former deputy director of the CIA and old friend of Donald Rumsfeld, current secretary of defence, come under scrutiny. John Major, the former British premier, and James Baker, former secretary of state in the first Bush administration, also figure.

Although Briody sets the scene for dramatic tension, building the reader's expectations for top-level conspiracy and corruption, he often fails to establish clearly a

link. He could be on to something, but the reader remains unconvinced.

For instance, he looks at United Defense, bought by Carlyle in 1997 with a "low-ball bid" of \$850m after General Dynamics, a much higher bidder, was apparently forced out of the auction by rumours of antitrust issues.

Following the attacks of September 11 2001, United Defense won a \$665m contract for its Crusader artillery system. Soon after, Carlyle floated it on the market, reaping a substantial profit. "All the time spent lobbying the government officials, calling on old friends, and greasing the palms of congressmen had finally paid off," Briody claims in a sweeping comment.

## THE IRON TRIANGLE

Inside the secret world of the Carlyle Group

By Dan Briody

John Wiley and Sons, \$24.95

However, he does also pick out points that do not put Carlyle in the most favourable light: the lobbying efforts paid for by Carlyle when Crusader's future seemed doubtful and a political action committee at United Defense to "funnel contributions to key lawmakers", for example.

"It was uncanny how United Defense planned to build manufacturing facilities, for the Crusader, in the back-

yards of key members of the arms committees. These are the kinds of things that get politicians re-elected, and get businesses what they want," says the author.

The book has two parts: the years following Carlyle's foundation by Stephen Norris, David Rubenstein, Daniel D'Aniello and William Conway, and the period after Norris was forced out "by his fellow co-founders in an acrimonious conflict". As a key source, Norris provides a fascinating insight into the group from its beginnings in the late 1980s until he left in 1995.

But Carlyle's more recent years are less well documented and the book appears vulnerable to accusations by Carlyle that it is little more than a cuttings job. There is a 24-page bibliography, while the body of the book barely runs to 150 pages. Space is devoted to already well-known links, now broken, with the bin Laden family as investors in Carlyle's funds.

There are also unnecessary digressions into US telecommunications regulation, George Soros's opportunistic shorting of the pound, and the recount in Florida at the last US election. They add little to the Carlyle story.

Briody, however, does provide plenty of insights into Carlyle's particular brand of "access capitalism".

He is right to point out that Carlyle deserves closer examination and, if nothing else, this attempt is unlikely to be the last.



Ar  
be  
Ba

11 - 065970SD/17523

May 12, 2003 9:02 AM

461

TO: Torie Clarke  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Book Opportunity

Please take a look at this note from Newt Gingrich. Do you have any thoughts on this?

Thanks.

Attach.  
5/7/03 Gingrich e-mail, "Book Opportunity to Tell SecDef's Story."

DHR:dh  
050903-21

.....

Please respond by 5/23/03

U19099 /03

12MAY03

May 9, 2003 10:54 AM

TO: Steve Cambone

CC: GEN. MYERS  
DOUG REITH

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Chronicle of Human Rights Abuses

Today in the NSC meeting, the President said he wants to chronicle the human rights violations, not dribble them out.

We need a historian/chronicle type, so the story of the unbelievable things the Saddam Hussein regime did will be irrefutable.

Please come up with a proposal as to how you think we ought to do that.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
050903-24

.....  
Please respond by 5/23/03

U19100 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/17525

IRAR

12MAY03

May <sup>12</sup> 8, 2003 11:19 AM

Afghanistan

TO: President George W. Bush  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Jay Garner

If Zal does not become U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, I think Jay Garner would be the right man for Afghanistan. I have told Colin and Condi. They are thinking about it.

My concern is I don't think we have a lot of time for further delay. I am convinced we need to get some energy into our leadership in Afghanistan.

I believe he is the kind of person who could work well with Karzai. My hope is that we can make a decision on this soon, so that either Zal, Jay or someone else is nominated, goes through the confirmation process, gets out there and gets at it.

Very respectfully,

DHR:dh  
050903-17

U19101 /03

12 MAY 03

5/13  
150 Snowflake

May 13, 2003 8:47 AM

0205D

TO: (b)(6)

ADVANCE  
COPY  
P (b)(6)

CC: Jaymie Durnan  
Col. Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Calendar

Please block out my calendar from February 13 through 22, 2004, to be with my family.

*Done*  
Jaymie Durnan  
*5/20*

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
051303-4

.....  
Please respond by 5/16/03

U19102 /03

13 MAY 03



ACQUISITION,  
TECHNOLOGY  
AND LOGISTICS

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

INFO MEMO

November 18, 2003, 8:13 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Mr. Michael Wynne, Acting Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L)

SUBJECT: Congressman Hobson – FY03-07 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan  
(NWSP)

- Item two of your October 30, 2003, snowflake (TAB A) indicates Congressman Hobson's desire for a copy of the revised NWSP.
- The aforementioned plan and the joint DoD/DOE transmittal memorandum to the President have been in your office for signature since early October. We are scheduled to brief you on the stockpile plan November 21<sup>st</sup>. It is anticipated you will sign the joint memorandum at the conclusion of the briefing.
- Once signed, the joint memorandum, which accompanies the proposed NWSP, will go to the Department of Energy for Secretary Abraham's signature. It will then go to the President through the National Security Council. There the plan is reviewed; necessary modifications made, and when approved, sent out as a National Security Presidential Directive.
- It would not be in our best interest to provide Congressman Hobson a copy of the plan before it has been approved by the President. Therefore, I have sent Congressman Hobson a letter (Tab B) explaining where the FY03-07 NWSP is in the production cycle, when I expect it to be approved by the President, and extend an offer to brief him on the plan once it is approved.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared By: Col Danny S. Wilmoth (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/17528

U19126/03

A

11/3  
~~October 30, 2003~~

TO: Mike Wynne  
CC: Powell Moore  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Congressman Hobson

On the subject of my phone call to Congressman Hobson, here are the materials. I did it.

Two things came out:

1. He believes he has solved almost all these issues and that the word has not yet gotten to the Department of Defense or the Department of Energy.
2. He wants us to send in the revised nuclear stockpile plan, which he says we have not done and he needs. I will leave that in your hands.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Budget appropriations

DHR:dh  
103003-26

.....  
Please respond by 11/21/03



ACQUISITION,  
TECHNOLOGY  
AND LOGISTICS

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

19 NOV 2003


The Honorable David L. Hobson  
United States House of Representatives  
Washington, DC 20515-3507

Dear Mr. Hobson,

Thank you for your recent request to Secretary Rumsfeld for a copy of the revised Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan (NWSP). The plan you refer to is the FY03-07 NWSP. This plan is still in development. The Secretary should sign the joint Department of Defense/Department of Energy NWSP transmittal memorandum to the President this month. Once signed, the joint memorandum, which accompanies the proposed plan, will be forwarded to the Department of Energy for Secretary Abraham's signature. It will then go to the President through the National Security Council. There the plan is reviewed; any necessary modifications made, and when approved, sent out as a National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD).

This new stockpile plan is only an initial step in downsizing the stockpile. It incorporates the initial decisions on nuclear force reductions made during the Nuclear Posture Review. The subsequent stockpile plan, due to the President late next year, will more accurately reflect the full scope of the planned reductions in operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads and the stockpile that we will need for the future.

I anticipate Presidential approval of the FY03-07 NWSP and the ensuing NSPD being issued sometime in January 2004. As soon as the new plan is approved by the President, I would be happy to have you briefed on the plan. Please do not hesitate to contact me for any further assistance on this matter.

  
Michael W. Wynne  
Acting



11-L-0559/OSD/17531

11/3  
~~October 30~~, 2003

TO: Mike Wynne  
CC: Powell Moore  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Congressman Hobson

On the subject of my phone call to Congressman Hobson, here are the materials. I did it.

Two things came out:

1. He believes he has solved almost all these issues and that the word has not yet gotten to the Department of Defense or the Department of Energy.
2. He wants us to send in the revised nuclear stockpile plan, which he says we have not done and he needs. I will leave that in your hands.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Budget appropriations

DHR:db  
103003-26

.....  
Please respond by 11/21/03

019128 / 03

November 19, 2003

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
Gen. John Abizaid

CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Iraq

*IRAQ*

Attached is an article on Iraq that is worth looking at.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Taheri, Amir. "What to Do," *National Review*, November 24, 2003, p. 18-19.

DHR:dh  
111903-5

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*19 Nov 03*

**U19130 . /03**



■ COVER STORY ■

## What to Do

The problem in Iraq is neither political nor military;  
it is a security problem

AMIR TAHERI

**I**n late October and early November, the Iraqi capital of Baghdad had some horrible days, with terrorist attacks that claimed scores of victims. The attacks put the usual what-is-to-be-done industry into overdrive in Washington and elsewhere. There has been no dearth of ideas, some outrageous, others amusing. One is to impose a 24-hour curfew in Baghdad. Another is to abandon democratization, and appoint a military junta to restore calm. (The calm, that is to say, of the graveyard.) We are told to court tribal sheikhs, to cuddle the mullahs, or to crown this or that aspiring despot as "strongman." The avalanche of ideas includes other gems: get a new U.N. resolution, put Kofi Annan in charge, call Jacques Chirac to the rescue, and even beg the mullahs of Tehran for help.

Mr. Taheri is an Iranian journalist and author of ten books on the Middle East and Islam. His most recent book, *L'Irak: le dessous des cartes*, was published last year by Editions Complexe.

The best short answer to the question, however, is to do nothing. Doing nothing is often better than knee-jerk reactions and panic measures. A longer answer, however, will have to start by establishing what it is that we face in Baghdad today. To present the attacks as "the Iraq problem" falsifies the issue. Iraq does remain a problem, not only for the U.S.-led coalition but also for the Persian Gulf, and, beyond it, the whole world. But to reduce that problem to the terrorism that we have witnessed since May would be to miss the point.

The terrorist attacks—in localities that account for perhaps just over 1 percent of Iraqi territory—do need to be dealt with, but they cannot be dealt with unless we understand their nature. First of all, they are not political. Their instigators have not presented any political demands, nor have they presented their terrorism in the context of any political analysis. The choice of targets, too, shows that there is no coherent political strategy behind the attacks. (To be sure, pundits speculate about such

motives. We are told, for example, that the attacks come from Iraqis who wish to drive the Americans out. In that case, one wonders why the terrorists attacked Muslim embassies, the United Nations, the International Committee of the Red Cross, hospitals, universities, and other points of concentrations of Iraqi civilians.) No, the agenda behind these acts is not political, and thus cannot be dealt with through political means such as changing policies, establishing dialogue, seeking compromises, and altering alliances.

Nor can the attacks be understood in military terms. One idea, from those who see the attacks as a military problem, is to flood Iraq with boots, to the tune of half a million or more. Another is to withdraw the GIs into cordoned-off bases, and let the Iraqis settle it among themselves. Yet another is to bring in the Turkish and Jordanian armies because they supposedly know how to deal with "the natives." The truth, however, is that these attacks do not represent a military threat to the coalition. The instigators are not trying to capture territory or deny territory to the coalition. Nor are they seeking to destroy the coalition's major assets or gain control of vital resources, such as water, or even to disrupt the logistics of the "enemy."

As things stand today, then, the U.S.-led coalition faces neither a political nor a military challenge in Iraq. Politically, the coalition enjoys support from a majority of Iraqis on two points: 1) making sure that the fallen regime does not return in any form and 2) preventing a single ethnic and/or religious group from winning an exclusive hold on power in any future regime. (This support, however, could be lost if a growing number of Iraqis sensed that, for domestic political reasons, the U.S. might not want to stay the course.)

Nor does the coalition face a military challenge in Iraq in the foreseeable future. (Gen. John Abizaid overstated the case when he suggested that Iraq was witnessing a guerrilla war.) The suggestion that, in military terms, Iraq could become "another Vietnam" comes from those who know neither.

This terrorism is, in fact, a security problem, which must be combated with policing methods. The coalition and the Iraqi Governing Council have had a measure of success in dealing with the wave of ordinary crimes that hit Baghdad in the

PHOTOGRAPH BY JAMES H. HARRIS FOR THE NEW YORK TIMES

immediate aftermath of liberation. That success has been achieved through the organization of Iraqi police units and the establishment of neighborhood-watch networks that supply the information needed for prevention and detection of crime.

That method has not been used against terrorism. For reasons that are hard to fathom, the U.S.-led administration has excluded the Governing Council and the newly created Iraqi police force from the task of combating terrorism. As for the Governing Council, some of its members claim that terrorism is "part of the war," and thus "a preserve of the Americans." Again for reasons hard to explain, the coalition has refused to build up an adequate counterterrorism capacity. It was not until early in October that Washington assigned a couple of counterterrorism experts to the reconstituted Iraqi Ministry of Defense. Of the 56 specialist detectives promised for a new division to deal with terrorism, only two have been assigned.

At the same time, the interim administration, perhaps anxious to do the best thing for the longer term, is trying to introduce technologies and equipment that few Iraqis understand and can handle. Creating a genetic database for criminal investigations, for example, may be useful in the long run. But right now you need people who know which tribes to infiltrate, which teahouses to frequent, and which money-changers to keep an eye on. The newly created police computer center in Baghdad looks like a Hollywood set. But very little of immediate use goes in, and less comes out.

On the ground, there is no organized effort to search out and destroy the terrorists. Whatever raids the coalition forces carry out and whatever arrests they make are prompted by information volunteered by Iraqis who share the dream of a new Iraq. This is a reactive, rather than proactive, way of fighting terror. The terrorists in Iraq have an easy time because no systematic watch is kept on them, no one is hunting them, and no one disrupts their cash flow. The American force that faces them, though large and well equipped, is unsuited to the task of infiltrating and destroying clandestine cells.

When Saddam Hussein went into hiding just before April 9, he made sure that his henchmen had emptied the contents of

the Central Bank. By most accounts they took something like \$1 billion. Of that, half was recovered by the coalition, including \$400 million in a cache close to the Tigris River in Baghdad. Saddam has therefore almost half a billion dollars to play with—that is to say, to spend on his terror network, possibly with the help of professional criminals and remnants of foreign terrorist groups that he had sheltered and financed for decades. Half a billion dollars is a lot of money, especially in cash-starved Iraq, and could buy quite a few volunteers for terrorism. And as long as there is no efficient policing action, the terrorists will see no reason why they should stop.


Nevertheless, this terror campaign lacks staying power. Saddam's money is bound to run out, sooner rather than later. Because he is not using terror in the context of a popular political program, his field of recruitment is bound to remain limited to diehard Ba'athists, mercenaries, and foreign militants thirsting to kill Americans wherever possible. There are no signs that the terror network has prepared for using the fundraising methods of classical terrorist organizations, such as robbing more banks, setting up rackets, and running extortion networks. Saddam has always been a reckless tactician and a cowardly strategist: He always started with as much violence as he could muster, but ended up looking for a hole in which to hide. In previous cases, such as the war he launched against Iran and his invasion of Kuwait, he got off the hook thanks to either the Western powers that supported him or the United Nations that offered him a way out.

This time he is unlikely to get a break. Sooner or later, the coalition will create and deploy a counterterrorism force constituted mainly of Iraqis. With this endeavor, some of Washington's allies, notably the British, can help. Rather than clean up after every terrorist attack, the new force would go on the offensive against an adversary that is politically isolated and militarily doomed. The liberation of Iraq was and remains a success; no explosion in Baghdad should make us forget that. Iraq could become a problem only in Washington—if short-term domestic political considerations override the broader goal of winning the war against global terrorism. NR

CATO  
INSTITUTE

## NEW AND FORTHCOMING BOOKS

CIVIL SOCIETY • INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY  
FREE MARKETS • LIMITED GOVERNMENT



### *Mugged by the State* Outrageous Government Assaults on Ordinary People and Their Property

Randall Fitzgerald

It's a scandal—misguided government policies and overzealous enforcement victimizing ordinary Americans. In *Mugged by the State*, Randall Fitzgerald uncovers example after example of government harassment, including a woman taken to jail for not wearing a seatbelt, a couple who found army helicopters hovering over their land in a dispute over wetlands, and countless others.

Fitzgerald, a longtime reporter for *Reader's Digest*, gives a voice to the countless Americans whose freedoms are being violated by the very government that should be protecting them. Published by Regnery Gateway. 256 pp./Cloth \$27.95 ISBN 0-89562-102-2

Available at bookstores nationwide.  
To order call 1-800-767-1241  
or visit [www.cato.org](http://www.cato.org)



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1600



INFO MEMO

November 19, 2003 10:00 a.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Daniel J. Dell'Orto, Principal Deputy General Counsel

SUBJECT: Snowflake – Belgian “War Crimes” Case (Franks/McCoy)

- The attorney responsible for filing the Franks/McCoy complaint continues to pursue two separate appeals following the dismissal of his complaint. The appeals ultimately will be fruitless – even if an appellate court revives the case, the new Belgian statute (passed on August 1) would require that it be dismissed due to lack of jurisdiction.
- With respect to one of the appeals, we understand that the attorney hired a process server to provide formal notification to General Franks and Colonel McCoy. Because the defendants are outside of Belgium, the process server sent a notice to the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which in turn sent a diplomatic note to the U.S. Embassy.
- The note neither requests any action by the Embassy (other than acknowledgement of its receipt), nor does it require that General Franks or Colonel McCoy do anything. This is similar to the process previously used by the Belgians to deliver complaints filed against U.S. officials – there is no expectation of any specific action.
- The State Department is considering how to respond, if at all. As before, State is asking a Belgian law firm for advice on Belgian legal procedures.
- We see no legal reason for this to affect your travel plans. This development is the result of actions by the attorney pursuing the appeals, not by the Belgian government. As reported previously, the Belgians appear motivated to implement the new law in a manner that minimizes the abuses permitted under the former law.

COORDINATION: None

Attachments: None

cc: General Tommy Franks  
Colonel Bryan McCoy

Prepared By: Robert Easton, Associate Deputy General Counsel (LC),

(b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/17536

119150 / 03

~~TOP SECRET~~  
(b)(3):50 U.S.C. § 3024(i)

11  
November 6, 2003

TO: Jim Haynes  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*  
SUBJECT: Belgian War Crimes Law

Here is another cable on the Belgian war crimes law. Please take a look at it. I have to make a decision as to whether I am going to go to Brussels next month.

Please screw your head into it fast.

Thanks.

Attach  
(b)(3):50 U.S.C. § 3024(i)

DHR:dh  
110603-19

.....  
Please respond by 11/14/03

~~TOP SECRET~~  
TOP SECRET  
104-L-03559/CSD/17537

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT(S)  
DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

(b)(3):50 U.S.C. § 3024(i)

November 11, 2003

TO: Jim Haynes  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*  
SUBJECT: Belgian War Crimes Law

Here is another cable on the Belgian war crimes law. Please take a look at it. I have to make a decision as to whether I am going to go to Brussels next month.

Please screw your head into it fast.

Thanks.

Attach

(b)(3):50 U.S.C. § 3024(i)

DHR:dh  
110603-19

.....  
Please respond by 11/14/03

U19151 /03

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT(S)  
DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~  
11-11-03 09:59:03 03D177538

TAB A

11/3  
~~October 30, 2003~~

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
CC: Powell Moore  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Question from Tennessee

Congresswoman Blackburn from Tennessee raised the question about the National Guard in Murfreesborough. Would you please look into that and let me know what the facts are?

Thanks.

DHR:db  
103003-23

.....  
Please respond by 11/12/03

03 NOV 4 AM 11:10

U19157 03

Tab A

TAB B

12 November 2003

INFORMATION PAPER

Subject: Question from Tennessee

1. Purpose. To respond to questions raised by Congresswoman Blackburn about the National Guard in Murfreesboro, Tennessee.

2. Key Points

• The 269th Military Police Company

- The Army National Guard 269th Military Police Company (MPCo.) of Murfreesboro, TN, was alerted on 25 October 2002 and mobilized 166 troops on 6 December 2002 to conduct force protection at Fort Campbell, KY, in support of Operation NOBLE EAGLE (ONE). Fort Campbell is approximately 90 miles from the National Guard Amory at Murfreesboro. After 6 months (13 June 2003), the unit was deployed to Iraq in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), expecting to demobilize on 5 December 2003.
- Due to policy change (1 year boots-on-the-ground), the 269th MP Co. was extended in-theater and is scheduled to redeploy on 17 May 2004 and demobilize on 17 July 2004. When demobilized, the unit will have been mobilized for a total of 590 consecutive days, well under the 2-year partial mobilization authority, although longer than any other National Guard or Army Reserve unit to date. Acting SECARMY Brownlee personally directed that this unit be programmed for redeployment prior to surpassing the 18-month "red-line"--it will in effect be in-theater for only 11 months.

• 118th Airlift Wing

- Direct coordination with Congresswoman Blackburn's office indicated that she was concerned with the 118th Airlift Wing. The 118th Airlift Wing, an Air National Guard C-130 unit from Nashville, TN (35 miles from Murfreesboro), was mobilized from November 2001 to October 2002 for 12 months in support of ONE.
- In March 2003, the unit was mobilized again (10 C-130 aircraft and 333 personnel) and deployed in support of OIF and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF). This mobilization order included 16 other Air Reserve Component (ARC) units. All personnel and

Tab B

11-L-0559/OSD/17540

airframes from the 118th Airlift Wing returned to CONUS by September 2003. In October 2003, under the same mobilization, three C-130s and approximately 95 personnel deployed overseas to continue support of OIF/OEF. The current plan for supporting this operation is to rotate selected personnel out of theater every 45 to 60 days.

- Unit members have expressed concerns about the short time between these two mobilizations (i.e., 5 months between mobilization for ONE and then OIF/OEF) and with the re-deployment of aircraft and personnel in October 2003 under the current mobilization (i.e., 1 month between return to CONUS and re-deployment). Feedback from unit leadership, however, indicates that these frequent deployments do not appear to be affecting overall morale, re-enlistment, or recruiting levels.



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CM-1373-03  
20 November 2003

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RMH/11/20*

SUBJECT: Question from Tennessee

- **Question.** Congresswoman Blackburn from Tennessee raised the question about the National Guard in Murfreesboro. Would you please look into that and let me know what the facts are? (TAB A)
- **Answer.** The 269th Military Police Company, Tennessee Army National Guard, is the only military unit from Murfreesboro, TN. Direct coordination with Congresswoman Blackburn's office, however, indicated that she was concerned with the 118th Airlift Wing, an Air National Guard unit from Nashville, TN.
- **Analysis.** Both units (TAB B) have been called to duty extensively to support ongoing operations (NOBLE EAGLE, ENDURING FREEDOM, and IRAQI FREEDOM), but have served within the parameters established by the department and/or the Services. Neither unit has exceeded limitations for total length of mobilization.

COORDINATION: TAB C

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: Maj Gen J. A. Bradley, USAF; OCJCS/RM; (b)(6)

U19158 03

11-L-0559/OSD/17542

11/3  
~~October 30~~, 2003

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
CC: Powell Moore  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Question from Tennessee

Congresswoman Blackburn from Tennessee raised the question about the National Guard in Murfreesborough. Would you please look into that and let me know what the facts are?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
103003-25

.....  
Please respond by 11/12/03

01:11:10 NOV 4 2003

U19157 03

Tab A

TAB B

12 November 2003

INFORMATION PAPER

Subject: Question from Tennessee

1. Purpose. To respond to questions raised by Congresswoman Blackburn about the National Guard in Murfreesboro, Tennessee.

2. Key Points

• The 269th Military Police Company

- The Army National Guard 269th Military Police Company (MPCo.) of Murfreesboro, TN, was alerted on 25 October 2002 and mobilized 166 troops on 6 December 2002 to conduct force protection at Fort Campbell, KY, in support of Operation NOBLE EAGLE (ONE). Fort Campbell is approximately 90 miles from the National Guard Amory at Murfreesboro. After 6 months (13 June 2003), the unit was deployed to Iraq in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), expecting to demobilize on 5 December 2003.
- Due to policy change (1 year boots-on-the-ground), the 269th MP Co. was extended in-theater and is scheduled to redeploy on 17 May 2004 and demobilize on 17 July 2004. When demobilized, the unit will have been mobilized for a total of 590 consecutive days, well under the 2-year partial mobilization authority, although longer than any other National Guard or Army Reserve unit to date. Acting SECARMY Brownlee personally directed that this unit be programmed for redeployment prior to surpassing the 18-month "red-line"--it will in effect be in-theater for only 11 months.

• 118th Airlift Wing

- Direct coordination with Congresswoman Blackburn's office indicated that she was concerned with the 118th Airlift Wing. The 118th Airlift Wing, an Air National Guard C-130 unit from Nashville, TN (35 miles from Murfreesboro), was mobilized from November 2001 to October 2002 for 12 months in support of ONE.
- In March 2003, the unit was mobilized again (10 C-130 aircraft and 333 personnel) and deployed in support of OIF and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF). This mobilization order included 16 other Air Reserve Component (ARC) units. All personnel and

Tab B

11-L-0559/OSD/17544

airframes from the 118th Airlift Wing returned to CONUS by September 2003. In October 2003, under the same mobilization, three C-130s and approximately 95 personnel deployed overseas to continue support of OIF/OEF. The current plan for supporting this operation is to rotate selected personnel out of theater every 45 to 60 days.

- Unit members have expressed concerns about the short time between these two mobilizations (i.e., 5 months between mobilization for ONE and then OIF/OEF) and with the re-deployment of aircraft and personnel in October 2003 under the current mobilization (i.e., 1 month between return to CONUS and re-deployment). Feedback from unit leadership, however, indicates that these frequent deployments do not appear to be affecting overall morale, re-enlistment, or recruiting levels.

TAB C

US Army

Colonel Chappell

November 12, 2003

US Air Force

Colonel Ball

November 12, 2003

Tab C

11-L-0559/OSD/17546



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

FEB 20 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDER, US SOUTHERN COMMAND

SUBJECT: Standing Joint Force Headquarters

Thank you for your letter regarding the proposal to aggressively develop a Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ). Dick Myers and I think it's a good idea and that you should proceed. You should plan to look within your existing command structure for needed personnel.

Please work with USJFCOM to validate and refine the SJFHQ through continued experimentation, and be sure to share your lessons learned among all regional combatant commanders for incorporation in the establishment of each SJFHQ.

Copy to:

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff  
Commander, USJFCOM

SOUTHCOM

20 FEB 03



U19192 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/17547

2/20  
1000

SECRET  
27



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

ACTION MEMO

CM-678-02  
24 December 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action \_\_\_\_\_

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBM 12/23*

SUBJECT: Standing Joint Force Headquarters

- In response to your request (~~SECRET~~) to provide insight regarding US Southern Command's (USSOUTHCOM) letter, the following is provided.
- USSOUTHCOM's proposal to establish an interim Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ) is consistent with current guidance and should be strongly supported.
- The suggested deployment of SJFHQs to other commands, while viable, does not fully leverage the US Joint Forces Command's (USJFCOM) vision of a headquarters with a thorough understanding of unique regional issues.
- USJFCOM is currently leading a SJFHQ organizational study on manpower requirements for each regional combatant command. This study is being done in close coordination with each command and Service. Study results will be briefed to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) as input into a final resourcing decision.

RECOMMENDATION: Recommend you sign the proposed response to CDR, USSOUTHCOM, (TAB B) concurring in subject request.

Approve *DA* FEB 20 2003 Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_ Other \_\_\_\_\_

COORDINATION: TAB C

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared By: LTG J. K. Kellogg, USA; Director, J-6; (b)(6)

*to*  
*from the Sec Def*  
*for*  
*1/16*  
*1/16*

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SR MA CRADDOCK	
MA BUCCI	<i>3/2/03</i>
EXECSEC WHITMORE	<i>1/16/03</i>

12/10  
1:500



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

ACTION MEMO

FORCE TRANSFORMATION  
OFFICE

December 4, 2002, 4:30 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DepSec Action \_\_\_\_\_  
FROM: VADM Arthur K. Cebrowski, Director, Force Transformation  
SUBJECT: SJFHQ Initiative at U.S. Southern Command

*Handwritten signature: Arthur K. Cebrowski*  
*5 Dec 02*

- Recommend that you sign the subject letter.
- The initiative supports the Department's planning guidance and the strengthening of joint operations.

-- The initiative to implement an interim Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ) supports Defense Planning Guidance FY '04 - '09 direction on strengthening joint operations through SJFHQ and experimentation. The DPG directs Regional Combatant Commanders to establish SJFHQ by FY 2005.

-- The draft Transformation Planning Guidance (TPG) further emphasizes strengthening joint operations through multiple joint concept development efforts to ensure a robust competition of ideas. The draft TPG gives guidance for Combatant Commanders to conduct experimentation programs.

RECOMMENDATION: SecDef sign letter at TAB A.  
COORDINATION: None

*Handwritten notes:*  
12/10  
VADM Cebrowski -  
CJCS  
is likely to have a view on this.  
J.R.H.

Attachments:  
Letter to General Hill  
Letter from General Hill (TAB B)

Prepared By: COL. Richard Marchant, Force Transformation, (b)(6)

*Handwritten:* 12/13

SPL ASSISTANT DIR OPS	
SR MA OPERATIONS	
MA 2000	
EXECSEC	<i>Handwritten: 12/16</i>

#338

November 19, 2002 7:43 PM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith  
Gen. Myers  
Gen. Pace  
Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Standing Joint Task Force HQ

Please take a look at this letter from General Hill and give me your thoughts, preferably coordinated.

Thanks.

 11/20

Attach.  
11/15/02 CDR, SOUTHCOM ltr to SecDef

DHR:an  
(11/19/02)

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/17550

**TAB C**

**COORDINATION**

USD(P)	Mr. Hoehn (DASD Strategy)	12 Dec 2002
OSD(PA&E)	Dr. Steve Cambone	12 Dec 2002
OSD(OFT)	COL Richard Marchant	11 Dec 2002
USJFCOM	Col Thomas Cariker	2 Dec 2002

**Tab C**

**11-L-0559/OSD/17551**



SECRET, U.S. OFFICE

2002 DEC 24 11:13:27

CH-678-02  
24 December 2002

**CDR Greg Wittman**  
**Navy Military Assistant**  
**OSD Executive Secretariat**

(b)(6)

DepSec Action \_\_\_\_\_

**MEMORANDUM**

1/6

TO: C+D  
SUBJ: U19192/02

regarding US Southern  
rovided.

standing Joint Force  
dance and should be

nands, while viable, does  
JSJFCOM) vision of a  
ie regional issues.

nal study on manpower  
This study is being done  
e. Study results will be  
(JROC) as input into a

*Please pass back to JCS for  
fixes per TSA.*

*Thanks,  
[Signature]*

esponse to CDR,

*1/6  
fixes to the Dept  
D. Rich  
1/6*

As stated

Prepared By: LTG J. K. Kellogg, USA; Director, J-6; (b)(6)

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SR MA CRADDOCK	
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC WHITMORE	[Signature]

11-L-0559/OSD/17552

U19192 /02



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000



MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDER, US SOUTHERN COMMAND

SUBJECT: Standing Joint Force Headquarters

Thank you for your letter regarding the proposal to aggressively develop a Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ). ~~Your efforts are fully supported.~~

~~Closely coordinate implementation plans with US Joint Forces Command's (USJFCOM) SJFHQ operational concept development and with the Joint Staff toward a final recommendation to me concerning resources. You should plan to look within your existing command structure for needed personnel.~~

*please work with*  
Leverage actions with those of USJFCOM to validate and refine all aspects of the SJFHQ through continued experimentation. <sup>and be sure to</sup> Share your lessons learned among all regional combatant commanders for incorporation in the establishment of each SJFHQ.

Reference:

~~1 Commander, USSOUTHCOM, letter, 15 November 2002~~

Copy to:

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff  
Commander, USJFCOM

*Dick Myers and I think it's a good idea and that you should proceed*

#338

November 19, 2002 7:43 PM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith  
Gen. Myers  
Gen. Pace  
Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Standing Joint Task Force HQ

Please take a look at this letter from General Hill and give me your thoughts, preferably coordinated.

Thanks.

Attach.  
11/15/02 CDR, SOUTHCOM ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh  
11/19/02

*A 11/20*

*1/6*

*Myers coordinated response attached.*

*D:2A*

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/17554



**OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

SECRETARY OFFICE  
2001 DEC 30 PM 4: 51

**FORCE TRANSFORMATION  
OFFICE**

**ACTION MEMO**

December 30, 2002, 8:00 AM

**FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**

DepSec Action \_\_\_\_\_

**FROM: VADM Arthur K. Cebrowski, Director, Force Transformation**

*AKC* 30 Dec

**SUBJECT: SJFHQ Initiative at U.S. Southern Command**

- Recommend that you sign the subject letter.
- The initiative supports the Department's planning guidance and the strengthening of joint operations.

-- The initiative to implement an interim Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ) supports Defense Planning Guidance FY '04-'09 direction on strengthening joint operations through SJFHQ and experimentation. The DPG directs Regional Combatant Commanders to establish SJFHQ by FY 2005.

-- The draft Transformation Planning Guidance (TPG) further emphasizes strengthening joint operations through multiple joint concept development efforts to ensure a robust competition of ideas. The draft TPG gives guidance for Combatant Commanders to conduct experimentation programs.

**RECOMMENDATION: SecDef sign letter at TAB A.**

**COORDINATION: JCS J-6**

**Attachments:**

Letter to General Hill

Letter from General Hill (TAB B)

Prepared by COL. Richard Marchant, Force Transformation, (b)(6)

**U19192-02**

11-L-0559/OSD/17555



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

General James T. Hill  
Commander  
United States Southern Command  
3511 NW 91st Avenue  
Miami, FL 33172-1217

Dear General Hill:

You have my endorsement to proceed with the interim Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ) initiative. I ask that you closely coordinate this initiative with US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) and their SJFHQ experimentation efforts.

Although USJFCOM Staff is conducting a manning study of the SJFHQ, I encourage you to proceed within your current resources.

I share your excitement about the operational potential of the SJFHQ and joint experimentation. These types of initiatives will allow us to keep our warfighting competitive edge.

Sincerely,

cc:  
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff



11-L-0559/OSD/17556



REPLY TO  
ATTENTION OF

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND  
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER  
3511 NW 81ST AVENUE  
MIAMI, FL 33172-1217

CLASSIFIED BY  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2002 NOV 20 11:17:00

November 15, 2002

Commander

Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
1000 Defense Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20301-1000


Dear Mr. Secretary:

Sir, I am seeking your support for what I believe to be a "leap ahead" initiative to implement transformation here at U.S. Southern Command. Within the next 90 days, I propose to create an interim Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ) associated with a J7 Transformation Directorate. I envision this organization attaining full operational capability within six months of stand-up. This concept is a by-product of your current guidance in the Quadrennial Defense Review, the Defense Planning Guidance, and the draft Transformation Planning Guidance. We have drawn on the initial lessons learned from Millennium Challenge 02 and our ongoing Regional Service Components study being conducted in tandem with the Joint Staff. This flag officer-led SJFHQ/J7 will be our principal engine in the development of new combinations of people, ideas, and technology designed to enhance our joint warfighting capabilities.

Great opportunities and potential exist for this SJFHQ/J7. It will provide this command a flexible, tailorable capability to command and control forces in myriad crises and short duration contingencies. For instance, had this organization existed in January 2002, the SJFHQ would have been the optimum choice to establish detainee operations at Guantanamo Bay. That would have eliminated the need to employ 2d FSSG and avoided the resultant degradation of combat effectiveness of II MEF. Once fully operational, our SJFHQ will also be available to support contingency operations in other AORs should the need arise. Additionally, the SJFHQ/J7 will be at the forefront of our joint experimentation effort and will closely coordinate transformation initiatives with U.S. Joint Forces Command. Naturally, I will share our lessons learned with the other Combatant Commanders and with you through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to whom a copy of this letter has been furnished.

I am excited about the possibilities inherent in this concept to dramatically enhance this command's joint warfighting capabilities in the short term, as well as to contribute to force transformation in the mid to long-range future. To those ends, I solicit your endorsement of my request. I will come back to you with more granularity on resourcing the manning.

Very Respectfully,

  
JAMES T. HULL  
General, USA  
Commander

c.c.: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff  
General Richard B. Myers

U18580-02

11-L-0559/OSD/17557

May 14, 2003 7:19 AM

TO: Marc Thiessen  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Armed Forces Day Remarks

350.001 SD

I am not satisfied with the Armed Forces Day remarks. I think they ought to get elevated. There ought to be one thing that is memorable in there.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
051403-2

.....

Please respond by 5/15/03

|

14MAY03

U19192 /03

November 21, 2003

TO: Condoleezza Rice  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*  
SUBJECT: Coleman Letter

Attached is a note I received from Bill Coleman with a message from a friend of his for the President. I will leave it in your hands.

*OK*

Attach.  
11/19/03 Coleman Letter to SecDef

DHR:dh  
112103-11

*cc: Dep Sec Def*

*21 Nov 03*

**U19230 . /03**

11-L-0559/OSD/17559



O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP

LOS ANGELES  
CENTURY CITY  
IRVINE  
NEWPORT BEACH  
NEW YORK  
SAN FRANCISCO

1625 Eye Street, NW  
Washington, D.C. 20006-4001

TELEPHONE (202) 383-5300  
FACSIMILE (202) 383-5414  
INTERNET: [www.omm.com](http://www.omm.com)

SILICON VALLEY  
TYSONS CORNER  
BEIJING  
HONG KONG  
LONDON  
SHANGHAI  
TOKYO  
OUR FILE NUMBER  
0600000-00009

19 November 2003

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
Washington, D.C. 20301-1000

WRITER'S DIRECT DIAL  
(202) 383-5325

WRITER'S E-MAIL ADDRESS  
[wcoleman@omm.com](mailto:wcoleman@omm.com)

Dear Don:

A close friend of mine in Great Britain who in the past held Cabinet positions in Defense and is now in the House of Lords asked me if I would pass on to the President before he goes on his trip to Great Britain the following:

*The problem we are facing has been brewing for some time, but the full scale of it has only burst into the public view in the last few days.*

*While nothing has yet been officially confirmed, the informed speculation, which is certainly shared by several past chiefs of defence staff, runs to the conclusion that MOD is going to have to face cuts of 2 and a half to 3 billion US\$ both this year and next. While these sums may not seem much to American ears, they could wreak havoc with our own already severely overstretched capabilities.*

*If cuts of this size are confirmed, we will be facing reductions in our procurements of frigates, attack submarines, main battle tanks, Eurofighters and joint strike fighters. In addition, the size of our next two aircraft carriers is likely to be reduced by at least 10%.*

*Leaving aside the impact that cuts of this size would have on our own capabilities, they would clearly send the worst of messages to the Continental Europeans, who could certainly justify their continued failure to meet their responsibilities by saying "if the Brits can cut like this, why can't we also."*

*It would, therefore, be enormously helpful if your President could say a few words to Prime Minister Blair along the following lines*

*"I want you to know that the performance of your troops in Iraq and elsewhere has elicited nothing but admiration in the US, with respect to both their professionalism and their capabilities. It is of enormous importance to the alliance that the UK continue to lay it present invaluable role. I therefore hope very much that you can assure me that reports that have*

*reached my ears of pending major cuts in UK defence expenditure will not in fact take place. If you do have problems, is there any way in which we can help?"*

*I can assure you that this message is not just my personal brainchild. Former British ambassadors to the US, and very senior retired military officers are all, like me, frantically calling our friends in Washington right now. Anything you can do will be hugely appreciated, and will, of course, be in the interest of us all.*

I was able to pass this on to a staff person high on the Security Council. I thought it is a thought you might wish to use also.

"Take care. . ."

Sincerely,



William T. Coleman, Jr.  
Senior Partner and The Senior Counsellor  
of O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP

WTC Jr.:pnc

DC1:568023.1

INFO MEMO

USD(P) ADVANCE COPY

11/20  
11/21

I-03/015707-P&S

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Thomas W. O'Connell, Assistant Secretary of Defense (SO/LIC) *TO 11/20/03*

SUBJECT: Plan Colombia Helicopters

Colombia

On October 4, 2003 you sent a note to Secretary Powell (Tab A) regarding the shortage of helicopters in Colombia to support both eradication and large-scale military operations against narcoterrorists.

The two issues were:

- The Colombian military wants more access to State Plan Colombia UH-60 helicopters, and
- The low operational readiness rate of the Colombian military's helicopters.

I believe that progress has been made on both of these issues. As a result of your note, Secretary Powell responded (Tab B) that:

- There is little need to approach the Hill for a change to the current system since it is being fixed,
  - Ambassador Wood is effectively managing requests for State helicopter support, and
  - The Embassy is exploring initiatives such as joint maintenance facilities, faster delivery of spare parts, and expedited Embassy mission clearance.

SOLIC, the Joint Staff, and SOUTHCOM believe that these measures have resolved the recent problem.

I will continue to monitor this issue, and will revisit if further problems arise.

Coordination: Tab C

Attachments: As stated

20 Nov 03

Prepared by: CDR C.J. Cassidy, USN, SOLIC/CN,

(b)(6)

U19241 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD/17562

Snowflake

October 4, 2003

TO: Honorable Colin Powell (by hand)

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Colombia and Helicopters

How do you propose we solve the helicopter problem for Colombia?

Should we both go up to Congress together and talk to some of the key people to see what we can do?

DHR:db  
100103-12

11-L-0559/OSD/17563

*U16451-3*

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

November 7, 2003

Dear Mr. Secretary:

In response to your note suggesting that we approach the Congress for removal of restrictions on use of counter-narcotics (CN) helicopters in Colombia for a larger number of counter-terrorism (CT) missions, you may know that I had to fight to justify the use of CN helicopters for CT missions in the first place. As a result, we have an agreement with our oversight committees to make clear that the United States Ambassador clears on all proposed CT missions case-by-case when the use of INL/State's CN helicopters is requested. This protects the interests of the United States and Colombian Governments, but is also the basis for the expanded authorities to use CN helos for any CT missions. We have every reason to believe that the process by which the U.S. Ambassador 'triages' requests for CN helos for CT missions has, to date, been working well. With respect to our committees, I do not see them setting aside our hard-fought understanding. I see little point in approaching our committees for a change that is both unlikely and, in any event, unnecessary.

That said, let me offer a new idea. Plainly, I think we both agree that there is a need for maximum flexibility in using State/INL and Colombian Army (COLAR)-maintained helicopters for both CN and CT missions. To date, our primary CN mission has not been eroded by periodic requests for helicopters to meet CT needs within the expanded authority. Ambassador Wood is effectively "triaging" requests. I even understand that General Hill recently indicated to Colombian General Mora his view that this process adequately addresses counter-terrorism support.

At the same time, we have confirmed operational readiness (O/R) rates for COLAR-maintained helos are substantially lower than for State/INL-maintained helos. As a result, I have instructed INL and the Embassy to explore new ways to maximize CN and CT missions through possible joint maintenance, faster

The Honorable  
Donald H. Rumsfeld,  
Secretary of Defense.

U18618 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/17564

spare parts delivery and expedited Embassy mission clearance. We can also encourage the COLAR to make more efficient joint use of the Colombian Air Force fleet. By pursuing these efforts, we should be able to improve blade time available in the lead up to President Uribe's Plan Patriota.

In short, my sense is that we can help the COLAR increase readiness and blade hour availability of the FMS UH-60 fleet by focusing on existing facilities at Tolemaida and improving maintenance of the twelve COLAR UH-60s. I would suggest we work together to expedite these initiatives.

We understand the Department of Defense is seeking to identify \$108 million in additional funding for Colombia during FY 2004 and that this would include approximately \$12 million to get the COLAR UH-60 helicopter fleet up to par, and for approximately \$1.7 million per month thereafter for operations and maintenance. This O/R improvement could allow more flying hours for the COLAR. If DOD can provide the funding this year, as the Deputies Committee has asked, State would plan on seeking to maintain this support through its FMF budget in FY 2005.

I welcome further ideas, but would suggest going to the Hill on this is probably not necessary at this time.

Sincerely,



Colin L. Powell

## COORDINATION

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense For Western Hemisphere Affairs (WHA)	Mike McMurray	November 18, 2003
Joint Staff Division Chief, CCSA, (J5)	Col. Jan Ithier	November 18, 2003
U.S. Southern Command, Washington Directorate	Col. Bockenstedt	November 18, 2003

October 9, 2003

TO: J.D. Crouch  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Deployable Forces

What percentage of US forces are usable, or deployable, to use the phrase of the Secretary-General?

370

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
100903-19 (ix computer)

.....

*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

9 OCT 03

Tab A

TO: Senior Staff

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



DATE: November 24, 2003

SUBJECT: **Clay Johnson Interview**

Attached is an interview with Clay Johnson, OMB Deputy for Management, from *Government Executive Magazine* entitled, "A Word to the Wise."

Clay Johnson's words, "Management is apolitical," is the right signal, and particularly so for this department, which we have a responsibility to manage in a non-partisan manner.

Thanks.



DHR/azm  
112403.14

Attach: "A Word to the Wise." *Government Executive Magazine*, Nov. 2003.

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_

U19340 /03

## A Word to the Wise

OMB deputy Clay Johnson says don't play politics with management agenda.



**T**he Bush administration runs the risk of discrediting the president's management agenda by touting its accomplishments during the upcoming presidential campaign, warns a key administration official.

"Management is apolitical," Clay Johnson, deputy director for management at the Office of Management and Budget, said during a recent luncheon hosted by the IBM Center for the Business of Government, an organization dedicated to improving government effectiveness. Civil servants might start questioning the adminis-

tration's motives for pursuing management reforms if President Bush spends too much time plugging the agenda on the campaign trail, Johnson said. Doubts may "creep into [their] minds" as to whether the agenda is designed with their interests at heart.

The agenda sets goals for agencies to improve performance in five areas: human resources management, competitive sourcing, financial management, electronic government and linking program performance to budgets. OMB rates agencies quarterly on their progress in meeting the agenda's objectives.

Agencies are taking more ownership of the initiatives and many are poised to get better reviews within the next nine months, Johnson said. Bush's campaign staff likely will be tempted to share many of the accomplishments with the public, Johnson added.

The urge to focus on management will be especially strong if Democrats attack Bush for large budget deficits and high spending on the war in Iraq. Paul Light, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, a Washington think tank, said at the luncheon.

But if the campaign emphasizes savings achieved through the management agenda, Bush risks alienating federal workers by politicizing the initiative. "What good management is about is good management," Light said.

To federal employee unions, the management agenda has been political all along. That is especially true of the competitive sourcing component, which forces federal workers to compete against contractors for their jobs. Colleen Kelley, president of the National Treasury Employees Union, who also appeared at the event, noted that Bush first raised the idea during the 2000 presidential campaign.

—Amelia Gruber

November 20, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Visits from Germany and France

When is Schroeder coming to the U.S., and when did the information say that the MoD of France might come? I want to look at my schedule.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
112003-9

.....  
Please respond by 11/25/03 11/21

→ To: *[Signature]*  
Exec Sec -  
Lauren Haber can probably find out.  
*[Signature]*  
Larry Di Rita  
11/21

091.112

20 NOV 03

U193567/03

EF-760215  
reflected  
USD(P)  
11/25/03

NOV 25 PM 4:50

USD(P)

**INFO MEMO**

I-03/015707

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Thomas W. O'Connell, Assistant Secretary of Defense (SO/LIC)

*Connell*  
11/24/03

SUBJECT: Plan Colombia Helicopters

000.5

On October 4, 2003 you sent a note to Secretary Powell (Tab A) regarding the shortage of helicopters in Colombia to support both counternarcotics eradication and large-scale military operations against narcoterrorists.

The two issues were:

- The Colombian military wants more access to State Plan Colombia UH-60 helicopters, and
- The low operational readiness rate of the Colombian military's helicopters.

I believe that progress has been made on both of these issues.

- Following up your memo to Secretary Powell, General Hill worked this issue with the U.S. Ambassador to Colombia and reports that the Ambassador is now effectively managing requests for State helicopter support, and
- The Embassy is exploring initiatives such as joint maintenance facilities, faster delivery of spare parts, and expedited Embassy mission clearance.

General Hill, General Pace and I believe that these measures have resolved the recent problem, for the time being.

I will continue to monitor this issue, and will revisit it if further problems arise.

Response from Secretary Powell: Tab B  
Coordination: Tab C

Attachments:  
As Stated

Prepared by: CDR C.J. Cassidy, SO/LIC Counternarcotics, (b)(6)

25 NOV 03

U19370 03

25-11-03 09:17 TN

11-L-0559/OSD/17571

COORDINATION

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense For Western Hemisphere Affairs (WHA)	Mike McMurray	November 18, 2003
Joint Staff Division Chief, CCSA, (J5)	Col. Jan Ithier	November 18, 2003
U.S. Southern Command, Washington Directorate	Col. Bockenstedt	November 18, 2003

**October 4, 2003**

**TO: Honorable Colin Powell (by hand)**

**FROM: Donald Rumsfeld** 

**SUBJECT: Colombia and Helicopters**

**How do you propose we solve the helicopter problem for Colombia?**

**Should we both go up to Congress together and talk to some of the key people to see what we can do?**

**DHR:dh  
100103-12**

**11-L-0559/OSD/17573**

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

November 7, 2003

Dear Mr. Secretary:

In response to your note suggesting that we approach the Congress for removal of restrictions on use of counter-narcotics (CN) helicopters in Colombia for a larger number of counter-terrorism (CT) missions, you may know that I had to fight to justify the use of CN helicopters for CT missions in the first place. As a result, we have an agreement with our oversight committees to make clear that the United States Ambassador clears on all proposed CT missions case-by-case when the use of INL/State's CN helicopters is requested. This protects the interests of the United States and Colombian Governments, but is also the basis for the expanded authorities to use CN helos for any CT missions. We have every reason to believe that the process by which the U.S. Ambassador 'triages' requests for CN helos for CT missions has, to date, been working well. With respect to our committees, I do not see them setting aside our hard-fought understanding. I see little point in approaching our committees for a change that is both unlikely and, in any event, unnecessary.

That said, let me offer a new idea. Plainly, I think we both agree that there is a need for maximum flexibility in using State/INL and Colombian Army (COLAR)-maintained helicopters for both CN and CT missions. To date, our primary CN mission has not been eroded by periodic requests for helicopters to meet CT needs within the expanded authority. Ambassador Wood is effectively "triaging" requests. I even understand that General Hill recently indicated to Colombian General Mora his view that this process adequately addresses counter-terrorism support.

At the same time, we have confirmed operational readiness (O/R) rates for COLAR-maintained helos are substantially lower than for State/INL-maintained helos. As a result, I have instructed INL and the Embassy to explore new ways to maximize CN and CT missions through possible joint maintenance, faster

The Honorable  
Donald H. Rumsfeld,  
Secretary of Defense.

U18618 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/17574

spare parts delivery and expedited Embassy mission clearance. We can also encourage the COLAR to make more efficient joint use of the Colombian Air Force fleet. By pursuing these efforts, we should be able to improve blade time available in the lead up to President Uribe's Plan Patriota.

In short, my sense is that we can help the COLAR increase readiness and blade hour availability of the FMS UH-60 fleet by focusing on existing facilities at Tolemaida and improving maintenance of the twelve COLAR UH-60s. I would suggest we work together to expedite these initiatives.

We understand the Department of Defense is seeking to identify \$108 million in additional funding for Colombia during FY 2004 and that this would include approximately \$12 million to get the COLAR UH-60 helicopter fleet up to par, and for approximately \$1.7 million per month thereafter for operations and maintenance. This O/R improvement could allow more flying hours for the COLAR. If DOD can provide the funding this year, as the Deputies Committee has asked, State would plan on seeking to maintain this support through its FMF budget in FY 2005.

I welcome further ideas, but would suggest going to the Hill on this is probably not necessary at this time.

Sincerely,



Colin L. Powell

TAB A

October 9, 2003

NATO 322

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Response Force

Please get back to me on what you think we ought to do with the NATO Response Force 1, 2, 3 and 4.

Thanks.

DHR:db  
100903-10 (to computer)

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

1119749 / 03

Tab A

9 OCT 03

11-L-0559/OSD/17576

Snowflake

December 4, 2003

TO: Honorable Newt Gingrich

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Women in Afghanistan

Thanks for sending along the piece on "Making a Nation More Equal," about women in Afghanistan. I found it very interesting and very helpful.

I had Zal read it and asked him to dig in hard.

Regards, my friend.

DHR:dh  
120403-24 (to computer)

*Afghanistan*

*4 Dec 03*

Snowflake

December 4, 2003

TO: Gen. John Abizaid

CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Afghan National Army Attrition

I would like a report as to what you are doing to fix the ANA attrition problem.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
120403-32 (to computer)

.....

Please respond by 12/30/03

*AFghanistan*

*4 Dec 03*

U19760 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/17578

December 5, 2003

000.7

TO: Ruth Wedgwood

CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Jim Haynes

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*

SUBJECT: Op-ed

Your piece in the *International Herald Tribune* on Lord Johan Steyn is first-rate.  
Good for you!

DHR:dh  
120503-16 (ts computer)



*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_ *→*

5 Dec 03

TAB A

10:09 AM

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

# 6/8

CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
LTG Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: November 24, 2003

SUBJECT: **DPB**

In the Defense Policy Board meeting, Fogelman, Jeremiah and Horner said that we are not using J-Stars or Global Hawk and other intel capabilities out in Iraq. Why not?

Iraq

They think it is a big mistake. What are the facts?

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
112403.11

Please respond by: 11/30

24 Nov 03

Tab A

U19869 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD/17580



SECRET  
011 1:29  
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

CH-1409-03  
8 December 2003

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RCBM 12/7*

SUBJECT: Combined Joint Task Force-7 (CJTF-7) Executive Summary

- **Question.** "Here are the daily reports. I am glad I receive them. I would like to see some summaries aggregating it for the country, in addition to the separate boxes. Next, I would like to see a weekly summary. Last, it looks to me like some of these outfits are not doing a lot of activity. What is up? Thanks."  
(TAB A)
- **Answer.** The CJTF-7 Executive Summary now includes a summary aggregating patrols, offensive operations and detained personnel for the country. A weekly summary of CJTF-7 offensive operations is included in the Iraq Status Brief.
- **Analysis.** Daily reports have been modified to provide the information requested.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Prepared By: Lt Gen Norton Schwartz, USAF; Director, J-3; (b)(6)

~~SECRET~~

MCFI

TAB A

November 10, 2003

611

TO: Gen. Pete Pace  
CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: CJTF-7 Operations

J-3/2/5

Here are these daily reports. I am glad I receive them. I would like to see some summaries aggregating it for the country, in addition to the separate boxes.

Next, I would like to see a weekly summary.

Last, it looks to me like some of these outfits are not doing a lot of activity. What is up?

Thanks.

Attach.  
0700C 06 NOV 03 CJTF-7 Operations

DHR:dh  
111003-8

.....  
Please respond by 11/21/03

Tab A

X04218-03

11-L-0019/001/1155P  
~~SECRET~~

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT(S)  
DO NOT RETURN TO THE ISSUING OFFICE

TAB B

COORDINATION PAGE

USCENTCOM

COL Reynes

2 December 2003

Tab B

11-L-0559/OSD/17583

May 14, 2003 2:35 PM

33550

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Thanks

Thanks so much for your update. I appreciate it. It is helpful and encouraging. I am sure you are doing a great job. Best to all.

DHR:dh  
051403-13



*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

U19922 /03

14 MAY 03

5/14/2003

MEMO TO SECDEF from Di Rita

Just a short note to tell you that Jerry Bremer is off to a great start. My early impression is that he has excellent judgment and instincts, and is a quick study.

He and Jay are working out their respective responsibilities, but I think each is quickly seeing that the other brings an awful lot to the equation.

The whole matter has been a little awkward, and the weekend press stories were bad, but we'll manage through that and forge ahead. They are both professional and patriotic. Your comments yesterday were very nice and will help a lot.

By the way, have you given any thought to Jay Garner as army chief of staff? He is sure an innovator and understands what is wrong with the army. Even for a year or so, he would shake the place up and probably be pretty fearless when it comes to taking on the groups who have made change so difficult (old generals, etc.)

Probably too crazy.

Thanks again. I hope you are doing well. Please give my best to Joyce.

11-L-0559/OSD/17585

5/19...  
1500

C 5/25/03

May 14, 2003 2:28 PM

TO: Torie Clarke  
CC: Powell Moore  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*  
SUBJECT: Declassified Version

Jaymie Durnan

5/23

I M I

Senator Domenici raised a question in the Senate Appropriation Committee hearing you did not attend about the care that went into the targeting. He wondered if there couldn't be a declassified version of that that someone could report on. I think it is kind of an interesting idea.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
051403-12

.....  
Please respond by 5/20/03

MAY 20 2003

5/26  
RESPONSE ATTACHED

10 05 03

U19923 103



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1400 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1400

16 May 2003

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

Honorable Pete V. Domenici  
SH-328 Hart Senate Office Building  
Washington, D.C. 20510-3101

Dear Senator Domenici:

Secretary Rumsfeld asked me to follow up with you based on the questions you asked at Wednesday's hearing. We conducted a background briefing here at the Pentagon on our targeting process in early March. I have attached the transcript and the slides from that briefing for your information and review.

Should you require additional information or would like your own briefing, we would be happy to comply. Additionally, if you or your staff have suggestions on how to get greater visibility on the careful targeting process, we would appreciate hearing them. My point of contact for additional information is Colonel George Rhyndance at (b)(6)

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Victoria Clarke".

Victoria Clarke  
Assistant Secretary of Defense  
for Public Affairs

Enclosures:  
As stated

11-L-0559/OSD/17587

NEWS

[About News](#)

[DoD News](#)

[Advisories](#)

[Contracts](#)

[Live Briefings](#)

[Photos](#)

[Releases](#)

[Slides](#)

[Speeches](#)

[Today in DoD](#)

[Transcripts](#)

**American Forces News**

[Articles](#)

[Radio](#)

[Television](#)

[Special Reports](#)

[Search](#)

[News Archive](#)

[News by E-mail](#)

[Other News Sources](#)

Updated: 05 Mar 2003



United States Department of Defense

## News Transcript

On the web:

[http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2003/t03052003\\_t305targ.html](http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2003/t03052003_t305targ.html)

Media contact: [media@defenselink.mil](mailto:media@defenselink.mil) or +1 (703) 697-5131

Public contact: [public@defenselink.mil](mailto:public@defenselink.mil) or +1 (703) 428-0711

**Presenter:** Senior Defense Official      **Wednesday, March 5, 2003 - 11:52 a.m. EST**

### Background Briefing On Targeting

(Background briefing on U.S. military practices and procedures to minimize casualties to non-combatants and prevent collateral damage during military operations. The slides shown during this presentation are available at <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2003/g030305-D-9085M.html> )

Staff: It is not quite afternoon. It's -- good morning, and thank you for joining us today, and welcome to this background briefing on the targeting process.

Last week we talked in here about countertargeting, and this was really the other side of the coin. You've heard us say many times that we strike only military targets while taking extraordinary care to avoid unnecessary civilian casualties and to minimize collateral damage. Saddam Hussein, on the other hand, flaunts the laws of war and co-locates military and civilian facilities, and employs human shields.

I guess I would want to remind you, before we get started, what the secretary said on this just last week or a few days ago.

(Reading.) "International law draws a clear distinction between civilians and combatants. The principle that civilians must be protected lies at the heart of international law of armed conflict. It is the distinction between combatants and innocent civilians that terrorism and practices like the use of human shields so directly assaults.

"Saddam Hussein makes no such distinctions. He deliberately constructs mosques near military facilities, uses schools, hospitals, orphanages and cultural treasures to shield military forces, thereby exposing helpless men, women and children to danger. These are not tactics of war, they're crimes of war. Deploying human shields is not a military strategy, it's murder, it's a violation of the laws of armed conflict and a crime against humanity, and will be treated as such. To those who follow his orders to use human shields, they will pay a severe price for their actions."

So today we are joined by a senior official from the coalition headquarters at

CentCom to shed some light on how we go about striking legitimate military targets while sparing no effort to protect innocent civilians. Again, I would remind you that this briefing is on background and can be attributable to a senior CentCom official. And our official today, for your notes, is --

We have just shy of 30 minutes with our briefer, so let's go ahead and get started.

**Senior Defense Official:** Well, good morning, ladies and gentlemen. I appreciate you taking the time to come spend a few minutes with me and let me try to talk to you a little bit about how important it is for us to ensure that when we are given an order to take military action, that we then take that action in a prudent fashion that allows us to minimize any potential damage to the people or facilities surrounding any military target.

If I could, next slide. I'll go through these, and I think we'll make these available after we complete.

These are just some thoughts that the President has had publicly over the past number of weeks. And it's just to remind all that it is very important, no matter what we do militarily, that we not create a situation where, after the war, you lose the peace; and as we saw in Afghanistan, as we continue to believe, considering potential military Iraq -- action in Iraq, that maintaining the ability for a country to grow and flourish and have an economy after any military operation is important, and you do that by ensuring that collateral damage is kept to a minimum.

Next slide.

Collateral damage is really kind of two separate pieces. One is damage to facilities and the other is unintended casualties that surround noncombatants. It can occur -- however, it does occur in any conflict, in some cases because of human error, in some cases because of a mechanical error in a weapons system and in some cases, the situation on the battlefield is confused enough that people make mistakes. However, as we evaluate targets potentially to be struck, we do look to ensure that we -- that we stay clear of sites that are intended to be protected, like schools, mosques, civil buildings that have no military value, certainly residence areas. We need to ensure that when we find targets that are what we'll call dual use, and we'll talk a little bit about that later, that we are very prudent in the way we strike those so as to minimize any potential damage or danger to noncombatants.

In the end, however, occasionally, though, noncombatants are injured and killed, and we do have some structures that are damaged. And our intent is to have a process that not only looks to determine the target's validity, if you will, but then find a means to strike that target to gain the desired military effect without creating an undue effect on noncombatants or surrounding structures.

Next slide.

There's a series of decisions that occur as we go through a targeting process, and this occurs -- I might say as an example, in Afghanistan, while the overall numbers of targets was not huge, the some 400 or so targets that we considered, each one of

those goes through a vetting process. And the vetting process looks to ensure that if you have to take the action on a target that you've reduced the damage. We look at targets that are likely to result in civilian casualties or noncombatant casualties, as you see here, or structures -- certainly targets that might be in the vicinity of a protected site -- and I'll talk a little bit about what those protected sites might be in a few minutes.

Targets that are dual use. Communications are a good example. The military clearly uses communications facilities as does the civilian population, as does the media. And we want to make sure that a decision to damage or destroy a dual use facility is made for the military purpose that you would gain from that, not -- and to minimize any resulting kinds of damage.

And then, the other target category that is a challenge for us is where the human shields that we've talked of before might be used. And you really have two types of human shields. You have people who volunteer to go and stand on a bridge or a power plant or a water works facility, and you have people that are placed in those areas not of their own free will. In the case of some of the previous use of human shields in Iraq, Saddam placed hostages, if you will, on sensitive sites in order to show that these were human shields, but, in fact, they were not there of their own free will. Two separate problems to deal with that, and it requires that we work very carefully with the intelligence community to determine what that situation might be at a particular location.

Next slide.

As we evaluate targets -- this is kind of a simple graphic, but it's designed to show you a couple of key elements.

First, if you assume that the container in the middle, that military headquarters, is a valid military target and it's met those criteria within the laws of armed conflict that have been mentioned, we still have to look at the surrounding area to determine if we'll cause collateral damage. The red circle you see is just a cartoon depiction of notionally what would be the maximum effective area that could be covered by collateral damage by a particular munition. And it's done by each particular weapon. For example, the -- a Hellfire missile has only about a 40-pound warhead. So the circle that it might cause damage is relatively small: 60 or 70 feet. On the other hand, a 2,000-pound bomb will create about 90 percent of its effect out to about 600 feet of the target. And so, depending on the kinds of weapons you would use, you would place a circle over the target and then look to see what's in the circle. In the case of our example here, we see a civilian housing structure, a hospital and a mosque. And those are, one, noncombatant facilities, and in the case of a mosque or a hospital, a protected facility. And so we want to make sure that we don't inadvertently cause damage to those facilities while we're striking that target.

So we then look at the aim points that we might use, and then the type of weapon. Can we make that circle smaller, for example? Can we mitigate the effect of the weapons? And I think there was a good article, maybe just today, I think, that showed as an Air Force model how they do something called the bug splat. It's sort of a groupie term, but it's really a mathematical process that we can go to that shows,

depending on the direction the bomb is actually falling, where the effects of that fragmentation from the bomb will go. And so they look at that to determine what facilities are in that ring, and then how they might be affected.

Next slide.

Once we determine that there are facilities in that ring and that hitting that target will cause damage to those, we look at some of the variables in the mitigation process, if you will. And the mitigation process is designed to take smaller weapons, employ a different type of fusing. For example, if you use a bomb with an air burst, meaning it explodes some number of feet above the ground, there's nothing that absorbs the fragmentation of that bomb, so it travels farther. If you use a delay fuse that goes a millisecond or two milliseconds under the ground, in fact the explosive -- the fragmentation doesn't go very far at all, and the explosive damage is created mostly straight up, as opposed to out from the target. So you can reduce the area that's affected.

You can also shift aim points around on a building. For example, in the case you see up there, if we move that little -- I'll just kind of point to it -- this little triangle is our aim point, if you will, and you can shift that various places on the building to mitigate the effect that it has. For example, if this mosque were a little closer in here and your aim point was on this point, you might have an effect on the mosque. So you shift the aim point to allow the effects to go in a direction that goes away from your protected facility.

You can also adjust the azimuth that you use for the attack. I'll just make a point. You see the yellow shaded area in the circle there; that is a notional depiction of a 500-pound fragmentary pattern used against a target. And so you can see by -- if you see the small arrow there on the triangle, the angle of attack of that bomb is coming from southwest to northeast, and so you see that the major effect of the bomb goes out in front of the flight path and to the side; it doesn't go in a concentric circle all the way around. So you can adjust by choosing a particular run-in heading where that fragmentary effect will occur.

And then finally, you can pick the time you choose to attack a target. Obviously, if your target is a military facility, you would assume day or night, probably wouldn't matter. On the other hand, if your target might be something that could have non-combatant casualties to a residence or, for example, close to a school, you may want to choose to strike that at night versus during the day, where you may not have kids in a school. Now, it's clear that in the middle of combat operations you probably aren't going to have school in session. But you can still adjust your day and night timing to try to continue to reduce the effect of your weapons.

In any case, our example here, we've used a smaller weapon than that large circle that we saw before. We've adjusted the angle of attack for the aircraft that would be designated to strike that target, and then changed the fusing of the bomb to allow it to detonate further into the ground than right at the top. And so, you can shrink down the effect of that weapon to a very minimal size.

Now, there is no doubt that in those -- in this particular example that civilian housing

area, you'll probably blow out some windows. And so, there will be some side effect from just blast, over pressure, that does occur. And as we go through this mitigation process, we also have a series of models that will say, well, if it's a high rise building with so many glass windows in this -- this particular number of feet away from the impact, you can tell, roughly speaking, what the effect will be on that building and make an estimate, given a set of criteria on the capacity of the building, for example, on how many additional casualties you might see in a strike.

So it allows you to be pretty predictive. It's certainly not science. To a degree, there is some art form in it. But it gives you a pretty good process by which you can determine an ability to strike a target in a fairly confined area and keep the collateral damage to a minimum. I might add, during the OEF, during the operations in Afghanistan, as we were striking targets, sometimes in downtown Kabul we were able to use this process and strike targets where an al Qaeda meeting was taking place. That meeting location was destroyed, and the adjacent buildings on all three sides were not damaged. As you know, many structures in Afghanistan had walls surrounding them. You can take advantage of those surrounding structures to help mitigate by using a delay fuse, et cetera.

So it's -- I don't want to say there will be no damage. I don't want to say there will be no casualties. But there is a very good way to try to keep the number of casualties and the damage to the minimum.

Next slide.

Now, we talked earlier about dual use facilities, and there are situations for sure where facilities are both military and civilian in nature. We take a look at each one of those facilities to determine if the benefit from striking that target outweighs the potential damage to surrounding facilities or to noncombatant casualties. And we -- and while a dual use facility is a legitimate target within the laws of armed conflict, we do want to make sure that we try to strike that target at a point where it minimizes the casualties. And that may be, for example, where I talked about using a day versus a night attack will help you with that.

Next slide.

There's one final mean of providing some mitigation, and is essentially provide some warning. We have, as many of you have reported, been using leaflets and radio broadcasts in Afghanistan, and certainly in Iraq now to send messages to the people. In our case, for example, in Iraq, we send messages to have them listen to our radio broadcasts. We send messages to tell them to stay away from military targets. And we would use this same kind of approach to be able to say to the people at a particular target location, "You probably don't want to go around a military base. You might want to stay home. You probably don't want to go to work if you work in one of those dual use facilities. And you can use the media -- I want to rephrase that -- (laughs, laughter) -- the medium of broadcast, both leaflets and the airwaves, to actually say to the civilian community, "You probably ought to stay away from the kinds of facilities that could be targeted in any kind of conflict." And you can do that over time and condition or you can do that in a very short period of time and allow you at least one more means of trying to get that message out to keep people away

from a target that may be struck.

Next slide.

Now, there are -- kind of, the summary to this process is to say that we really have -- we are continuing to work hard to minimize the effects that we have. But -- and there are some targets that we will, as a routine, not strike at all. You can see diplomatic facilities. Now, there will be somebody out there that says, "Well, what about in Kosovo? You made a mistake." If you will go back to the first chart where I had that little yellow ellipse that said "fog of war; human error," those things will occur and we won't get this 100 percent correct. But we feel confident that as each day goes by, we continue to develop better intelligence and location information on things like diplomatic facilities, public services, locations of the NGOs, locations of the media, and certainly, the hospitals and religious facilities that we have around.

There is an important point, though, and that is once a government, an enemy force chooses to locate military -- valid military targets, like surface-to-air missile systems, like AAA weapons, like tanks, like weapons of mass destruction, if a government chooses to co-locate those with one of these protected sites, they lose their status, under international law, as a protected target. Now, that doesn't mean you're striking the protected target. It means you're striking the military capability that is co-located there. And again, we'll go through a similar process to make sure that you target the thing and not the facility; again, trying to minimize the kind of damage that you might incur.

Folks, that's -- those are the general slides I wanted to cover. And I see I've prompted a few questions, so let me go around here.

Q: Yeah. I was wondering what -- if you could describe what techniques you have for mitigating collateral damage if you hit a chemical or biological weapons site.

**Senior Defense Official:** That's a great point. There has been great work done by a number of both military and civilian agencies to determine the effects of a weapon on a chemical site, whether it's something simple, like a missile fuel manufacturing facility, for example, that uses a variety of chemicals, or if you find a mustard gas storage site.

First point is, there are some ways to deny use of that facility without destroying the facility. For example, you can take the power out from that facility, and so you might strike the power production for -- or the switching site for that facility, so it makes it not functional. You might deny access to that by using self-destructing small mines -- and these are air-deliverable -- that have a 24-hour or 48-hour self-destructing capability. And so you could keep people from going in and taking something out of that facility.

We might also target some of those kinds of facilities with special operating forces, as opposed to kinetically, with bombs. And so there's a number of ways that you might preclude a chemical or weapons of mass destruction emission.

There's also some good studies on the kinetic effect of various types of munitions on

various types of chemicals. And so you may be able to incinerate some of those in the actual attack itself.

I think, finally, just to say this -- because this is an important point, we will attempt to not create those kinds of effects. That's not to say we won't strike targets we need to, but we think we have some means that will allow us to deal with some of those --

Q: And is this the same for biological or chemical?

**Senior Defense Official:** There are again, some similar studies -- I really don't want to give you too much of the results there, because I'd probably speaking -- beyond my level of understanding.

Q: Yesterday General Myers said that roughly 60 to 70 percent of the bombs that would be used would be -- were precision-guided, which would mean roughly a third of those dropped would not be. Can you compare for us your accuracy in achieving what you're attempting to do with all of this with the precision-guided bomb and a "dumb" bomb?

**Senior Defense Official:** Sure. First, it's important to say that you pick the weapon that is best suited to the target. And so, for example, troops in the open, where precision is not so critical -- we would generally try to use non-precision weapons for those kinds of targets. And there are a number of those.

On the other hand, as you start to get closer in to a requirement for precision, the actual percentage of precision to non-precision will actually swing way over to the left. And I would say that General Myers' characterization is good as you look at an entire campaign. But as you look at the areas where collateral damage is the most concern for us, then you'll probably see a much more substantial reliance on precision weapons up into the 90 percent.

Q: In comparing the two in terms of collateral damage and in terms of actually hitting the targets that you're -- that you're attempting to hit, how do they -- how would you --

**Senior Defense Official:** I'll just give you an example. A 500- pound dumb bomb, if you will, dropped from medium altitude has a circular error probable -- in other words, that's sort of the basket it's expected to hit -- of somewhere around 200 feet. A 500-pound laser-guided bomb or a GPS weapon is down in the 21 or 22 feet. So that's sort of the order of magnitude. And again, as I would go back to you, you would choose to use the smarter weapons when you -- when the precision is more required for you. Does that help you?

Yes, ma'am.

Q: Could you answer a couple of questions? With regard to your precision-guided munitions, what's your dud rate or your mistake rate? Because some of them --

**Senior Defense Official:** Sure.

Q: And the second question I have is, how confident are you in your targeting databases? Because that was a problem in Kosovo. Could you talk about the changes you will have made?

**Senior Defense Official:** Sure.

Q: And also, could you --

**Senior Defense Official:** Now, see, you're going to confuse me with a third question.

Q: All right.

**Senior Defense Official:** I'll come back to you if I -- if we can. Okay.

First, targeting database. I think we've made a huge improvement. It -- and that's maybe unfair. We have continued to refine that process. And people who have an input to that have become -- have begun -- have become much more forthcoming, if you will, to help us with that. For example, nongovernmental organizations are keenly interested in letting us know where their locations are so that they are not targeted. And so, we think we are making great progress in improving our database.

Now, if you go back to your first question of things don't go where they're supposed to go all the time, I think it's fair to say that between, somewhere between 7 and 10 percent of even our precision weapons do not hit within that 21-foot circle that I just mentioned a while ago. And so, there will be some unforeseen circumstances. A bomb comes off an airplane, and there are a number of both electrical and mechanical things (that) have to happen in order for that bomb to go where it is designed. And you could have a power failure on a guidance unit, you could have a fin lock up, and that bomb will go somewhere we know not. And so it's important to understand that collateral damage can occur not because you struck the wrong target, but because a bomb just flat didn't go. And that's -- that is not uncommon in 8 to 10 percent of the time.

Q: Any possibility of compensation for -- for --

**Senior Defense Official:** I'm really not at the level -- .

Q: There have been reports about Iraq purchasing GPS jammers and possibly putting them around. Is that a concern as far as targeting is done? And are you confident that the military has overlooked it and gotten past it?

**Senior Defense Official:** Well, GPS jammers don't affect laser- guided weapons, so -- and GPS jamming doesn't affect electro- optically-guided weapons. So, what I'm really saying is we have a broad enough capability that I'm not worried about it.

Now, to the question of GPS jamming, it's certainly something we have to acknowledge is a capability, but I think we have paid attention to that and we're not terribly concerned.

Q: As you design your structure for command authority to drop bomb X on target X,

are there categories of targets that will require -- in Kosovo, you may recall, some of the targets required going all the way up to presidents of coalition countries. How is your command structure designed? How much freedom does the pilot have? How much freedom does Tommy Franks have and his subcommanders to go? Will you likely have open free-fire zones, boxes, where you're patrolling and looking for certain things?

**Senior Defense Official:** Yeah, I think first, the point I'd like to make is that the command control structure is built very flat. It allows for decision-making at the lowest possible level, and that's a good thing. I don't believe you'll see the kinds of challenges that military commanders in Kosovo faced. I think the president, secretary and General Franks have a very good agreement on only those key targets that have to be elevated, and we allow the battlefield commanders to make those decisions. I think -- I'm getting old -- the second point you mentioned?

Q: The box.

**Senior Defense Official:** Ah. Okay. Yes.

Q: (Inaudible) - In a fluid battlefield you create boxes where you have different --

**Senior Defense Official:** Sure. Absolutely. We'll have -- again, that will be dependent upon the effect that you want to achieve on the battlefield. For example, if you're moving a large maneuver force forward in an open battle area, that land component commander may very well want sort of roaming patrols in a large geographic area to strike any military target they find. Pilots -- the ground commander always still has a responsibility to positively identify what he's going to shoot. And so, it still has to meet the criteria of a military target that affects the battlefield. So -- but there will be areas where a broad area engagement permission is given and to effect the battlefield.

Q: Could you talk at all about non-lethal weaponry that might be used? I'm thinking of the E-bomb, for example, and maybe other things. Do you -- I know people don't want to get into the E-bomb, but if not that, the other --

**Senior Defense Official:** I'm chuckling because I haven't met that guy yet.

Q: Is there such a thing? Or is it --

Q: Well, let's go to my question first, if that's alright? (Laughter.) Any of the non-lethal --

**Senior Defense Official:** I think --

Q: -- non-lethal weaponry that might be in your inventory that you could use?

**Senior Defense Official:** I think what is fair to say is that our military technology has developed to a point where there are a number of tools that are not necessarily explosive -- they are non-kinetic. And I think that there are many places where a non-kinetic tool is better for you than a kinetic tool. And they can be something as

simple as using a concrete-filled bomb as opposed to an explosive bomb. If your desire is to make a trailer-size thing go away and make it not functional, you could hit that with a concrete weapon and it won't work anymore, but you haven't destroyed anything. So I think it's unfair to try to get so specific to say is there one of these or one of those or how do you use them. It's probably more fair to say that we have a broad ability to use non-kinetic tools and we will take advantage of those on the battlefield.

Q: What about pulse weaponry of any kind?

**Senior Defense Official:** You know, I'm an A-10 pilot; I'm not smart enough to talk about it.

Q: But you don't know anything about the pulse weaponry at all?

**Senior Defense Official:** No, I really can't comment on it.

Q: You can't comment because you don't know, or you never heard, or you know but you --

**Senior Defense Official:** I don't know enough about it to say it exists or to say that it works.

Q: May I just follow up on that? Is there anything that uses electromagnetic pulses or anything in that general category that might be used in this -- in any upcoming battle?

**Senior Defense Official:** Well -- I'm stuttering, and you'll say, "Well, he knows something he's not telling me." I really don't know of a weapon right now that has that kind of characteristics. But I am not a scientist and there are a lot of smart scientists trying to develop weapons that take advantage of the electromagnetic field, the radio field and others.

Q: But not scientists trying to develop one now, but, I mean, is there one in existence? I would presume you'd know about weapons --

**Senior Defense Official:** I'll just let you continue to speculate.

Q: But is that --

**Senior Defense Official:** Sir?

Q: -- part of a disinformation campaign, the stories about --

**Senior Defense Official:** No, I just -- I honestly don't know enough to give you an answer. I guess that's as good as I can give it to you.

Q: I want to go back to an issue that Jack raised, and that's about targeting oversight. There was this story -- whether it was correct or not, I don't know -- from Afghanistan, where a Predator had spotted a vehicle and there was a question about whether the JAG on duty had to authorize that strike. That created a lot of

controversy over whether the role of the JAGs, given the -- sort of the short sense of the shooter space that we have now, whether the role of the JAGs is the same as it was in the past. Do JAG officers have to rule on --

**Senior Defense Official:** No. I think that was a grossly unfair characterization of the process. But I will say that it was also a process that we were learning, because that's the first time that we used that particular kind of weapon system on the battlefield, that gives you that situational awareness. But I think it was unfair to say that the JAG rules that process. Every commander at every level has a legal adviser with him because there are laws of armed conflict and there are accepted means of behaving on a battlefield. And so if you have a question, at every command level, you have a relationship with your combat lawyer that says, "Well, what do you think? This seems a little bit of a gray area to me; is it?" That is a healthy interaction and it needs to occur. The key is making that decision loop as tight as you can. And I think we've learned a lot from the first day of Afghanistan till today, and I think -- I'm confident, to go back to the point over here, that the decision cycle is very, very agile and should not be a concern.

Sir?

QA political overview question here. Is the purpose of this briefing, besides imparting specific information, is the purpose of this because CentCom is so concerned about the prospect of urban conflict and a lot of civilian casualties that you want to sensitize those who are going to be covering it, and the world who reads the briefing, that CentCom has a process in place to mitigate whatever may happen in an urban conflict environment?

**Senior Defense Official:** Well, I happen to be a CentCom person speaking, but I think the briefing is a fair approximation of where we have come in the transformation of the use of military over the last -- even the last three or four years. And so I think the purpose of the briefing is to say bad things will still happen on the battlefield, but if we are asked to use military power in Iraq, our intent is to ensure that we keep those bad effects to the minimum.

(Crosstalk.)

Q: What about the --

**Senior Defense Official:** I do -- I'll take two more questions. I can do that.

Q: What about the leaflets and the broadcasts? In your experience in Afghanistan, did people pay much attention to that? Did -- when you dropped a leaflet and said stay away from this, or had broadcast.

**Senior Defense Official:** Absolutely. You know, there are some great stories of that, and I could spend a hour here doing it. But let me just give you two snippets.

As refugees left Afghanistan, we were able to speak with many of them and ask them, "So did y'all see any leaflets running around or anything like that?" And they said, "Oh, yes. We got them, and it said to tune in to this frequency. And we listened

to you. We enjoyed listening to your music. We" -- (laughter) -- they said, "Your music was way better than what we could hear," you know.

So there is -- in the process, the evolution of these messages, you build an audienceship (sic), just like you do. And what we found is that the programming, the messages, and the information, we told them where humanitarian aid was going to be delivered. We told them to stay away from the city centers at night.

Q: Did they do that? Did they get --

**Senior Defense Official:** And they seemed to affect them. And, in fact, one of the follow-on snippets is "We saw you so precise with your targeting that we weren't afraid. We felt comfortable that we could stay in our house and you wouldn't hurt us."

Back here.

Q: A couple of JDAM questions. You used the example of a 500- pound JDAM. One question is, I wasn't aware that those were out in the field in large quantities --

**Senior Defense Official:** I think I used -- I said "JDAM", I said "laser-guided weapon and JDAM". But you're right, we have 500- pounders still coming to us. But it was really -- the circular error is about the same for a laser-guided bomb or a JDAM.

Q: So the laser-guided 500-pounders obviously are out there.

**Senior Defense Official:** Yes.

Q: Okay. The other thing is, you were talking about the pilot still has the responsibility to identify the target. Now, obviously, when you're using JDAMs, which are becoming a popular thing, you don't have to have eyes on the target. Do they -- or do they still have to?

**Senior Defense Official:** No. Let me -- let me -- that's a good point, because there -- as you prepare for every mission, there is a very detailed mission planning process that goes on for every air crew.

For weapons where you're -- for missions where you would use a weapon that is not sort of terminal guidance, there is a detailed target study process that occurs with that air crew and his flight members so that they can look at the surrounding area, find ways to identify it. And then in the aircraft they have, whether it's radar, whether it's a targeting pod, whether it's a -- just using even the visual eye, in some cases, you can identify that even though I'm not going to see that bomb physically hit that spot, I can see where that spot is on the ground. And unless the coordinates on my weapons system are in error, it's going to go where it's supposed to. And so, there is -- I'm not concerned that we will induce additional error by the fact that that's not a terminally guided weapon by the guy in the airplane. Does that help you?

Q: Well, let's say, the example of the case in Baghdad where there were 400 civilians

gathered in a --

**Senior Defense Official:** Or wherever.

Q: -- command post right -- whatever it was. Let's say that you could actually see those -- those people around it. I don't think that was the case with this particular thing --

**Senior Defense Official:** No.

Q: -- because it was a laser-guided thing. But let's say there was a case where people had gathered around it for whatever reason, and you're using JDAMs to hit that command post. I mean, would you -- would be a man in the loop there or not?

**Senior Defense Official:** Well, again, you -- you would hope that your messages that say "Don't go around facilities that are military in nature" would take. And --

Q: Well, maybe they didn't go voluntarily.

**Senior Defense Official:** And I'll go back to my statement on the fog of war, that sometimes there will just be mistakes made. That's not the intent, but it does happen.

Okay, last question.

Q: Okay. Given the targeting calculations that have already been made, what is the current estimate for civilian casualties?

**Senior Defense Official:** I really don't have anything that I could say to you as a good estimate. I think the view would be that our precision capability allows us to keep targets -- keep civilian casualties to a lower number than we've ever seen in the past. But there will be some.

Q: Are we talking hundreds?

**Senior Defense Official:** I really would -- it would be unfair of me to try to guesstimate that, because --

Q: This number 3,500 that a group at Harvard put out for the last gulf war of civilian casualties, do you subscribe to that? Is it ballpark?

**Senior Defense Official:** Somebody from Harvard's pretty smart, so they surely probably have a good answer. But I -- I really wouldn't want to affirm or deny that that was accurate.

Q: Just to be clear: even given the kind of intensity of the bombing campaign that we're hearing about, the calculation is still that there will be fewer numbers of civilian casualties in this conflict than -- if there is one -- than there was during Desert Storm?

**Senior Defense Official:** I think that there -- it's fair to say it's possible. I mean, I

think our -- we will use -- in Desert Storm I think we used 20-some percent precision weapons. Here we'll use 70 percent precision weapons. An example in Desert Storm, we -- on a number of occasions we targeted a particular location with 16 or 18 airplanes; we'll do that same target with one now. And so, the ability to be that more precise intuitively tells me that there should be fewer casualties. But I -- but that's probably as close as I can get for you.

Q: Last one. How many people sign off --

**Senior Defense Official:** This will be my other last question. (Laughter.)

Q: You talk about the vetting process. How people sign off on a target before it indeed becomes a target? What happens to that targeting process, that vetting process when you do have a real-time situation such as a Predator hunting, you know, Omar X over there, and he finds him, and he needs a quick decision on whether or not to attack?

**Senior Defense Official:** I think the first question is the easiest one to answer -- well, they're both fairly easy to answer.

The vetting process for targets involves the entire intelligence community. There are video teleconferences each day that look at targets and decide whether they are viable targets.

In terms of the time-sensitive targeting, which is what you're talking about, we also have a command structure of intelligence operations, legal and commanders, who can make a determination. And in the end, they will do just that. They will make a judgment based on all the best information that we have. And I'd just say we have a very robust capability to gather and fuse information at a point of decision.

Thanks, ladies and gentlemen. I appreciate it. Sorry, I have to catch a flight.

Q: Thank you.

**"THIS TRANSCRIPT WAS PREPARED BY THE FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE INC., WASHINGTON, D.C. FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE IS A PRIVATE COMPANY. FOR OTHER DEFENSE RELATED TRANSCRIPTS NOT AVAILABLE THROUGH THIS SITE, CONTACT FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE AT (202) 347-1400."**

---

 [Printer-friendly Version](#)

 [Email A Copy](#)

---

[Privacy & Security Notice](#) | [External Link Disclaimer](#) | [Web Policy](#)  
[About DefenseLINK](#) | [Contact Us](#)



# Targeting and Collateral Damage



**5 March 2003**

11-L-0559/OSD/17602



## **Avoiding Unintended Non-Combatant Casualties**

**“America is a friend to the people of Iraq. Our demands are directed only at the regime that enslaves them and threatens us. When these demands are met, the first and greatest benefit will come to Iraqi men, women, and children.”**

*President Bush  
Cincinnati, OH  
7 Oct 02*

**“Saddam Hussein regards the Iraqi people as human shields, expendable when their suffering serves his purposes”**

*President Bush  
Nashville, TN  
10 Feb 03*

**“We will try in every way we can to spare innocent life. The people of Iraq are not enemies.”**

*President Bush  
Nashville, TN  
10 Feb 03*



## Definitions...

- **Collateral Damage (CD) and Unintended Casualties occur when:**
  - **Sites intended to be protected are damaged or destroyed**
  - **Facilities with both military and civilian purposes are targeted**
  - **Non-combatants are injured or killed**
  - **Non-combatant structures are damaged or destroyed**

**Collateral damage and unintended casualties also occur as a result of weapon system malfunction, human error, and the fog of war**




## Target Decisions...

- **For each military target, the potential for Collateral Damage is reviewed and a decision is made regarding:**
  - **Targets likely to result in non-combatant casualties**
  - **Targets likely to result in damage to non-combatant structures**
  - **Targets that affect protected sites**
  - **Targets that serve both a military and civilian purpose**
  - **Targets in close proximity to known Human Shields**



## Target Assessment... Non-Combatant Casualties and Non-Combatant Facilities (An Example)

- **Each target is identified and characterized**
- **Aimpoints are selected for Precision Guided Weapons to achieve the desired military objective**
- **Collateral Damage Concerns are identified within the maximum weapon effects area**



**Assessment: High Potential for Collateral Damage**




## Target Assessment... Mitigation of Collateral Effects

- **Ways to reduce collateral damage...**

1. Employ smaller weapons
2. Employ different fusing
3. Shift aimpoints
4. Limit attack angles and azimuths
5. Time attack to periods of low occupancy

- **In this case... collateral damage is mitigated to Low**


**In every case, desired weapons effects are achieved**





# Target Assessment -- Dual Use Facilities

- **In some cases, facilities perform both military and civilian functions**



- **Assessment of each target weighs mission value against predicted non-combatant casualties**

**Dual use facilities are legitimate targets, but we want to minimize non-combatant casualties ...**



## Other Mitigation Techniques...

### Provide “Early Warning”

- **Leaflets, radio broadcasts, and television advisories for civilians to stay away from sites associated with military**
- **Advise media/organizations to vacate selected sites immediately**
- **Broadcast radio advisory regarding selected specific targets**

**Warnings allow non-combatants to make informed decisions to enhance their safety... they should be taken seriously!**



## Other Mitigation Techniques...

- **Significant efforts have been taken to identify and record facilities the coalition intends to protect from military strikes**
- **Categories of facilities considered include:**
  - **Diplomatic Facilities**
  - **Public Services**
  - **Non-Governmental Organization Facilities**
  - **Medical Facilities**
  - **Civilian Education Institutions and Facilities**
  - **Religious Facilities**
  - **Historically Significant Sites and Facilities**

**...military use of protected sites constitutes “abuse”**

**...makes sites legally subject to attack**


May 14, 2003 2:45 PM

TO: Jaymie Durnan  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Coercive Diplomacy

Please tickle a note for a month from now to see if we have set up any of those meetings with the President to talk about coercive diplomacy, etc.

DHR:dh  
051403-16

.....  
Please respond by

  
6/14/03



U19924 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/17611



May 14, 2003 3:01 PM

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *TR*  
SUBJECT: MEK

*ADVANCE COPY SENT VIA E-MAIL*

I need a memo on the MEK—who they are, what they do, how many there are, etc. I need either a memo or a phone call from somebody, because I need to know before tomorrow.

*01113*

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
051403-20

.....  
Please respond by 5/15/03

*5/15/03*

U19926 /03

May 14, 2003 3:38 PM

TO: Pete Geren  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Transformation Package



391

I hear you are just working so hard and so effectively on this transformation package, and I want you to know I appreciate it. Your fingerprints are all over it up on the Hill.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
051403-21

.....

Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

14 May 03

U19927 /03

May 14, 2003 4:18 PM

TO: Jaymie Durnan  
Col. Bucci  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Meeting

337

Please do set up a meeting with Gus Pagonis and that group I listed.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
051403-24

*Set up for  
early June.*

Please respond by 5/30/03

*J*

Jaymie Durnan  
5/22

19 May 03

U19920 /03

1700  
Snowflake

Done 6/3

May 14, 2003 4:19 PM

Received 5/28  
9:30 am.

TO: Jaymie Durnan  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR  
SUBJECT: Metrics

I don't know what metrics Gus Pagonis is talking about. I would like to see the metrics he referred to.  
Thanks.

100-5

DHR.dh  
051403-25

.....

Please respond by 5/23/03

19 May 03

U19930 /03

5/30  
1300

5/30  
6/2

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100



COMPTROLLER

INFO MEMO

May 30, 2003 8:09 AM

Jan 6/2  
M  
FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim *DZ*

SUBJECT: Question about metrics from Gus Pagonis visit on May 14<sup>th</sup>

- During your meeting with Gus Pagonis, Chairman of the Defense Business Practice Implementation Board (DBB), Mr. Pagonis mentioned the Board's work on balanced scorecard metrics. The metrics to which Mr. Pagonis referred were developed in coordination with Ken Krieg, and are described in DBB Report FY02-2 (attached). The balanced scorecard metrics recommended by the Board in this report were formalized by Management Initiative Decision (MID) 901.
- The Board also recommended a set of discrete financial indicators. It is described in DBB Report FY03-1 (attached). These recommended indicators currently are being integrated into a comprehensive set of financial management metrics for the Department.
- I attach a summary page depicting both sets of DBB recommended metrics (balanced scorecard and financial indicators).

Attachments:  
As stated.

Prepared by: T.Modly/Executive Director, DBB/2E314/(b)(6)/May 30, 2003

11-L-0559/OSD/17616

# DEFENSE BUSINESS PRACTICE IMPLEMENTATION BOARD

**Table A: Balanced Scorecard Metrics (as defined in DBB Report FY02-2)**

<u>Force Management Risk</u>		<u>Operational Risk</u>	
• Quality Index	• Civilian Workforce Progress	• Joint Con Ops Progress	• Specific Issues List
• Force Tempo Trend	• PMA Human Capital	• Operational Availability	•
• Quality of Life Index	•	• Joint Monthly Readiness	•
• Total Force Cost Trend	•	• C-Sorts	•
<u>Future Challenges Risk</u>		<u>Institutional Risk</u>	
• Experiments Progress	• Transformation Budget	• BRAC Progress	• Acquisition Cycle Time
• Joint Training Progress	•	• Life-Cycle Cost Trends	• Other PMA
• New Organization Standup	•	• FMMP Progress v Plan	•
• National Capabilities Definition	•	• Competitive Sourcing Progress	•

**Table B: Key Financial Indicators (as defined in DBB Report FY03-1)**

1	4	5	10
2	<b>High Level Indicators for Senior Management</b>		11
3			12
6	9		13
7			
8			

Snowflake

May 14, 2003 2:11 PM

TO: Powell Moore  
CC: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: WMD

*DR*

Please get an answer to Senator Leahy on WMD, and I need to see it before it goes.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
051403-10

.....  
Please respond by

*5/30/03*

*K*

U19931 /03

*14 MAY 03*

11-L-0559/OSD/17618

May 14, 2003 8:54 AM

337

TO: LTG Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Schedule/Metrics

As we discussed, we have to get organized for the period we are in. Specifically, rather than getting the usual SVTC briefings, we ought to have someone responsible for daily reports on where we are in at least each of the following categories:

1. **WMD:** site exploitation, organization, management and progress in seeing it is being led and executed in an orderly way, with sufficient resources. (Steve Cambone)
2. **Public Services for Iraqis:** We need better granularity. I am not sure I believe those red, green, amber, and blue charts. I would like to push a little underneath them to see how accurate they really are. (Bremer)
3. **Security.** We need some metrics on security. We have to be able to track it. The Joint Staff, working with the CFLCC commander, needs to be responsible for seeing that they are produced. (LTG Casey)
4. **Political Evolution.** We have to have some way of tracking the political progress—city councils, IIA, etc.—every day or two. (Jerry Bremer)

There may be other categories like the above that we owe it to ourselves and the President to put into a disciplined process. We need to keep pushing at it until we are satisfied we have the right leadership in each category, the right organization structure and the right metrics.

Thanks.

DHR:db  
051403-1

.....

Please respond by 5/23/03

14MAY03

U19932 /03

Snowflake

May 14, 2003 7:21 AM

000-7

TO: Torie Clarke  
CC: Ken Krieg  
Pete Geren  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Op-ed

I think we ought to get an op-ed piece on the transformation bill and do it fast.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
051403-3

.....  
Please respond by 5/16/03

U19933 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/17620

14MAY03

May 14, 2003 7:24 AM

4/3/51

DONE

TO: Jaymie Durnan  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: TIA Report

Where is the Total Information Awareness report required by Public Law. It says that SecDef, the Attorney General and DCI have to submit it by May 20, 2003. I would like to see it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
051403-4

.....

Please respond by 5/16/03

14MAY03

U19934 /03

05  
5/20

May 14, 2003 8:59 AM

Middle East

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA  
SUBJECT: Road Map

Is there any way the Road Map can be accomplished? I haven't looked at it, but someone tells me it is something like 26 complicated steps.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
051403-5

.....

Please respond by 5/30/03

U19935 /03

14MAY03

May 14, 2003 9:00 AM

TO: Torie Clarke  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Mass Graves

I think we should mention these mass graves at the press briefing tomorrow. It is a gripping story.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
051403-6

.....  
Please respond by 5/15/03

U19936 /03

May 12, 2003 2:38 PM

032

TO: Jaymie Durnan  
Powell Moore  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Testimony

I may want to have David Chu go up with me before the Congressional testimony this year, as well as Dov Zakheim.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
051203-13

*Copy* (b)(6) *Please ensure he is invited*

.....  
Please respond by 5/13/03

Jaymie Durnan  
*5/13*

U19937 /03

12MAY03



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

DEC 9 2003

The Honorable Mel Martinez  
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development  
451 7<sup>th</sup> Street, SW, Room 10000  
Washington, DC 20410

Dear Mel,

I understand that you were able to spend some time in Iraq recently.

It would be an enormous help to get a report of your impressions of what you saw. I think it would be helpful to the President as well.

Any report you may wish to file you can please feel free to send to Mr. Reuben Jeffery, Executive Director and Representative, Coalition Provisional Authority Representative Office, fax (b)(6) He'll get it to me as well as to others who would find it useful.

Thanks for taking the time to make the trip and spending some time with our forces.

Sincerely,

U19938 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/17625

333

9 Dec 03

TO: LTG John Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: October 22, 2003  
SUBJECT: **Iraq Reports**

Let's get a letter off to cabinet members who go to Iraq and ask them for some sort of report back in writing. I would like to see what they have to say and I think it would be helpful also if they sent a report to the President. Or I could send him the one they send me.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
102203.15

---

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_

*11/5*

*Zeno,  
appreciate you working  
this -  
vr/  
Nose*

May 12, 2003 2:00 PM

TO: Torie Clarke  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Cartoon

000.75D

Please see if you can get this cartoon from *Gentlemen's Quarterly*.

Thanks.

Attach.  
*Gentlemen's Quarterly*, May 2003.

DHR:dh  
051203-1

.....  
Please respond by 6/13/03

12MAY03

U19939 /03

# THE GQ LIST



## 21 New Names for Iraq

- 1) People's Republic of Texaco
- 2) Bushstanistan
- 3) Islamabunkport
- 4) Bedrock
- 5) We-raq!
- 6) Notosamabad
- 7) Crawford Ranch East
- 8) Afghanistan on the Euphrates
- 9) The Persian Golf
- 10) Burkini Beach
- 11) Rumsylvania
- 12) Country with a New Regime We're Now Supporting but Will Have To Take Out in Two Decades
- 13) Gasmaskistan
- 14) The Hussein Asylum
- 15) Allahwood
- 16) The Ponderosa
- 17) Ididitfordadistan
- 18) Infertile Crescent Nuclear-Waste Storage Facility
- 19) The United Emirates of Whup-Ass
- 20) Who's your baghdaddy now?
- 21) France

May 13, 2003 8:44 AM

33550

TO: Powell Moore  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA  
SUBJECT: Congressman Davis

If I have not written Congressman Davis yet, please prepare a letter for me to sign.

Thanks.

Attach.  
5/8/03 Davis ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh  
051303-3



Please respond by 5/23/03

U19940 /03

13MAY03



HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
WASHINGTON, D C 20515

SECDEF HAS SEEN

MAY 13 2003

THOMAS M. DAVIS  
ELEVENTH DISTRICT  
VIRGINIA

May 8, 2003

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld  
Secretary  
Department of Defense  
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld:

As you know by now, the Government Reform Committee took a big step forward last night toward improved government management by passing the Civil Service and National Security Personnel Improvement Act and the Services Acquisition Reform Act of 2003. We could not have achieved our goals without your assistance and the help of your very competent staff. Through our continuing discussions, we moved legislation of which we can all be proud.

Please give my personal thanks to: Powell Moore, David Chu, Ginger Groeber, Charlie Abell, Pete Geren, Steve Ramp, Helen Sullivan and Tom Jones. They truly exemplify the excellence we want in our federal workforce, and I compliment you on putting together such a capable team. Their performance reflects well on you, the Administration and our country.

I look forward to continuing to work with you on this and other legislation as we continue to serve this great nation of ours.

Sincerely,

Tom Davis  
Chairman

---

original in  
Special Consp  
cc: Dunman  
C+D

11-L-0559/OSD/17630

SECRET  
200 PER - 2 EN 1: 49

September 16, 2003

TO: David Chu  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *[Signature]*  
SUBJECT: California Recall Vote

Are U.S. military forces going to be able to vote in the California recall? What arrangements do we have for absentee ballots as a result of the study Bill Cohen initiated before we got here?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
091603-11

.....  
Please respond by

*9/20/03*

*TO: Charlie  
Abell  
Per our discussion  
on 12/5, should  
we think about a  
memo to the  
CCs etc?*

- Dr. Chu responded on 20 Oct 03
- Copy located in (b)(6)
- Filing cabinet
- To SMA on 27 Oct 03

*[Signature]*  
11-L-0559/QSD/17631

U19961 / 03

SECRET  
273 FEB -9 AM 11:57

October 15, 2003

To: Powell Moore  
Pete Geren

TO: Jim Haynes

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Legislation re: Superintendents of Academies

*How do we do this?*

I do want to repeal that legislation that prohibits a person who serves as a superintendent of an academy from going to a new post.

*Jaymie  
Durnan  
12/8*

Thanks.

Attach.  
10/9/03 GC memo to SecDef re: Retirement of Air Force Academy Superintendent

DHR:dh  
101503-30

.....  
Please respond by 11/21/03

*(Handwritten circle around 11/21/03 and a large checkmark below it)*

*- Response attached  
Mr. Haynes responded on  
9 Oct 03*

U19963 / 03



GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

✓  
10/15

INFO MEMO

October 9, 2003, 2:45 P.M.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel *WJ Haynes*

SUBJECT: Retirement of Air Force Academy Superintendent

- This responds to your request that I provide my legal opinion as to whether the Superintendent of the Air Force Academy must retire after completing his detail to the position.
- The answer is yes. 10 U.S.C. §§ 8921 and 9333a require the retirement of an officer detailed to the position of Superintendent of the Air Force Academy. Similar statutory provisions also exist for the U.S. Military Academy and the U.S. Naval Academy.
- These provisions of law were added for all three academies by section 532, FY00 National Defense Authorization Act (Public Law 106-65, October 5, 1999). Section 532 also amended 10 U.S.C. § 525(b) to exclude from general and flag officer grade strength limitations officers serving in the grade of O-9 as the Superintendent of a service academy.
- These requirements could be eliminated by repealing 10 U.S.C. §§ 3921, 4333a, 6371, 6951a, 8921 and 9333a. Such repeals would leave intact the authority to exclude from general and flag officer grade strength limitations officers serving in the grade of O-9 as the Superintendent of a service academy.
- Please advise if you want me to draft a legislative package to repeal the retirement requirements.

COORDINATION: None.

Prepared by: Jim Smyser, ODGC (P&HP), (b)(6)



UNITED STATES ARMY

THE CHIEF OF STAFF

8 DEC 2003

INFO MEMO

SECRET

703 570 -7 PH 3-23

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THRU: R.L. Brownlee, Acting Secretary of the Army

FROM: Peter J. Schoomaker, Chief of Staff Army

SUBJECT: Lessons Learned

- This memo is in response to your question regarding differences between the U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) lessons learned report and the Army War College Strategic Studies Institute's (SSI) brief, *Iraq and the Future of Warfare*. The Army concurs with the JFCOM study findings, which are generally consistent with the conclusions of the CSA-chartered Army OIF Study Group (OIFSG). In concert with the other Services and the JFCOM team, OIFSG conducted an extensive review of actions during major combat and continues to gather information from the ongoing operation.
- Concurrently, the SSI is analyzing Operation Iraqi Freedom from the beginning of the war through the conclusion of major hostilities. The study team's lead author, Dr. Stephen Biddle, posits that "jointness" and speed may not have played a significant role in the coalition's low-cost rapid victory, rather citing the skill of U.S. forces and Iraqi ineptitude as the principle reasons for the coalition's success. While this work highlights issues important to the Joint Force – the crucial role of training and leadership, as well as the caution to avoid equating the OIF battlefield with possible future wars – it reaches a number of conclusions that are at odds with the Army position.
- This SSI study does not benefit from the depth and breadth of real time access to wartime decision makers and supporting data, as well as ongoing analysis of OIF actions, that underpin the findings of both the Army and JFCOM reports. However, there is continued value in our academic institution's analysis of operations. It should be noted that in subsequent versions of this study, the author has modified many of his conclusions, to include those regarding the importance of "jointness" as additional academic rigor is applied. The leadership at Carlisle has active oversight of this ongoing effort and does not currently intend to distribute this study beyond an internal Army analytical audience.

U19985 / 03

**SUBJECT: Lessons Learned**

- **COORDINATION: TAB A**

**Attachments:**

**As Stated**

**Prepared By: BG Mark O'Neill /** (b)(6)

**TAB**

**A**

Coordination Sheet

Joint Forces Command

BG Cone

(b)(6)

**TAB**

**B**

3 NOV 03 JSA

November 3, 2003

TO: Gen. Pete Schoomaker  
CC: Les Brownlee  
Gen. Dick Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Lessons Learned

I thumbed through the Army War College brief, "Iraq and the Future of Warfare," last weekend.

I am curious to know if you have read it and what you think of it. If it is sound, then some of Admiral Giambastiani's lessons learned may not have been sound. Conversely, if the Army War College brief is not sound, you might want to look into it.

Thanks.


Attach.

"Iraq and the Future of Warfare," U.S. Army War College 8/18/03

DHR:dh  
110303-19

.....  
Please respond by 11/28/03

11-L-0559/OSD/17639



**U.S. Army War College**

**Strategic Studies Institute**

---

# ***Iraq and the Future of Warfare***

## **Implications for Army and Defense Policy**

**Dr. Stephen Biddle, Study Director**

**COL James Embrey, Project Coordinator**

**COL Edward Filiberti**

**COL Stephen Kidder**

**Dr. Steven Metz**

**Dr. Ivan C. Oelrich**

**LTC Richard Shelton**

**August 18, 2003**

---

11-L-0559/OSD/17640

# Agenda


- Research Question
- Sources
- Contrasting Views
- Evidence and Analysis
- A Different View
- Conclusions and Implications

# Research Question

- Explain OIF outcome – Saddam toppled with:
  - Low US losses
  - No scorched earth
  - No WMD use
  - Moderate collateral damage
- Focus is on high-intensity operations, 19 March to 9 April
- Scope limited to military cause and effect, implications for defense policy

# Sources

- 176 Interviews
  - Army, USMC, UK, SOF, USAF, Iraqi EPWs; E-5 to O-9
  - Baghdad/Basra/Hillah/UmQasr Iraq
  - Camp Doha/Arifjan Kuwait
  - Pentagon/Ft. Carson/Fallon NAS/Carlisle Barracks
- Terrain inspection
  - OBJ Montgomery
  - OBJ Saints
  - Baghdad
- Primary-source written documentation, CFLCC
- Published secondary sources



# Findings

- Early accounts have often emphasized:
  - Speed
  - Precision and situation awareness
  - Jointness
  - Coalition skill
  - Iraqi shortcomings
  - Luck
- Evidence suggests:
  - Speed and luck played smaller roles than early accounts imply
  - Jointness was valuable, important, but not a necessary precondition for low-cost victory
  - Key determinant: synergy between advanced Coalition technology and major Coalition-Iraqi skill imbalance

# Speed

- Accounts seeing speed as decisive and the ne mass as declining usually hold:
  - Iraqis unable to track fast-moving, unpredictable Coalition movements
  - Iraqis unable to communicate well enough to res
  - Speed of advance demoralized defenders; helped “Fortress Baghdad”
  - Iraqi scorched earth, WMD use preempted by rap Coalition advance
- Was this so?

# Speed and Iraqi C4ISR

- Iraqis used low-tech means to assemble picture sufficient to move paramilitaries, multiple RG divisions in ways that imply timely knowledge of our whereabouts
  - Scouts in civilian clothes reconnoitred US positions continuously; reported via cell/sat phones, landlines, couriers
  - Reporting apparently reached high command but compartmented narrowly
    - Division commanders and below have no situation awareness beyond immediate environs – several captured in inadvertent contact with US formations
    - Corps commanders and above have clearer picture; use it to orchestrate response
  - RG redeployed elements of 4 divisions directly across V Corps axis of advance; blocking movement completed 1-2 days before US contact
    - Hammurabi div moved from NW of Baghdad to S and W of city
    - Adnan brigade moves NW along Hwy 6 from Al Kut to SE of Baghdad
    - Nebuchadnezzar elements move > 250 km from Green Line opposite Kurds to OBJ Murray S of Baghdad
    - Medina div shifts west to concentrate vs. 3 ID, 1 MEF
  - Paramilitary Reinforcement of Najaf, Nasiriyah
    - 10,000 Fedayeen moved south from Baghdad after G-day via undefended routes
    - Najaf: threaded needle via sole undefended route into city; little/no accidental contact with US blocking forces – combat was overwhelmingly deliberate assaults from within city, not accidental contact with Iraqis trying to infiltrate
    - Nasiriyah: USMC captures detailed, accurate sandtable of US positions

# Speed and Iraqi Morale

- Speed does not appear central in Iraqi morale breakdown
- RA morale largely broken before G-day; SRG, paramilitary resistance continues long into the war
  - Baghdad: SRG, paramilitary resistance did not collapse when 3 ID arrived at outskirts; broken only by defeat via close combat in urban center
    - Apr. 5, 2 BCT “Thunder Run:” every vehicle hit by RPG fire
    - Apr. 7, 2 BCT advance from BIAP to Tigris: heavy fire from all directions; Iraqis reoccupy destroyed positions behind US advance; emergency resupply must fight through to advance position after nightfall, losing 2 fuel, 1 ammo truck, 2 KIA, 30 WIA en route
    - Not clear that “Fortress Baghdad” would have been much more formidable if encountered later, reached more slowly
  - Basra: paramilitary resistance continues for two weeks; broken only by defeat via close combat in urban center
  - Nasiriyah, Najaf, Samawah: Iraqi resistance continued long after Coalition forces bypassed cities; broken only by defeat via close combat in urban centers

# Speed and Scorched Earth


- Little evidence that speed preempted an imminent scorched earth campaign
  - Rumaila Oil Field
    - Of 250 total oil wells, only 22 actually prepared for demolition – of these, only 9 detonated, creating 7 fires
    - No GOSPs, pumping stations, pipelines prepared for demolition
    - No evidence of ongoing preparations for additional demolitions
    - Field not secured until 1500Z, D+2; Iraqis had ample time to destroy entire field if actually prepared for detonation
  - Kirkuk Oil Field
    - Iraqis held field for 3 weeks after hostilities initiated; no wells destroyed
    - No evidence of preparations for demolition uncovered when Coalition took control of field
- Scorched earth threat as bluff for deterrent effect?
  - Evidence is consistent with thesis that Iraqis meant to create credible threat to deter us from invading but with no intent of mass destruction
  - Little positive evidence that slower advance would have yielded significant increase in damage

# **Speed and Iraqi WMD non-use**

- **Unlikely that speed preempted Iraqi WMD use**
  - No Iraqi WMD located close enough to delivery systems for near-term employment
  - No hard evidence that Iraqis were within days or weeks of effective WMD use; little evidence that slower Coalition advance would have made a difference here

# Luck

- Implies that with different breaks, Iraqis could have hurt us much more gravely
- Yet plausible “what ifs” had been anticipated and planned against – few seem likely to have caused serious, strategic-level setbacks
- Where breaks favored Iraqis, their tactical shortcomings prevented exploitation



– OBJ Montgomery, Apr. 4:

- RG reinforced tank battalion in prepared positions on ground of own choosing eluded air attack, met US ground advance at full strength
- Apache Trp, 3-7 Cav advanced directly into prepared kill sack
- Iraqis engaged from flanks at 800-1000m range, fired >16 125mm rounds: none hit
- US return fire annihilated the battalion

– If Iraqis’ poor training left them unable to take advantage of breaks, not clear that more breaks would have made a decisive difference

# Jointness

- For jointness to be *necessary* condition for low-cost victory implies that without it, cost would have been much higher
- Yet in 1991, less-joint Coalition offensive with smaller technology edge defeated Iraqis at *lower* loss rate
  - Coalition forces were larger in 1991, but local assaults at parity or worse still annihilated dug-in, actively-resisting RG opposition at very low cost
    - 73 Easting: 2 US Cav troops annihilated RG brigade without loss to enemy fire
    - Wadi al Batin: US battalion annihilated RG brigade in frontal assault, killed 160 Iraqi AFVs losing only 6
    - Medina Ridge: US brigade annihilated RG brigade in frontal assault, suffered no casualties
- In 2003, Coalition ground forces sometimes fought without tightly integrated CAS, yet still prevailed at very low cost
  - Through D+3, few CAS sorties flown, yet 3 ID, I MEF advance up to 350 km, fight through stiff resistance at Talil, Samawah, OBJ Rams
  - OBJ Montgomery, Apr. 4: single Cav troop decimates dug-in RG battalion by direct fire without loss
- Jointness clearly strengthened Coalition forces in 2003 – and could be decisive advantage in future warfare – but little evidence that OIF low-cost victory is attributable to a significant increase in jointness


# Skill-Technology Synergy

- Technological sophistication enabled a skilled Coalition force to punish Iraqi errors with unprecedented severity
  - To survive vs. modern weapons requires very high tactical proficiency, ability to exploit complex terrain
  - Iraqis very poorly trained and led
  - Resulting mistakes, ill-prepared fighting positions, poor marksmanship, flawed dispositions left them fatally exposed to Coalition technology
  - Enabled relatively small Coalition force to prevail in short, relatively low-cost campaign
- If Iraqis' poor skills were necessary for our technology to produce these results, then dangerous to assume we can obtain similar results against better-skilled enemies

# Iraqi Ineptitude

- **Extremely Poor Marksmanship**
  - Most Iraqis fired little/no live ammunition in past year:
    - Baghdad RG div: 1 live fire exercise/year, 10 rds each
    - 2<sup>nd</sup> div RA: zero live fire in past 12 mos
    - 3<sup>rd</sup> div RA: 1 live fire exercise/year, 4 rds each
  - Vs. 3BCT, Baghdad: RPG hit rate < 10% at ranges of 100-500m
  - Vs. 3-7 Cav at OBJ Montgomery: 16 125mm rounds, ranges of 800-1000m, zero hits; nearest miss falls 25m short
- **Self-defeating tactics**
  - Repeated, exposed, frontal assaults by paramilitaries in NTVs
  - Sought out Coalition combat forces; avoided soft targets, LOC interdiction
- **Poor leadership**
  - Officers abandoned troops in heat of battle
  - Radical, mutual, mistrust between leaders and led
- **Poor equipment maintenance:**
  - 10% ORR for Iraqi HETTs on 3BCT front
- **Poor fighting position preparation**
  - Some success at concealment, but limited ability to provide cover
  - No ability to combine cover, concealment, field of fire

**Al Qaeda, Afghanistan**



**Republican Guard,  
Iraq**



## Iraqi Ineptitude, cont'd

- Iraqis systematically unable to exploit potential of urban terrain
  - Only SRG given any conventional MOUT training – RA, RG totally untrained in MOUT; paramilitaries given little/no conventional military training of any kind
  - RG, RA denied access to city centers; deployed in rural areas, urban outskirts
  - Paramilitaries in urban areas sortied into open; prior to Apr. 5, Iraqis on tactical offense in most urban fighting
  - No interior building prep
  - Prepared fighting positions typically outdoors, exposed
  - No obstacles, mines, barriers
  - Disaffection of Iraqi public with Ba'athist regime facilitated SOF targeting of otherwise concealed urban assets



# Iraqi Ineptitude: Consequences

- RG, SRG, RA exposed to LRPE
- Lightly-armed paramilitaries exposed to overwhelming direct fire from armored vehicles
- Paramilitary command, support infrastructure targetable even when concealed
- Coalition able to fight mounted in cities, engage exposed urban defenders from standoff
- Poor Iraqi marksmanship, fire control, vehicle/weapon maintenance left them unable to exploit (rare) opportunities
- Result:
  - Maximum scope for US technological advantages to affect outcome
  - Combination of 21<sup>st</sup> c. technology and Iraqi exposure yields radical lethality – enabling small, well-trained Coalition force to succeed at very low losses
  - *But requires advanced technology and skill mismatch: either alone insufficient*

# Counterfactual: What if Iraqis had been skilled?

- Actual Iraqis forfeited most advantages of urban terrain; skilled urban defense would negate important US technological advantages
  - Many fewer exposed targets for LRPE
  - Much harder to avoid dismounted assault to clear properly-prepared buildings
  - Higher rate of larger-caliber Iraqi hits vs weaker US side, rear, roof, floor armor
  - 1:1 LER not implausible in MOUT vs skilled defenders – possible US losses of multiple thousands
- Actual Iraqis avoided LOC interdiction; skilled partisan warfare would've required large US troop diversion to support MOUT campaign, reducing MOUT force ratio and increasing losses
- US could besiege cities rather than assault them, but:
  - Lacked troops to invest multiple urban areas while defending 500 km LOC – important parts of country would have to be left under Ba'athist control
  - A motivated, prepared opponent could hold out under prolonged siege: Milosevic held out under 78 days of bombing in 1999
  - Survival of Baathist control apparatus would inhibit civilian HUMINT assistance, reduce Coalition's ability to find concealed urban command, logistical targets
  - Barring decapitation via lucky shot, could be very long war; political pressure for eventual assault would be difficult to resist
  - Hard to rule out eventual requirement for direct assault

# Conclusions

- Central finding: synergistic interaction between advanced technology and Iraqi ineptitude was necessary and sufficient for low-cost victory
  - Without 2003 precision, situation awareness, survivability, even inept Iraqis could have inflicted much heavier casualties
  - Without Iraqi ineptitude, even 2003 technology could not have enabled a force this size to prevail at this cost
  - 2003 technology punishes ineptitude very severely, but cannot guarantee similar results vs. adept enemies
- Can speed, precision, information now substitute for mass?
  - In Iraq, speed less important than precision, information
  - Effects of precision, information critically dependent on Iraqi exposure – against less-exposed opponent, results could be very different

# Strategy and Policy Implications

- To assume that precision and information will always permit small forces to succeed would be high risk
- But to assume that precision and information will never again permit small forces to succeed would be over-conservative
- Campaign planners must be able to tell the difference – in advance – between skilled and exposed enemies
  - Routine worst-case campaign planning is unsustainable
  - To do better requires knowledge we don't have today: explaining the determinants of skill is a critical national research requirement
  - Civil-military relations as promising avenue
- Title 10 force providers must ensure preparedness for skilled enemies – would be dangerous to assume Iraqi-style scenarios as the future norm

EF-5336

May 15, 2003 12:09 PM

CC ISP

Iceland

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Iceland

Please see me about how we push ahead on Iceland.

Thanks.

*Cathy:*  
*Schedule*  
Jaymie Durnan  
*5/20*

DHR:dh  
051503-16

.....  
Please respond by 5/20/03

5/20/03  
→ SD  
JD Crouch is  
doing a note  
for you.  
Doug Feith

05-19-03 07:04 IN

15MAY03

U20014 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/17660

RECEIVED  
MAY 15 2003

May 15, 2003 12:10 PM

6/5/03

TO: Ray DuBois  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR  
SUBJECT: Nebraska Ave. Naval Facility

Andy Card mentioned that the Homeland Security Office is looking at the Naval Facility on Nebraska Avenue. Do you know anything about that?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
051503-17

.....  
Please respond by 5/23/03

U20016 /03

15 MAY 03

May 15, 2003 3:17 PM

OB  
5/17

IRAQ

TO: Torie Clarke  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Crime

Please take a look at these crime statistics. Baghdad is twice the size of Chicago and Los Angeles, and two-thirds the size of New York. I don't know how many murders, robberies, larcenies and thefts there are in Baghdad in a given week, but given the fact that they emptied every prison in the country and dumped out plus or minus 100,000 criminals, it strikes me that what is going on in Baghdad and Iraq ought not to be surprising.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Crime Statistics

DHR:dh  
051503-18

.....

Please respond by 5/23/03

U20017 . /03

ISMAY03

5/15/03  
ExecSec

**Crime Statistics**

**Average Week (2003 Data Only)**

	<b>Murders</b>	<b>Robberies / Larcenies / Thefts</b>
<b>Chicago</b>	10	2,043
<b>Los Angeles</b>	10	2,050
<b>New York</b>	11	1,671

**Average Week (2001 - 2003 Data)**

	<b>Murders</b>	<b>Robberies / Larcenies / Thefts</b>
<b>Chicago</b>	12	2,137
<b>Los Angeles</b>	11	1,955
<b>New York</b>	39	2,395

**POPULATION**

<b>Baghdad</b>	5,600,000
<b>Chicago</b>	2,896,016
<b>Los Angeles</b>	3,694,820
<b>New York</b>	8,008,278

MAY 20 2003 May 15, 2003 4:26 PM

*Please See Attached*

*France*

TO: Torie Clarke  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Quote

*[Handwritten signature/initials]*

Please give me the answer I apparently gave last Friday on Bill Gertz's issue on French passports or visas. He quoted me on television, and it didn't sound like me.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
051503-20

.....  
Please respond by 5/23/03

U20018 /03

*15May03*



United States Department of Defense

## News Transcript

On the web: <http://dod.mil/transcripts/2003/tr20030509-secdef0162.html>Media contact: [media@defenseink.mil](mailto:media@defenseink.mil) or +1 (703) 697-5131Public contact: [public@defenseink.mil](mailto:public@defenseink.mil) or +1 (703) 428-0711**Presenter:** Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld

Friday, May 9, 2003 - 11:15 a.m. EDT

### DoD News Briefing - Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Franks

(DoD news briefing. Participating were Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld and Army Gen. Tommy Franks, commander, U.S. Central Command.)

Rumsfeld: Good morning.

I promised that from time to time when General Franks was in town I would bring him down here. I have done so. And I think with that, with the fact that we do have him here suggests that I should be very brief. So I shall be.

I think I should, however, introduce his wife Cathy, who is sitting right there in a red blouse, who is a nifty lady.

A number of you were in the region with me last weekend, in CENTCOM and in Iraq and Afghanistan and then London. The thing I would simply say in introducing General Franks is that he has put together a superb team. He fashioned a brilliant plan. The fact that it was so successful is important. I think that, however, the way that campaign was conducted is also important, and the effect of the way it was conducted has put us on a path that would be notably different than had the plan been different or the plan been conducted in a way that was different. All of those things that could have gone wrong, for the most part, did not. And that is a great benefit to the region, to the neighboring countries; it's a benefit to the people of Iraq, who did not suffer a prolonged air war; it is a benefit to those who are now in the process of working on the stabilization and reconstruction of Iraq. And I simply want to say that General Franks is a truly outstanding professional military officer who performed his critically important tasks just about as well as they could have been performed, and I am very grateful.

General Franks?

Franks: Mr. Secretary, thanks very much.

Fifty-two days ago today, President Bush issued the order to begin Operation Iraqi Freedom. And it's interesting to me, when I think about it, to note that on that day, the President and Secretary Rumsfeld gave our forces -- gave me -- gave our forces a very clear mission with very clear objectives. And Mr. Secretary, I may be wrong, but I believe right here in this room, you announced very publicly those objectives on about the day that that war started. It's also interesting to me that those objectives have not changed, and that we measure our progress in this effort against those objectives fifty-two days ago.

Today, the Iraqi people no longer live in fear of a regime of Saddam Hussein, and key regime figures are being brought to justice every day, one by one. Camps of terrorists who had found safe harbor in Iraq have been destroyed. And our forces are exploiting intelligence information day by day on their organizations, their networks, their operating procedures.

Coalition forces have removed hundreds of tons of dangerous weapons and munitions from schools, from civilian neighborhoods, from religious centers. And to be sure, the difficult work of exploiting hundreds of sensitive sites is ongoing, as we speak.

11-I-0559/OSD/17665

The coalition has secured Iraq's oil fields so that those precious resources can in fact be used by the Iraqi people to help rebuild their country after decades of neglect and oppression. The predicted humanitarian crisis in Iraq has been averted by the provision of food, water, medicines -- in fact, at levels in some cases never before seen by the Iraqis.

Children in Iraq are beginning to return to school, and basic services like health care, electricity and water, while not where they need to be, and certainly not where they will be, are improving every day.

Coalition forces continue to work tirelessly with the international community, and certainly with Kuwait, to locate military personnel and citizens who have been missing in Iraq since the 1991 war.

The Iraqi people are now experiencing the right of democracy, and everything that goes with the responsibility of democracy, as they work to form a government of their choice.

And nations in the Red Sea and, in fact, in the Gulf region, are no longer threatened by a regime in Iraq that attacked neighbors twice in the last 20 years.

As President Bush told the nation from the deck of the Abraham Lincoln, decisive combat operations in Iraq have concluded, and the coalition today is focused on helping Iraqi people as they work to build a new country. Our forces still stand in harm's way and much dangerous work remains to be done. I have every expectation that we will continue to see pockets of resistance, and we will see pockets of instability and we will come across difficult situation[s] in the weeks and in the months ahead. But our forces are up to the task, and will remain committed to the task.

Iraq's best days are yet to come. And the Iraqi people are already taking steps to build a new government, that in fact, will be of their choice. Local governments and town councils are being formed in virtually every city and town across the country. The transition from dictatorship will take time, but is worth the effort that, in fact, we put to the task.

As we think about achievements behind us and the work force -- or, the work that lies before us, I think we pause every day to remember the families and the loved ones of the heroes who have given their lives during Operation Iraqi Freedom. These men and women died so that others, so that we could live in a safer and more secure world. They have succeeded in that task. We'll not forget their service, nor their sacrifice.

I believe the Secretary and I'd be pleased to take your questions.

Q: Mr. Secretary, General, journalists in Iraq report that a sense of public order is still lacking.

Rumsfeld: Who reports this?

Q: Journalists.

Rumsfeld: Journalists.

Q: In Iraq... is still lacking in Baghdad and in some other parts of the country. And some U.S. officials are quoted as saying that U.S. planning and execution of the postwar reconstruction were inadequate. Do you think that any mistakes were made in this area? And what is your assessment of the current state of the reconstruction effort?

Rumsfeld: Who are the officials?

Q: They're unnamed.

Rumsfeld: Ah. (Laughter.) That's nice. (Laughter.) What you're seeing in the press and on television are slices of truth. You're seeing that someone is harmed, or in a particular location the water isn't back on, or in a different

location the power is only intermittent, or is in 80 or 90 percent of the city and not 100 percent of the city. All of that's true. A good deal of it, of course, was also true prior to the war. And it seems to me it's important to have that in mind.

We keep tracks, where we look each day at the major cities -- I don't know how many, 20?

Franks: Twenty-seven.

Rumsfeld: Twenty-seven cities, and track them and see how they're doing with respect to security, how they're doing with respect to water, how they're doing with respect to power and what have you. And each day it gets better. We use red for a situation that is worse than the beginning of the conflict, and green when it is better -- the same as prior to the conflict, and blue when it's better than -- the situation for the people of the country is better than it was at the beginning of the conflict, and a white for not observed. The white has pretty well disappeared now.

Franks: It has, yes, sir.

Rumsfeld: And now we are able to observe and have some sense in every portion of those 27 cities, every portion of the country.

The reds have disappeared as of this morning. There are very few blues, but there are some blues. And there are amber, or yellow, for --

Franks: -- getting better --

Rumsfeld: Getting better but not up to the green level. This is a reflection of the seriousness of purpose of General Franks and his team. And as he said in his remarks, things are, in fact, getting better every day in that country. That does not mean that people cannot continue to write articles or see television clips of something that isn't perfect, or isn't as good as it was, or isn't better than it was. That is probably also true if one looks around any city in the United States or Western Europe, that things are -- we find things are not perfect. You'll see slices of truth that suggest that there are problems.

My impression of what's taking place is that the folks in General Franks' organization and in General Garner's organization have done an outstanding job and are continuing to make things better in almost every corner of that country, every week and every month, and that's a good thing.

The other thing I'd do, just to put a little perspective on it, is it's been 51 days since the war started. I mean, ask ourselves, each of us, what have we accomplished in 51 days? No, that's embarrassing, I shouldn't do that to you! (Laughs.) That would be wrong. (Laughter.) But 51 days is not very long. And I think that the reality is that it is a very difficult transition from despotism and repression to a freer system. It's untidy, it is -- it is -- there will be fits and starts, and a couple of steps forward and a step back. There'll be bumps along the way.

And it strikes me that what it requires is for people to be realistic; to look at other countries that have made that transition and ask how was that done, how long did it take, how difficult was it, how untidy was it? And recognize that this country does not have a history of representative or democratic systems; it's going to take some time and it's going to take some patience. And we accept that, and we're there to create an environment where that process can take place. And we have patience, and we accept the fact that it's untidy. And I hope that others can recognize that and accept it and put it into some historical context.

Q: Mr. Secretary, we talked about this before several times, but I'd like to ask General Franks.

General, I talked to several active-duty generals in the Army, since the war began, who, obviously, will remain nameless. But -- and they criticized your --

Rumsfeld: That's not obvious until your question's been posed, I don't think, and --

Q: Well, you will know why in a moment. But they have criticized your plan by saying that it was too light, not enough boots on the ground, such words as a "gamble" that could have been catastrophic and that it was irresponsible. Also, the criticism is voiced about not enough troops to maintain the peace. Would you comment on both those criticisms, please?

Franks: Sure, I'd be pleased to. I make it a practice to not comment on the remarks of predecessors, and I think it's distinctly unuseful to comment in the direction of unnamed officials. And so, I won't put a point on a comment. I'll simply say that it's instructive to take a look at what could have happened in this military operation and didn't.

I have a sense that stability in the Red Sea region and in the Persian Gulf neighborhood is certainly as good as it was the day this started. That doesn't necessarily have to have been the case. I think we could have had problems with the launch of surface-to-surface missiles into neighboring countries with weapons of mass destruction aboard them. We didn't. I think the oil infrastructure, the future of the country of Iraq, could have been devastated, but it wasn't. I think the water infrastructure of the country of Iraq could have been ruined, but it wasn't.

The calculus associated with working one's way through how many forces, of what type, to do what, over what period of time is a matter of both art and science. There are military professionals -- have been and will continue to be -- who have views on both the science and the art of military operations. I am satisfied, based on what we see today, 51-plus days -- (clears throat) -- excuse me -- into the event, and in consideration of all those things I just mentioned which did not happen, that the plan we saw was a good plan and that the execution of that plan by the armed forces of this country and other coalition members was absolutely magnificent.

Rumsfeld: Could I just add a comment? I agree completely with what General Franks said. The other thing that didn't happen was mass -- masses of refugees and internally displaced people. And another thing that didn't happen was a humanitarian disaster.

This plan was so different than what the world expected, and what was reported, and what was leaked; that -- the fact that the ground war began before the air war; the fact that the air war was long -- correction -- long in 1991 and very short here; the fact that it -- I don't know what it was, but it may have been complete reversal of precision weapons versus dumb weapons in this conflict percentage-wise; [1991: 10% precision weapons, 90% unguided; 2003: 70% precision weapons, 30% unguided] --

Franks: It was, yeah.

Rumsfeld: -- all contributed to something that, clearly, a lot of people had trouble wrapping their heads around because it was so distinctly different than the expectation and than the views that were reported.

We will know more about what took place when we're able to do interrogations. And we know a lot of bad things didn't happen now; we don't know quite why that is. We think we know, but we don't know for sure. And my guess is, as time passes and historians write their books, they'll be able to talk to people who were there, and we'll find out why some of those bad things didn't happen. But I suspect one of the reasons they didn't happen is because this plan was distinctly different than previously, and because it did not do the expected, and because of that, it achieved a degree of tactical surprise that was not expected.

Q: Mr. Secretary, what is your understanding of the role France played in connection with the Iraqi regime up until the start of the war, and even after combat operations?

Rumsfeld: France has historically had a very close relationship with Iraq. My understanding is that it continued right up until the outbreak of the war. What took place thereafter, we'll find out.

Q: Do you believe that France is harboring Iraqi leaders or helped Iraqi leaders get out of that country?

Rumsfeld: I've read those reports, but I don't have anything I can add to them.

Q: General Franks, can you talk about this year-long military occupation that's envisioned in the new U.N. resolution? How do you see that year unfolding, you know, what your work will be during that time?

Franks: Ma'am, actually, I'm not familiar with the year you're referring to in the --

Q: You know, I think it said a year or probably more you would have to be there.

Franks: Well, no, ma'am, I can't talk specifically to that, but I can give a sense. I think what we'll -- I think what we'll see is that there are a lot of variables associated with all of this. And I think right now what the future will hold a year, two, three, you know, ahead of us is not exactly knowable.

But I do know this: I know that the instructions that I have from the Secretary and from the President will commit what is necessary for as long as it is necessary, and no longer, in order to do the work that we said we would do and in order to execute the objectives that the Secretary gave us. We are going to watch this nation form anew in accordance with what the Iraqi people themselves want to do. And I'm not sure at this point that we know exactly what the force structure or size is going to look -- or what the international content is going to look like as we move forward.

Rumsfeld: I'm not sure you're right that there is a one- year figure there.

Q: (Off mike.) --

Rumsfeld: Just a minute. Just a minute.

Q (Off mike.) --

Rumsfeld: Just a minute. I'm not doing the negotiations, the Department of State is. And I suspect that if someone's mentioning a year, it's probably just a review period, because anyone who thinks they know how long it's going to take is fooling themselves. It's not knowable. And that's why General Franks said what he said.

The President and I have told General Franks and Ambassador Bremer and General Garner that the United States is prepared to keep any number of troops that are appropriate and necessary in Iraq for as long as it takes to create a secure and permissive environment so that they can go about their business of reconstructing their country in a way and in a fashion politically and economically that makes sense. What portion of those would be U.S., as he says, depends on what number of people, other countries, step forward. And a large number of countries are stepping forward. There have been two donors' conferences already. I don't recall all the countries. I wrote them down here someplace. But there are a large number of countries that have stepped up and said they will, in fact, be providing forces. My guess is that we'll know more about that in the next two or three weeks. Some countries may depend on the passage of a U.N. resolution, but certainly that's a minority.

Yes?

Q: Could I ask you to step back a minute. I'd like to ask you a more general question. As you look ahead now, you've asked, I think, for a study or some recommendations on the future of the U.S. military footprint overseas, that this is a time to now take a look at it; there may be some innovative things out there. Could you talk a little bit about that; what you'd like to see happen now? Are there some innovative things that could be done now as a result of the success in Iraq?

Rumsfeld: I think that the 21st century, and September 11th and certainly, Afghanistan and Iraq conflicts have, in fact, changed the circumstance in the world fairly significantly. And it would be unrealistic to think that the way we were arranged in the world in the 20th century would necessarily make sense in the 21st century.

As a result, when I came here, I began the process early on, well before September 11th, of having the combatant commanders in the areas of responsibility being a process of looking at how our forces are arranged and how the -- our friends and allies are arranged, and seeing if we might not want to make some adjustments in it. I'm now far enough along in that process that it's rather clear to me that there will be adjustments in every area of responsibility. And I feel very good about the progress that we've made. I don't know where it will end, but what we'll do is once we develop conviction, we will then talk to our friends and allies and they will -- we'll work with them to get ourselves properly arranged.

Q: Do you think something as innovative as possibly U.S. troops for the first time being based in the former Soviet bloc is a possibility?

Rumsfeld: I understand there's some provisions in some agreement or some meeting that took place that would require that if we were to do that, there would have to be discussions with Russia. I've forgotten what conference it was, but there was some conference that was held not too long ago.

Q: Mr. Secretary?

Rumsfeld: Yes?

Q: Speaking of adjustments, a couple weeks ago, before you went to the -- on your Middle East trip, you replaced the Army secretary. Can you give a sense of some of the trends or directions of that service that troubled you that prompted this leadership change, and what you expect the new secretary to do to correct these deficiencies you see?

And a quick follow-up, did you offer General Franks the Army vice -- Army chief of staff position?

Rumsfeld: The -- first of all, those important posts, and they are important posts, are posts that the President offers, not the Secretary of Defense, as you well know, and they are subject to Senate confirmation. And I don't discuss what I recommend to the President; I let him make those judgments.

It is interesting, and possibly instructive, for this group to note that I have seen at least 40 or 50 newspapers say that I selected the Army chief of staff a year and a half ago, to the great embarrassment of the current Army chief of staff, which is false; I never did. Anyone who's ever been around knows I still have not recommended a name to the President for Army chief of staff, let alone having done it a year and a half ago. But everyone goes into the morgue and then they reprint it, and over and over and over again out comes this totally false statement.

Secretary White's last day is today. He is a fine man. He's served his country ably, and I wish him well.

The White House has announced that the president's decided that Jim Roche, the Secretary of the Air Force, will be -- it's an intention to nominate, after some more paperwork and process is taken care of, to succeed Mr. White. And he and I will be sitting down and talking about the future and who might be appropriate to succeed General Shinseki, who I think has a four-year term limit; his service ends as of a date certain, under the law. And we will be talking to General Shinseki and to General Keane, who is the vice chief, and the secretary nominee, when that nomination is made.

Q: What are some of the trends or problems? There's a number of stories that have come out in the last couple of weeks saying you're at war with the Army, and making all sorts of --

Rumsfeld: That's kind of an inside Washington thing. It's just not true.

Q: What are some of the issues with the Army you want Secretary Roche to deal with?

Rumsfeld: I'll sit down with Secretary Roche and we'll talk about it with the new chief of staff of the Army and with General Shinseki and others.

11-L-0559/OSD/17670

Q: Mr. Secretary, a question for General Franks.

Could you outline -- or have there been any problems with looting in the oil fields? And has that caused any problem, any problem of looting?

Franks: Looting parts, and so forth, in the oil fields, sure, there have, just as there's been looting in downtown Baghdad as well as other population centers in the country. Valves, fittings, parts, and so forth, are things that looters would likely take; small enough things to perhaps be able to resell and make money.

Interestingly, the level of expertise that we have available to us working in those oil fields, along with thousands of Iraqis right now, are in the process of overcoming the pilfering that has taken place there. And what we see most striking about those oil fields is that that infrastructure has been so terribly disregarded and permitted to run down over decades, that it is the process of replacing and taking care of what has been permitted to fall apart under the previous regime that gives us the most difficulty. And so I think we'll see that those oil fields will produce for the Iraqi people in the near term a certain amount of oil. And I think that as time goes forward, we'll work with the Iraqis and they will be able to bring those oil fields up to a standard we're looking for. And so some pilfering and looting, yes, to be sure; major and in the form of a show stopper, no.

Q: General Franks?

Q: Mr. Secretary, could you explain to us why, with 2,000 more arms inspectors going -- or not arms inspectors, but folks going over to look for Iraqi weapons of mass destruction and other things under the Iraq survey group, the U.N. arms inspectors haven't been invited to join? Only American arms inspectors from the U.N. are on that team, Dr. Cambone told us.

And General Franks, could you in detail sketch out for us the way ahead in the next couple of months for keeping security in Iraq? I understand it's going to be divided into three sectors. Could you describe what's going to go on in each of those sectors and how they'll be administered?

Rumsfeld: I don't know the answer to your first question. I --

Q: Do you think more bodies will be better than fewer?

Rumsfeld: Part of the problem is, if you have an environment where there are still pockets of violence and people are being killed -- as I'm sure you noted, and General Franks mentioned, we had a trooper killed yesterday -- that it is much more logical that the people associated with the defense establishment, General Franks, would be doing their work. At what point it would make sense to have international inspectors come in, it might very well make sense. I just don't happen to know.

Q: (Off mike.)

Rumsfeld: I'm sure they are. As I say, I haven't been dealing with the United Nations, the Department of State has, and it may very well be that at some point that would make sense.

Jamie?

Q: I'm sorry; General Franks, about security?

Franks: Sure. Very quickly. Security in that country is absolutely critical to everything else that's going to be done there. A condition has to be established so that the people of Iraq can feel free to, you know, unshutter the windows of their shops and go to work and so forth. And at the end of all of it, it will be the Iraqis themselves who will get the police forces stood up and be able to handle security for the long term.

In the meanwhile, if you think about the types of forces that we used during this very kinetic phase of this war, and then you think about the functions that we're going to want to be working with the Iraqis to perform in the future vis-a-vis security, then we can see that there are certain kinds of forces that we're probably going to rearrange with other kinds of forces more ideally suited to that task. I don't think there is a certainty that says that security will be arranged in a number of sectors and so forth. What we want to be sure of is that we have the right sectors with the right leadership working with the Iraqis all over the country, in all the population centers. And we'll surely do that.

Rumsfeld: I would also add that it's -- it would be inaccurate and unfortunate for people to go off thinking that the United States is dividing that country into three pieces, because we are not. And there have been pressures to have the country not be a whole country; and when somebody indicated that, well, these forces would be in this area, and the other in this area, and it comes out to three, people ran off and said, "Oh, my goodness; they're dividing the country up." We're not. It's a whole country.

Q: But -- (Inaudible.) -- do exist.

Rumsfeld: We may have -- well, they do exist. The areas of responsibility within the country may be assigned to the Marines here, this military unit there, to the Brits there. But that has nothing to do with dividing the country up into parts. And I was -- I've seen press reports to that effect, which worried me. And I think it would be unfortunate.

Q: General Franks, back to the war plan just for a moment. Some in the media, and in particular, some retired military generals took some heat for suggesting early on in the war that perhaps things weren't going as well as you'd hoped. Did they get a little bit of --

Franks: You said, Jamie, they took some heat, did you say?

Q: I said they took some heat -- (Inaudible.) -- some criticism that perhaps they rushed to judgment. But in fairness to them as you look back, wasn't there a point about five or six days into this when it did appear, even to your own commanders, that this might be a more difficult challenge than it eventually turned out to be? And didn't you make adjustments at that point to sort of turn things around?

Franks: Well, I'm not sure about the last phrase in there, Jamie. I wouldn't necessarily talk about that.

I think one of the characteristics of the plan which the Secretary of Defense described very early as a plan which would be unlike -- or a campaign which would be unlike anything that we have seen before. Well, one of the reasons for that is because this has been a plan that was above everything else joint. I mean, actually joint -- not a plan that deconflicted the Services, but rather, a plan that caused the Services to work together. So, it's a characteristic of it.

Another characteristic of the plan is, or was up to this point -- and you know, we're still on a plan, obviously -- but the other characteristic was that it was a plan that's flexible, adaptable and provides the opportunity to respond to weather, to respond to -- if we believe that we'll find an enemy circumstance set in a certain way and we find when we get there that the enemy circumstance is arranged in a bit of a different way, the flexibility and the ability to adapt is what's really, really critical to this.

And so, did I ever second-guess the plan? Nope. Did not. I think that all of us who look at the execution of a military operation look at it through the lens of our own experience. Now, that deserves a little thought by all of us, because if, in fact, what the secretary said was true, and that is this will be an effort that is not like anything we have seen before, that means that it's going to be difficult to find a lens through which anyone could look and say, "Aha, we know just exactly what this is going to do." And so surprised, disappointed, questioning? Not at all, Jamie, no.

Q: Well, speaking of bum raps, did you get a bit of a bum rap in the criticism about failing to protect the museum in Baghdad, when now we know that many of -- or most of the antiquities, in fact, were not looted? And did that, in fact, occur before the U.S. even got there?

Rumsfeld: I was told personally, by someone who went to the museum three weeks before, that the door was closed and that there were a very few items that were visible through the doors, and it was fairly clear that things had been put away into safekeeping or been secreted away by somebody on an inside arrangement.

Franks: No bum rap --

Q: (Inaudible.) -- a bum rap?

Franks: No bum rap. I think if we wrapped ourselves up in, you know, considering and thinking about that, we'd sure waste an awful lot of time. I think what the operational commander is expected to do in this country is to put -- is to put an effort together and focus on it and stay with it, and not worry about what people say on any given day while it's being executed. And that's what we have been doing, and that's what we'll continue to do.

Rumsfeld: I would go so far as to say that it would have been a bum rap even if the items had been looted. And the reason I say that is that it would have been a terrible thing if they'd all been disappeared and looted. Terrible. And here are the antiquities of that civilization. On the other hand, the task for the general was to go in and make a whole series of judgments with his key leaders, at different levels, different ages, different ranks, different seniority, about what they should do to prevail in the conflict with a minimal loss of U.S. life, with a minimal loss of innocent Iraqi life, and to capture and contain and put into custody the regime leadership to the extent possible, and to think of a lot of things. Museums, yes. Hospitals, yes. Schools, yes. Mosques, yes. Shi'a holy sites, yes.

It isn't as though you had one task, you invaded the country to go in and protect a single thing. You had a complex set of tasks. And that those decisions cannot be made in Tom Franks' headquarters; they have to give guidelines and then people go out, and colonels and captains and lieutenants and sergeants and corporals and privates make those decisions as to is it more important to save the life of my trooper buddy standing next to me or to provide safety for a mosque or for a hospital or for something. Those are tough calls. And they -- in my view, if one looked at it in toto 51 days ago, dropped a plumb line through the whole thing, anyone would have to say, "Damn good job, General Franks."

Q: General Franks?

Rumsfeld: We're through. Thank you. (Laughter.)

Q: Is your voice okay? Are you suffering from --

Rumsfeld: I've got a little rasp in my voice, but I'm -- (Off mike).

Copyright ©2003 by Federal News Service Inc., Ste. 220, 1919 M St. NW, Washington, D.C. 20036 USA. Federal News Service is a private firm not affiliated with the federal government. No portion of this transcript may be copied, sold or retransmitted without the written authority of Federal News Service Inc. Copyright is not claimed as to any part of the original work prepared by a U.S. government officer or employee as a part of that person's official duties. For information on subscribing to the FNS Internet Service, please visit [www.fednews.com](http://www.fednews.com) or call (202)347-1400.

<http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/tr20030509-secdef0162.html>

Copyright 2003 News World Communications, Inc.  
The Washington Times

May 10, 2003, Saturday, Final Edition

**SECTION:** NATION; Pg. A04

**LENGTH:** 492 words

**HEADLINE:** Rumsfeld expects to corroborate **French passport help** for Iraqis

**BYLINE:** By Bill Gertz, THE WASHINGTON TIMES

**BODY:**

Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld said yesterday that he expects to find out about French support for Saddam Hussein's government from information recovered by coalition forces now working in Iraq.

"France has historically had a very close relationship with Iraq," Mr. Rumsfeld told reporters at the Pentagon. "My understanding is that it continued right up until the outbreak of the war. What took place thereafter, we'll find out."

When asked whether France is harboring Iraqi officials or had helped Iraqi leaders flee Iraq, Mr. Rumsfeld responded by saying: "I've read those reports, but I don't have anything I can add to them."

Several members of Congress, including the chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, have asked the Bush administration to investigate reports first disclosed by The Washington Times that France covertly supplied passports to fleeing Iraqi officials around the time of the fall of Baghdad to coalition forces on April 9.

U.S. intelligence officials told The Times that France provided passports to an unknown number of Iraqi leaders in Syria, who then used the passports to go to Western Europe. The passports helped the Iraqis escape capture from U.S. and allied forces.

The French government has denied that it provided visas to fleeing Iraqis.

The intelligence on the passports coincides with other intelligence reports indicating that a French company helped Baghdad earlier this year by providing spare parts for Iraq's Mirage jets and Gazelle helicopters.

Also, other intelligence reports linked a French exporter to the export from China to Iraq of a chemical used in making missile fuel.

Intelligence officials have also said that France, along with Russia, attempted to conclude new deals with Baghdad for oil in the days before U.S. military action began against Saddam's forces.

The Pentagon has dispatched special intelligence exploitation teams of up to 2,000 people to Iraq to search for Saddam's hidden stocks of chemical and biological weapons.

The teams also will look for leads that identify how Iraq was able to obtain military goods and weapons in violation of the United Nations arms embargo in place since the end of the 1991 Persian Gulf war.

Mr. Rumsfeld said last month that finding out about Baghdad's arms acquisition was one of the remaining tasks for coalition forces in Iraq.

On Thursday, Rep. F. James Sensenbrenner Jr., Wisconsin Republican and chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, asked the Homeland Security Department and other federal agencies to investigate the French role in allowing Iraqi officials to escape.

Yesterday, Rep. Joe Pitts, Pennsylvania Republican, also wrote to Mr. Ridge seeking an investigation of

11-L-0559/OSD/17674

whether the French government provided passports to fleeing Iraqi officials. Rep. Christopher Cox, California Republican and chairman of the Homeland Security Committee, also is investigating the matter.

**LOAD-DATE:** May 12, 2003

◀ [prev](#) Document 2 of 2

---

[About LexisNexis™](#) | [Terms and Conditions](#) | [Privacy Policy](#) | [Support Identifier](#)  
[Copyright © 2003 LexisNexis](#), a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.



United States Department of Defense

## News Transcript

On the web: <http://dod.mil/transcripts/2003/tr20030515-secdef0185.html>Media contact: [media@defenseLINK.mil](mailto:media@defenseLINK.mil) or +1 (703) 697-5131Public contact: [public@defenseLINK.mil](mailto:public@defenseLINK.mil) or +1 (703) 428-0711**Presenter:** Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld

Thursday, May 15, 2003 - 11:30 a.m. EDT

### DoD News Briefing - Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Myers

(DoD News Briefing. Participating were Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld and Air Force Gen. Richard B. Myers, chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.)

Rumsfeld: My goodness. Good morning. I first want to express my sympathy to those U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan and Iraq who have been wounded in recent days, and to the families of those who have been killed. Our prayers are with them all. I also want to express my sympathies to the families of those that were killed in the terrorist bombings in Riyadh. We're told that possibly seven Americans were killed along with the citizens of several other nations. And we deeply regret the loss of those innocent lives.

While the terrorists are still being hunted, this much is clear. As Vice President Cheney put it earlier this week, there really is no treaty, there's no policy of containment or deterrence that works to deal with the problem of terrorism. The only way to deal with the terrorists is to find them and stop them before they launch more attacks.

With the discovery this week of mass graves in Iraq we have seen still more evidence of the brutality of that regime. The discovery was still another chilling reminder of why so many nations came together to remove Saddam Hussein from power. One looking at that mass grave and the photographs of it cannot help but feel that it's a good thing that a regime with such disregard for innocent human life is gone and will not possess the tools of mass murder.

The liberation of Afghanistan and Iraq were accomplished by large coalitions of nations. And today many nations, those and others, are stepping forward to help the people of Afghanistan and Iraq to rebuild from the rubble of tyranny. There are now 34 coalition partners in Afghanistan helping Afghans build a more stable, secure and free society. The liberation of Iraq was conducted with the support of 65 countries, including some 40,000 troops, 190 aircraft, 58 ships contributed by various coalition partners. Today the coalition continues to grow as nations across the globe come together to help the Iraqis build peace.

Each day I look at a map that gives us the conditions, estimates of conditions in some 27 major cities. It tracks food, water, power, security and various public services. A few areas have challenges, to be sure. But most areas are progressing, and a growing number actually have conditions that are today estimated to be better than prior to the recent war.

Security remains the number one priority in Iraq. The combatant commander will be increasing the number of military police in Baghdad in the days immediately ahead. To strengthen the coalition presence, the commander is bringing elements of the 1st Armored Division into Iraq, as has been planned, I think since last year. These forces were in the queue to flow in at this time. It is not some sudden new decision, as some have suggested.

There are now about 7,000 Iraqi policemen back at work in Baghdad, I'm told. And that number should also increase in the days ahead.

At the moment, 24 coalition countries are providing military support in Iraq. Some are doing it publicly, others are doing it privately. Thirty-eight nations have made offers of financial assistance totalling more than \$1.8 billion, and

humanitarian assistance continues to flow into the country. Now, let me offer a few examples.

The Czech Republic has deployed a field hospital to Basra and sent aid convoys with medicine, drinking water, tents and blankets.

Greece has contributed some 20 tons of food and clothing.

Lithuania has sent orthopedic surgery specialists to Um-Qasr.

Spain has a 150-person health team in Iraq and is working to repair electrical and water systems in the country as well.

And many more contributions could be mentioned and will likely be mentioned in the days ahead. But to see how much the world has changed, consider that in just 20 months Afghanistan went from an ally of al Qaeda in its war on the free world to becoming a member of the coalition of free nations in the effort to liberate and assist Iraq.

General Myers.

Myers: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

I join the secretary in extending my condolences to the families of those killed or wounded in operations and hostilities in Iraq, in Afghanistan, and also to those killed in the terrorist bombings in Riyadh Monday. In Riyadh, these brutal murders of innocent civilians remind us that the world is still a dangerous place, and we must not and we will not relent in our determination to defeat terrorism and achieve stability.

In Iraq today, 4th Infantry Division forces raided a regime safe house south of Tikrit, where it has detained several dozen people.

Also in the Middle East, the Combined Task Force Commander for Horn of Africa, Major John F. Sattler, will turn over command to Brigadier General Robeson, United States Marine Corps, on the 24th of May.

And finally, I just returned from a trip to the Middle East to visit U.S. troops in Qatar, Kuwait and Iraq, and then stopped in Brussels for a NATO Military Committee meeting on the way back. As I noted in Brussels on Tuesday, although major combat operations have ceased in Iraq, it's still a very dangerous place where considerable difficult work remains to be done. And we're about that work now.

And with that, we'll take your questions.

Rumsfeld: Charlie?

Q: Mr. Secretary, you said earlier that the only way to deal with terrorists is to find them and stop them before more attacks can be made. The White House and the U.S. ambassador to Saudi Arabia suggested perhaps the Saudis didn't do enough in advance of the Monday attack. You announced recently in a visit to Riyadh that the United States was sharply cutting its military presence there, due in large part there no longer was a need for Southern Watch, but that you-all that would keep a fairly small number there for training the Iraqi military and would continue joint exercises. Following these attacks, is there any consideration to perhaps further cutting back the U.S. military presence in Saudi Arabia?

Rumsfeld: No. First of all, I think what I said was that the reason we can draw our forces down except for the Office of Military Affairs and forces that are involved in training or exercises was not simply because Operation Southern Watch is closed down, but also because Saddam Hussein and his regime are gone. But there's nothing that's changed our plans. We do plan to draw down almost all of those forces and maintain a relationship in training and exercises and in Office of Military Affairs.

Q: Are you concerned, either of you, concerned that perhaps the U.S. forces that remain there might be in some danger because of this perception that perhaps the Saudis aren't doing enough to prevent this?

Rumsfeld: Look. Force protection levels change in country to country all over the world all the time. U.S. forces are in danger from terrorists just as people in the United States are in danger from terrorists from time to time. So, no. The answer is no. We're comfortable that the combatant commander in the region will provide appropriate force protection for forces in that country and other countries -- there's no difference -- and life goes on.

Mm-hmm, yes?

Q: Given the attacks in Saudi Arabia, you haven't really talked about al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden in some time. When you look at these attacks, what's your assessment -- al Qaeda stronger or weaker?; bin Laden still calling the shots? Was this a new cell that emerged? What's your assessment on this whole thing?

Rumsfeld: I don't think I'm going to get into it. I read the intelligence, and I don't make those assessments; the intelligence community makes those assessments. They communicate them to the senior levels of the government, and it's really not for me to do that; that's what they do. And I think I'll leave it to them.

Q: If I could just press you on one single point, though, you -- in the past, you do have a long record of saying something about bin Laden one way or the other on various days. Do you still have any view yourself as to whether or not you think he's alive? I mean --

Rumsfeld: I do. I think he's alive or dead -- (Laughter.) -- and I just don't know. I mean, what can I say? I can just say the same thing over and over again. He's either alive -- he's alive and injured badly -- or he's dead. And he's -- who knows? He -- if he is alive and functioning and playing a role, which I don't know -- (Chuckling.) -- it is a much more difficult role than it had been previously. It's more difficult in terms of raising money; it's more difficult in terms of moving people and things and weapons and money; it's more difficult to recruit; it's more difficult to retain. And that's a good thing. The pressure that dozens and dozens and dozens of countries across the globe are putting on that terrorist network is having a good effect. We've always said that it doesn't mean that there will not be terrorist attacks; we knew that and we've said that repeatedly from this podium. And I suspect there will be more. But it's tougher for them, and we intend to make it still tougher.

Q: Mr. Secretary, you said yesterday that you have a plan and you're going to use muscle to restore security to Iraq. Can you be a little more definitive for us? And as part of that muscle, is it shooting looters on site?

Rumsfeld: No. I think everyone who's been asked that question -- I don't know; someone in the press wrote that, and it came out of somewhere in Iraq, and it was knocked down by everybody who's been asked it in Iraq as having never been said or never been the policy. We have rules of engagements; have had; do today. They've not been changed. They permit, obviously, what -- the use of whatever force is necessary for self-defense or for other selected purposes. But that was hyperbole.

Q: What kind of muscle? That connotes something more than you're using now.

Rumsfeld: I mentioned it in my remarks. The combatant commander -- it's not -- those decisions aren't made here. Those decisions are made there, and the combatant commander has a flow of forces that have been put in train since last year. They're continuing to flow in the country. The forces that have been redeployed out of the theater have been, I believe, almost entirely air and sea forces.

Myers: That's correct. That's correct except for there were a couple of Marine units, I think the 25th MEU and the 24th, I believe.

Rumsfeld: But for the most part, the ground forces are remaining there, and judgments as to how many more will be permitted to flow in and what forces may or may not be allowed to flow out would be recommendations from the

combatant commander, which Dick and I would then consider at some point. But at the moment, the intention on the part of the commanders there is to provide security in that country as best as is possible and create a presence, a physical presence in places so that people recognize that there are individuals in the coalition who are determined to see that the environment becomes permissive for the people of Iraq.

Q: Mr. Secretary, yesterday, the South Koreans and our president issued a joint statement saying 'we will not tolerate nuclear weapons in North Korea'. That is such a strong and definitive statement. Can you help us to understand what that means? Does that mean the U.S. is prepared to take military steps to deal with this? Or does this mean we will continue indefinitely consultations, diplomacy?

Rumsfeld: Well, I must confess, I was -- saw early drafts of that statement, but I did not see the final statement. I was in the meeting that the president had with the president of the Republic of Korea, and also in a separate meeting with him. It's not for me to interpret statements by two presidents. I'll -- they obviously -- if that's what they issued, they obviously know what is meant, and I suspect they mean what they said.

Yeah, Bill.

Q: Mr. Secretary? Mr. Secretary, the French government is accusing the United States of a disinformation campaign about France's support for Saddam Hussein's regime. I know you addressed this Friday, but I wondered if you could address that particular charge.

Rumsfeld: I know nothing of such a campaign.

Q: You're -- (Off mike.).

Q: Mr. Secretary, has there been -- following up on that question, has there been any --

Rumsfeld: Certainly there's no such campaign out of this building. I can't speak for the rest of the government. But I have heard of nothing like that.

Q: Has there been any change in the military-to-military relationship with France as a result of the position it took prior to the war in Iraq?

Rumsfeld: There's so many linkages and connections between the United States and NATO allies that I wouldn't want to say yes or no. It may very well be that things are -- I just can't answer the question, because people make judgments at a whole host of levels. And what we've been trying to do in our security cooperation engagement relationships that involve the combatant commanders -- it involves the services, it involves the people in the Office of Secretary of Defense -- is to work closely with those countries that want to work closely with us. And that logically leads you to countries that are of a certain relationship with us. So they would more likely be countries that we would make port visits to. They would more likely be countries that we would invite to exercises or things like that. But these things are scheduled so far in advance I suspect that there's just as whole series of things taking place with all kinds of countries. But --

Q: But at your level has there -- you know, have you taken any decision, or are you inclined to scale back that, you know, military --

Rumsfeld: The only thing I can remember at the top of my -- off the top of my head was I -- there was some discussion about the Paris Air Show that's come up. And I don't know precisely -- but it's not as though people won't be going from the United States. It may be at a certain level. But -- no, I mean, it --

The United States is really about wanting to work closely with other countries. We do that. It's terribly important from a military-to-military standpoint. And -- but you -- to the extent you have so many open slots for an exercise, or for a -- oh, I'm trying to think what -- some activity, you would tend to look at countries that have been -- in fact, for

example, helpful in Iraq or helpful in Afghanistan. And I suspect that you're going to see that as a pattern because those are the people you're working with. But it's not a matter that you're anti something, it's that you're -- you want to look forward and be engaged with people that you're likely to be doing things with.

Q: It shouldn't be seen as a signal of displeasure or --

Rumsfeld: Oh, gosh. You know, I guess it's a reality, is all, is the way I would characterize it.

Q: Mr. Secretary, North Korea. I want to go back to McWethy's question.

Q: General Myers?

Rumsfeld: Go to General Myers.

Myers: (Chuckles.)

Rumsfeld: I'm going to have a drink of water.

Q: General Myers, you briefly mentioned that 4th ID raid. Can you talk about -- well, possibly provide more details; why it was initiated, was it successful, did you get anybody? Anything more on that raid?

Myers: We're trying to find out the details right now. What I gave you were first reports. I think some of the early reports said there were maybe a couple hundred people that were detained. We think it's maybe several dozen, we don't know for sure. It's possible they got one of the people on the black or the gray list; we don't know yet, but we're trying to run that down. So, to be determined.

And I'm sure they were -- not sure -- most probably they were tipped off by some sort of intelligence that this is where they ought to go look. And that's -- you know, that's happening all over Iraq. One of the things that we've said, and I think is coming true, is that a lot of our intelligence is from Iraqis who inform us -- it was true during the major combat operations as well -- you know: That's where the Ba'athists are holed up. that's where the paramilitary are congregated. And it allowed us to take action against them. And my assumption would be this would be right along that line.

Q: Mr. Secretary, today an Iranian opposition group is out with some details about what they believe to be Iran's weapons of mass destruction program. What's your assessment of the status of that program, not only the nuclear, but perhaps biological and chemical weapons in Iran?

Rumsfeld: Who came out with a report?

Q: There is an opposition -- an Iranian opposition group today.

Rumsfeld: I haven't seen it.

Q: They say that Iran has weaponized anthrax.

Rumsfeld: I haven't seen the report. I think that it's -- it's widely accepted that Iran has been -- has had a program in the nuclear area that has been proceeding over a period of years.

Q: And biological or chemical, do you know?

Rumsfeld: I'd have to go back and refresh myself on the latest assessments on that. I just don't have it at the tip of my tongue.

Q: Mr. Secretary, on North Korea, can I ask a follow-up? President Roh also suggested at the White House that this might not be the best time to start reducing U.S. troop levels over there, as he suggested last year when he signed a declaration on coming into office. You've also suggested maybe it's time to relook at the 37,000 U.S. troop level over there. In light of the threat North Korea poses with its nuclear capability, what's your view on whether U.S. force levels should remain at that level, at the current level for the foreseeable future?

Rumsfeld: I think it's a mistake to look at it that way, the way you've characterized it, the way your question characterizes it. As I say, I was in the meeting with both presidents and then I left when they went outside and made a statement and may have said something. I just am not knowledgeable of what they said and I'm not going to comment on what they said.

Our position has been that the existence of nuclear weapons in North Korea is, at the minimum, probable. They have been assessed to have a small number. It has also been assessed that in the event they reprocess, they could have a handful more in a relatively short period of time; not weapons, but the materials for weapons.

That fact, to me, does not make a notable difference in the -- it's a bad thing. It's unfortunate that that's the case. We wish it weren't the case if, in fact, it is the case. And the president and Secretary Powell have worked very hard and continue to work very hard, with Japan and South Korea and with the People's Republic of China, to try to follow a diplomatic path to find a way that the peninsula, the Korean peninsula be nuclear-weapon free.

I personally -- and Dick, you might want to comment on this -- in trying to think about it, I don't think that that issue necessarily affects the kinds of things we've been discussing with South Korea about how our forces are organized, how they're arranged there. And it seems to me that so many things have changed in the world since those forces were put there. They're now spread out over dozens and dozens of locations in the country, which is not efficient. It's not helpful from a force protection standpoint. It tends to be somewhat intrusive in terms of the people who live there.

And General LaPorte was asked, when he took that post, by me, just as I was asked by the president when he was elected, to look at our arrangements around the world and see if we can't modernize them, see if we can't arrange them so that they fit the 21st century, instead of the end of a conflict 50 years ago, in that case, or in Europe. So, we're looking all over the globe.

And General LaPorte has had good discussions with the Republic of Korea's civilian and military leadership. We certainly consider them a very close ally. We certainly would do whatever makes sense in very close consultation with them. But if you think of the changes in warfare -- just most recently, Iraq and Afghanistan -- it's rather clear that there are enhancements that can be made to that force, and capabilities that can be arranged that would considerably strengthen the deterrent, even though it might change how forces were arranged and what kinds of forces were there. So --

Q: (Off mike.) -- forces?

Rumsfeld: It -- the ultimate test is how capable, how lethal, how effective is what you have? And it does not necessarily, as we learned in Iraq, go to the total number of forces. I'm not going to get into what we might or might not do with the Korean government, other than to say whatever we do, we do in very close consultation with them.

Q: General Myers, are there lessons from the Iraq war that kind of -- are starting to shape the way you're viewing U.S. force structure and --

Myers: I'm sure there will be. And it's probably too early to tell.

But let me -- there are three points of what the secretary said I think are really important.

One is any changes on the peninsula are being worked very closely between the two militaries, between the two

governments. So, there's no surprises here.

Two, no change will make the capability on the peninsula in South Korea less than it is today; it will only improve it -- only improve it. And as the secretary said, that does not necessarily mean more people. It's just capabilities we're talking about, so we're talking about technology, as well, and how we might be organized.

And the third thing I'd say is that this is not going to happen next week. Anything that happens happens over time, so we're taking a long view, not a short view. And therefore, you can't connect it with what's going on in the north or south. I mean, it's -- the security of the peninsula and of our ally in South Korea is paramount, and it obviously won't be compromised.

Q: Mr. Secretary, going back to Riyadh for just a moment, as you have stressed when you are there, the U.S. and Saudi Arabia continue to have close military ties. But I'm wondering, is there any concern about Saudi Arabia's military failing to protect the compound? And also, since most of the terrorists are known to have come from Saudi Arabia, any concerns about Saudi Arabia cracking down on terrorists?

Rumsfeld: The -- I'm not intimately knowledgeable about who protected what or whatever. I'm aware of the general intelligence that led to the visit. I'm aware of what was communicated. But what took place on the ground, I think we'll let the embassy discuss and describe, not me.

There -- we're finding terrorists from all over the world, from almost every country you can name. And there's no question but that the Saudi government can play an important role in working with the United States and with other countries in attempting to bring all elements of national power to bear to reduce the threats of terrorism, whether it's the money piece or the transportation piece or the movement of people piece. And they have had a helpful and cooperative role in this global war on terrorism.

Q: Mr. Secretary, back --

Q: Getting --

Q: Mr. Secretary, back in 1994, the U.S. drew up options for an airstrike to take out the Yongbyon nuclear reactor.

Rumsfeld: I recall.

Q: Have you, as a matter of prudent military planning, updated those plans to give the president the full range of options as he decides how to deal with North Korea?

Rumsfeld: We do not discuss war plans or contingency plans or options or excursions.

Q: Could I just ask you then about another sort of historical note? Back in 1996, the attack on the Khobar Towers. At the time, many officials here in the building indicated they suspected Iran might be behind that attack. With the benefit of the intelligence and hindsight now, have you come to the conclusion that that was in fact an al Qaeda attack in 1996?

Rumsfeld: I would have to go back and refresh myself, but -- you -- do you have anything to say on this?

Myers: No, I don't. Nothing that would -- (Inaudible.)

Q: (Off mike.)

Rumsfeld: I thought the Justice Department --

Myers: In fact implicated Iran. There were several --

Rumsfeld: I thought they implicated or at least referenced Iran in an indictment that it -- maybe I shouldn't use the word indictment -- in an announcement they made, which may or may not have been an indictment, this is a couple of years ago, three years ago, I think.

Q: Yeah, I was wondering if your thinking the -- (Inaudible.)

Rumsfeld: And in the process of specifying some people in another country, which I can't recall which it was, they referenced -- it was -- they referenced Iran. But someone would have to go back and look at the history of that. I'm not an expert on that.

Q: But, Mr. Secretary, given the attacks in Riyadh this week, how would you assess the U.S. efforts to find the terrorists and stop them?

Rumsfeld: I would say that if you go back to September 11th and think of what's taken place in the intervening period, there have been notable, significant accomplishments. There have been the denial of Afghanistan as a haven for the al Qaeda and training camps for terrorists that were then spread around the world. More recently, Iraq is no longer a haven for the terrorists that were operating in -- some in Baghdad, and some in the northeastern portion. Third, I haven't looked at a number in several months, but something in excess of 2,000 people have been arrested who have terrorist linkages and relationships across the globe.

(To General Myers.) Do you know a better number than that?

Myers: No, sir.

Rumsfeld: That's -- that's the last I heard.

Myers: It might be higher than that, but I don't -- don't want to --

Rumsfeld: I wouldn't doubt for a second but that it is higher.

Countries that have served as havens in some instances have become more careful. Let me put it that way. They have -- they have not necessarily stopped doing everything, but they have modified their behavior. And --

Now, is the problem over? No. Has everything been accomplished that one would want? No. But is it harder to raise money? You bet it is. Is it harder to get from one country to another? Yes, it is. There are an awful lot of countries that are -- have watch lists, where they're looking for people. So it's much more difficult for them to function. I would say that the progress has been quite good. And -- but that it is a difficult problem, it's an unconventional problem, it's a problem that is not symmetrical with the way the capabilities of the world have previously been arranged. And it's something we have to continue to evolve and adapt our forces to deal with. And it's particularly important that we share intelligence and have close, cooperative relationships with other countries.

Myers: Can I add, it's also much more difficult for the al Qaeda organization to communicate with one another. I mean, that's -- it's been severely restricted. Their freedom of movement of their leadership is also very restricted. And as the secretary said, the money flow has been severely curtailed. That does not mean that there are not going to be attacks in the future. And the effort continues -- has continued, and will continue to put the pressure on them.

I think one thing that the bombings in Riyadh remind us of is that one thing that has not changed is the intentions of this terrorist group. I mean, they went into that compound at 11:00 p.m. at night. Why 11:00 p.m.? Because that's when they hoped to have maximum occupancy. And these were compounds that had women and children present as well. So one thing is, their motives have not changed. And we'll continue to deal with them.

Rumsfeld: Well take a last question here.

Q: Mr. Secretary, on the Riyadh attacks, is there -- are you giving any thought to the possibility of a U.S. military role for improving security at compounds where there are civilians, American, foreign civilians?

Rumsfeld: The force protection issue is one that is looked at by the combatant commanders. The civilian issue is one that the Department of State addresses. And I've not seen anything in the last 48 hours, since the attack, on that subject, other than an announcement by the Department of State, I believe, that they were changing their guidance to families and civilians, if I'm not mistaken.

Q: Is Saudi Arabia still a friend of the United States?

Rumsfeld: The United States has had a relationship with Saudi Arabia for decades. We do today. They have been very helpful in many respects. We've been helpful to them. It's -- I think the answer to that question is self-evident. We have diplomatic relationships, we have a military-to-military relationship, we have economic relationships.

Q: Mr. Secretary, is France still a friend of the U.S.? (Laughter.)

Rumsfeld: Ally as well!

Q: Mr. Secretary, these 2,000 -- more than 2,000 people, which you said have been arrested, do they include the 600-plus that are being held in Guantanamo or --

Rumsfeld: No, no, no.

Q: -- this is aside -- this is aside from those?

Rumsfeld: No, no. These are different.

Q: And why can't the U.S. find Osama bin Laden? (Laughter.)

Rumsfeld: Yeah, that's a good question.

Q: No, seriously.

Myers: No, it is a serious question. And it goes back to the answer a little bit earlier and that the restricted freedom of movement of some of the senior al Qaeda leadership is one of the effects we've had. And, you know, communications, freedom of movement -- they are -- if they're -- our suspicions are they're living in areas where they can bribe the local -- the tribals that are inclined to support them and protect them, and they're in very difficult areas on this earth. And that doesn't mean we don't have people out this very minute looking for them, matter of fact.

Q: That suggests you think he's alive.

Myers: We look -- we're looking at every place. You know, we don't know if he's alive or he's dead. So -- but that doesn't mean you stop looking for the leadership. If we think there's leadership holed up somewhere, that's where we go.

Rumsfeld: I'd say two things in additional answer to your question -- Why haven't we found him?

One is, it's very hard to find a single individual in the world. It's a big place. And it isn't easy. And our government didn't get up one morning, 10, 15, 20 years ago and say, "Gee, let's organize, train and equip so we can do manhunts." We just haven't gotten -- we have not focused our capabilities in doing that until more recently.

The second thing I would say is that there are ungoverned areas in the world, as the general said, and that is a

problem. That makes it easier for people who are trying to evade attention and capture to continue to function, because -- literally areas that no one is governing. And that makes it more difficult.

Third, there are still countries that are harboring terrorists. I mean, we know there are senior al Qaeda in Iran, for example, presumably not an ungoverned area.

So it's the combination of those things that make it difficult and challenging, but not impossible. And we've had a lot of good luck.

Myers: We've had good success. We've picked up a lot of senior al Qaeda leadership, U.S., our coalition partners in this fight. And let there be no doubt: I mean, we're continuing to move on that problem. There will be more of them rounded up. None of them should feel secure at all, no matter where they are.

Q: Thank you.

Copyright © 2003 by Federal News Service Inc., Ste. 220, 1919 M St. NW, Washington, D.C. 20036 USA. Federal News Service is a private firm not affiliated with the federal government. No portion of this transcript may be copied, sold or retransmitted without the written authority of Federal News Service Inc. Copyright is not claimed as to any part of the original work prepared by a U.S. government officer or employee as a part of that person's official duties. For information on subscribing to the FNS Internet Service, please visit [www.fednews.com](http://www.fednews.com) or call (202)347-1400.

<http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/tr20030515-secdef0185.html>

May 15, 2003 4:33 PM

IRAQ

TO: Torie Clarke  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Policy Guideline Paper

When I checked those boxes, the boxes I checked referred to the unclassified version of that policy guideline paper on Iraq, needless to say.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
051503-22

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

U20019. /03

15MAY03

11-L-0559/OSD/17686

May 15, 2003 4:47 PM

020000

TO: ~~Jaymie Durnan~~  
 CC: Powell Moore  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
 SUBJECT: Hearings on Goldwater-Nichols

*Please prepare draft.*  
*Thanks,*  
*Jaymie*

Jaymie, you are going to draft a letter from me to the Hill suggesting that they hold hearings on Goldwater-Nichols. You might want to use the word "jointness" in it as well.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
051503-23

.....

Please respond by 5/23/03

15 MAY 03

U20020 /03

May 15, 2003 4:47 PM

381

TO: Pete Geren  
CC: Jaymie Durnan  
Powell Moore  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Letters on Transformation

I don't feel I am getting letters up to people on the Hill I should be thanking in connection with transformation. Do you have any suggestions? Are you feeding them in to Jaymie Durnan?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
051503-24

.....  
Please respond by 5/23/03

*Pete:*  
*Please prepare letters for*  
*SD. Thanks,*  
*Jaymie*

15MAY03

U20021 . /03

May 15, 2003 7:29 AM

TO: Jaymie Durnan  
LTG Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Award for Garner

to Ray Dubois  
200.6  
2

Let's remember to make sure we give the highest award to Jay Garner when he comes back.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
051503-4

.....

Please respond by 6/13/03

15MAY03

U20023.103



432

May 15, 2003 7:39 AM

TO: Gen. Myers  
 CC: Powell Moore  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA  
 SUBJECT: Montana

Senator Burns suggested that Montana might be available for training facilities. Would you please have the Joint Staff work with the Services, and see if there are things there in Montana we could do.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
051503-6



Please respond by 6/12/03

6/23  
 CJCS RESPONSE ATTACHED  
 v/r

U20024 /03

6/23  
"10/23"

SECRET  
777 JUN 23 11 45 AM '03



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

M

INFO MEMO

CM-1008-03  
20 June 2003

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS

*RBM*

SUBJECT: Montana Training Ranges

*Larry Di Rita  
6/25*

- In response to your request (TAB A) for Army and Air National Guard training ranges and facilities located in Montana, the following comments are provided.
- There is no joint training or readiness value-added by utilizing the training ranges in Montana, as they do not provide enhanced training capability over Active Component training ranges located in the western states (National Training Center at Fort Irwin, Nellis Air Force Base, Fallon Naval Air Station, and 29 Palms). Additionally, infrastructure at the Montana facilities would not adequately support large-scale deployments. Finally, active forces would incur increased deployment time and transportation costs for personnel and equipment.
- The Montana Air National Guard (MT ANG) is developing a new air-to-ground training range in the Hays Military Operating Area (MOA) that will support the general-purpose mission of the 120th Fighter Wing (MT ANG). While adequate for the MT ANG mission, Hays MOA does not provide the capability required by the USAF. More information on Hays MOA is at TAB B.
- The Montana Army National Guard (MT ARNG) operates three training areas: Fort William Henry Harrison, Limestone Hills Training Area, and the Waco Training Area. Fort Harrison and Limestone Hills have small arms, and crew-served weapons ranges and ground combat maneuver areas. These training areas are adequate to support smaller scale National Guard and Reserve Forces training, but are not suitable for active Army and Marine Corps maneuver training and exercises. Additional information on Fort Harrison and Limestone Hills is at TABs C and D.
- The Joint Staff will provide information on training facilities in Montana to US Joint Forces Command's Joint Management Office-Joint National Training Center (JNTC) for consideration as potential training areas for inclusion in future JNTC actions.

COORDINATION: TAB E

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared By: BG Mark P. Hertling, USA; Director, J-7; (b)(6)

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	<i>6/23</i>
SR MA CRADDOCK	
MA BUCCI	<i>6/23</i>
EXECSEC MARIOTT	<i>6/23</i>

U09642 / 03

2 June 2003

INFORMATION PAPER

Subject: Hays Military Operating Area (MOA) and Rattlesnake Range Project,  
Montana Air National Guard (MT ANG)

1. Purpose. To provide the Secretary of Defense information on training ranges and facilities in Montana for talking points with Senator Burns.


2. Key Points

- Hays MOA is roughly 120 nautical miles (NM) by 40 NM and is charted for use from 300 feet above ground level up to 18,000 feet mean sea level.
- The MOA is similar in size to the northern half of the Nellis Range, used to support RED FLAG and other large force employment exercises.
- Two air refueling tracks (designated AR-9 and AR-604) exist immediately north of the Hays MOA and AWACs orbits are located northeast and northwest of Hays MOA.
- The addition of an air-to-ground training range (Rattlesnake Range) under Hays MOA will significantly enhance training capability at Hays.
  - Project is in response to a change in 120th FW (MT ANG) mission to general purpose.
  - Range land area is 3x5 miles and includes a 1 mile square impact area and an 18x22 mile Restricted Area up into the Hays MOA.
  - HQ Air Force policy and programming stakeholders are working with the MT ANG, the local Fort Belknap Indian Reservation and the Bureau of Land Management to acquire required real estate.
  - Funding has been requested in the ANG FY 05-09 MILCON POM.
  - FAA Aeronautical Process estimated completion is Sep 04 with limited operations expected to commence in Oct 04 with full capability estimated for Oct 05.
- The MOA's large size, few altitude restrictions make Hays MOA a good resource for air combat training, though the small size of the impact area is not conducive for large package, ground attack training.

Prepared by: BG Mark P. Hertling, USA; Director, J-7; (b)(6)



# High Altitude Airspace Overlaid on Hays MOA



Enclosure  
Tab B

11-L-0559/OSD/17694

TAB C

2 June 2003

INFORMATION PAPER

Subject: Fort Harrison Training Facility, Montana Army National Guard

1. Purpose. To provide the Secretary of Defense information on training ranges and facilities in Montana for talking points with Senator Burns.

2. Key Points. Fort Harrison has the following capabilities.

- 6,118 acres of ground maneuver area (training land).
- 6,716 acres of total range and training land.
- Combat Pistol Qualification Course (15 automated target lanes).
- Modified Record Fire Range – M16 (10 automated target lanes).
- Multi-purpose Machine Gun Range (240B/SAW).
- M203/40MM Range (Inert ammunition only).
- Hand Grenade Qualification Range (Practice).
- Law Enforcement Firing Range (10 lanes).
- Shotgun Range (2 lanes).
- MOUT Assault Course (48 automated targets).

Prepared by: BG Mark P. Hertling, USA; Director, J-7; (b)(6)

2 June 2003

## INFORMATION PAPER

**Subject:** Limestone Hills Training Facility, Montana Army National Guard

1. **Purpose.** To provide the Secretary of Defense information on training ranges and facilities in Montana for talking points with Senator Burns.

2. **Key Points.** The Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management, which has control over this facility, is working with the Montana Army National Guard to provide a long-term usage agreement to replace the current Right-of-Way Agreement that expires in 2013. Limestone Hills has the following capabilities.

- 18,189 acres of ground maneuver area (training land).
- 19,120 acres of total range and training land.
- Multi-Purpose Training and Tank/Bradley Fighting Vehicle Ranges.
  - 7 defensive positions and 4 moving lanes with 6 multiple target positions and 3 moving targets.
  - Capable of Tank/Bradley Fighting Vehicle Gunnery through Table VIII.
  - All targets are radio frequency controlled from a tower.
- Aerial Gunnery (Attack Helicopter) with 5 firing boxes (2.75MM rockets, 20MM mini-gun, and 7.62MM machinegun).
- Live Fire Scout Course.
- 240B/M60 and .50 caliber Qualification Range (10 firing positions).
- M203/40MM Range.
- Mortar Range (4 firing points).
- Anti-Tank Ranges.
- Demolition and Hand Grenade Ranges.
- MK-19 Range.

Prepared by: BG Mark P. Hertling, USA; Director, J-7; (b)(6)

TAB E  
COORDINATION

USJFCOM	CAPT Thorp, JW302	5 June 2003 Concur
USNORTHCOM	Col Pino, DJ-7	5 June 2003 Concur
USSOCOM	MAJ McDowell, SOOR	3 June 2003 Concur
HQ DA	COL Chappell, JACO	5 June 2003 Concur
HQ USN	CAPT Thompson, JACO	4 June 2003 Concur
HQ USAF	Col Ball, JACO	3 June 2003 Concur
HQ USMC	Col Bultemeier, JACO	4 June 2003 Concur
STARC MT NG	LTC Schulz, ANG	5 June 2003 Concur

OB  
5/20

May 15, 2003 7:45 AM

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: ROK Commitment

I pretty much committed to the President of the Republic of Korea that I would develop a plan whereby I would go over there and help explain to the South Korean business community exactly what is going on, what we are considering, why it makes sense and why the deterrent is strong, so he doesn't suffer a market crash because of our changes.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
051503-9

.....  
Please respond by 6/13/03

U20025 . 103

11-L-0559/OSD/17698

**HOT**

OB  
5/20  
Done

May 15, 2003 8:07 AM

TO: Jaymie Durnan  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Crime Statistics

**ADVANCE  
COPY**

I would like the crime statistics fast, preferably this morning, for Chicago, Los Angeles, New York, and Washington, DC, telling me for each of those cities in an average week how many people are shot, how many are murdered, and how many robberies there are.

See if you can get it fast this morning, so I will have it for the press briefing.

Thanks.

DNR:dh  
051503-12

.....

Please respond by 5/15/03

Purttle 5/15/03 1015 hrs

U20026 : /03

## **Crime Statistics**

### **Average Week (2003 Data Only)**

	<b>Murders</b>	<b>Robberies / Larcenies / Thefts</b>
<b>Chicago</b>	10	2,043
<b>Los Angeles</b>	10	2,050
<b>New York</b>	11	1,671

### **Average Week (2001 - 2003 Data)**

	<b>Murders</b>	<b>Robberies / Larcenies / Thefts</b>
<b>Chicago</b>	12	2,137
<b>Los Angeles</b>	11	1,955
<b>New York</b>	39	2,395

## **POPULATION**

<b>Baghdad</b>	5,600,000
<b>Chicago</b>	2,896,016
<b>Los Angeles</b>	3,694,820
<b>New York</b>	8,008,278

## Crime Statistics

### Average Week (2003 Data Only)

	Murders	Robberies	Larcenies/Thefts
Chicago	10	327	1,716
Los Angeles	10	494	1,556
New York	11	430	1,241
<del>Washington, DC</del>	<del>5</del>	<del>No report for 2003</del>	

*Combine*

### Average Week (2001 - 2003 Data)

	Murders	Robberies	Larcenies/Thefts
Chicago	12	341	1,796
Los Angeles	11	412	1,543
New York	39	486	1,909
<del>Washington, DC</del>	<del>5</del>	<del>78</del>	<del>412</del>

*Combine*

- ① *Combine Robberies & Larcenies*
- ② *Delete D.C*
- ③ *Put in the population of these cities  
of Bay Area*

## INFO MEMO

TO: The Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense

FROM: Major Bob Purtle

SUBJECT: Crime Statistics

- You asked for specific crime statistics for Chicago, Los Angeles, New York, and Washington, D.C.
- I reviewed crime statistics for years 2001, 2002, and 2003 (year to date)
- Tab 1 provides the crime data for an average week.
- Sources reviewed are products compiled by the FBI and the individual city crime reports.

Please let me know if you would like the data manipulated or put into a different format.

Purtle  
5/15

6/2 154K

6/13  
EF-5354

May 15, 2003 8:31 AM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Mideast Manifesto

*W P*  
*DR*

*LARRY DI RIN*  
*6/13*

Please take a look at this letter from my close friend, (b)(6) and tell me what you think.

Thanks.

Attach. (b)(6)  
5/12/03 *hr to SecDef re: Mideast Manifesto*

DHR:dh  
051503-14

.....  
Please respond by 6/13/03

*6/2*  
**RESPONSE ATTACHED**  
*✓R*

9-03 13:00 18

U20027 /03

CA

To: Secretary of Defense

From: Douglas J. Feith DTF/ky (WA) 6/2/03

Re: (b)(6) Letter

- You asked that we review the letter written to you by (b)(6) and assess the "Mideast Manifesto" project.
- The Manifesto is a statement of purpose of an informal interfaith group (Muslim-Jewish-Christian) that meets to discuss and promote Israeli-Palestinian peace.
- Priorities designated in the Manifesto are benign, including the commitment of the international community to contribute to:
  - security of Israelis and Palestinians;
  - practical projects to improve the economic situation; and
  - a final status agreement based on international law and UN resolutions that is negotiated to the satisfaction of the parties.
- The Manifesto is long on even-handedness and "moral equivalence" formulations. It contains no specific recommendations.

(b)(6)

SECDEF HAS SEEN

MAY 15 2003

May 12, 2003

(b)(6)

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld  
Office of Secretary of Defense  
Department of Defense  
1000 Defense-Pentagon  
Room (b)(6)  
Washington, DC 20301-1000

Dear Don:

I am enclosing copies of a Chicago Tribune editorial and an article entitled "A Mideast Manifesto" which were published on May 4. Also enclosed is an internet reprint of an article by Carol Marin published on April 30 which provides some background for the "Mideast Manifesto".

I am involved (but very peripherally) because of my role in helping start a program in Christian Muslim dialogue at the Bernadin Center of the Catholic Theological Union (CTU). CTU is a theology school and the seminary for 14 Catholic religious orders located on the University of Chicago campus. The Christian Muslim program parallels a Christian Jewish dialogue program established years ago and which was recently endowed by significant gifts from the Crown and Ryan families. One of my purposes in helping start the Christian Muslim program (pre 9/11) was to provide a forum for moderate Muslims to speak out and to reclaim their religion. The origin of the "Mideast Manifesto" was a meeting of Marshall Bennett and Talat Othman at the Bernadin Center.

The manifesto has been well received and the group of authors intends to expand the list of subscribers in order to give the statement more impact. My concern is that the statement not get out in front of where the Bush Administration wants to be. If that were the case, I would attempt to change the statement and, if I were unsuccessful in that regard, I would drop out of the group of authors. You have a lot on your plate (D.C. to Afghanistan is a tough commute) but a little guidance, if possible, would be very helpful and much appreciated.

The pentagon's success in Iraq is nothing less than spectacular, including the unexpected benefit of turning arm chair generals into an endangered species. Congratulations on a great job. It is hard to imagine how the country could be better served.

Best to Joyce.

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/17705

**Talking peace: 10 voices and counting ; Maybe these people can apply enough pressure to make peace in the Middle East achievable**

*Chicago Tribune*; Chicago, Ill.; Apr 30, 2003; Carol Marin Carol Marin is a Chicago journalist and former CBS correspondent;

**Abstract:**

*That's why [Marshall Bennett] and Talat Othman have created their own combined constituency of Christians, Jews and Muslims. Maybe if they build a big enough tent, it will give politicians and diplomats the kind of cover they need to once and for all put together a lasting peace plan that provides for security, justice and economic opportunity for Israelis and Palestinians. If this group of 10 can multiply its ranks by 10 and then 10 again, maybe it will be a movement that cannot be ignored.*

**Full Text:**

*(Copyright 2003 by the Chicago Tribune)*

Talat Othman is 67, a very successful international investment banker in Long Grove, and a Palestinian Muslim.

Marshall Bennett is 82, a retired but by no means retiring industrial real estate mogul from Chicago, and an American Jew.

Until the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, the two had never met.

But one night in October of 2001 on the South Side of Chicago they ended up in the same room.

It was a gathering at the Bernardin Center at the Catholic Theological Union. A sizable crowd showed up to talk about what they did or did not know about Islam. In the audience were Christian, Muslim and Jewish business people, academics and religious leaders.

What united them was a shared sense of grief at the attacks in New York City and Washington and Pennsylvania. But there was a lot that divided them, too. It was an impassioned and sometimes contentious meeting. Marshall Bennett didn't speak that night. Talat Othman did.

Something about that evening made Bennett want to know more about Othman. They began to meet for lunch.

Bennett says what stunned him after their first meeting was how he had reached his 80s without having any real, meaningful contact with a Muslim on a personal level.

Talat Othman says what struck him was just how quickly he and Bennett found common ground on the most difficult and emotional of issues, namely the standoff between Israelis and Palestinians in the Middle East.

If they differed on some of the details of what a peace agreement should look like, it was the killing perpetrated by both sides on which they focused. It had to end.

This is not a signal for readers to begin humming "Kumbaya."

Bennett and Othman did not achieve their success or wealth by being dewey-eyed idealists. They are clear-headed pragmatists who both have strong personal, religious and cultural ties to lands of Abraham.

Barbed wire and bloodshed divide that land and no one in five decades has found a lasting solution.

So what exactly could they do?

Well, to put it in Chicago terms, they are people who know people. And maybe, just maybe, they could put together a movement of like-minded people to apply enough pressure on Washington to make peace in the Middle East achievable.

In the last five months, the two men started reaching out.

On Bennett's list were members of two of this country's and Chicago's most prominent Jewish families: Lester Crown, the billionaire businessman who controls General Dynamics, and Penny Pritzker, in charge of real estate for her family's own vast empire. Bennett also tapped Newton Minow, an adviser to President John F. Kennedy, President Bill Clinton and to both Bush administrations.

Othman brought in prominent Chicago Arabs, among them international banker and businessman Robert Abboud, a Lebanese Christian, human-rights expert Cherif Bassiouni, an Egyptian Muslim, as well as Dr. Imad Almanaseer, an Iraqi Muslim and a pathologist.

A couple of Catholics rounded out the group. One was James Denny, former chief financial officer of Searle Pharmaceutical/Pharmacia and Sears, Roebuck and Co. The other was Father Donald Senior, head of the Catholic Theological Union, who has devoted decades to dialogue among Christians, Muslims and Jews.

They did not achieve instant agreement. As Newton Minow says, "I'm a peacenik who doesn't go along with Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. My friend Lester Crown is a hawk who sells F-16s to Israel." Lester Crown agrees but adds he and Minow were united as were the others on the need to put an end to the slaughter of Israelis and Palestinians.

They believe what a lot of us believe: that the United States is indispensable to the peace process. And the timing is right to go for broke.

The war with Iraq appears to be over. Palestinians are undergoing a leadership change. The Bush administration is ready to unveil its "road map" for peace.

Even so, other issues still threaten to put Mideast peace again on a back burner. Unfinished business in Afghanistan. Rebuilding Iraq. Fixing the U.S. economy. Finding Osama bin Laden. North Korea. Syria. Yemen.

And then, of course, there is the looming presidential contest of 2004 with constituencies to please. The Christian right. Israeli lobbies. Muslim interests.

That's why Marshall Bennett and Talat Othman have created their own combined constituency of Christians, Jews and Muslims. Maybe if they build a big enough tent, it will give politicians and diplomats the kind of cover they need to once and for all put together a lasting peace plan that provides for security, justice and economic opportunity for Israelis and Palestinians. If this group of 10 can multiply its ranks by 10 and then 10 again, maybe it will be a movement that cannot be ignored.

That's Bennett's and Othman's plan. And so this week they will issue an appeal for more public voices to join a resolute chorus that won't shut up until the killing stops.

11-L-0559/QSD/17707

Could they fail? Sure. But just think what it would mean if they succeed.

-----  
E-mail: MarinCorpProductions@yahoo.com

**[Illustration]**  
GRAPHIC; Caption: GRAPHIC: Illustration by Paul Lachine.

---

**Sub Title:** [Chicago Final Edition]  
**Start Page:** 19  
**ISSN:** 10856706

---

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction or distribution is prohibited without permission.



Spain where he is.

That bet could turn out to be wrong. To start with, there are

members of the...  
ate problems if it happens to  
the chief custodian of the na-

Martin Feldstein, the Harvard  
professor and former head of

The Tribune's editor-in-chief.  
E-mail: schapman@tribune.com

# A Mideast manifesto

*Ten influential Christians, Jews and Muslims in Chicago's business, academic and religion arenas have been meeting informally for the last five months. This is their statement of purpose to fashion a movement to bring peace to the Middle East.*

As citizens of the United States and as members of the Christian, Jewish and Muslim communities, we feel an urgent responsibility to address the conflict between Palestinians and Israelis in the Middle East. Each of us has personal, religious and cultural ties to that region. From those lands came Abraham, the common ancestor of all three religious traditions, and in those lands were forged the religious history and profound legacy of faith in which all of us share.

Yet these lands, particularly Israel and the Palestinian territories, have not known peace for over half a century. The violence there continues to mount, innocent lives are being destroyed, the economies of both sides are in shambles, and there seems to be little if any progress toward an equitable solution. We sense that many of the peoples in this region no longer have hope that peace is possible and see no way out of the morass of violence and suspicion that has only intensified in recent months.

We express our concern about this situation not as government representatives or religious leaders but as members of the business, civic and legal community of Chicago. We have gathered under the auspices of the Joseph Cardinal Bernardin Center in the spirit of mutual respect and commitment to open dialogue that characterized the leadership of the late Cardinal Bernardin himself.

We recognize that as citizens of the United States we enjoy the gift of freedom of speech and freedom of religion. Despite the racial and cultural tensions that have been part of our history, we also experience that our country is a place where peoples of diverse origin, race, and religious allegiance can join together in mutual respect and understanding. The very fact that we ourselves—Christians, Jews,

## The authors

A. Robert Abboud is a businessman and international banker; Imad Y. Al-manaseer is a Chicago pathologist; M. Cherif Bassiouni is a human-rights expert and professor at DePaul University; Marshall Bennett is a retired real estate businessman; Lester Crown is president of Henry Crown and Co. and a director of General Dynamics; James Denny is retired vice chairman of Sears, Roebuck & Co.; Newton N. Minow is a Chicago lawyer; Talat Othman is an international banker; Penny Pritzker is president of Pritzker Realty Group and Rep. Donald Santor is head of the Chicago Theological Union.

promote peace between Israelis and Palestinians. It is not our competence or role to instruct our government leaders on the mechanics of such a peace process. Nor do we intend to take a position on the complex historical circumstances that have fed this conflict. However, we believe there are certain principles and moral values that need to be included in any equitable and lasting solution.

At the outset and as the most urgent priority of any peace process, the security of both Israelis and Palestinians must be guaranteed. We also unequivocally condemn any acts of violence taken against innocent civilians. These acts of violence do not further the legitimate causes of the parties but only increase the burden of human suffering and generate fear, hatred and a spiraling of violence.

We recognize that the ongoing violence and lack of a political solution have done enormous damage to the economies and infrastructures of both sides. Collapsing morale and fear plague both Israelis and Palestinians and discourage economic investment and initiative. We consider it imperative that along with strong and effective security measures, the international community must publicly commit itself to visible and practical projects

did for Europe at the end of World War II. We believe that evidence of economic investment and the prospect of growing employment can contribute to the establishment of security by giving people a stake in the peace and thereby eroding support for the perpetrators of violence.

Along with international support for security measures and economic recovery, efforts must also proceed along the political front and be undeterred by acts of violence or subversion by groups opposed to a peaceful solution. We support the two-state solution that has been endorsed by our own government, by members of the international community, and by the major political parties in the region. We recognize that any solution will have to deal forthrightly with the issue of the settlements and the refugee question. An ultimate solution must be based on international law as outlined in the pertinent UN resolutions and be negotiated to the satisfaction of the Israelis and Palestinians themselves.

It is evident to us that in all of these efforts the government of the United States must play a vigorous and sustained role. The support of the international community, including the Europeans, Russians and the Arab League, is also crucial. So, too, is strong endorsement by international religious leaders from the Christian, Jewish and Muslim communities. Yet to bring about peace, we believe that it is crucial that our own government resume its essential role as an honest broker between the parties in the region and therefore we fully support its recently announced determination to do so.

For that reason we appeal to all citizens of good will to join us in this effort to awaken the moral conscience of our various communities, to support our government in its determination to promote a solution to the conflict, and together to begin again the journey to peace. We fully recognize that journey will be arduous and we are under no illusions about the enormous obstacles that stand in the way. But we also believe that it is our responsibility not to give up the journey.



Illustration by Dean Rohrer

President Bush's proposed 2004 budget calls for a Pell Grant increase, but only to make up for part of the short-fall. And just to show that shortchanging low-income college students has become a bipartisan deal these days, President Bill Clinton's 25 percent increase in 1997 also failed to keep up with rising college costs. According to his political adviser Dick Morris' 1998 memoir, Clinton chose to push a tuition tax credit instead, which Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin ridiculed as "opening the Treasury door to pass out goodies before the election."

Goodies to the middle class, it must be said. Today's political landscape struggles mightily for middle-class swing voters, while earnest, aspiring low-income youths of all colors and a college degree to be becoming economically elusive. One might think that a country willing to offer \$25 billion to Turkey and billions more to new Iraq and Afghanistan might find a few billion here or there to help more of its

May 15, 2003 4:52 PM

TO: Powell Moore  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Notes of Thanks

I talked to Duncan Hunter to thank him, and I asked him about notes. He said I should write some folks, and he will have Rangel call you with a list of the people I should write. When you get the list, please give me a draft or something, and I will dictate them and get them out of here.

It is important that this be done fast, not slow.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
051503-25

.....  
Please respond by ~~5/23/03~~ 5/21/03

*T*

U20028 /03

1:46 PM


TO: Jaymie Durnan  
Col. Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

DATE: May 17, 2003

SUBJECT: **Calendar**

Cathy 

I need a 30-minute meeting with Jaymie Durnan on Monday, and then I need at least 20 minutes every day the rest of the week with Gen. Craddock and Jaymie Durnan so that I can offload stuff. 

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
051703.12

Please respond by: 5/19

U20029 /03

5/20  
1333 Snowflake

9:57 AM

C-5/20

TO: Jaymie Durnan  
Col. Bucci

Jaymie Durnan  
5/23

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*

DATE: May 17, 2003

SUBJECT: **Calendar**

In the future, we don't need the secure call on Saturdays, I don't think.

Thanks.

*OK*

DHR/azn  
051703.01

Jaymie Durnan

*723*

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_

U20030 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/17713

5/28

1:48 PM

TO: Gen. Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
DATE: May 17, 2003  
SUBJECT:

I have got to get my head wrapped around the subject of things being Op-Con to Services. I just don't feel comfortable with that since they are not linked to me. Get somebody thinking about it so that they can talk to me intelligently about it as to what is going on in that regard.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
051703.13

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_

5/23/03

U20031 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/17714

May 19, 2003 1:48 PM

*ADVANCE COPY SENT*

TO: Gen. Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Communications Support

You have to find a way to get the military to support the necessary communications packages for Garner and Bremer. I have never once had a SVTC or a phone call with them that works right. They can't talk to us. They can't talk to each other. How do the military and the State Department manage to have good comms?

We ought to be capable of putting in a comm. package there, including e-mail, in the next 72 hours, even if we have to take it away from somebody else. Please help to get it done.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
051903-32

.....

Please respond by 5/22/03

U20032 /03

4.9 Snowflake  
300

19  
May 18, 2003 11:57 AM

TO: Jaymie Durnan  
Col. Bucci

CC: (b)(6)

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Event at Torie's House

Please put on calendar as optional a press party at Torie Clarke's house on May 31, and get the correct time.

Thanks.

*on the calendar*

DHR:dh  
051603-9

Jaymie Durnan

Please respond by 5/23/03

*5/20*

U20033 /03

May 19, 2003 3:00 PM

TO: Jaymie Durman  
LTG Craddock  
(b)(6)  
Executive Secretary

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Snowflakes

Doug Feith tells me that frequently when he gets a snowflake, and it is dated May 13, for example, it actually arrives four days later to him on May 17.

Would you find out what is going on in our system that it works that way, that it takes that long to get to him? It may be a weekend, but almost every Saturday people are working here, so it is hard to believe it would be more than two days.

In any event, he says that 25 percent of them are more than a weekend.

Please take a check of this and find out what is wrong with the system. His office is not that far away.

Thanks.

Attach.  
5/19/03 Policy "Snowflake Report"

DHR:dh  
051903-44

.....

Please respond by 5/23/03

U20034 : /03

**SNOWFLAKE REPORT**  
as of 5/19/2003 12:19 PM

TITLE	SNOWFLAKE DATE/TIME	DATE/TIME RECEIVED
Iraq Oil Names	01 Mar 03 / 1302	05 Mar 03 / 1556
Letter to Musharraf	03 Mar 03 / 0908	04 Mar 03 / 1415
Contingencies	03 Mar 03 / 0916	04 Mar 03 / 1415
Turkey	03 Mar 03 / 0918	04 mar 03 / 1415
France	03 Mar 03 / 0922	04 Mar 03 / 1415
Civil Administrator	03 Mar 03 / 0948	04 Mar 03 / 1415
ITA Agreement	03 Mar 03 / 1115	04 Mar 03 / 1415
Iraqi Opposition	03 Mar 03 / 1159	05 Mar 03 / 1710
Congressional Response	05 Mar 03 / 0740	05 Mar 03 / 1953
Prior Coalition	05 Mar 03 / 0855	05 Mar 03 / 1953
Rebasing	05 Mar 03 / 0927	05 Mar 03 / 1953
Philippines	05 Mar 03 / 1608	06 Mar 03 / 0814
Paper on North Korea	06 Mar 03 / 1703	10 Mar 03 / 0719
Earth Penetrator	07 Mar 03 / 0757	10 Mar 03 / 0719
France Selling to Iraq	08 Mar 03 / 1115	11 Mar 03 / 1053
Bosnia	08 Mar 03 / 1145	11 Mar 03 / 1052
Iraq Post War	08 Mar 03 / 1207	11 Mar 03 / 1052
Pakistan	10 Mar 03 / 0920	11 Mar 03 / 1053
Team to South Korea	10 Mar 03 / 1343	11 Mar 03 / 1052
Harold Brown to South Korea	10 Mar 03 / 1449	11 Mar 03 / 1052
Israel	10 Mar 03 / 1457	11 Mar 03 / 1052
Export Administrtrative Review Board	11 Mar 03 / 1530	13 Mar 03 / 1236
Post - Saddam	13 Mar 03 / 0705	17 Mar 03 / 1236
Letter to PM Howard	13 Mar 03 / 0841	17 Mar 03 / 0737
Speech to 8th Grade Class	13 Mar 03 / 1529	14 Mar 03 / 1338
Black List	15 Mar 03 / 1025	19 Mar 03 / 0736
Rewards	17 Mar 03 / 0749	18 Mar 03 / 1332
Support for Jay Garner	17 Mar 03 / 0749	18 Mar 03 / 1332
Intelligence Ministry	17 Mar 03 / 0802	25 Mar 03 / 0644
Metrics for Garner	17 Mar 03 / 0804	25 Mar 03 / 0644
Reporting Template for Garner	17 Mar 03 / 0806	17 Mar 03 / 1325
Coaliton Country Events	17 Mar 03 / 0956	28 Mar 03 / 1331
Tracking Resolutions	17 Mar 03 / 1032	17 Mar 03 / 1325
Currency	17 Mar 03 / 1033	18 Mar 03 / 1331
Numbers	17 Mar 03 / 1044	28 Mar 03 / 1331
Stabilization Forces	17 Mar 03 / 1159	18 Mar 03 / 1619
UN and UNSC Action List	17 Mar 03 / 1202	18 Mar 03 / 1332
Flow of Funds	17 Mar 03 / 1209	18 Mar 03 / 1619

*These were not snowflakes. Sec Def dictated memos to be handed to [redacted] them to [redacted].*

*according to my records, I gave these to Policy 3/18*

✓ = completed

**SNOWFLAKE REPORT**  
as of 5/19/2003 12:19 PM

Public Affairs with Garner	17 Mar 03 / 1224	18 Mar 03 / 1332
Letters to Coalition Countries	19 Mar 03 / 0756	20 Mar 03 / 1111
Suadi Arabia	19 Mar 03 / 1415	21 mar 03 / 1314
UN Role in Iraq	19 Mar 03 / 1419	21 Mar 03 / 1313
UK and Australia Clearance	19 Mar 03 / 1441	20 Mar 03 / 1111
UK Input on Post-Conflict Administration	20 Mar 03 / 0732	21 Mar 03 / 1314
Albania	20 Mar 03 / 0802	21 Mar 03 / 1314
Deputy for Policy and DART Teams	20 Mar 03 / 1754	21 Mar 03 / 1314
Ideas from "Formers"	25 Mar 03 / 1454	26 Mar 03 / 1524
Bill Timmons	25 Mar 03 / 1639	26 Mar 03 / 1525
Syria	26 Mar 03 / 1201	26 Mar 03 / 1044
NATO Capability Shortfalls	27 Mar 03 / 0930	27 Mar 03 / 1554
Chalabi and the Interim Authroity	28 Mar 03 / 1626	31 Mar 03 / 1351
State Department 1003V	31 Mar 03/1657	1 Apr 03/1156
Information Operations	31 Mar 03/1400	1 Apr 03/1156
Alternatives	31 Mar 03/1357	1 Apr 03/1156
Iraqi Interim Authority ✓	1 Apr 03/1132	1 Apr 03/1250
MoD Ivanov ✓	4 Apr 03 / 0640	7 Apr 03 / 1234
Priorities Before the War Ends ✓	7 Apr 03 / 0710	Revd from VCJCS 7 Apr 03
Issues with Various Countries	7 Apr 03 / 1146	8 Apr 03 / 1256
MoD Ivanov ✓	7 Apr 03 / 1318	8 Apr 03 / 1256
ORHA Paper ✓	7 Apr 03 / 1021	8 Apr 03 / 1256
ICC Countries ✓	7 Apr 03 / 0739	8 Apr 03 / 1358
Removing Forces Working	8 Apr 03/ 0715	9 Apr 03 / 0659
Ambassador's Party ✓	8 Apr 03 / 1149	11 Apr 03 / 0920
Saudi NGOs ✓	8 Apr 03/1151	11 Apr 03/1335
Security Cooperation Paper ✓	8 Apr 03/1252	11 Apr 03/1335
Senior Political Figure ✓	9 Apr 03/1718	11 Apr 03/1335
Rewards FY 1	9 Apr 03/1752	11 Apr 03/1335
Flight Intervention FY 1	9 Apr 03 / 1741	10 Apr 03 / 0654
Letter from de Rose ✓	10 Apr 03/0726	11 Apr 03/1335
Iraq's Debts USD Reviewed - redo	10 Apr 03/0842	11 Apr 03/1400
France	11 Apr 03/0809	11 Apr 03/1400
7,000 EPWs in Iraq ✓	11 Apr 03 / 0614	14 Apr 03 / 0730
Detainees FTT Working Hand	11 Apr 03 / 0614	14 Apr 03 / 0730
Recuriting Arabic Speakers - OSD for review	11 Apr 03/1501	15 Apr 03/1345
Symbolism FY 1	14 Apr 03/1013	15 Apr 03/1346
France	14 Apr 03/1022	15 Apr 03/1349

Libya work syria done

weekend

**SNOWFLAKE REPORT**  
as of 5/19/2003 12:19 PM

*✓ = completed*

Kosovo DC	14 Apr 03/0737	15 Apr 03/1349
Oil in Iraq ✓	14 Apr 03/0757	15 Apr 03/1350
Oil-for-Food Contracts ✓	14 Apr 03/1553	15 Apr 03/1351
Eastern Europe ✓	14 Apr 03/0950	15 Apr 03/1351
Freedom Proclamation ✓	14 Apr 03/0953	15 Apr 03/1351
Italy ✓	14 Apr 03/0951	15 Apr 03/1352
Prep for Trip ✓	15 Apr 03/1135	15 Apr 03/1344
Documenting Saddam Hussein's Regim <i>Brif working</i>	15 Apr 03/1221	15 Apr 03/1348
NATO Involvement in Iraq	15 Apr 03 / 1201	18 Apr 03 / 0908
CENTCOM AOR <i>FYI</i>	15 Apr 03 / 1227	18 Apr 03 / 0909
Writing in Plain English <i>FYI</i>	16 Apr 03/1420	25 Apr 03/1314
Response to Senators Hagel and Biden	16 Apr 03 / 1449	21 Apr 03 / 1310
Hot Buttons ✓	17 Apr 03 / 0653	21 Apr 03 / 1310
Middle East Footprint ✓	18 Apr 03 / 1544	18 Apr 03 / 1748
Oil-for-Food ✓	18 Apr 03 / 1220	21 Apr 03 / 1310
Abu Abbas ✓	18 Apr 03 / 1128	21 Apr 03 / 1310
Pre-War Iraq Baseline ✓	21 Apr 03 / 0905	22 Apr 03 / 1255
Pre-War Baseline <i>FYI</i>	21 Apr 03 / 0919	22 Apr 03 / 1255
Phase IV Countries <i>✓</i>	21 Apr 03 / 0912	22 Apr 03 / 1255
Recovery Money ✓	21 Apr 03 / 0858	22 Apr 03 / 1255
Tying Down Gulliver <i>FYI</i>	21 Apr 03/0923	25 Apr 03/1314
Phase IV for Afghanistan ✓	23 Apr 03 / 0700	23 Apr 03 / 0817
Talking Points for ROK ✓	23 Apr 03 / 0652	23 Apr 03 / 1648
Spare Parts for PI ✓	23 Apr 03 / 0659	23 Apr 03 / 1648
Trade ✓	23 Apr 03 / 1628	28 Apr 03 / 0726
Money Spent on Iraq ✓	23 Apr 03 / 1243	28 Apr 03 / 0726
Syria PC Summary of Conclusions	24 Apr 03 / 1334	28 Apr 03 / 0726
Security Cooperation Guidance ✓	24 Apr 03 / 1001	28 Apr 03 / 0726
Policy on Iraq ✓	24 Apr 03 / 0642	28 Apr 03 / 0726
Greece and U.S. Sailor ✓	24 Apr 03 / 0758	28 Apr 03 / 0726
Footprint Changes ✓	26 Apr 03 / 1500	28 Apr 03/1333
Iraq's Debt	26 Apr 03/1440	28 Apr 03/1333
MEK ✓	27 Apr 03/1555	28 Apr 03/1333
Selling Oil <i>working</i>	27 Apr 03/1604	28 Apr 03/1333
Approach in Iraq ✓	28 Apr 03/0253	28 Apr 03/1334
Saudi Detainees ✓	29 Apr 03 / 1218	6 May 03 / 0732
Demarche <i>w/ state</i>	1 May 03/0746	5 May 03/1036
Stabilization Funds <i>DSD ✓</i>	1 May 03 / 1533	6 May 03 / 0731
Pakistan ✓	1 May 03 / 0754	6 May 03 / 0731

*4/16 some snowflakes were returned to me 4/21. Exec Sec distr. "Plain English" one*

(b)(6)

*I did not get these back before we departed 4/26. Bucci distributed Monday 4/28*

(b)(6)

*All these and next page were generated on the trip. When I found out Monday they had not been distributed I sent them that m w/o Bureau review*

**SNOWFLAKE REPORT**  
as of 5/19/2003 12:19 PM

*✓ = completed*

Forces in Europe <i>FYI</i>	1 May 03 / 0732	6 May 03 / 0732
Iran ✓	1 May 03 / 1541	6 May 03 / 0732
Nepal ✓	1 May 03 / 0531	6 May 03 / 0732
Oil Flow ✓	1 May 03 / 1534	6 May 03 / 0732
Turkey ✓	1 May 03 / 1715	5 May 03 / 1036
Assistance from Kuwait ✓	1 May 03 / 1426	6 May 03 / 0731
Baseline Force presence and Changes <i>✓ FYI</i>	1 May 03 / 1356	8 May 03 / 0728
German Force Protection <i>FYI</i>	2 May 03 / 0805	6 May 03 / 0732
Talk to MoD Martino ✓	2 May 03 / 1632	8 May 03 / 0728
Selecting Meetings on Foreign Visits ✓	2 May 03 / 0657	6 May 03 / 0732
Provincial Recon Teams ✓	2 May 03 / 1208	6 May 03 / 0731
Saudi Arabia <i>FYI</i>	2 May 03 / 0744	6 May 03 / 0732
Help We Have Received for Iraq <i>FYI</i>	2 May 03 / 0655	6 May 03 / 0731
Afghanistan ✓	2 May 03 / 1156	6 May 03 / 0731
Air Defense ✓	2 May 03 / 0743	6 May 03 / 0731
Assistance from GCC ✓	3 May 03 / 0655	6 May 03 / 0732
Arafat	3 May 03 / 1219	6 May 03 / 0731
Ministry of Defense in Afghan ✓	3 May 03 / 1315	6 May 03 / 0731
Iceland ✓	5 May 03 / 0951	8 May 03 / 0723
Statistics on France	5 May 03 / 1139	8 May 03 / 0728
Thank the Aussies ✓	5 May 03 / 1337	8 May 03 / 0728
Chronicle of Human Rights Abuse	12 May 03 / 1054	14 May 03 / 0905
Congressman Lantos	12 May 03 / 0751	14 May 03 / 0905
Lunch for Ivanov ✓	12 May 03 / 0833	14 May 03 / 0904
Paper on Afghanistan ✓	12 May 03 / 0753	14 May 03 / 0904
Saddam Dinar	12 May 03 / 1119	14 May 03 / 0904
Singapore Training and Exercises	12 May 03 / 0756	14 May 03 / 0904
Guidelines	12 May 03 / 1716	14 May 03 / 0859
Precedent	13 May 03 / 0753	14 May 03 / 0859
An Najaf ✓	14 May 03 / 1457	15 May 03 / 0738
MEK ✓	14 May 03 / 1501	15 May 03 / 0738
Road Map	14 May 03 / 0859	15 May 03 / 0738
Security for Ivanov ✓	14 May 03 / 1459	15 May 03 / 0738
ROK Commitment ✓	15 May 03 / 0745	16 May 03 / 1130

*Generated on trip*

5/20  
1330 Snowflake

May 19, 2003 3:13 PM

TO: Jaymie Durnan  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA  
SUBJECT: Phone Numbers

ADVANCE COPY SENT  
Exec Sec

Please give me the first names and home phone numbers of Jay Garner's wife and Jerry Bremer's wife, without letting them know. I may want to call them sometime this week.

Thanks.

Dane

Jaymie Durnan  
5/22

DHR:dh  
051903-45

.....  
Please respond by 5/22/03

U20035 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/17722

5/20  
133 Snowflake

May 20, 2003 7:09 AM

TO: Jaymie Durnan  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Wolfowitz Travel

Jaymie Durnan  
5/23

I said that Paul ought to go to Singapore and back. It may be that he ought to go to Korea and get that teed up for me when I come over later. But I would skip Japan and have him get back fast, because there is so much to do here.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
052003-6

.....  
Please respond by 5/23/03

5/2/03  
In the works  
w/ Policy.

*J.*  
Jaymie Durnan

5/23  
@ 5/28

DSD informed SO yesterday at Round table he is going to make a stop in Japan.

U20036 103

May 20, 2003 2:49 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Coming Home

Why don't you think about coming home this weekend, being here next week and getting back in the saddle.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
052003-17

.....

*Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_*

U20037 /03

May 21, 2003 7:49 AM

TO: Jaymie Durnan  
Col. Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Time for Phone Calls

*Autumn Sent*

I need at least a half hour a day left on my calendar for phone calls. I have six or eight here I have not made that I have to do.

*WILCO.*  
*J*

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
052103-12

.....

Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

U20038 /03

May 21, 2003 7:53 AM

TO: Jaymie Durnan  
LTG Craddock  
CC: Col. Bucci  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Calendar

MEETING ALREADY  
SCHEDULED w/  
DURNAN & CRADDOCK  
@ 2:50 pm TODAY.

Please set me up to see my calendar for the rest of the week. I have to make phone calls, I have to do work, I have to approve papers for Bremer and I have to stop doing what I am doing.

Thanks.

*TODAY*

DHR:dh  
052103-14

.....  
Please respond by 5/21/03

U20039 /03

May 21, 2003 7:53 AM

TO: Jaymie Durnan  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Congressional Calendar

*ALREADY SENT*

I need to see when Congress is going to be in session, so I can think through what I have to do by way of confirmations, and I need it today without fail.

Thanks.

*WILCO.*  


DHR:dh  
052103-13

.....  
*Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_*

U20040 /03

May 22, 2003 7:50 AM

TO: Jaymie Durnan  
LTG Craddock  
Col. Bucci

*Advance copy sent*

CC: (b)(6)

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Travel on Calendar

On the June monthly calendar, please cross off Bulgaria. I may go to Croatia and Albania, but not Bulgaria. And I am not going to go to Norway.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
052203-9

.....  
Please respond by 5/28/03

U20041 /03

May 22, 2003 7:45 AM

TO: Jaymie Duman

CC: (b)(6)

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Midge Decter

*ADVANCE TO* *1.24 SENT*  
(b)(6)

Midge Decter has other meetings on Friday, so I suspect she would not want to shift it to Saturday. It makes absolutely no difference to me.

Thanks.

*Down at Friday!*

DHR:dh  
052203-7

.....  
Please respond by 5/23/03

U20042 /03

TO: Jim Haynes  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: May 24, 2003  
SUBJECT:

Let me know the next time Gerhardt Caspar is coming into town. Joyce and I would like to have dinner with him.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
052403.02

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_

U20043 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/17730

Shirley K. P.

Snowflake

May 27, 2003 3:07 PM

TO: Jaymie Duman  
LTG Craddock  
  
CC: Col. Bucci  
  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA  
  
SUBJECT: Pentagon Spaces

cc: Cathy

Please set up a meeting for me with Steve Cambone, Paul Wolfowitz, Ray DuBois and Larry Di Rita, after Larry gets back. I want to discuss the attached Pentagon floor plan. Please tickle this paper for me for that meeting.

ADD Jaymie

Thanks.

Attach.  
Pentagon floor plan

DHR:dh  
052703-29




Please respond by 6/10/03

held for mtg  
~~7/9 4:30~~  
~~6/19 0940~~  
w/ Sec Def

U20045 /03

# Defense Leadership Location




## LEGEND


- SecDef
- DepSecDef
- USD AT&L
- CJCS
- VCJCS
- Sec Army
- USec Army
- CSA
- VCSA
- Sec Navy
- USec Navy
- CNO
- VCNO
- CMC
- ACMC
- Sec Air Force
- USec AF
- CSAF
- VCSAF
- OSD ESC
- NMCC
- Army OC
- Navy OC
- USMC OC
- Air Force OC

(b)(6)

# BASEMENT




# MEZZANINE







# 2ND FLOOR





# 3RD FLOOR



# 4TH FLOOR






PUBLISHED - OCTOBER 15, 2002

LEGEND

	OSD
	JS
	ARMY
	NAVY
	AIR FORCE
	DIA
	DDIGC
	OTHER DEFENSE AGENCIES (DISA, DIRM, NSA, DTRA, etc.)
	JOINT USE
	UNDER CONSTR
	PENREN

CURRENT




PenRen OFFICE  
THE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC

AGENCY ALLOCATIONS

11-L-3-69/OSD/17739


FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FACILITY INFORMATION MANAGEMENT SYSTEM






# 2003 Agency Space Allocations (Draft)

## LEGEND



UNDER CONST

VACANT



~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

18 June 2003

LTG Craddock,

Sir,

The attached info sheet is provided as background information for the meeting with the SECDEF on Floor plan on 19 June 2003 at 0940-1010.

Last year I asked PENREN to investigate the possibility of moving the Secretary of Defense and Executive Offices in January 2005 vice November 2005. With the focus of how much it would cost to have the move take place earlier than planned, also what the cost would be if the move was put on hold due to the new administration not wanting to move.

This Office is scheduled to move in November 2005 to the Army Area. This move will take place 9 months after the start of the new administration. I have brought up the idea of using the new space as a transition space for the new administration (regardless of whether current personnel or new personnel) and use this current office space as transition out space after January 20, 2005.

V/R

msg. to R.A.A.

Sir,

I. 20 copy for you.

V/R

11-L-0559/OSD/17742



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

PENTAGON RENOVATION PROGRAM

100 BOUNDARY CHANNEL DRIVE

ARLINGTON VA 22202-3712

DEC 24 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, SPACE POLICY AND ACQUISITION

SUBJECT: Proposed Relocation of Secretary of Defense for Renovation

In response to your memorandum dated December 10, requesting the Pentagon Renovation Program (PENREN) to investigate the possibility of accommodating a modification of the scheduled move date for the Secretary of Defense and his Executive Offices from November 20, 2005 to January 20, 2005, we offer the following:


As you are aware, PENREN construction activities in tenant areas are predicated on a highly organized and regimented schedule. First, the area to be built out must be vacated. Once vacated, the area under construction undergoes demolition to bare concrete, including hazardous material removal. After demolition is complete the area is available for reconstruction and ultimate move in for the tenant. Our design-build contractor, Hensel Phelps, has implemented an innovative construction process referred to as SIPS (Short Interval Production Schedule) in order to facilitate our meeting the congressionally mandated acceleration schedule. The SIPS schedule requires large areas to be under construction at any given time to ensure that construction activities are done economically and efficiently. The construction phasing plan attached shows our current renovation schedule for construction over the duration of the Program. The Secretary of Defense is scheduled to move temporarily into the third floor E-ring, between corridors 6 and 7, indicated in areas of Phase 2.3 and 2.4. As you can see we must acquire the entire area to allow for demolition activities. In order to accommodate an early move date for the Secretary of Defense, all areas of Phase 2.3 and Phase 2.4 would need to be vacated by June 2003, fully 4 months earlier than planned. These areas currently house among other tenants, the Secretaries of the Army and the Navy along with their staffs.

To allow for the vacate of the area encompassing Phase 2.3 and 2.4, renovated area in the building equivalent to the area vacated would need to be available. Current construction schedules indicate that we will not have enough renovated space available in the building until October 2003 at the earliest, or at least 4 months later than the date required to achieve an early move plan. Due to that fact, we do not believe we can expedite the move in for the Secretary of Defense in the time frame you have requested.

If you have any further questions, please call me directly at (b)(6)

Darryl A. Henderson  
PRISM Group Leader


Attachment  
As stated



11-L-0559/OSD/17743



# Renovation Schedule for 2010 Completion Phasing Plan



December 13, 2002

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/17744

May 28, 2003 9:45 AM

TO: Jaymie Durnan  
LTG Craddock

CC: Powell Moore

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: BRAC

Now that Duncan Hunter is back, we have to set a meeting to brief me on the BRAC provisions he put in. Then we need to meet with him about the BRAC provisions, go over them and tell him why they are bad.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
052803-3

*Meeting w/ Dubois*  
*ON SAT 5/31*

.....

Please respond by 6/6/03

U20046 /03

May 29, 2003 1:33 PM

TO: ~~Larry D. RITA~~ / JAMIE D.  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld D.  
SUBJECT: Legislation

MANAGE  
CAP  
JULY

I cannot keep waiting for my meeting on the legislation. I simply have to get briefed on what happened up in the House and the Senate and what we are going to do about it.

We are wasting important days, and we are not getting at the task and the problems of seeing that it comes out right. This cannot go on.

Thanks.

*Dene*

DHR:dh  
052903-24



Please respond by 6/4/03

U20048 /03

SENT 5/29 0700  
May 27, 2003 4:15 PM

TO: Gen. Myers  
CC: LTG Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Staff Meeting Attendance

There was no one in the staff meeting from the Joint Staff this morning. I don't think that is good. I think we need someone in there.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
052703-38

.....

Please respond by 5/30/03

LTG C, 5/28  
YOUR NOTES NEEDED  
DJS IN THE MTG.  
VIA L

U20049 /03

May 29, 2003 11:55 AM

TO: Jaymie Durnan  
LTG Craddock

CC: Col. Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

*S. 07/2*

SUBJECT: Walter Reed

Dr. Baxter says he is going to schedule me for an hour and a half or two hours at Walter Reed for a physical on Saturday, June 7.

If so, while I am out there I might want to visit some of the wounded I have not visited previously.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
052903-22

.....

Please respond by 6/4/03

U20050 /03

6/14 Snowflake  
1730

8:15 PM

TO: Andy Hoehn  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: June 12, 2003  
SUBJECT:

*Larry Di Rita*  
*6/23*

We want to keep Ambassadors who have countries like Germany informed as to what we are doing with the footprint. We need to reassure them from time to time. Ambassador Coates is anxious to be helpful to us but he needs to know what we've got in mind. Let's set up a system so we do that skillfully.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
061203.13

I-03/008563-STRAT

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_

Sir,

Mr. Feith has asked the regional DASDs to establish a mechanism to keep the relevant Ambassadors informed without getting ahead of your decision process. Policy will provide updates on these interactions as they take place.

*Andy Hoehn* 19 June 03  
ANDY HOEHN

Cc:  
Mr. Feith  
Mr. Henry  
Dr. Crouch  
Mr. Rodman

06-18-03 08:52 18

11-L-05597OSD/17749

U20065 /03

6/24

SENT 6/11  
June 9, 2003

*Done*  
*6/16*

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Hold on Nominations

Please check in and tell me what you think I ought to do about Senator Craig holding up all the Air Force nominations. It seems to me we ought to call Bill Frist and get it stopped, or else we ought to go public against Craig.

What do you think?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
060903-28

.....  
Please respond by 6/13/03

U20067 /03

June 9, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
Jaymie Durnan

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Plans for Nominations

You have to come up with a press plan and a legislative plan for the Schoonmaker and other recommendations to the White House.


I talked to John Warner about it. He said he thought it was a good idea to bring somebody back, and that he would get it through the Senate. Needless to say, we are going to figure out who talks to Shinseki, who talks to Les Brownlee, and who talks to Carl Levin.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
060903-4

.....

Please respond by 6/13/03



U20089 /03

SENT 6/9  
June 7, 2003

TO: Gen. Myers  
CC: Powell Moore  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Responses Regarding Shortages

Please have someone draft a response for the attached letter from Congressman Wicker, and see that somebody briefs him and briefs Ike Skelton as well.

Attached is the material I received from CENTCOM, which is totally contradictory to the complaints the Congress is receiving.

We need to get ground truth.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
060703-4

..... 6/16/03

Please respond by 6/13/03

CJCS RESPONSE  
ATTACHED.

*✓* 1R  
6/16

U20090 /03



CHAIRMAN  
of the  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Date: JUN 16 2003

MEMO TO: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

**SECDEF HAS SEEN**

JUN 18 2003

Enclosed you will find copies of my response to Representatives Wicker and Skelton reference shortages in Iraq. Some problems exist but CENTCOM has been dealing with problems aggressively as they arise. The Army is prepared to brief Representatives Wicker and Skelton.

*VR*  
*Dock*



**CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF**

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-8999

16 June 2003

**The Honorable Ike Skelton  
House of Representatives  
Washington, D.C. 20515-2504**

Dear Mr. Skelton,

Thank you for your letter concerning the rations and supplies for our troops in Iraq.

The quality of life for all military personnel in Iraq is one of our highest priorities and is monitored carefully. I brought your concerns to the attention of Central Command and asked for their immediate assessment of the situation. They acknowledged that some problems exist and added that the chain of command has been dealing with the problems aggressively as they arise. My take, based on the feedback I have received, is that most Service members receive one hot meal and two MREs each day. Personnel at remote posts likely miss the hot meal and substitute an MRE. There is an ample supply of MREs in Iraq.

Each person is also allocated three liters of bottled water per day. In addition to the bottled water, there is an abundance of purified water available. All Service members are not getting their daily ration of bottled water because of ongoing operations. When this occurs the purified water is available as a substitute. The Third Infantry Division's equipment has sustained intensive operations. The Army has identified the required repair parts for its equipment and is prepared to meet the urgent needs.

Our people have performed magnificently and sustaining their morale remains a top priority. Please be assured that I will continue to monitor the situation. If you desire, the Army is prepared to brief you personally on these issues. Thank you for your continued concern on the behalf of our men and women in uniform.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Richard B. Myers".

**RICHARD B. MYERS**  
Chairman  
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

11-L-0559/OSD/17754



**CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF**

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

16 June 2003

**The Honorable Roger Wicker  
House of Representatives  
Washington, D.C. 20515-2504**

**Dear Mr. Wicker,**

Thank you for your letter concerning the rations and supplies for our troops in Iraq.

The quality of life for all military personnel in Iraq is one of our highest priorities and is monitored carefully. I brought your concerns to the attention of Central Command and asked for their immediate assessment of the situation. They acknowledged that some problems exist and added that the chain of command has been dealing with the problems aggressively as they arise. My take, based on the feedback I have received, is that most Service members receive one hot meal and two MREs each day. Personnel at remote posts likely miss the hot meal and substitute an MRE. There is an ample supply of MREs in Iraq.

Each person is also allocated three liters of bottled water per day. In addition to the bottled water, there is an abundance of purified water available. All Service members are not getting their daily ration of bottled water because of ongoing operations. When this occurs the purified water is available as a substitute. The Third Infantry Division's equipment has sustained intensive operations. The Army has identified the required repair parts for its equipment and is prepared to meet the urgent needs.

Our people have performed magnificently and sustaining their morale remains a top priority. Please be assured that I will continue to monitor the situation. If you desire, the Army is prepared to brief you personally on these issues. Thank you for your continued concern on the behalf of our men and women in uniform.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Richard B. Myers", written over a horizontal line.

**RICHARD B. MYERS**  
Chairman  
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

11-L-0559/OSD/17755

#455

June 6, 2003

TO: Gen. Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Shortages

*Put this out*

Please check and get back to me on what you find out in connection with the shortages of food and water for the military people in Iraq. I cannot believe it, but five Congressmen said they have been getting letters to that effect. What in the world is going on?

Thanks.

DHR:sh  
060603-22

Please respond by 6/9/03

SECDEF HAS SEEN

JUN - 7 2003

*CENTCOM response  
Attached*

*C6/7*

U20091 /03

C617

SECDEF HAS SEEN

JUN - 7 2003

SUBJECT: Congressional Inquiries Regarding Sustainment

1. Circumstances identified by Congressman Skelton may have existed at some time during the rapid movement of troops during combat operations in March 2003. The current situation reported by subordinate units is presented below.

2. Rations:

- MRE stocks remain robust.
  - Today theater level stock is 8 days of supply.
  - Beyond theater stocks, unit stocks range from 2 to 10 days.
- **Soldiers receive 1 hot meal and 2 MREs a day.**
- This past week units began receiving rations which included perishable and frozen entrees.
- CJTF-7 has approved LOGCAP contract to establish 20 contract dining facilities in Iraq.

3. Water:

- **Each soldier is allocated three liters of bottled water a day.**
- Bottled water pushed from theater maintains units at 2 to 6 days of supply.
- Bottled water is augmented by water purified by Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Units (ROWPU) produced from local sources.
- Bulk water is produced continuously at ROWPU sites, typically maintained at 1 day stock.
- Units provide any excess bulk water to Iraqi towns that may have problems with treatment plants or wells.

4. Spare Parts Availability:

- Unit combat vehicles in Iraq have sustained intensive operations.
  - Training planning factors call for combat vehicles to drive about 750 miles a year.
  - Tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles of 3ID have traveled over 1000 miles.
- Sustainment plan called for Army Preposition Stocks (APS) to be refurbished after return to APS storage locations.
- 3 ID did not order certain repair parts when they thought that they were redeploying.
- When deployment of 3ID was extended, 3ID resumed ordering all repair parts.
- CJTF-7 has identified required parts and is preparing packages to meet urgent needs, including track and suspension parts.
- The repair parts system works.
  - In the past four months, 3ID received 102,565 items sent from the United States.
  - Parts are already arriving in response to 3ID's extended deployment.

11-L-0559/OSD/17757

OB  
6/9

June 3, 2003 7:30 AM

TO: Jaymie Duman  
Larry Di Rita  
LTG Craddock  
Col. Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Paperwork

Having a stack of four inches of stuff arrive in my office after I leave at 6:30 p.m. tells me that someone is blocking it and holding big stacks of it somewhere out there, and they are not getting to it.

That is not going to work. We have to figure out a new way to do it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
060303-4

.....

Please respond by 6/6/03

U20093 /03

June 3, 2003 8:03 AM

TO: Marc Thiessen  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *?*  
SUBJECT: Speeches

It would be helpful to me in the future when we are using long quotations if you would indent them slightly.

Also, it would be helpful if you would leave an extra space between sentences, so I can take my eyes off the page and be able to come back and find where the gap is.

In addition, it would be helpful if there were fewer dashes between things within sentences.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
060303-12

.....  
Please respond by 6/4/03

U20097 /03

SENT 6/2 15 30  
May 31, 2003 1:53 PM

TO: Gen. Myers  
cc: David Chaffin  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Pulling Together Elements

As I understand it, you are going to come back to me with some proposals as to how we pull together all the Guard, Reserve, military and civilian elements in DoD and some proposed guidance for General Blum.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
053103-18

.....

Please respond by 6/16/03

*Handwritten notes at the bottom of the page, mostly illegible.*

U20099 /03



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000



JUL 9 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS  
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Rebalancing Forces

The balance of capabilities in the Active and Reserve components today is not the best for the future. We need to promote judicious and prudent use of the Reserve components with force rebalancing initiatives that reduce strain through the efficient application of manpower and technological solutions based on a disciplined force requirements process.

To that end there are three principal objectives that I want to achieve. They are:

- Structure active and reserve forces to reduce the need for involuntary mobilization of the Guard and Reserve. Eliminate the need for involuntary mobilization during the first 15 days of a rapid response operation (or for any alerts to mobilize prior to the operation). Structure forces in order to limit involuntary mobilization to not more than one year every 6 years.
- Establish a more rigorous process for reviewing joint requirements, which ensures that force structure is designed appropriately and which validates requests for forces in time to provide timely notice of mobilization.
- Make the mobilization and demobilization process more efficient. When Reservists are used, ensure that they are given meaningful work and work for which alternative manpower is not readily available. Retain on active duty only as long as absolutely necessary.

320.2

I consider this a matter of the utmost urgency. I expect each of you to tailor the actions in the attachment to your specific organization and report back to USD (P&R) by memo on your assessment and plan for implementation NLT July 31, 2003. Follow up actions may be reviewed at a future SROC as necessary.

Attachment:  
As stated

cc: Combatant Commanders

U10510-03

9 Jul 03

Attachment

**Actions for Force Rebalancing**

**Rebalance Forces:**

- **Rebalance AC/RC Forces.** Services submit Program Change Proposals to correct imbalances that result in lengthy, repeated, or frequent mobilization of RC individuals and units by changing force structure and/or mix, using contractors or civilians, or mitigating shortfalls through technology. Specifically address capabilities that reside exclusively or predominantly in the RC and are in high demand because of on-going operations and the Global War on Terror, capabilities that are required for homeland defense missions, and capabilities critical to post hostilities operations. (August 03)
- **Reduce Early Dependence on Involuntarily Mobilized RC.** Services submit Program Change Proposals or undertake policy changes in order to reduce dependence on involuntary mobilization of reservists needed early in an operation. (August 03)
- **Revise Requirements Review Process.** CJCS, in coordination with USD (P), USD (P&R), USD (C) and the Services will revise the requirements review procedure to ensure appropriate force structure is available and validate Combatant Commanders' request for forces. (August 03)
- **Determine RC Role in Homeland Defense.** ASD (HD), in coordination with NORTHCOM, PACOM, USD (P&R), the Services and Joint Staff, determine Total Force requirements for Homeland Defense and Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (September 03). Based upon the established DoD requirements, ASD (RA) prepare a report on Reserve Component Contributions to Homeland Defense and Civil Support that will recommend the appropriate roles, force mix, priorities, command relationships, and resources required for conducting these missions. (December 03)

**Encourage Increased Volunteerism**

- **Establish Prototype Programs.** Services submit Program Change Proposals or undertake policy changes to establish prototype programs that expand the use of RC volunteerism at both the individual and unit levels, through techniques that allow for varying amounts of Reserve participation. (August 03)
- **Resources.** Services ensure that sufficient military pay is programmed to support the utilization of volunteer RC units and individuals.

Attachment

**Actions for Force Rebalancing (continued)**

**Innovative Management**

- **Establish Prototype Programs.** Services submit Program Change Proposals (August 03) to implement innovative management techniques such as those described in the *Review of Reserve Component Contributions to National Defense* to include the design and test of innovative RC affiliation programs for individuals with specialized skills, for military retirees, and for civilian volunteers. (December 03)
- **Use RC for Rotational Overseas Presence.** Services submit Program Change Proposals to allow RC capabilities to meet predictable, long lead-time missions such as rotational overseas presence and experimentation. (August 03)
- **Increase the Use of Reachback.** USD (P&R), in conjunction with USD (I) and ASD (NII) develop CPG language regarding the importance of Combatant Commanders' utilization of reachback and chair a reachback GOSC to determine the road ahead (July 03). Services submit Program Change Proposals to enhance RC use in support of CONUS-based operations intended to provide reachback capabilities for forward forces, thereby reducing footprint in theater. (August 03)
- **Improve the Mobilization Process.** Working within the JFCOM effort on mobilization process improvements, the USD (P&R), in coordination with JFCOM, the Joint Staff, the Services and other OSD offices as appropriate, undertake "Quick Win" opportunities to improve policy or process changes that can be implemented within the next three months, to improve the mobilization process. Issue guidance as appropriate. (September 03).



PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

ACTION MEMO

C4D Hold  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2003 JUL -3 PM 5:13

July 3, 2003

**FOR:** DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

**FROM:** David S.C. Chu, USD (P&R)

*David S.C. Chu @ Jul 03*

**SUBJECT:** SROC Decision Memorandum

- Attached at Tab A is a proposed memorandum summarizing the taskings you discussed with the Senior Readiness Oversight Council members at the most recent meeting. It includes changes to the tasking based on the meeting's discussion.
- The memorandum will provide us the "action plan" the Secretary requested in his June 23<sup>rd</sup> "Snowflake" (Tab B).

**RECOMMENDATION:** Sign Tab A

**COORDINATION:** Tab C

**ATTACHMENTS:** As stated

**PREPARED BY:** Captain Stephen M. Wellock, OUSD(P&R), (b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/17764

U10510-03

June 23, 2003

TO: David Chu  
CC: Gen. Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Rebalancing Forces

I have read your memo of June 13 on rebalancing forces. I like most of it.

Please coordinate that with Dick Myers, the Services and anyone else who is appropriate, and then develop an action plan and get back to me.

I consider this a matter of the utmost urgency.

Thanks.

Attach.

6/13/03 USD(P&R) memo to SecDef re: Rebalancing Forces [U09353/03]

DHR:dh  
062303-12

.....  
Please respond by 8/1/03

UNCLASSIFIED

COORDINATION

<u>Office</u>	<u>POC</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Action</u>
Secretary of the Navy	Mr. Navas	July 3, 2003	Concur
Secretary of the Army	BG Ralston	July 3, 2003	Expect Concur
Secretary of the Air Force	Mr. Dominguez	July 3, 2003	Expect Nonconcur
Joint Staff	VADM Holder LGEN Cartwright	July 3, 2003 July 3, 2003	Expect Nonconcur Expect Concur
General Counsel	Mr. Dell'orto	July 3, 2003	Expect Concur
USD (P)	Ms. Haber	July 3, 2003	Unknown
USD (C)	Dr. Zakheim	July 3, 2003	Nonconcur(wait to 2006)
USD (AT&L)	Mr. Wynne	July 3, 2003	Expect Concur
USD (I)	Ms. Long	July 3, 2003	Expect Concur



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

JUL 9 2003



MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS  
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Rebalancing Forces

The balance of capabilities in the Active and Reserve components today is not the best for the future. We need to promote judicious and prudent use of the Reserve components with force rebalancing initiatives that reduce strain through the efficient application of manpower and technological solutions based on a disciplined force requirements process.

To that end there are three principal objectives that I want to achieve. They are:

- Structure active and reserve forces to reduce the need for involuntary mobilization of the Guard and Reserve. Eliminate the need for involuntary mobilization during the first 15 days of a rapid response operation (or for any alerts to mobilize prior to the operation). Structure forces in order to limit involuntary mobilization to not more than one year every 6 years.
- Establish a more rigorous process for reviewing joint requirements, which ensures that force structure is designed appropriately and which validates requests for forces in time to provide timely notice of mobilization.
- Make the mobilization and demobilization process more efficient. When Reservists are used, ensure that they are given meaningful work and work for which alternative manpower is not readily available. Retain on active duty only as long as absolutely necessary.

I consider this a matter of the utmost urgency. I expect each of you to tailor the actions in the attachment to your specific organization and report back to USD (P&R) by memo on your assessment and plan for implementation NLT July 31, 2003. Follow up actions may be reviewed at a future SROC as necessary.

Attachment:  
As stated

cc: Combatant Commanders

SENT 6/2 1530  
~~May 31, 2003 1:46 PM~~

TO: LTG Craddock  
CC: (b)(6)  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA  
SUBJECT: CINC Dinner July 15

I we will have the CINC dinner at our house on July 15, not July 14. Please change the calendars and make sure Joyce knows. She will want to get a caterer.

My instinct is to invite the CINCs plus their spouses, the Chairman, Vice Chairman, and Service Chiefs—but not the Vice Chiefs—and Paul Wolfowitz. Below the line, put the Undersecretaries—David Chu, Steve Cambone, Doug Feith—and Di Rita and Craddock. Also, below the line put the President, the Vice President, George Tenet and Colin Powell. Then let me see how many people that comes to.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
053103-16

.....

Please respond by 6/4/03

U20101 /03

June 16, 2003

TO: Jay Garner  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Correction

FYI.

Attach.  
*Newsweek*, June 16, 2003, Letter to editor

DHR:dh  
061603-13

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

U20104 /03

Newsweek  
June 16, 2003

## **Jay Garner And Iraq**

Your statement that Jay Garner and other officials were fired from their positions in Iraq is simply false ("Giving Peace a Real Chance," June 2). At Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's request, Garner began in January to assemble a team from across the government and the private sector that would be ready to deploy to Iraq after the conflict, address immediate reconstruction and humanitarian needs and lay the groundwork for a longer-term Coalition authority. At that time, Garner indicated to the secretary that his goal was to deploy for about 90 days, and to be prepared to turn the operation over to a senior civilian administrator. Garner deployed in mid-March, and we expect he will return by mid-June. Ambassador Jerry Bremer is now building upon the solid foundation Jay Garner laid for him.

**Victoria Clarke, Asst. Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, Department of Defense, Washington, D.C.**

**Editor's Note:** The column referred to appeared in the *Current News Supplement*, May 28, 2003.

O/B  
6/23

June 16, 2003

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Paper from MoD

I gave you that paper the MoD of Azerbaijan gave me. Please give me a report back after you look into it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
061603-5

.....

Please respond by 6/20/03

U20105 /03

6/18/03

June 16, 2003

Sir:

Please see attached, T.E.

TO: Torie Clarke  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Quote About Iran

Larry Di Rita  
6/20

Colin Powell said he heard somebody make a statement last week or was quoted as having said something about how fast Iran would have a nuclear weapon.

Would you please get his office to send that over, so we can look at it?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
061603-36

Please respond by 6/20/03

6/24

6/25  
SecDef

Larry Di Rita  
6/26

**SECDEF HAS SEEN**

JUN 27 2003

~~Ricco -  
Sec Def is referring  
to a statement he  
(SecDef) allegedly  
made. Can we check?  
Thanks  
D. White~~

Larry Di Rita  
6/25

U20109 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/17772

6/20

①

Secretary Rumsfeld Interview with WCBS-TV  
Tuesday, May 27, 2003

Q: What about Iran's nuclear weapons program or nuclear program? It seems to be some evidence they may be doing something that could be a concern the U.S. and to the entire region of the world?

Rumsfeld: There's no question in my mind but that they have an active nuclear weapon program.

②

Infinity Radio Town Hall with Secretary Rumsfeld  
Thursday, May 29, 2003

Rumsfeld: In terms of causing additional proliferation, I think that's really not the case at all. There are nuclear weapons being -- we haven't made new nuclear weapons for some time. The nuclear weapons are being made all the time in Russia. Any number of countries currently have nuclear programs that are underway -- Iran does, North Korea does, and other nations as well -- China. So I think that any suggestion that it would contribute to proliferation, which is at the present time -- I would almost have to describe it as pervasive, the proliferation situation doesn't need any further encouragement from anybody to be going and doing what's being done.

Kroft: We have a caller, John, from KDKA in Pittsburgh.  
John, are you there?

Q: Yes. Secretary, it's a pleasure and honor to speak to you. Prior to the war, there was talk of the nuclear power plant that the Iranians are building. I was wondering how close to completion and being operational would that be?

Rumsfeld: Well, there's a -- that falls on my -- the answer to the last question. We don't know of certain knowledge how close the Iranians are. **The U.S. intelligence community, and other intelligence communities in the world, John, do assess that the Iranians have a nuclear weapon program.** We also know that there are -- that they have an active ballistic missile program.

**How close they are to having a weapon** -- certainly, they're intelligent people. There's a great deal of information about how to do these things that is available in the public these days. There are also a number of technicians who used to do it in other countries who hire themselves out to assist people in how to do it. So, one reasonably has to believe that if you have seriousness of purpose, you have money, you have intelligent people and you have networks of people around the world that are available to help you with the more difficult aspects of it, that it's going to happen. And the -- **I think reasonable people assume that sometime in this decade, the Iranians, if they continue to pursue this, which is unfortunate, that they will, in fact, have nuclear weapons.** Some would estimate earlier, some would estimate later.

③

Copyright 2003 The Bradenton Herald  
All Rights Reserved

## BRADENTON HERALD

Found on Bradenton.com

The Bradenton Herald

May 23, 2003 Friday EST EDITION

**SECTION:** FRONT; Pg. 3

**LENGTH:** 675 words

**HEADLINE:** White House considers trying to destabilize Iran

**BYLINE:** WARREN P. STROBEL; Knight Ridder Newspapers

**DATELINE:** WASHINGTON

**BODY:**

Prompted by evidence that Iran is harboring top al Qaida operatives linked to last week's suicide bombings in Saudi Arabia and fears that Tehran may be closer to building a nuclear weapon than previously believed, the Bush administration has begun debating whether to take action to destabilize the Islamic republic, U.S. officials said Thursday.

Officials in Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld's office are using both issues to press their view that the United States should adopt both overt and covert measures to undermine the Islamic regime in Tehran, said the officials, who are involved in the debate. Other officials argue that such a campaign would backfire by discrediting the moderate Iranians who are demanding political reforms.

Although one senior official engaged in the debate said "the military option is never off the table," others said no one was suggesting an invasion of Iran, although some officials think the United States should launch a limited airstrike on Iran's nuclear weapons facilities if Iran appears on the verge of producing a nuclear weapon. By some estimates, **Iran could have a nuclear weapon** within two years.

Some Pentagon officials suggested using the remnants of an Iranian opposition group once backed by Saddam Hussein, the Mujahedeen Khalq (MEK), to instigate armed opposition to the Iranian government. U.S. military forces in Iraq have disarmed the roughly 6,000-strong MEK, which is on the State Department's list of foreign terrorist groups. But the group's weapons are in storage and it hasn't disbanded.

However, national security adviser Condoleezza Rice and other top officials rejected the idea, saying that while some might consider the MEK freedom fighters, "a terrorist is a terrorist is a terrorist," according to officials involved in the debate.

Bush has designated Iran a member of an "axis of evil," along with Iraq and North Korea. But until now, he's pursued a middle course with Iran, approving talks on issues of common concern such as Afghanistan, while not attempting to re-establish diplomatic ties.

A formal statement of U.S. policy toward Iran, called a National Security Presidential Directive, has been on hold about a year because of internal administration debates and the war in Iraq, American officials said. The document is being resurrected, they said.

Bush's senior foreign-policy advisers were to have met at the White House on Thursday to discuss Iran policy, said a knowledgeable administration official, but the meeting was postponed until next week to give Iran several more days to meet U.S. demands that it turn over the suspected al Qaida terrorists. If it doesn't, Washington is likely to react with harsher measures, the official said.

11-L-0559/OSD/17774

Copyright 2003 National Post, All Rights Reserved  
National Post (Canada)

May 29, 2003 Thursday National Edition

**SECTION:** World; Analysis; Pg. A12

**LENGTH:** 638 words

**HEADLINE:** U.S. steps softly as it deals with Iranian threat

**SOURCE:** The Associated Press

**BYLINE:** George Gedda

**DATELINE:** WASHINGTON

**BODY:**

WASHINGTON - In its links with terrorism and in its weapons programs, Iran is more of a menace than Iraq was. Despite that, Bush administration officials are talking as though a military strike is the last thing on their minds.

Iran is closer to having a nuclear weapons capability than Iraq was under Saddam Hussein and the administration believes al-Qaeda operatives working out of Iran were behind the devastating terrorist bombings in Saudi Arabia on May 12.

The ties officials were able to establish between Saddam and al-Qaeda seemed less compelling.

But the administration is not ready to do battle with the Iranians. A turning point in its preferred approach, diplomacy, could come next month when the International Atomic Energy Agency visits Iran to inspect its nuclear facilities. An IAEA finding that the country is in violation of its Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty commitments could put the issue before the UN Security Council.

Whatever the Council decides, the U.S. administration may opt for restraint. Iran is flanked on either side by Afghanistan and Iraq, both of which feature expensive -- and somewhat messy -- U.S.-led reconstruction efforts.

The political climate does not favour a pugnacious approach. Unlike Iraq, there is no UN Security Council resolution demanding Iran dispose of weapons of mass destruction. The administration was able to use a dozen years of council weapons resolutions as a lever to justify force against Iraq.

Nonetheless, Iran is even more a U.S. irritant now than when George W. Bush, the U.S. President, designated it a member of the "axis of evil" 16 months ago. Its supposed ties to al-Qaeda are causing anxiety, as are disclosures Iran is producing highly enriched uranium and perhaps plutonium.

The opposition National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) has been tracking Iran's nuclear development activities through its sources inside the country.

The administration confirmed an NCRI report last August of a uranium enrichment facility and is now examining a new NCRI claim of two additional enrichment facilities 65 kilometres west of Tehran. An NCRI spokeswoman said **Iran could have a nuclear weapon** by 2005.

The Central Intelligence Agency says Iran is seeking chemical and biological weapons and is in the late stages of perfecting a medium-range missile. Analysts wonder if the time will come when Mr. Bush will apply to Iran his policy statement on terrorism of last September, as he did to Iraq.

"Our greatest fear is that terrorists will find a shortcut to their mad ambitions when an outlaw regime supplies them with the technologies to kill on a massive scale," Mr. Bush said at the time.

11-L-0559/QSD/17775

Regime change is not the official policy for Iran, but that certainly is the goal of a large number of Iranians, now weary of the conservative mullahs who have run the country, albeit with some democratic trappings, for 24 years.

Perhaps the most sensitive issue in U.S. relations with both China and Russia is the degree to which both have contributed to Iran's military buildup. The U.S. State Department used exceptionally strong language last week in denouncing China's alleged acquiescence to the sale by a Chinese company of materials designed to aid in Iran's missile development.

Russia, meanwhile, may be having second thoughts about assisting with an Iranian nuclear reactor under construction at Bushehr.

Russia's second-ranking diplomat expressed concern this week about the existence of "serious unresolved questions in connection with Iran's nuclear research."

Moscow had been maintaining the Bushehr project was unrelated to nuclear weapons development, which is consistent with Iran's own explanation.

Mr. Bush is certain to sound out Vladimir Putin, the Russian President, on the issue when they meet this weekend in Russia.

**LOAD-DATE:** May 29, 2003

◀ [prev](#) Document 41 of 62 [next](#) ▶