



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

✓  
9/30

ACTION MEMO

CM-1232-03  
30 September 2003

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action \_\_\_\_\_

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBM 9/29*

SUBJECT: Service Deployment Force Ratios

- In response to your inquiry, the following information is provided.
- As you know, Services' Force Rotation Goals were discussed at length during ELABORATE CROSSBOW III, culminating in a brief to you on 15 September. As a result, a common method of force deployment ratio measurement has been agreed upon: number of months deployed versus number of months non-deployed.
- As we have discussed, force ratios will continue to differ by Services for a variety of reasons, and each Service builds its force deployment ratio goals based on the competing demands of long-standing global contingency commitments, sustaining readiness and managing force tempo.
- Current Service Ratio Goals (by Service) are:
  - Navy 1:3: 6 months deployed for every 18 months non-deployed. Unit of measure is each fleet unit.
  - Marines 1:3: 6 months deployed for every 18 months non-deployed. Unit of measure is a battalion.
  - Army 1:4: 6 months deployed for every 24 months non-deployed. Unit of measure is a brigade.
  - Air Force 1:4: 3 months deployed for every 12 months non-deployed. Unit of measure is the Air Expeditionary Force.
- Recommend an upcoming session be set aside to meet with Service Chiefs to further explore underlying force rotation goal rationales.

RECOMMENDATION: OSD and CJCS staffs coordinate meeting with Service Chiefs regarding force rotation goal rationales.

Approve *RA* Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_ Other \_\_\_\_\_

11-L-0559/OSD/18577

COORDINATION:

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: Lt Gen N. A. Schwartz, USAF; Director, J-3; (b)(6)

COORDINATION PAGE

USA	LTC (P) Hooker	6 August 2003
USN	CAPT Thompson	6 August 2003
USAF	Col Ball	6 August 2003
USMC	Col Van Dyke	6 August 2003

29  
July 24, 2003

TO: Gen. Keane  
ADM Clark  
Gen. Jumper  
Gen. Hagee

CC: Gen. Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Core Competencies

Attached is an information paper from Ray DuBois about the Army prison system. As you will see on page three, the cost per inmate at the U.S. Disciplinary Barracks is \$46,000, versus \$15,000 in a federal penitentiary and \$12,000 in the Kansas penitentiaries.

Clearly that is not a core competence of the U.S. military. There are dozens of examples like this. We need to do more benchmarking and get about the task of transferring these things to the private sector.

Thanks.

Attach.  
7/22/03 DuBois memo re: Transfer of the U.S. Disciplinary Barracks

DHR:dh  
072403-22

.....

Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*Done 8/5*

TO: LTG Craddock

Army  
INFORMATION PAPER  
July 22, 2003

From: Ray Dutton

7.22.03  
C 1/22

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Transfer of the United States Disciplinary Barracks

Reference: The Senior Executive Council (SEC) meetings on August 15 and September 24, 2002, the Army outlined a plan to outsource the operations of military prisons.

Background:

New Disciplinary Barracks opened Oct 02 and houses 428 prisoners of all Services

Federal Bureau of Prisons houses without compensation 330 other DoD prisoners at various security levels.

- 70 at maximum security, under a 1994 Memorandum of Agreement

The Services Secretaries agreed, outsourcing long-term incarceration of DoD prisoners at the US disciplinary Barracks to the Fed bureau of Prisons was appropriate.

Based on the agreement of the Service Secretaries, the Army has begun negotiations for transfer of responsibility for both DoD Level III prisoners and the US Disciplinary Barracks.

- Negotiations should be completed by Sep 03
- Will free-up 393 military police, 103 other military and 94 civilian spaces
- Estimated annual saving of \$30 million

POC: Rich Whiston, SASA-Business Transformation

11-L-0559/OSD/18581

# The Army Prison System

11-L-0559/OSD/18582

# The Prison Decision

Long term incarceration of prisoners is not a core competency of the Army.

Therefore, the Army will no longer manage prisons. Prisoners will be sent to the Federal Bureau of Prisons (FBOP) and/or FBOP contracted private or state facilities. The new facility at Leavenworth will either be turned over to the Federal Bureau of Prisons or sold to a private company.

Note: This BIC proposal was approved by the Secretary of the Army on June 27, 2002.

# Facts

- Army operates 6 prisons.
  - One Level III: USDB at Fort Leavenworth
  - Three Level II: Fort Sill, Fort Lewis, Fort Knox
  - Two Level I: Mannheim Germany, Camp Humphreys, Korea
- Army has 1603 inmates (1051 in Army prisons; 552 elsewhere (Navy/USMC 99, FBOP 383, and local facilities 70)).
- Army is DOD executive agent for Level III prisoners.
- USDB, DOD's only Level III facility, replaced by a new \$68M facility that holds one third of the previous capacity (521).
- Navy/Marine Corps operates Level II prisons at Charleston, Miramar, Norfolk, Pendleton, Lejeune and Quantico.
- Air Force does not operate Level II facilities.

# Statistics

- Cost Per Inmate Per Year

- Leavenworth area prisons

Federal penitentiary	\$15,300
KS penitentiary	\$12,100
CCA facility	\$16,100
USDB	\$46,000

- FBOP FY 2003 budget \$23,700

- DOJ Bureau of Justice statistics

Kentucky	\$16,300	(Fort Knox, KY \$50,500)
Washington	\$26,700	(Fort Lewis, WA \$63,400)
Oklahoma	\$10,600	(Fort Sill, OK \$61,300)
Nationwide	\$20,100	

- Cost Drivers

- Facility size: DOD 200 - 400 inmates; Leavenworth federal penitentiary 2,095; state and private about 1,000
  - Inmate to employee ratio: DOD 1.5 - 2.0; private and federal 3.3 - 4.6

# Issues

- While cost comparisons with other facilities are not completely on an “*apple to apple*” basis, Army costs are significantly higher.
- For the Army, using non-Army prison facilities frees up approximately 1,000 soldiers for reallocation to other priorities. The cost of reallocating the soldiers would be less than adding to the end strength.
- Army would retain Level I capability for pre-trial and short term incarceration and return to duty; retention of any residual Level II capability will be an issue for consideration.
- Legal Counsel opine ....
  - No legal objection to contracting out prisons.
  - No legal issues that need to be addressed regarding rehabilitation, return to duty, or welfare of inmates.
- There are 819 active 95Cs and 119 RC 95Cs in the Army inventory. When the Level III and Level II guards are removed there are 167 active and 119 RC remaining. The use of Army prisons as training for war time missions for 95Cs is not a critical issue.
- Repeat offender rates. Army lower but population is different.

# Possible Steps to Implement the Proposal

- USDB and some land at Fort Leavenworth (100 acres) transferred to FBOP ownership and operation.
  - Annual cost of operations for DOD prisoners could be offset to recoup cost of new facility.
- Army will continue to send female prisoners to Miramar.

29  
July 24, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
CC: Col. Bucci  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.*  
SUBJECT: Iceland Meeting w/Feith, Crouch

I need to meet with Doug Feith and J.D. Crouch on Iceland.

Please set up a meeting, and give me this note on Iceland for the meeting.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
072403-27

.....  
Please respond by 8/1/03

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*Iceland*  
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497

29  
July 24, 2003

Done

TO: LTG Casey  
CC: Gen. Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Metrics in Daily Report

Please add a metric in your daily reports on the number of people who are being arrested and what happens to them. Do they get released? Are they put in jail?

Also you need a metric on the number of weapons we are capturing every day.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
072403-29

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Please respond by 8/1/03

U20945 /03

29  
July 24, 2003

C8/4

EF-6321  
I-03/010573

Doug Feith

Paul Wolfowitz

SUBJECT: American Iraqis

I believe we simply have to get more American Iraqis in there working with our people.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
072403-31

.....

Please respond by 8/8/03

✓  
8/9

Sir,  
Response attached.  
✓  
CDR Nasenzo  
B/B

U20946 103

COMPLETED  
8 Aug 03

29- -03

11-L-0559/OSD/18590

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

✓  
8/9

INFO MEMO

EF-6321  
I. 03/010573-ES

Deputy Secretary \_\_\_\_\_

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
FROM: Douglas J. Feith *for [Signature] 10/26/03*  
SUBJECT: More Iraqi-Americans in Iraq

- You asked what we are doing to get more Iraqi-Americans working with our forces in Iraq.
  - With the Army as executive agent, we are about to start contracting for Iraqi expatriates to serve with our forces in Iraq as interpreter-advisors.
  - These individuals will not only interpret Arabic or Kurdish, but will also advise their U.S. commander on local, politics, atmospherics, and culture.
  - Those hired will probably include Iraqis with citizenship or permanent resident alien status in the U.S., Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and members states of the European Union.
- Our goal is to contract 1,000 qualified Iraqi expatriates and place them with U.S. units down as far as company level by the end of the year.
  - We expect to have the first 200 by September 1.
  - We will use an existing contract to speed the process.

COORDINATION: None

Prepared by: C. Straub, (b)(6)  
*for* DUSD(NESA) *WS3* *WAGOP*

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

11-L-0559/OSD/18591

29  
July 24, 2003

TO: Doug Feith  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Retired Military Arabic Speakers

I think we have to get more retired American military who speak Arabic into Iraq, helping our people.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
072403-33

.....  
Please respond by 8/8/03

*oh*  
*10-29*

U20947 /03

29  
July 24, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
LTG Craddock  
  
CC: Col. Bucci  
  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
  
SUBJECT: Trip to Baghdad

I have to go to Baghdad pretty soon. I am out of touch.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
072403-35



Please respond by 8/1/03

*8/2*  
*✓ 8/14*

*Sec Def —*  
*We are planning for a*  
*trip the first week in*  
*September.*

*C*

U20948 /03

C 7/29

29  
July 24, 2003

TO: Powell Moore  
Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Working Congress on Iraq

We have to get a team that will start working Congress on Iraq regularly, every single day, so they pummel people with good information.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
072403-36

.....  
Please respond by 8/1/03

*7/29* ✓ *7/30*  
→ Sec Def - We have a team doing just this that we pulled together within last 3 weeks or so. They put together - for example - the recess packages. They sent Frist Talking Points for Senate floor speeches this week, briefings for staff, etc. We're ~~offering~~ instituting weekly briefs, and doing other regular interaction. It's happening. O, White

U20949 103

Forwarded via CDR Nosears 7/29 11-L-0559/OSD/18594

C 8/14

29  
July 24, 2003

EF-6322  
I-03/010574

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Keeping Progress in Iraq Visible

At least two or three times a week we have to get out all the things that are going right—how many people we are capturing, how many people we are killing, what we are doing, the political advances, the economic advances, and the security advances.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
072403.37

.....  
Please respond by

8/1/03

✓ 8/5

Mr. Secretary,

OSD Policy, JCS (J-5), and CPA Washington will take the following actions to "keep progress in Iraq visible."

- Include how many people we have captured or killed, and what we are doing on the economic, political, and security fronts in the Monday/Thursday strategic overview briefing.
- Forward inputs to OSD/PA for domestic and international media outlets.
- Include these in the bi-weekly deputies report and weekly Iraq status update.
- Forward information to CPA Public Affairs for in-country media distribution.

*Ryan Henry*  
Ryan Henry

U20950 /03

July <sup>29</sup> 24, 2003

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Warning

Please take a look at this *Washington Post* article I marked here. It says the U.S. intelligence agencies were "persistent and unified in warning the Defense Department that Iraqis would resort to 'armed opposition' after the war was over."

I don't remember any intel to that effect. Would you please have someone do a scrub and see if there was any.

Thanks.

Attach.

Slevin, Peter and Priest, Dana. "Wolfowitz Concedes Iraq Errors," *Washington Post*, July 24, 2003, p. A01.

DHR:dh  
072403-39

.....  
Please respond by 8/8/03

U20951 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18596



chief of staff warned that a larger stability force would be needed.

Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld and his team disagreed, confident that Iraqi military and police units would help secure a welcoming nation.

The State Department and other agencies spent many months and millions of dollars drafting strategies on issues ranging from a postwar legal code to oil policy. But after President Bush granted authority over reconstruction to the Pentagon, the Defense Department all but ignored State and its working groups.

And once Baghdad fell, the military held its postwar team out of Iraq for nearly two weeks for security reasons, and then did not provide such basics as telephones, vehicles and interpreters for the understaffed operation to run a traumatized country of 24 million.

"People always say that sometimes people plan for the wrong war," said Richard N. Haass, president of the Council on Foreign Relations and former head of the State Department's policy planning office. "One can say in some ways that the administration planned for the wrong peace. In particular, there was an emphasis on preparing for a humanitarian crisis when in fact the larger challenges turned out to be political and security."

Bush administration officials say bad news from Iraq overshadowed extensive planning for calamities that never occurred, such as a chemical weapons attack, a refugee crisis and an oil field disaster.

"Given the magnitude and the complexity of the task, and given how far we have come since the war ended, I think it has been a pretty well-managed process," said Douglas J. Feith, undersecretary of defense for policy and a central player in the occupation planning, in an interview. Pentagon policymakers drew on advice from throughout the administration, he said, and Bush's decision to put the Pentagon in charge of the early postwar period is being "vindicated by events."

But in contrast to the planning for war, other officials said, the Defense Department's attention to the occupation was haphazard and incomplete.

"There was a serious disconnect between the forces necessary to win a war and occupy a country," said a U.S. official who worked in the initial postwar effort and is still in Baghdad. "We fooled ourselves into thinking we would have a liberation over an occupation. Why did we do that?"

## Warnings About Obstacles

Preliminary planning for the occupation began in August, one month before Bush signaled in a speech to the United Nations that he was prepared to oust Hussein by force. National Security Council member Frank Miller quietly received instructions to create a structure to study topics ranging from refugees to financial reform.

By early October, officials drawn from agencies across the government were beginning to meet, amid speculation that the United States could be at war by year's end. Considerable attention was focused on a potential humanitarian crisis, and how relief and reconstruction would win Iraqi support for the

occupation.

"The whole operation is going to rise or fall on whether Iraqi people's lives are materially improved," said one committee member who reckoned that the Americans would have to deliver visible results within weeks of an invasion.

Veterans of other conflicts soon identified security as the most important requirement for early relief and long-term stability. Secretary of State Colin L. Powell emphasized the need in talks with Bush last fall, aides said, as he urged the president to seek U.N. approval for the war. With U.N. assent, Powell believed, would come troops and contributions from other nations.

Similarly, the intelligence agencies, especially the CIA, were "utterly consistent in arguing that reconstruction rather than war would be the most problematic segment of overthrowing Saddam," a senior administration official said. In classified written and oral reports, the official continued, the intelligence community warned the administration "early and often" about obstacles U.S. authorities were likely to face.

In particular, the agencies repeatedly predicted that Hussein loyalists might try to sabotage U.S. postwar efforts by destroying critical economic targets, the official said. One analysis warned that Iraqis "would probably resort to obstruction, resistance and armed opposition if they perceived attempts to keep them dependent on the United States and the West."

Those concerns, however, were secondary among the principal architects of the Iraq policy, who were concentrated in the Defense Department, the White House and Vice President Cheney's office.

In addition to believing that Iraqi soldiers and police officers would help secure the country, they thought that Iraqis would embrace the American invaders and a future marked by representative government, civil liberties and a free-market economy, and that Iraqi bureaucrats, minus a top layer of Baath Party figures who would quit or be fired, would stay on the job.

Within weeks, if all went well, Iraqis would begin taking control of their own affairs and the exit of U.S. troops would be well underway.

"Everyone thought it could be done on a small investment and that Iraqis could be mobilized to do the bulk of the job," said Tim Carney, a former diplomat recruited to manage an Iraqi ministry.

Through the fall, there was no single coordinator for competing ideas: A proposal to set up a postwar planning office died because the administration feared that it would signal already skeptical U.N. Security Council members that Bush was determined to wage war.

No issue was more contentious than the shape of Iraq's future governing structure. Central to this issue was the role of exile Ahmed Chalabi, the London-based head of the Iraqi National Congress who was reviled by the State Department and CIA as much as he was revered by senior Defense Department officials and some in the White House.

Prominent Chalabi supporters, including some at the Pentagon, backed his demand to create a provisional Iraqi government dedicated to democratic principles and designed to reassure Iraqis that the

United States had no colonial intentions. The State Department argued that Iraqis who had suffered under Hussein's rule would be alienated by a wealthy expatriate who left Iraq in 1958 -- and would blame the Americans for backing him.

That debate and others remained unresolved as autumn gave way to winter. It was not until January that Bush designated a coordinator to pull together the various plans. On Jan. 20 -- the day the French foreign minister announced that France would not support a U.N. resolution for war -- Bush signed National Security Directive 24, giving postwar control of Iraq to the Pentagon, which had lobbied hard for the job.

Career civil servants who had helped plan U.S. peacekeeping operations in Haiti, Bosnia and Kosovo said it was imperative to maintain a military force large enough to stamp out challenges to its authority right away. Gen. Eric K. Shinseki, then-Army chief of staff, thought several hundred thousand soldiers would be needed.

Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz rebutted him sharply and publicly.

"It's hard to conceive that it would take more forces to provide stability in post-Saddam Iraq than it would take to conduct the war itself and to secure the surrender of Saddam's security forces and his army," Wolfowitz told the House Budget Committee on Feb. 27. "Hard to imagine."

Powell and his top aides thought it made sense to allow the Pentagon to control the immediate postwar phase, when security would be the dominant issue. Still, they expected to contribute ideas and staffing to the political side of reconstruction -- they even budgeted for an embassy to become the central U.S. institution in Iraq within a few weeks of Hussein's anticipated defeat.

But as the Defense Department put together its occupation plans, the State Department felt doors closing.

## 'So Much Tension'

The circle of civilian Pentagon officials given the task of planning the occupation was small. From its early work, it all but excluded officials at State and even some from the Pentagon, including officers of the Joint Staff.

"The problems came about when the office of the secretary of defense wouldn't let anybody else play -- or play only if you beat your way into the game," a State Department official said. "There was so much tension, so much ego involved."

The Pentagon planners showed little interest in State's Future of Iraq project, a \$5 million effort begun in April 2002 to use Iraqi expatriates and outside experts to draft plans on everything from legal reform to oil policy. Wolfowitz created his own group of Iraqi advisers to cover some of the same ground.

Defense rejected at least nine State nominees for prominent roles in the occupation; only after Powell and others fought back did Rumsfeld relent. Tom Warrick, leader of the Future of Iraq project, was still refused a place, at the reported insistence of Cheney's office.

Retired Army Lt. Gen. Jay M. Garner, who was appointed to be the first civilian coordinator in the occupation, said in an interview that he asked Wolfowitz for an expert on Iraqi politics and governance.

Wolfowitz turned not to the roster of career specialists in the State Department's Near Eastern Affairs bureau, but to a political appointee in the bureau: Elizabeth Cheney, coordinator of a Middle East democracy project and daughter of the vice president; she recruited a State Department colleague who had worked for the International Republican Institute.

While responsibility for developing an occupation plan resided with Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz and Feith -- along with the National Security Council -- a small defense policy shop called the Office of Special Plans was given a key role in developing policy guidance for on-the-ground operations.

Its staff was hand-picked by William Luti, a former aide to Cheney and Newt Gingrich who headed the Pentagon's Middle East and South Asia policy office; they worked in a warren of offices on the Pentagon's first floor. The office held its work so closely that even members of Garner's office did not realize its role until February, a month after Garner was appointed.

That month, 30 people showed up at a meeting called to share the Special Plans work with Garner's office and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

There, the Special Plans staff handed out spreadsheets on four dozen issues, all policy recommendations for key decisions: war crimes prosecution, the elimination of the Baath Party, oil sector maintenance, ministry organization, media strategy and "rewards, incentives and immunity" for former Baath supporters.

Once a policy was approved by the defense secretary's office and the interagency principals, it would become the operating guidance for the U.S. Central Command, whose troops would occupy Iraq.

To the outsiders at the meeting, it looked like a *fait accompli*. "We had had no input into the Special Plans office," said one reconstruction official who was there.

A senior defense official, however, played down the office's role in occupation planning. He said Special Plans "had influence into the process. We were not the nerve center."

As for complaints that the office was secretive or exclusive, he said: "There are a lot of crybabies everywhere. . . . I cannot account for people's hurt feelings." To say the office was isolated, he added, "is laughable."

Garner worked closely with Rumsfeld and Feith and met about once a week with national security adviser Condoleezza Rice. Only seven weeks before the war began, Garner's staff members could be counted on one hand, but he eventually assembled a staff that drew from a number of agencies. He said they spent 30 to 40 percent of their time planning for humanitarian crises, refugees, hunger, chemical weapons attacks and oil field fires.

By March, after Garner arrived at a staging site in Kuwait, members of his own team believed that the administration had poorly prepared both Iraqis and Americans for what was to come.

One U.S. official recalled, "My uniformed friends kept telling me, 'We're not ready. We're going into the beast's mouth.'"

## 'It Was Just Chaos'

As war drew nearer, the matter of Iraq's political future became more urgent.

Despite Pentagon support for a provisional government led by Chalabi, Bush rejected that option. Instead, he took the State Department's view that exiles and internal Iraqi figures should be given an equal chance to prove themselves in an Interim Iraqi Authority to be created immediately after the war.

But Chalabi continued to work closely with Feith and others at the Pentagon, staying in touch by satellite telephone from Iran and northern Iraq. Officials at the National Security Council and the State Department were stunned to learn in early April that U.S. military authorities had flown Chalabi and 700 hurriedly assembled fighters into southern Iraq. The vice president concurred in the decision to airlift him.

Feith said it was strictly a decision made on military grounds by U.S. Central Command, but his Pentagon critics believe that he and Wolfowitz were trying to boost Chalabi's political prospects.

After the fall of Baghdad on April 9, the scenario on which the occupation plan was based never materialized. If there was no humanitarian crisis, neither were there cooperative Iraqi police, soldiers or bureaucrats. Instead, a security crisis led to a cascade of other crises:

The U.S. military did not stem extensive looting. The looting crippled government ministries and police stations beyond any expectation of the Defense Department's leaders. With too few soldiers to provide security and logistics to Garner and his team, the military delayed his entrance into Baghdad for 12 days. The crippled institutions, and the delay, left a power vacuum that his staff could not fill.

Lacking virtually any working phones, Garner's staff members could hardly communicate with one another at their headquarters in Hussein's 258-room Republican Palace. They were not prepared for an overhaul of Iraqi media. They had few means of projecting a sense of American intentions or authority.

"There wasn't any way out of the chaos," said a former official who worked in Baghdad. "It was just chaos."

As Garner's effort faltered, the administration accelerated the deployment of L. Paul Bremer, whose long-planned role was to take command of reconstruction and direct the creation of a new political structure.

Bremer's "job was to go there and make it clear that we had a grip on this deal, that we were serious, that we were there to stay," a senior U.S. official said. "And to give confidence to the Iraqis and the rest of the world that we had a plan."

*Staff writers Glenn Kessler, Vernon Loeb and Thomas E. Ricks contributed to this report.*

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July 29, 2003

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Afghanistan Report

Please take a look at this Afghanistan report that is being reported on in today's press involving human rights accusations, some of which they say the U.S. is aware.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
072903-1

.....

Please respond by 8/7/03

U20952 /03

July 29, 2003

TO: Gen. Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: End Strength

I am afraid we are going to delay so long in properly addressing the issues of end strength that we are going to end up with a mess like we did on redeployments, because we waited so long and didn't think it through carefully.

Please give me a schedule as to how we are going to address this in an orderly way.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
072903-3

.....  
Please respond by 8/1/03

U20955 /03

July 29, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Gingrich Paper

Please see me on this Newt Gingrich paper on "Seven Strategic Necessities."

Thanks.

Attach.  
6/27/03 Gingrich paper: "Seven Strategic Necessities"

DHR:dh  
072903-6

.....  
*Please respond by* 8/8/03

U20954 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18606

Seven Strategic Necessities  
June 27, 2003  
Newt Gingrich

12/16

There are seven large areas of strategic necessity that require strategic planning and some significant modifications of current assumptions and efforts.

I. Strategic need 1. Winning the larger argument about terrorism, weapons of mass murder, and American security

It is very important for the Bush administration not to get drawn into a day to day, incident managing, news media and legislator appeasing mindset.

We are going to take casualties.

We are going to be engaged in Iraq, Iran, Palestine and elsewhere for a long time.

We need an elevated debate about the larger zone of American security and the threats to that security. We want to divide the country into three factions.

1. Those who would hide and ignore reality (essentially the McGovern-Dean Democrats).
2. Those who pretend to be responsible but really want to carp and complain without an effective alternative.
3. Those who understand that this will be a hard campaign and may take years and will involve mistakes.

You want to force the carping, criticizing group to join you for the long haul or join the isolationists and reality avoiders.

If there is a clear strategic choice the Bush Administration will win.

If people get three choices the knit picking, daily critics will steadily gain ground.

Do not let yourself be caught up in a daily argument or in trying to predict when you will leave a country or when you will solve everything.

The country needs a little Churchillian promise of 'blood, sweat, toil and tears'.

In 1945-47 the country reluctantly had a great debate about the nature of the Soviet threat. People who had survived a depression and a world war wanted to return to normalcy. Gradually they concluded that that was impossible and with the help of young Republicans like Nixon and Ford, Harry Truman and George Marshall forged a consensus that lasted for over 40 years.

A large debate requires large strategies and speeches about the larger realities.

II. Strategic Need 2. Creating a world with minimum terror and minimum risk of weapons of mass murder requires both the negative goal of defeating bad people and bad regimes and the positive goal of creating systems of safety, health, prosperity, and freedom (the four words which best express the world we want our neighbors to live in).

We are very good at creating a first campaign to defeat the bad guys or the bad regime. We are stunningly less effective at creating a campaign to build systems of safety, health, prosperity and freedom.

We need a doctrine for second campaigns. This will inherently be a doctrine for integrated operations. Joint operations involve all the services. Combined operations include foreign countries. Integrated operations involves all the elements of governmental and non-governmental power being orchestrated and brought to bear to help build a country or society after we have defeated the bad forces which have been oppressing them and threatening us.

The current challenges in Iraq and Afghanistan are symptoms of this lack of an integrated doctrine and the lack of an effective interagency system for implementing such a doctrine. We can continue muddling through at increased cost and risk to ourselves or we can take winning the peace as seriously as we take winning the war.

Compare the quality of people and level of resources spent thinking through and creating the units and people which won in Iraq in three weeks with the stunningly smaller effort to think through how we rebuild a country and the disparity becomes unchallengeable.

There is still some wishful thinking in Washington that somehow these things will go away or can be fixed on the cheap.

The countries we liberate will not go away. In the absence of a successful and powerful American doctrine and system for a second campaign using integrated and combined assets we run a real risk of losing in the peace what we have gained in the war.

Those trying to deal with Iraq, Afghanistan and Palestine should simply build lists and brief reports on every impediment to effectiveness and every tool and system they wished they had. We will only get better by being consciously self aware.

III, Strategic Need 3..Palestine may present us the challenge of trying to win a total war against an enemy hiding among civilians. Hamas' leaders state publicly that 'not a single Jew' will be left in Israel and that 'not a single meter of territory' will be left in Jewish hands. There is sound reason to believe they mean it. This is a declaration of total war.

America has a sound doctrine for total war against an entire nation. Dresden, Hamburg, Tokyo and Nagasaki are among the memories of how decisive Americans can be when faced with a threat of total war.

However America does not have a doctrine for total war against an enemy who is hiding behind a civilian population. Furthermore that civilian population is likely to be terrorized by the forces of total war and so simply appealing to their better interests is useless. ✓

We learned in Iraq that the Baathist forces would kill villagers and threaten wives and children in order to get people to attack the Americans.

It is clear that Palestinians who favor real democracy or would be willing to live peacefully with Israel risk their lives if they speak out.

When faced with a terrorist opponent willing to use violence against their own people the only solution is to develop overmatching systems of intelligence and force which can help people defeat them. ✓

British General Thompson in Malaya developed a system like this and decisively defeated the communists. In one of the most successful aspects of the Viet Nam war (described in Bing West's *The Village*) very small units of Marines worked with villagers to develop self defense forces in communities of 6,000 Vietnamese with about 20 Marines.

If the President is to be able to confront and defeat Hamas the United States will have to develop a doctrine and system of helping those Palestinians who want their families to have safety, health prosperity, and freedom and are prepared to fight the terrorists if necessary to achieve that future.

The only hope for peace between Israel and the Palestinian people is for the United States to overtly ally with those Palestinians who will accept Israel if they have safety, health, prosperity and freedom and in this alliance defeat and ultimately eliminate the threat of the terrorists.

Victory in the Israel-Palestinian conflict thus inherently means victory both in a campaign against terrorists and in a campaign to build a safe, healthy, prosperous, free Palestinian society.

In this case victory in a total war surrounded by civilians requires waging the first and second campaigns concurrently.

The specialists at Quantico, Fort Benning and Fort Bragg should be assigned the job of developing in detail a doctrine, strategy and structure for winning this total war on behalf of the Palestinian people against the terrorists. The intelligence community should be ✓

involved for its knowledge but the doctrine for war winning should come from specialists in policing, urban warfare, and guerrilla operations in the military.

The goal is to give the President the instruments he needs to be able to win if the forces of Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Al Fatah, etc insist on total war.

IV. Strategic Need 4. Future threats and complex realities rather than lessons learned from Iraq should define the core of American intelligence, military and integrated needs for the next generation.

Iraq and Iran are useful campaigns to study but they have limited application to force size and structure for the future. The real challenges are in heavier opponents (North Korea, a rogue Pakistan, Iran) and more dispersed problems (Palestine, the ungoverned areas, the dictatorships of Syria, Libya etc.)

Planning should begin with the decisiveness of President Bush's description of the global war on terror on the USS Lincoln and the wide ranging assertions of the National Strategy released September 20,2002.

The forces today are stretched much further than people in Washington believe.

The number of places we could be involved is far larger than anyone in Washington wants to contemplate.

The number of people who live in ungoverned areas is far greater and more dangerous than anyone currently wants to report.

The amount of money and scale of activity underway in the gray areas (people smuggling, illegal arms deals, illegal international transportation, traditional international crime, and international narcotics) creates a system within which terrorism can operate which is far larger, more robust and more agile than anyone contemplates. This dark underside of globalization is better funded than the police, more agile than public bureaucracies and often better equipped technologically.

In 1975 Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld used the facts to convince the post-Viet Nam, post-Watergate Democratic Congress that the world was dangerous and defense spending had to be increased.

Today a similarly comprehensive, realistic and starkly candid assessment needs to be developed by the Administration and shared with the Congress and with the American people so they will understand the scale of the threat, the complexity and speed of the modern world, and the amount we will have to invest to develop truly effective systems of national security.

This may be the most difficult challenge we face and it may take more political and bureaucratic courage to confront than any other strategic necessity.

V. The fifth strategic necessity is to transform the Army into an institution which is at the center of jointness. This is a much bigger challenge than simply bringing the Army into jointness. The Army's instinct that complex warfare requires land forces is exactly right. The Army's instinct that in the end all the other services may end up supporting ground forces is almost certainly right.

However this is an argument for jointness at the heart of the Army and not at its periphery.

This requires the development of joint tactics and effective fires so the entire process from day one is seamlessly joint.

This also requires profoundly reshaping the Army's personnel system to get rid of the 1917 individual replacement system and move to a unit preparedness system more like the Navy and the Marine Corps.

If the new Army team is instructed to begin with jointness and then think through the redesign of the Army a drastically different outcome will result than if the team is told to rethink the Army with jointness as one of the goals.

First comes immersion in jointness and then comes design of the new 21st century Army.

This is the only way to get to an effective joint force in the next decade.

VI. The sixth strategic necessity is a briefing on the first two years of the war and where the United States must go from here.

The first step is to combine the lessons learned from 9/11, Afghanistan, and Iraq with the emerging threats and realities around the world into a single briefing for the congress, the news media and the country.

Beginning in mid-September the Congress should be thoroughly briefed on the first two years of the war with terrorism and weapons of mass murder. The briefing should go on to outline the current threats to security and to outline the President's strategies for defeating these threats. Finally, the briefing should outline a positive vision of a future of safety, health, prosperity and freedom for all people in a world in which terrorism and weapons of mass murder are opposed and defeated by virtually everyone in a strategic coalition of the willing.

The entire information campaign of the future (which has to be an integral part of developing the Integrated doctrine and system mentioned in strategic necessity two above (second campaigns) depends on the development of this presentation.

Members of Congress, reporters, and citizens all need a coherent single explanation of what has happened, what we have learned from it, what threatens us and what we are going to do about it and the metrics appropriate to measure success in the future.

In September there will still be great interest in the lessons learned and they are the logical hook as a two years after review of phase one of the global war. By January the lessons will be in the past and the Congress will be focused on politics and elections.

There is a window of about three months in which this can be achieved.

This is potentially an enormous mobilizer of understanding, support and resources. Without it people will develop their own models and their own metrics for success and the situation will be dramatically more muddled.

VII. The seventh strategic necessity is to establish a system of DoD detailees throughout the federal government and where possible as overseas detached personnel for foreign governments to both maximize DoD's influence on debates and to maximize the flow of information to DoD.

It has been a significant mistake to yield the territory at NSC and elsewhere to the State Department and other interests. The result has been a much more limited reach by the Defense system into the policy making apparatus.

What is really needed is the opposite approach.

There should be a conscious systematic strategy for sending good people to every point in the federal government and to as many contacts with foreign governments as possible.

This requires carrying extra officers and senior ncos on the rolls but in the long run it will pay a tremendous dividend in communicating the defense system's views, values, and practices.

July 29, 2003

TO: Col. Bucci  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: NATO Summit

*Joyce will go with me*

Please find out if spouses go to the NATO Summit in Istanbul in May 2004.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
072903-15

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*✓ 8/4*

*8.1.03*

*Per John Boyd @ US NATO —*

*Yes, all Minister Spouses will be included.*

*However, still waiting to confirm final Summit Dates w/ White House/NSC.*

*U20955 /03*

*Mary Claire*

11-L-0559/OSD/18613

July 29, 2003

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*  
SUBJECT: Service Intelligence Heads

When we are looking for Service intelligence heads, we ought to make sure they have served in Combatant Command as the top intel person before they get promoted for those posts.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
072903-19

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

*SD outbox  
8/6*

U20956 /03

Copy please

THX  
C 2/29

TO: Pete Aldridge  
CC: Andy Hoehn  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Goldwater-Nichols

Here are some suggestions on Goldwater-Nichols.

Thanks.

Attach.  
*On Revolutions, Barriers, and Common Sense*, p. 45-49.

DHR:dh  
072903-20

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

U20957 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18615

ideas generated by Joint Staff officers, who were further handicapped by their lack of experience and understanding of joint activities. A succession of defense secretaries, frustrated by their inability to extract useful military advice (especially *joint* military advice) from the chiefs and the Joint Staff, gradually built their own Joint Military Staff and buried it in OSD where it exists until this day. These facts, perhaps more than any other, persuaded Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee Les Aspin to take JCS reform seriously and to put some energy behind it.

At my last count there were roughly three-quarters as many military officers in OSD as on the Joint Staff and two-thirds as many generals and admirals. When Goldwater-Nichols 1986 put the Joint Staff under the command of the Chairman and made the Chairman the principal military advisor, it removed the operational barrier between the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff that had prevented the Secretary from getting useful joint military advice. Does the Secretary really need two Joint Staffs today, after Goldwater-Nichols?

All these sources of growth work like compound interest. A Defense Secretary, focused on military operations and the 5-year Defense Program, probably won't notice a 1-year, 5 percent growth in the headquarters strength—but that will double the staff in 15 years and quadruple it in 30 years. Do you wonder how we got to 30,000?

### **What to Do?**

Max DePree says that one of the first obligations of a leader is to define reality for the organization. I am not the leader of DOD, but what I have just described is reality. So, what should we do? It is not a simple task to overcome 40 years of compounded staff growth. It is not simple to overcome habit patterns etched in tradition and judged "right" through a long habit of not thinking them "wrong." But DOD really needs to change, and to do so it needs another revolution—but a planned revolution.

The DOD headquarters organization we have today is destined to implode through the pressures of the budget and the absolute necessity to improve core processes. If not managed well, this contraction may produce a scatterbrained solution. The Commandant of the Marine Corps says, "We are at an inflection point." I couldn't agree more. In thinking about what to do, there are at least three primary areas to look at:

- *The Military Department Secretariats.* There is at least one extra echelon in the nine-echelon management structure of DOD. It is manifest in the trappings that were carried over from the days when we had War and Navy Departments. I don't propose doing away with the military departments, but I do believe that the Military Department secretariat and military staff functions should be consolidated, and several of the presidential appointee positions eliminated. I would retain the positions of Secretary, Under Secretary (as the acquisition and R&D executive), General Counsel, and perhaps the Comptroller-FM. Candidates for these positions can be recruited reasonably well, whereas it is difficult to find private sector executives who know anything about military manpower and logistics. Their staffs, however, would be skeletal; each Joint Chief would be the true Chief of Staff for the service secretary and the secretary's few assistants.
- *OSD.* The tasks and positions that have been collected in OSD over four decades should be deeply scrubbed. For example, there is now an effective Joint Staff; a second joint military staff, buried in the OSD, is no longer needed. The joint military tasks that have been assigned to OSD over the decades should—if still needed—finally be assigned to the Joint Staff. OSD should be a policy-making body with financial oversight, with no more than 500 people, and far, far fewer assistant secretaries.
- *Core Competencies.* This term has become part of the popular jargon, but focusing on the things you must do and

can do well, and delegating or contracting out the rest, are serious and important tasks. The competition for resources is unrelenting; if DOD has any hope of maintaining a reasonable force structure, modernizing it, keeping it ready, and—above all—taking care of its people, it must become competitive. Today it is not. It's time to put a full court press on re-engineering. In sum, these are the steps I suggest:

1. Consolidate the military department secretariats with the service staffs, eliminating about ten assistant secretaryships.

2. In OSD, stop doing the things that add little or no value and zero out the offices doing these things.

3. Delegate OSD operational responsibilities to the level that understands them best. If necessary, collect the operational tasks OSD has accumulated that cannot be delegated and—where still needed—put them under a single presidential appointee who has DOD operational experience, perhaps a retired senior military officer.

4. Transfer the essential joint military staff activities now conducted in OSD to the Joint Staff and consolidate or further delegate those activities.

5. Focus the remainder of OSD on the critical programming, budget, and policy development activities.

6. Limit OSD to 500 people, and count everyone.

7. Reduce the number of DOD Senate-confirmed appointees by at least one-third.

8. Continue the implementation of Goldwater-Nichols 1986 through, for example, further enhancement and use of the JROC.

9. Contract out to specialists the administrative and business chores that are not part of the essential DOD core competencies; ask Congress to allow the DOD to retain the budgetary resources so liberated if the Department agrees to apply those resources to increased

combat capability and readiness. There is precedent for this.

The military secretaries and the business staff functions of OSD probably should report to a second Deputy Secretary of Defense who would manage the business functions of the Department and oversee an accelerated business process re-engineering effort. This would allow the existing Deputy (who becomes the "Principal Deputy") to focus on the larger issues of operational and strategic importance and to step in for the Secretary of Defense when needed.

### **Barriers to Change**

We all know the barriers. Here they are in no particular order of importance:

- *Traditions.* These take on many forms: Among the strongest and the best in DOD are the service traditions that create esprit and that provide continuity from one generation to the next. These are the traditions that will motivate people to put their lives and the lives of their friends in harm's way. They must be respected and preserved.

But, as George Marshall said, "Sentiment must give way to common sense." The tradition that treats the military departments as full-fledged cabinet positions is more sentimental than fundamental.

- *Checks and balances.* Congress and the American people want checks and balances in any organization that involves the capability to organize and employ military force. We have a surfeit of checks and balances and can afford to lose a few. It makes no sense to me to continue arrangements that foster inefficiency and low morale.

- *The tyranny of the in-box.* The arrangements in the Pentagon headquarters today frustrate the competent, and allow the urgent to drive out the important. We must make

reform a prime DOD management topic. If the need is not now seen as a crisis situation, it soon will be. It makes a lot of sense to get the homework done now and to go about the process thoughtfully.

- *Lack of conviction and courage.* This, I believe, speaks for itself.

July 29, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Statement on Bob Hope

Why would the Department of Defense put out a statement on Bob Hope instead of putting it out under my name? It seems to me that it looks strange coming out from the Department.

Any thoughts?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
072903-22

.....

Please respond by 8/1/03

7/30

✓ 7/31

I agree. I thought it went out as a Sec Def Statement. I'll find out.

*D. Rita*

U20958 /03

**Craddock, John J, Lt Gen, OSD**

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**From:** dlnews\_sender@DTIC.MIL  
**Sent:** Monday, July 28, 2003 3:14 PM  
**To:** DODNEWS-L@DTIC.MIL  
**Subject:** Department of Defense Statement on the Death of Bob Hope

NEWS RELEASE from the United States Department of Defense

No. 548-03  
IMMEDIATE RELEASE  
Jul 28, 2003  
(703) 697-5131 (media)  
(703) 428-0711 (public/industry)



Department of Defense Statement on the Death of Bob Hope

Today, we mourn the loss of a true American patriot. The first and only American ever to be made an honorary Veteran of America's Armed Forces, Bob Hope holds a special place in the national security pantheon. He called the troops his "best friends," and he made it his mission to be with them wherever they served, regardless of distance or danger.

To many of our forces from across the generations, Bob Hope's visits were a taste of home in a far-off land; a moment of mirth in the middle of war, and a loud and clear message to our military that America honored their service and prayed for their safe return.

Bob Hope's final tour, at age [90], took him to the Persian Gulf and the men and women of Desert Storm.

Although he is no longer with us in life, he will always remain, just as he was, in our hearts -- cracking jokes, boosting morale, and reminding all the world of what it means to be an American.

With profound gratitude for his decades of service to our country, we extend our deepest sympathy to his family and many friends.

[Web Version: <http://www.dod.mil/releases/2003/nr20030728-0262.html>]

- News Releases: <http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/>
- DoD News: <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/dodnews.html>
- Subscribe/Unsubscribe: <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/dodnews.html#e-mail>
- Today in DoD: <http://www.defenselink.mil/today/>

July 29, 2003

TO: Gen. Myers  
CC: LTG Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Brief POTUS

*Advance copy sent to LTG Craddock*

I want to brief the President on end strength on August 8 in Crawford. We need to be ready, and I will probably need to have had a couple of sessions on it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
072903-24



Please respond by 8/1/03

*Done  
TEW  
8/11*

U20959 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18623

July 29, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Vin Weber

*Done*

*SEE  
SCHEDULE  
↓*

Please make sure I talk to Vin Weber by tomorrow.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
072903-33

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

U20960 /03

07/29/03, 4:14 PM

**Wednesday 30 July 2003**

6:45am	Depart Residence (SA K-Bar)
7:15am-7:25	C/C Call
7:30am-7:55	Round Table
8:00am-8:30	CENTCOM/CPA Secure call
8:35am	Depart River Entrance
8:55am-9:15	POTUS One-on-One, Oval Office, White House
9:15am	Depart White House
9:30am	Arrive River Entrance
10:00am-10:20	Di Rita, Duman, Craddock
10:25am-10:40	PDB
10:45am-11:00	Gus Pagonis, Zakheim, Modly
11:00am-11:30	Defense Business Board, SecDef Conference Room
12:00pm-12:30	Lunch
12:35pm-12:45	Phone Call w/Vin Webber
1:00pm-1:25	PC Prep (for 7/31) w/VCJCS, Feith, Haynes
1:30pm-2:00	David Kay, VCJCS, Feith, Wolfowitz
2:05pm-2:15	SLRG Prep w/Krieg, Hoehn
2:15pm-3:15	SLRG, SecDef Conference Room (Global Force Posture-Policy)
3:30pm	Depart River Entrance
3:50pm-4:00	Senator Frist, S-230, Capitol
4:00pm-5:30	Senate Briefing S-407, Capitol w/CJCS
5:30pm	Stake Out
5:45pm-6:10	Senator Stevens, Capitol S-128 w/Moore, Chu
6:15pm-6:45	Senator Inouye, Capitol S-239 w/Moore, Chu
6:45pm	Depart Capitol
7:00pm	Arrive Residence

11-L-0559/OSD/18625

July 29, 2003

TO: Gen. Abizaid  
CC: Gen. Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Guerilla Wars

Attached is an interesting story about guerilla wars that I thought might be of interest.

Thanks.

Attach.

Winik, Jay. *April 1865: The Month that Saved America*, HarperCollinsPublishers, pp. 147-158.

DHR:dh  
072903-26

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

*Done 8/6*

U20961 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18626

APRIL 1865

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*The Month  
That Saved America*



Jay Winik



HarperCollins Publishers

momentous step of surrender was anathema to him. Here, surely, was induction. And in this fateful moment, while he considered his response—both what he would decide and what he would reject—the aging general would alter the course of the nation's history for all time. It would constitute perhaps Lee's finest moment ever.

• • •

Throughout the years variously referred to as "guerrillaism," "guerrilleros," or "partisans," or "Partheyganger," or "bushwhackers," guerrilla warfare is and always has been the very essence of how the weak make war against the strong. Insurrectionist, subversive, chaotic, its methods are often chosen instinctively, but throughout time, they have worked with astonishing regularity. Its application is classic and surprisingly simple: shock the enemy by concentrating strength against weakness. And as Mao would one day explain, "The strategy is to pit one man against ten, but the tactic is to pit ten men against one." Countering numerical superiority, guerrillas have always employed secrecy, deception, and terror as their ultimate tools. They move quickly, attack fast, and just as quickly scatter. They strike at night—or in the day; they hit hard in the rain, or just as hard in the sunshine; they rain terror when troops are eating or when they have just concluded an exhausting march; they assault military targets, or, just as often, hunt down random civilians. In short, they may hit at the rear of the enemy, or at its infrastructure, or, most devastating of all, at its psyche; the only constant is that they move when least expected, and invariably in a way to maximize impact.

And as military men have often learned the hard way, guerrilla warfare does the job. By luring their adversaries into endless, futile pursuit, guerrillas erode not just the enemy's strength, but, far more importantly, the enemy's morale as well. Every American, of course, in the final quarter century of the twentieth century saw just how effective guerrilla warfare is. They watched it be turned against them with frightening success in Vietnam. But neither has America been its only victim. An astounding number of other world powers, large and small, have been humbled by guerrilla war in the past century alone: at the turn of the

twentieth century, the heavily outnumbered Boers in South Africa would stave off the mightiest force on the globe, the British empire, for a full four years. The Algerians used guerrilla tactics with devastating success against the far more powerful French; Castro handily deployed them in Cuba; the Khmer Rouge employed them to come to power in Cambodia; the PLO exploited them for over three decades in the West Bank of Israel; and, just as notably, against enormous odds the Mujahadeen managed to humiliate the Soviet army in Afghanistan. Robert E. Lee, of course, knew about none of this. Nor did he need to. Far from being simply a phenomenon of the most recent century, the awesome pedigree of guerrilla warfare runs back to the earliest days of human combat. Much of this he would—and in fact did—know about.

The list of effective guerrilla wars since mankind's earliest days is a long one. Five hundred years before the coming of Christ, the ceaseless harassment and lightning strikes of the nomadic Scythians blunted the efforts of the Persian king, Darius I, to subdue them; then, three and a half centuries later, the Israelite Judas Maccabeus waged successful guerrilla operations against the Syrians. In Spain, no less than the Romans (after suffering a number of humiliating defeats) required several long centuries before they could finally surmount the hit-and-run tactics of the Lusitanians and Celtiberians. Much later, in Wales, the English conquest succeeded only in 1282, after some 200 years of stubborn, acrimonious struggle and the widespread use of encastellation—covering the country with small strongholds—which presaged the blockhouse arrangements of ensuing centuries. By the time of the Civil War, even as the emphasis remained on large armies and full-scale battles (as one Prussian general put it, “the small war was swallowed by big war”), guerrilla efforts were well established as a viable mode of warfare. By then, the French ominously referred to guerrilla battle as a war of extermination requiring “*un peu de fanatisme*”; General Baron de Jomini, a Swiss military man and the most widely studied theorist in the mid-nineteenth-century world, warned in his famous work, *Précis de l'art de la guerre*: “National wars are the most formidable of all”; and European statesmen, eyeing the growing nationalist passions sweeping across the continent, agreed, speaking direly of guerrilla warfare presaging the “*bellum omnium contra omnes*,” or “the war of all against all.”

The actual word "guerrilla" came from the Spanish insurgency against France in the early 1800s, a conflict Jefferson Davis frequently referred to. In 1807, while Napoleon's mighty legions were mired down in Spain, the great general once grumbled in a fit of pique that this guerrilla war was his "Spanish ulcer." And firsthand, he watched his ulcer grow, as regional bands seemed to spring up everywhere. As one observer at the time noted, "the priest girded up his black robe and stuck a pistol on his belt," "the student threw aside his books and grasped the sword," "the shepherd forsook his flock" and "the husbandman his home." Spurred on by small victories, the bands quickly multiplied and began attacking with greater conviction and fury than ever before, until at one point, guerrillas were largely responsible for containing three of Napoleon's armies. Remarkably, Napoleon met similar tragedy against poorly fitted yet equally determined guerrillas later on, in his ill-fated invasion of Russia. This, too, was of course well known to Lee and Davis.

But these were, by no means, the only widely known examples of guerrilla war. Equally familiar to nineteenth-century Americans were the Thirty Years War and French Religious Wars; the experience of Frederick the Great in Bohemia; of Wellington in Portugal; the partisan war against Revolutionary France in the Royalist Vendée; the Netherlands against the Spain of Philip II; Switzerland against the Hapsburg empire; the Polish uprisings in 1831 and 1861; and the nineteenth-century struggle of Caucasian tribes against their Russian invaders. At the same time as the Civil War was ending, in South America the tiny country of Paraguay was waging a fierce struggle against a triple alliance of Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay, whose combined population outnumbered its by thirty to one; it would hold them at bay for six years. And then, of course, there was the most honorable example of them all, the American experience in employing guerrilla tactics against the British in the War of Independence. Using muddy roads and swollen streams to their advantage, American guerrilla heroes like Colonel Francis Marion, known as the "Swamp Fox"; Thomas Sumter; Andrew Pickens; and General Nathaniel Green harassed the European battlefield trained-and-bred British. And beginning with the "Liberty Boys" in Georgia, who first stole gunpowder from a British ship in 1775, the American insurgents had not shied away from

employing guerrilla tactics in battle, in historic engagements like Kings Mountain and Cowpens, and then Guilford Courthouse—which British General Lord Cornwallis labeled “truly savage” and which another British general forlornly spoke of as “that sort of victory which ruins an army.”

For his part, West Point graduate and former U.S. secretary of war Jefferson Davis was aware of much, if not all, of this illuminating past. Now, in April 1865, with his government on the run, he was thinking precisely about such things as a war of extermination, a Confederate ulcer, a national war that ruins the enemy. In short, guerrilla resistance.

The day after Richmond fell, Davis had called on the Confederacy to shift from a static conventional war in defense of territory and population centers to a dynamic guerrilla war of attrition, designed to wear down the North and force it to conclude that keeping the South in the Union would not be worth the interminable pain and ongoing sacrifice. “We have now entered upon a new phase of a struggle the memory of which is to endure for all ages,” he declared. “. . . Relieved from the necessity of guarding cities and particular points, important but not vital to our defense, with an army free to move from point to point and strike in detail detachments and garrisons of the enemy, operating on the interior of our own country, where supplies are more accessible, and where the foe will be far removed from his own base and cut off from all succor in case of reverse, nothing is now needed to render our triumph certain but the exhibition of our own unquenchable resolve.” He concluded thus: “Let us but will it, and we are free.”

In effect, Davis was proposing that Lee disperse his army before it was finally cornered. Years later, Charles Adams, the grandson and great-grandson of two presidents, remarked balefully, “I shudder to think of what would happen” if “Robert E. Lee [was] of the same turn of mind of Jefferson Davis . . .” But was he? From a military point of view, the plan had considerable merit. The Confederacy was well supplied with long mountain ranges, endless swamps, and dark forests to offer sanctuary for a host of determined partisans. Its people knew the countryside intimately and instinctively and had all the talents necessary for adroit bushwhacking, everything from the shooting and the riding, the

tracking and the foraging, the versatility and the cunning, right down to the sort of dash necessary for this lifestyle. Moreover, given that most of them would be battle-hardened and well-trained veterans, arguably an organized Confederate guerrilla army could be among the most effective partisan groups in all of history. For its part, no longer opposed by major concentrations of military regulars, the Union army would then be forced to undertake the onerous task of occupying the entire Confederacy—an unwieldy occupation at best, which would entail Federal forces having to subdue and patrol and police an area as large as all of today's France, Spain, Italy, Switzerland, Germany, and Poland combined. Even in early April 1865, the Union had actually conquered only a relatively small part of the physical South—to be sure, crucial areas for a conventional conflict, like Nashville, New Orleans, Memphis, and, of course, the crown jewel of Richmond—but all would be largely meaningless in a bitter, protracted guerrilla war. As the Romans had found out 2,000 years earlier, cities could become useless baggage weighing down the military forces, what the ancient commanders memorably called "*impedimenta*."

In moving to occupy vast stretches of land defended only by small, dispersed forces, Grant's strategy of exhaustion would be turned on its head. Consider the nearly insuperable difficulties that he would face: up to that point, no more than roughly a million Union men had been in arms at any one given time. But confronted with a guerrilla phase, the Union would not be able to demobilize its armies, which is always problematic for a democracy, then and now. Wartime conscription would have to continue, with all its attendant political difficulties and war-weariness. Even granting the North's theoretical ability to put more than 2 million men under arms, it would be unlikely that the Federals could ever pacify, let alone manage and oversee, more than fragmented sections of the South against a willful guerrilla onslaught. Rather than having a restored United States, in time, the country could come to resemble a Swiss cheese, with Union cities here, pockets of Confederate resistance lurking there, ambiguous areas of no-man's-land in between. The cities would no doubt be firmly in Union hands, but as the days marched on, they, too, could become like embattled garrisons, where organized violence and chaos were

always a real possibility. Even the North would not be safe. Indeed, in a likely harbinger of things to come, in 1864, a ragtag group of twelve Confederates, without horses, plus ten lookouts, and financed by a mere \$400 in cash from the Confederate secretary of war, had crossed the Canadian border, plundered three Vermont banks, stolen \$210,000, and turned the entire state into chaos. From New York to Philadelphia, and Washington to Boston, then, potential targets would abound: banks, buildings, businesses, local army outposts, and possibly even newspapers and statehouses. All were vulnerable, threatening to turn these cities into nineteenth-century versions of Belfast and Beirut. Under such a scenario, month after grinding month, even year after year, who would feel under siege: the victorious Union or the hardened guerrillas?

Across most of the South, the situation would be even more daunting. In Charles Adams's famous warning, "The Confederacy would have been reduced to smoldering wilderness." As in virtually all guerrilla wars throughout time, the Union forces would have little choice but to station outposts in every county and every sizable town; they would be forced to put a blockhouse on every railroad bridge and at every major communications center; they would be reduced to combing every sizable valley and every significant mountain range with frequent patrols. With Lee's army and other loyal Confederates—by some historians' estimates, there were still up to 175,000 men under arms who could be called upon, and all virtually agree that there were still large combat-ready forces to be mustered—dispersed into smaller, more mobile units, they could make lightning hit-and-run attacks on the invading forces from safe havens in the rugged countryside and then invisibly slip back into the population, only to reappear at a later date with renewed strength. Their molestations need not be constant or even kill many people; they need only be incessant. Terror would be the watchword. All the Union could do would be wait . . . and wait . . . and wait. And to the extent that they carried out counterinsurgency measures, they could well have found what many occupiers invariably learn: rarely do such tactics work, and in most cases, they only turn the local populace against them. As Marx would later comment on the French guerrilla experience, it would be like "the lion in the fable, tormented to death by a gnat."

The military balance would be almost meaningless. In truth, more frightening to the Union than the actual casualties it might suffer would be the psychological toll as prolonged occupiers, the profound exhaustion, the constant demoralization. Where would the stamina come from? There would be no real rest, no real respite, no true amity, nor, for that matter, any real sense of victory—only an amorphous state of neither war nor peace, raging like a low-level fever. In fact, recall this: success thus far had actually come to the Union only in the nick of time; prospects for Northern victory had seemed dim as recently as August 1864, largely because Northerners had grown weary of the war. In truth, the Northern home front had nearly crumbled first—by April 1865 an astounding 200,000 men had already deserted the Union army—and was saved only by the captures of Mobile and, more importantly, of Atlanta, which paved the way for a presidential reelection victory that Lincoln himself had, just weeks earlier, judged to be an impossibility. In fact, it was only the heartening prospects of sure and relatively sudden victory that had sustained the Federals to this time. In a guerrilla war, however, all bets would be off. The North, deprived of the fruits of closure, deprived of the legitimacy that all victors invariably clamor for, would at some point reach a moment of reckoning: how much longer would the country countenance sending its men into war? How long could it tolerate carrying out the necessary mass executions, the sweeping confiscations, the collective expulsions? At what point would it deem the agonies and cruelties of a full-scale guerrilla war, which would inevitably pervert its identity as a republic, to be no longer worth it? And when would the war become so unpopular that it could no longer be continued? We know what the French once said of a comparable experience. As its columns sought to put down the guerrilla resistance of Abdelkader in North Africa in 1833, one urgent dispatch to King Louis-Philippe stated sadly: "We have surpassed in barbarity the barbarians we came to civilize." It is hard to imagine Americans willing to pay this price for Union.

But could the South in fact carry it out? Grant and Sherman certainly had no doubt about the Confederacy's ability to wage protracted guerrilla war—it was their greatest fear. At one point, Grant himself ruminated, "To overcome a truly popular, national resistance in a vast

territory without the employment of truly overwhelming force is probably impossible." As it was, the Union never had any systematic plans to cope with such an eventuality—all of Grant's efforts were principally designed to break up the Confederacy's main armies and to occupy the main cities. And what patchwork plans they did have had failed and failed them dismally in the more limited guerrilla war fought in Missouri. As General John D. Sanborn, who served under Grant's command, would later admit: "No policy worked; every effort poured fuel on the fire."

Lincoln, too, was equally concerned, and he, as much as anyone else, understood the toll guerrilla war could take on the country. On the Missouri guerrilla conflict he lamented, "Each man feels an impulse to kill his neighbors, lest he first be killed by him. Revenge and retaliation follow. And all this among honest men. But this is not all. Every foul bird comes along, and every dirty reptile rises up." Some of Lincoln's aides put it even more fearfully. Said one, guerrilla warfare is "the external visitation of evil."

Before the Civil War even began, guerrilla activity had already made its mark on the North-South conflict. On May 24, 1856, John Brown and five other abolitionists brutally murdered and mutilated five Southern settlers at Pottawatomie Creek in Kansas (Brown had read Wellington's *Memoirs* and, after personally inspecting fortifications on European battlefields, came to fancy himself a leader of guerrilla forces). Day after day for over two years, dueling bands of Free-Soil abolitionists and pro-slavery marauders burned, robbed, and killed in an effort to drive the other from "Bleeding Kansas," a grim dress rehearsal for the Civil War to follow. By the time war erupted in 1861, many on the bloodstained Kansas-Missouri border were already veterans of irregular warfare.

And once the war started, across the Confederacy, Southerners quickly took to guerrilla tactics. One partisan recruiter proclaimed, "It is only men I want . . . men who will pull a trigger on a Yankee with as much alacrity as they would on a mad dog, men whose consciences won't be disturbed by the sight of a vandal carcass." Such recruiters found their men in abundance. Sam Hildebrand roamed the woods of southern Missouri slaying scores of Unionists; Champ Ferguson tormented the Cumberland in Tennessee, knifing, mangling, and bludgeoning luckless Federals whenever he encountered them. Before he was

eventually captured—he was summarily hanged—Ferguson personally extinguished over a hundred lives. In the swamps of Florida, John Jackson Dickson outmaneuvered, outfought, and outfoxed the bluecoats; and anarchy literally reigned in Unionist Kentucky, where brutal guerrilla bands led by Ike Berry, Marcellus Clark, and scores of others sprang up across the state. Whatever draconian measures the Union instituted, including confiscation of property and executions of five guerrillas for every loyalist killed, accomplished little. Adding insult to injury, guerrillas often shrewdly fooled Union military leadership. At one point, the partisan Jesse McNeil slipped into Cumberland, Maryland, and in a daring raid captured two Union generals, Benjamin Kelly and George Crook, narrowly missing two future presidents in the process, Congressman-elect James A. Garfield and Major William L. McKinley. (Incredibly, this was not the first time Union generals had been snatched.) And of course, there was the redoubtable chief of the Cherokee Nation, Stand Watie, whose exploits in major battles and in hit-and-run skirmishes alike made him a Confederate military hero, and eventually earned him the honor of an appointment as a Confederate brigadier general. A veteran of eighteen major battles and a multitude of smaller skirmishes, Watie and his Indian forces waged fierce guerrilla warfare along the Arkansas River valley. Among two of his most stunning victories was the capture of the federal steamboat *J. R. Williams* on June 15, 1864, and then, in a daring nighttime raid with his brigade of 800 Indians, the bold seizure of a Northern supply train carrying \$1.5 million worth of Union supplies—food, clothes, boots, shoes, guns, medicine, mules, and ammunition—at the second battle of Cabin Creek in September 1864.

In fact, some of the Confederate's guerrillas became legendary, feared not simply in the North, but known internationally on both sides of the Atlantic. Of these, John Mosby was among the most dashing and prominent. Pint-sized, plucky, and daring, he was a bit of a Renaissance man. He read Shakespeare, Plutarch, Washington Irving, and Hazlitt's *Life of Napoleon*, and his words and writings were frequently sprinkled with passages from the classics. The twenty-nine-year-old had been expelled from the University of Virginia—he shot a fellow student—yet he later finagled a pardon from the governor, and then, of all things, took up the law. At the outset of the

war, he was actually opposed to secession and was an "indifferent soldier" at best; though after joining Jeb Stuart's cavalry, he proved himself to be a fearless courier and cavalry scout and, when he raised a company of his own under the Partisan Ranger Act of April 1862, a remarkable guerrilla leader. His fame rapidly spread with such exploits as the capture of a Northern general, Edwin H. Stoughton, in bed with a hangover—a mere ten miles from Washington, D.C., in March 1863. "Do you know who I am?" bellowed the general, upon being so indiscreetly interrupted. Mosby shot back: "Do you know Mosby, general?" Stoughton harrumphed: "Yes! Have you got the rascal?" Mosby: "No, but *he* has got *you*!" (Mosby completed the humiliation by brazenly retreating with his prisoner in full view of Federal fortifications.) Operating on horseback at night, with stealth, surprise, and celerity, he soon earned the sobriquet of the "Grey Ghost," and the romance surrounding his exploits brought recruit after recruit to his doorstep. In turn, he was sheltered and fed by a large and sympathetic population in northern Virginia, which served as his early warning network—and his refuge. Never amounting to more than a thousand men, Mosby's partisans were confined to small platoons of several dozen. But they mauled Union outposts with such effectiveness and a whirlwind fury that the regions stretching from the Blue Ridge to the Bull Run mountains were quickly dubbed, by friends and foes alike, "Mosby's confederacy." Union supplies could not move through his territory unless well protected, and even then they were likely prey.

The destruction Mosby inflicted upon Union lines was considerable, and he was detested accordingly. Various strategies were employed—without success—to subdue him. One plan called for an elite team of sharpshooters to shadow Mosby until he was either caught or destroyed. It failed. Another promised massive arrests of local civilians in Mosby's confederacy and a wholesale destruction of their mills, barns, and crops. This, too, was done, but also failed. While Mosby still roamed freely, a frustrated General Sheridan, whom Mosby relentlessly foiled in the Shenandoah Valley, once thundered about the restless guerrilla: "Let [him] know there is a God in Israel!" Finally, Grant ordered that any of Mosby's men who were captured should be promptly shot. And in autumn of 1864, the yellow-maned General George Custer obliged, cap-

uring six men and executing them all. Three were shot, two were hanged, and a seventeen-year-old boy was dragged bleeding and dying through the streets by two men on horses until a pistol was finally emptied into his face—while his grief-stricken mother hysterically begged for his life. But the Union's hard-line tactics collapsed when Mosby began (albeit reluctantly) hanging prisoners in retaliation.

Three times, Mosby was wounded; once, he was given up for dead—Union newspapers even carried his obituary. But by April 1865, Mosby was still very much back in action; he had already provided Lee with valuable information, had been honored by the Confederate Congress, and had become a constant irritant in draining Union strength and confounding its campaign strategies. Yet Mosby was hardly the only guerrilla who inspired such Northern outrage—and was ready and waiting to be tapped by Lee. The hard-bitten cavalryman Nathan Bedford Forrest had pummeled the Yanks so many times that he was known as “the Wizard of the Saddle.” An enraged Sherman, who tangled with Forrest far too many times for his own taste, once called him “the most remarkable man our Civil War produced on either side.” Sherman later ordered an expedition to hunt Forrest down, “to the death, if it costs 10,000 lives and bankrupts the treasury.” Now Forrest and his men were still at large. Another dreaded guerrilla and a model to many was John Hunt Morgan, a flamboyant thirty-six-year-old Kentuckian, whose manner joined the spirit of Mosby and the killer instinct of Forrest. Well-groomed and genteel, the laconic Morgan unleashed his self-raised brigade of sturdy, nimble Kentuckians early in the war, first making a name for himself in July 1862 with a stunning 1,000-mile raid in twenty-four days through Kentucky and middle Tennessee that netted him 1,200 prisoners and stockloads of supplies in the tons. Morgan made life a festering hell for his enemies. In August, he turned up again in Tennessee, blocking the railroad to Nashville by pushing flaming boxcars into an 800-foot tunnel, causing the tunnel to collapse. As part of an overall guerrilla force of 2,500 rangers, Morgan helped pin down an advancing Federal army of over 40,000 men, by fading in and out of familiar hills and a friendly population, brilliantly burning, destroying, tapping and tearing down telegraph wires, and then retreating back into the mountains. As Sherman

observed, "every house is a nest of secret . . . enemies." Later, Morgan was captured and imprisoned in an Ohio penitentiary, only to make a spectacular tunnel escape. Eventually, he was killed in 1864, but this hardly ended the North's woes. By 1865, partisans swarmed across the Confederacy like locusts in ancient Egypt.

But if ever there was a question about the Confederacy's ability to wage guerrilla war in April 1865, or the likely consequences of such a nationwide conflict, it was answered by the mere mention of one word: Missouri.

\* \* \*

Throughout the Civil War, Missouri was labeled "the war of 10,000 nasty little incidents," but it was much more than that. On one level, it was the very embodiment of the Civil War itself: a conflict-ridden slave state that didn't secede, a state deeply divided in loyalties, a state with an ill-formed identity. On yet another level, as it descended into full-scale guerrilla war, Missouri became a very different creature altogether, less a reflection of what the Civil War was and more a mirror for what the Civil War could become. It became a killing field.

Missouri also produced the most bloodthirsty guerrillas of the war. Topping the list was William Clarke Quantrill, a handsome, blue-eyed, twenty-four-year-old former Ohio schoolteacher. A close second was Bloody Bill Anderson, whose father was murdered by Unionists and whose sister was killed in a Kansas City Union prison disaster. Among their disciples included young men destined for later notoriety: Frank and Jesse James, and Coleman Younger. And there were countless other lesser but no less notorious lights.

In early 1862, Quantrill and his band of bushwhackers launched a series of strikes into Kansas that all but paralyzed the state. Then, in 1863, the revenge-minded Quantrill set his sights on a new target: Lawrence, Kansas. One would be hard-pressed to find a place more thoroughly despised by Quantrill and his comrades than Lawrence. It functioned as a Free-Soil citadel during the 1850s, then as a haven for runaway slaves, and, during the war, as a headquarters to the Redlegs, a band of hated Unionist guerrillas. Early in the morning of August 21, Quantrill and his

29  
July 24, 2003

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Personnel

George Tenet seems cool to Mike DeLong. He is looking for an operator to replace Soup Campbell. He is going to send us a job spec.

He has no person in mind yet for (b)(3):50 U.S.C. § 421.(b)(6) replacement. We both agree it should be someone you can work with.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
072403-40

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

U20962 /03

29  
July 24, 2003

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Stipulations

*OB*  
*10/15*

I think we ought to put some stipulations on Syria and/or Lebanon before we allow U.S. taxpayers' dollars to keep going to Lebanon.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
072403-41

.....  
Please respond by 8/8/03

U20963 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18641

29  
July 24, 2003

TO: Gen. Jones  
CC: Gen. Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Communications

I talked to George Tenet about the disconnect you feel with the Agency. He is going to give you a call.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
072403-42



*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

U20964 103

03  
9.20

July <sup>29</sup> 24, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: DPB Briefing

I mentioned the possibility of the Agency briefing the Defense Policy Board on their lessons learned.

Thanks.

DHR:db  
072403-44

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

U20965 /03

29  
July 24, 2003

OB  
10/15

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA  
SUBJECT: Rewards

I would like a report on all the rewards that have been paid by State, CIA and DoD since 9/11. Then I think we ought to get a monthly report.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
072403-45

.....  
Please respond by 8/8/03

U20967 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18644

29  
July 24, 2003

TO: Jim Haynes  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Release of Prisoners

Jerry Bremer mentioned to me that he was wondering if I should delegate to him the authority to release non-Iraqis. He said there are three Palestinians that they want to release, and it takes forever to work it through our system.

Please look into it, find out why it takes so long and advise me.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
072403-46

.....  
Please respond by 8/8/03

*OS*  
*10.30*

U20968 /03

July <sup>29</sup>~~24~~, 2003

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Informant(s)

The worst thing that could happen in relation to the individual or individuals who provided information on the location of Qusay and Uday is if those individuals don't get paid, go public and complain; or if they get killed. It would ruin anyone else's incentive to come in and get a reward.

Someone has to get his arms around this and see that the people who turned those guys in are properly handled—so that they don't get ticked off, don't say they are not getting paid, don't get mad, and don't get killed.

I would like you to get involved in that and let me know.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
072403-47

.....  
Please respond by 8/1/03

*✓ 8/11*

*8/11*

*Sir,  
Response Attached.  
V/V  
CDR Nosunzo  
8/11*

U20969 103

29  
July 24, 2003

TO: Gen. Dunn  
CC: Gen. Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Scarlet Shield

Thanks for your feedback on the Scarlet Shield exercise. It is helpful.

DHR:dh  
072403-1

.....

Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

U20970 /03

29  
July 24, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Victor Westphall

What should we do about the death of Victor Westphall? I certainly should write a letter to somebody.

Thanks.

Attach.  (b)(6) 7/23/03 fax to SecDef

DHR:dh  
072403-2

.....  
Please respond by 8/1/03

U20971 /03

**LAW OFFICE**

(b)(6)

**TAOS, NEW MEXICO 87571**

**Phone:** (b)(6)

**Fax:** (b)(6)

**FACSIMILE TRANSMITTAL MEMORANDUM**

**DATE: JULY 23, 2003**

---

**TO: Donald H. Rumsfeld**

**FAX NO: (b)(6)**

**RE: Victor Westphall (Vietnam Veterans' Memorial)**

---

**Hi Don,**

**Victor Westphall, founder of the Vietnam Veterans' Memorial near Angel Fire, died yesterday. He dedicated the memorial to this proposition:**

**If those who died can, in any measure, become a symbol that will arouse all mankind and bring out a rejection of the principles that defile, debase, and destroy the youth of this world, perhaps they will not have died in vain.**

**Victor was one of the true great heroes of the Vietnam War. He was idolized by hundreds of thousands of Vietnam veterans, especially those who were in combat.**

(b)(6)

29  
July 24, 2003

TO: Jerry Bremer  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Steve Hanke

is the widow of my very close friend,  who died recently. You may recall he was Deputy Secretary of the Treasury.

She gave me this note and says that Steve Hanke would very much like to go to Iraq. He did banking and economic reform in Montenegro and Estonia.

There's another name for your list.

Thanks.

Attach.   
WSJ article and note from

DHR:dh  
072403-3

.....

Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

U20972 /03

STEVE HAUKE



AUGUST.....

AUTHOR OF  
THIS ARTICLE  
PARTNER OF  
JONATHAN  
ARNOLD

---

HANKE  
DID BANKING  
& ECONOMIC  
REFORM  
IN  
MONTENEGRO

+  
ESTONIA

WOULD GO  
TO IRAQ  
MZR


 FORMAT FOR  
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 sponsored by
 

July 21, 2003 1:16 a.m. EDT

## COMMENTARY

## Dinar Plans

By STEVE H. HANKE

Millions of fresh dinars, graced with the visage of Saddam Hussein, recently began rolling off Iraq's printing presses at the behest of the Coalition Provisional Authority. This inspired about as much confidence and unity as the Allies would have garnered with the introduction of Mussolini lire and Hitler marks after World War II.

To belatedly correct this maladroit decision, L. Paul Bremer, head of the provisional authority, announced on July 7 that new Iraqi dinars will be introduced over a three-month period starting in October. These will replace both the Saddam dinars and the "Swiss" dinars that circulate in Iraq's Kurdish areas. And to reinforce its adeptness, the provisional authority has handed the banknote-printing contract (awarded without competitive bid, as it were) to a company with a subsidiary that, on July 9, became the subject of a price-fixing investigation by the Justice Department.

Mr. Bremer has now declared that an independent central bank will govern the emission of new dinars. This seems like an unattainable objective. We should not hold our collective breath anticipating a Bundesbank clone to be plopped down in Baghdad.

\* \* \*

What are the chances that an "independent" Iraqi central bank will be able to restore confidence and pursue the sole objective of price stability without government interference? Simply put, no central bank can be independent without a strong dose of fiscal control. After all, any budget deficit that cannot be financed in domestic or foreign debt markets will have to be financed by money creation. This is the inflation tax at work. If Iraq is going to resist the inflation tax (which is, incidentally, the easiest tax to collect when the legal and fiscal infrastructure is nonexistent or flimsy), the transitional administration needs to produce an iron-clad budget.

The prospects for such a budget are dim, however. On the revenue side, the administration plans to rely on oil revenues. Never mind the investments and repairs needed to activate the oil fields fully, as well as theft, smuggling and sabotage. Opportunities for spreading the tax base are few, as little productive activity survives, and resources are not in place to administer income or excise taxes. And there are so far no privatizations in the works.

On the expenditure side, the administration will need to confront a number of demons. Besides paying for reconstruction -- no easy task -- the transitional administration will have to unwind the institutions of a command economy. It will inherit bankrupt state-owned enterprises. The banking sector will have to be recapitalized and revamped to operate in a market economy. A decision must be made on whether outstanding debt from the Hussein regime will be serviced. And all of this is not to mention the growing wish list cobbled together by Washington, including massive health-care spending, investment in educational facilities, and the construction of that great open-ended contingency and hallmark of Western welfare states, the "social safety net." The gap between potential revenues and planned expenditures will be large. The relatively large primary deficit in the interim budget is already scheduled to be financed by printing money.

Even if the fiscal management in Iraq is exemplary, the idea of an independent, Bundesbank-style Iraqi central bank is nearly laughable. Indeed, the language being used to describe the future operations of the central bank gives a false air of sophistication to what will be a primitive affair. Interventions in the foreign-exchange market will not take place at a Reuters terminal, but in the open outcry of the bazaar, where traders will have to be coerced in some way to buy and sell at the desired exchange rate. The interbank market -- an indispensable institution for directing the course of interest rates and the availability of liquidity -- will probably consist of several trucks plodding through the desert laden with banknotes and paperwork. Money markets -- in which short-term paper is traded, and where central banks buy and sell bonds when conducting open market operations -- will again be more like the bazaar than Lombard Street, if they exist at all. The Iraqi central bank can also forget about such modern conveniences as real-time gross settlement, indirect instruments of monetary policy, and any close supervision of the banking system.

In short, the transitional administration wants to erect some huge central-banking edifice, but no scaffolding is to be found. The British were at least competent enough to point out the legal and economic prerequisites of central banking when that idea first came to the region. Then, as now, those prerequisites are absent in Iraq. But the coalition authority hasn't the slightest appreciation of the technical

issues it's blundered into.

A successful currency-reform plan must be well-crafted and informed by Iraq's history. In the past, Iraq has had success with "dollarization" and a currency board. From 1916 to 1932, Iraq used the Indian rupee, which was linked to sterling, as its official currency. When Iraq became independent in 1932, the Iraq Currency Board was opened. It issued a convertible Iraqi dinar at par with the British pound, backing the dinar fully with pound reserves. Until the central bank commenced operations in 1949, the currency board operated without problems.

A currency reform for Iraq must not include a central bank, even one that is nominally independent. Iraq's history suggests two alternatives would be superior to a central bank. It could return to a currency-board system governed by a foreign national. Ideally, legislation for an Iraqi currency board would follow the model of the classic British currency boards. Bosnia and Herzegovina's currency board, which was mandated by the Dayton/Paris Treaty of 1995, is a close approximation of such an orthodox system. Indeed, the quick execution of the legislation for Bosnia's currency board is a testament to the technical expertise of the Treasury under Robert Rubin and Lawrence Summers. The system inspired confidence, was a cohesive force in unifying a country ravaged by civil war and has produced sound money.

It could also "dollarize" by replacing the dinar with the euro (or the greenback). The euro has international acceptance, and neither the U.S. nor Britain uses it, which may be something of a political advantage in the current context. Several other countries have replaced their local currency with a foreign currency in the last few years, including Ecuador, El Salvador, and East Timor (which use the dollar), and Montenegro and Kosovo (which use the euro). No significant technical obstacles stand in the way of making the euro Iraq's official currency. If the transitional administration is going to switch currencies, why not upgrade to one that's worth using?

*Mr. Hanke, a professor of Applied Economics at Johns Hopkins, is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute.*

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<http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB105875272615912100,00.html>

*Updated July 21, 2003 1:16 a.m.*

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29  
July 24, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Rich Haver

Please get a good letter drafted for Rich Haver, and let's get him an award for sure. Make sure he is invited to my party on August 16.

Thanks.

Attach.  
7/22/03 Haver ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh  
072403-4

.....

Please respond by 8/1/03

*Done 8/5*

U20975 /03

128  
1250

Larry Di Rita  
7/23


(b)(6)

July 22, 2003

Secretary of Defense  
Pentagon  
Washington, DC

Dear Mr. Rumsfeld:

It has been my high honor and privilege to serve you as Special Assistant for Intelligence during the past two years. It is now time to resume my private industry career. I would like to terminate government service effective at the end of the current pay period on July 26, 2003. There is no higher calling than serving the nation and Department of Defense so if there is a need for me in the future I stand ready to serve. Thank you for the opportunity assist you and the Administration of President Bush.

Sincerely  
  
Richard L. Haver

29  
July 24, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
CC: Col. Bucci  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Meeting w/Thiessen, etc.

Please schedule a meeting with Marc Thiessen, you, me and (b)(6)

(b)(6) should have with her the files she is keeping for me, so I can see what the categories are. Thiessen will have his suggested categories or baskets. Then we can get the filing system redone to fit the new baskets and keep it that way.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
072403-5



*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

U20974 /03

29  
July 24, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Interns

I think we ought to invite some Congressional interns and Executive branch interns down here for the Pentagon tour.

I think I ought to meet with the DoD interns sometime and let them ask questions.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
072403-7

.....  
Please respond by 8/1/03

U20976 /03

29  
July 24, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Press About Foreign Troops

I think we ought to constantly be playing up the foreign troops in the country. That is to say, we ought to figure out ways to get press in the United States for the Spanish troops coming in. I read there are 1500 of them or something—the battalion of carabinieri and all these other countries.

We ought to show photos of them and create the awareness in this country of the fact that it has been internationalized.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
072403.9

.....  
Please respond by 8/8/03

U20977 103

11-L-0559/OSD/18658

<sup>29</sup>  
July 24, 2003

CAF Box  
9/19

TO: Marc Thiessen  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Material to Remind

Do you think it would be useful to pick out some things I said in January, February, March, April, May, June and July—where we said what was going to happen, what we knew and what we didn't know.

We could reset this thing by reminding people with a couple of sentences what the gravamen was of what we were saying during that period.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
072403-10



Please respond by 8/1/03

U20978 103

29  
July 24, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Eileen O'Connor

Please make sure you have Mary Matalin, Karen Hughes and Torie Clarke tell us what they think of Eileen O'Connor.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
072403-12

.....

Please respond by 8/1/03

U20979 /03

Done 8/6

29  
July 24, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Bill O'Reilly

Please look at O'Reilly from 8:10 p.m. Wednesday night and listen to what he said about Rumsfeld and what we said.

Then get some of the statements compiled as to what we actually have said, show them to me, and then let's send them to him.

We repeatedly said we didn't know the cost, the length and the number of people who would be killed. He is saying we underestimated. How can you underestimate if you don't estimate? We knew we didn't know. We were criticized for not knowing. How can you be criticized for not knowing and then criticized for underestimating?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
072403-14

.....

Please respond by 8/1/03

U20980 /03

29  
July 24, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Bing West

I just read Bing West's piece in the *Wall Street Journal* on June 28. What do you think about adding Bing West to our list of people to go to Baghdad. He is a smart fellow.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
072403-15

.....  
Please respond by 8/1/03

U20981 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18662

DONE

July 30, 2003

*Advance call  
12/30/03 sent  
sked for 12/30/03*

TO: Col. Bucci  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Call w/Roche

Please make sure I have a phone call with Jim Roche. I want to talk to him personally about Montelongo.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
073003-11



Please respond by 7/30/03

U20982 /03

July 30, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
LTG Craddock

CC: Col. Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Next Defense Policy Board Meeting

The next time there is a Policy Board meeting, I would like to have some free time so I can see some of the members individually. I would like to attend their lunch on one of the days they are here, and I would like some free time at the end to shake hands with them.

It was just not good the way it worked yesterday.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
073003-13

.....

Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*✓ TEN 9/3*

U20985 /03

July 30, 2003

TO: Col. Bucci  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Information

✓ delivered 0725

Please give me USNATO 832 and also the Colin Powell fax to me about the report on George Robertson's meeting in Iceland.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
073003-1

.....

Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

✓ 7/31

Sir,  
US NATO 832 attached.  
v/r  
CDR Nosenzo

U20984 /03

HOT

cc Dr Feith, JSD  
EF-6364  
July 31, 2003 03/01/0727

TO: Doug Feith  
CC: JAYMIE DURVAN  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld D.R.

ADVANCE  
COPY 1145

SUBJECT: State Department Volunteers

Please get back to me today on this issue of 201 State Department volunteers stacked up in Baghdad, twenty percent of whom are fluent in Arabic. According to Colin Powell, they have been waiting one and a half months to get validated to help out.

What is the issue?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
073103-14


.....  
Please respond by 7/31/03

U20985 /03

*File*

July 31, 2003

TO: Secretary of Defense

THROUGH: Jaymie Durnan 

FROM: Fred Smith, Office of the CPA Representative

CC: Deputy Secretary of Defense  
Ambassador Bremer  
Ambassador Kennedy  
Larry DiRita

SUBJECT: Department of State Personnel for Iraq

I understand that Secretary Powell raised the issue of 200+ State personnel ready to go to Iraq, but there is a problem with DoD. The CPA has only 33 State billets identified, and we, working closely with State, have identified 27 of the 33 people needed in Baghdad.

The facts of this situation are:

Several weeks ago State canvassed all its personnel asking who would be interested in serving in Iraq for a temporary assignment. State received approximately 230 responses (according to State, it turns out that some of these people are not truly interested, not available until next year, or not cleared for medical reasons). State is working off that list to find people to fill 33 positions identified by the CPA. Twenty-seven people, to date, have been identified by name by State to fill those positions. Several of those people are already in Baghdad, many are en route, and the rest are being processed (several people are not available to deploy until September, October, or November). We are working closely with State every day/every hour to process all the people. Pat Kennedy, Jerry Bremer's Chief of Staff and a Foreign Service Officer, spent a full day at State last week working on this issue.

Talking points you may wish to sue in a conversation with Secretary Powell:

- Defense (Fred Smith) is working closely with State (NEA, Kathleen Austin-Ferguson) on this issue.
- The CPA has validated a requirement for 33 State people to work in the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Governance.

11-L-0559/OSD/18667

- We have already moved, or are processing, 27 people to fill those positions.
- One limiting factor in Baghdad is living space to put these people—there's a waiting list of 300 people for the Al Rasheed Hotel; 200 people are sleeping on cots in the hotel ballroom. We are working to resolve this problem.
- We greatly appreciate State's support. In fact, we will try to use as many State people as possible to fill positions identified in other ministries.

July 31, 2003

TO: Paul Bremer

CC: Doug Feith  
Paul Wolfowitz  
LTG Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Reuben Jeffrey

I got your message of July 30 on Reuben. It looks reasonable to me. We'll set it up that way.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
073103-13

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*dh*

*Provided for information and retention only.*

*FYI*

*✓ 8/4*

*CC NESIT*

*8/3/03*

*→ SD*

*I raised with Hadley the issue of Jeffrey's attending Deputies Committee meetings and Hadley said "OK."*

*Doug Feith*

U20986 /03

✓  
7/31

30 July 2003

MEMO FOR: Secretary Rumsfeld  
FROM: Paul Bremer  
SUBJECT: CPA/Washington

On the way back I thought about the office of CPA/Washington that is being set up to support our efforts in Iraq. It will be especially important to Reuben's success that he have the right access to you and that he be seen to have that access. I do not mean that he take your time everyday, except to attend your round table in the mornings. But it will be important, I believe, that it is understood that he reports directly to you. As Paul agreed, he must also attend all meetings on Iraq of the Deputies Committee.

It would be helpful in cutting through the bureaucratic fog that may envelope this straightforward but important decision if you would indicate your desire that Reuben report to you and that his title should be The Director, Washington Office, CPA.



11-L-0559/OSD/18670

July 31, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
CC: Col. Bucci  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Cancelled Program

I want to get knowledgeable on the DARPA program we canceled, so I can characterize it accurately. Please set up a briefing.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
073103-10

.....  
Please respond by 8/7/03

U20987 /03

July 31, 2003

TO: Honorable Tom Ridge  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Briefing Senators

During a briefing to the Members of the Senate, I was confronted by Senators Dianne Feinstein, Barbara Boxer and Hillary Clinton. They are determined to have something done to protect their people. The new threat information that Senator Feinstein received is what led to their concern.

You might want to have someone brief them on what your folks are doing.

DHR:dh  
073103-8

U20988 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18672

July 31, 2003

TO: Mary Claire Murphy  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: More for Barbecue

*Alert  
to MCM*

Please invite the following people (and spouses) to the August 16 barbecue:

Andy Hoehn  
Jim Thomas  
Gen. Boykin (works for Steve Cambone)  
Ken Krieg  
The people who designed the memorial (Joyce talked to Mary Claire about it)  
Vin Webber

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
073103-3

.....  
*Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_*

U20989 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18673

Aug 4  
~~July 31~~, 2003

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith  
Peter Rodman

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Regional Centers

I want to get engaged in these regional centers and who goes in them. I am uncomfortable with the way we are doing it and what has been done so far.

I would like to see a proposal as to how we are going to proceed and what the criteria are. I don't want anything to just happen without my engaging it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
073103-15

.....  
Please respond by 8/22/03

U20990 /03

Aug 1  
July 30, 2003

TO: LTG Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: NSC

*to Warren copy sent*

For the NSC meeting on Friday on Iraq, why don't we just give them an update on reconstruction, some of the good and bad things that are happening, a good briefing on the military raids and what the strategy is on mid-level Baathists.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
073003-14



Please respond by 7/31/03

*Done 8/11  
SMA*

U20991 /03

Amr  
July 30, 2003

TO: LTG Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld ~~WA~~  
SUBJECT: Arabic Speakers

I need the details on the information Charlie Abell gave me on Arabic speakers, as I have requested, separated out.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
073003-16

.....  
Please respond by 8/8/03

Done  
8/11

U20992 /03

Aug 1  
July 30, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Meetings w/Dolan and Kellems

In the future, if I am going to meet with Dolan and Kellems, you should be in the room. I didn't understand some of what was said.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
073003-17

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

U20993 /03

Aug 1  
~~July 30~~, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita  
LTG Craddock

CC: Col. Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: POTUS Press Conferences

Presidential press conferences should be put on my calendar, and to the extent I am able, I should try to watch them.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
073003-18

.....

Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

TEN ✓ 9/3

U20994 /03

L-051010/31  
EF-6388  
C84  
Add 1  
July 30, 2003

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Offer Role to NATO

My instinct is to think about proposing the peacemaking/peacekeeping idea to NATO to become the sponsor, and be ready to do it ourselves if they won't do it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
073003-20



Please respond by 8/2/03

*✓ 8/4*

→ SD 8/3/03

As we discussed, we've incorporated this idea in our briefing for the President on the peacekeeping initiative.

*Doug Feith*

U20995 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18679

*8/4*

Aug 1  
~~July 30, 2003~~

TO: Larry Di Rita  
LTG Craddock

CC: Col. Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Republican Convention

I am pretty sure I will be going to the Republican Convention next year. I talked to Andy Card about it today, and he thinks it is likely, so let's just leave it on the calendar.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
073003-21

.....

Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*Done 8/5*

U20997 /03

Aug 1  
July 30, 2003

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *TR*  
SUBJECT: NATO and CPA

Attached is a copy of a note from Paul Bremer. It proposes that we take some action with respect to NATO. What is the status on that?

Thanks.

Attach.  
7/30/03 Bremer memo to SecDef re: CPA Issues

DHR:llh  
073003-4

.....  
Please respond by 8/8/03

U20998 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18681

✓  
1/30

30 July 2003

**MEMORANDUM**

TO: Secretary Rumsfeld  
FROM: L. Paul Bremer, III  
RE: CPA Issues

**MEK**

- Need to resolve broader strategy as soon as possible.

**NATO**

- Should we consider issuing invitation to NATO to 1) establish small presence in Iraq of commanders/ advisors or 2) make a statement in support of international troop contributions?
- Endorsement, even in the absence of large troop deployment, could help provide political cover to member countries.

**IRAQI GOVERNANCE COUNCIL**

- GC elected a new nine-member leadership body to chair the Council on a rotational basis.
- Nine members elected were Ja'afari; Chalabi; Allawi; Talabani; Hakim; Pachachi; Hamid; Bahr al-Uloum; Barzani.

11-L-0559/OSD/18682

Aug 1  
~~July 30, 2003~~

*sent via  
e-mail*

TO: Mary Claire Murphy  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Invitation

Please invite Asa Hutchinson to the August 16 barbecue. He is the Under Secretary for Border & Transportation Security at the Department of Homeland Security.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
073003-5



Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

U20999 /03

Aug 1  
~~July 30, 2003~~

TO: LTG Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Foreign Trips

Please make sure the October calendar is changed so it shows we are going to Japan first. I think it would be terrible to go to Korea first.

For December's calendar I may very well end up in Liberia after Algeria.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
073003-9

.....

Please respond by 8/8/03

*✓ 8/14*

*8/2*

*Sec Def*

- We are reworking the Far East trip to put Japan first - no problem.
- I have already passed on the African "possibilities" after the NATO Ministerial in December.

*C* U21000 /03

Aug 1  
July 30, 2003

TO: ~~LTC Craddock~~ *Larry D. Rite*  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Letter to USO

I probably ought to send a letter to the head of the USO every couple of years thanking them for all they do for the troops. Why don't you have someone draft one up for me.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
073003-8

.....

Please respond by 8/15/03

U21001 /03

Aug 1  
July 30, 2003

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Personnel

I know you are interested in personnel, as you should be. We have a growing number of spots to fill. To do so in the time available, you and your office are going to have to respond promptly for scheduling.

We cannot delay in filling these posts. Please try to see them the day I see them.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
073003-10

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

U21002 /03

June 9, 2003

TO: Gen. Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Finding Individuals

Would you please come back to me with a proposal as to how we could organize, train and equip the Department of Defense to find single individuals, like Usama Bin Laden, Saddam Hussein, etc.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
060903-22

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

*OB  
10/12*

U21005 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18687

July 8, 2003

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Iraqi Envoys at UN

Please take a look at this article about the UN. Is that true? If so, what do we do about it?

Thanks.

Attach.

Stogel, Stewart and Behn, Sharon. "Saddam's Low-Level Envoys Still Work at U.N.," *Washington Times*, July 3, 2003, p. 15.

DHR:dh  
070803-18

.....  
Please respond by 7/18/03

U21007 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18688

Washington Times  
July 3, 2003  
Pg. 15

## Saddam's Low-Level Envoys Still Work At U.N.

By Stewart Stogel and Sharon Behn, The Washington Times

NEW YORK — Saddam Hussein might be gone, but his diplomats are still in their U.N. offices, supported by Saddam holdovers working in the Iraqi Foreign Ministry.

"They are civil servants, they serve Iraq, they can stay as long as they want," said Akila Al Hashimi, acting deputy director-general of the Iraqi Foreign Ministry under the U.S.-led Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) that runs Iraq.

Ms. Al Hashimi, who served in Saddam's ousted regime and who four months ago warned Third World countries that the American war machine would roll over them after invading Iraq, was hand-picked by the provisional authority to represent her country at a recent U.N.-sponsored donors conference.

Iraq, she said, was ready to "participate in the international community."

"It needs the joint efforts of all parties. It needs to hold hands with others so that it can meet its reconstruction needs, strengthen its economy and its abilities in accordance with contemporary international norms," she said last week.

But at least one senior member of the provisional authority was not pleased with Saddam's diplomats still working at the United Nations in New York as well as the U.N. European offices in Geneva and Vienna, Austria.

"They do not belong there," said the senior member, speaking on condition of anonymity. "They represent no one. They are doing nothing. We will ask countries in which they operate to send them home."

U.N. spokesman Farhan Haq said the diplomats in New York, Geneva and Vienna could remain in their posts until they were replaced. "Until someone challenges the credentials in the General Assembly, they can still maintain them," Mr. Haq said.

The U.N. General Assembly has a credentials committee that addresses challenges, then refers its decision to the full assembly. A simple majority vote is then needed for any formal action.

When diplomats are sent to the United Nations they are given credentials by the General Assembly and granted diplomatic status by the United States as host government.

So far, no one — neither the United Nations nor the United States — has challenged the status of the Iraqi diplomats.

"It's obviously a little surreal," said one U.N. official, but spokesman Stephane Dujarric said it was not the first time that representation at the United Nations did not reflect the facts on the ground.

The latest example of that, he said, was Afghanistan, which during the Taliban regime years actually was represented by the dissident Northern Alliance while the Taliban had unofficial representatives based in the New York City borough of Queens.

"They obviously have not been asked to address any meetings," Mr. Dujarric said of the four or five Iraqi diplomats left at the United Nations.

Iraqi Ambassador Mohammed al-Douri and his deputy left of their own accord shortly after the war began.

A number of other Iraqi diplomats at the United Nations were expelled by the United States prior to the conflict.

Reached by telephone, an Iraqi representative at the U.N. mission declined to comment.

According to a U.S. official, the Iraqi diplomats who have remained are lower-level administrative staff who have already been vetted by U.S. security.

"There are no concerns about these," he said, adding that the diplomats' role in the world organization was minimal. "They are not on the radar screen of countries that need to be wooed."

Richard A. Grenell, a spokesman for the U.S. mission to the United Nations, confirmed that none of the delegates is a security concern.

"We will make sure that no one visiting the country is abusing their privilege of residence," he said. "Our national security is obviously the priority."

The U.S. official, who asked not to be identified, said the diplomats were likely being paid from a large account of the Iraqi mission that was frozen soon after the war started so that it would not be used by those diplomats wanting to flee the country.

"That money will continue there until an Iraqi government is established and they appoint a new ambassador. It could be a while," he said.

December 17, 2003

TO: Gen. John Handy  
CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Distribution in DoD

Thanks so much for your note of December 1. It sounds to me as though you're hard at it.

With my best wishes for the **Holiday Season**,

DHR:dh  
121703-3

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*TRANSCOM*

*17 Dec 03*

U21008 /03

(b)(6)

*Handwritten:* ✓  
12/16  
M17



**UNITED STATES TRANSPORTATION COMMAND**

508 SCOTT DRIVE  
SCOTT AIR FORCE BASE, ILLINOIS 62225-5357

1 December 2003

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
1000 Defense Pentagon  
Washington DC 20301-1000

Dear Mr. Secretary

I submitted the draft Distribution Process Owner Charter on 15 October 2003, as you requested. The intent of the Charter is to produce a clean, simple, and surgical approach to improving distribution, and these values are reflected in the draft.

While the Charter is in coordination, we are executing an aggressive campaign plan to improve distribution in the Department of Defense (DOD). Since we submitted the Charter, we have developed our top 10 distribution improvement priorities, discussed them with all the Combatant Commanders, and are aggressively tackling every one of these challenges. Key among these is the creation of a deployable and tailorable Deployment and Distribution Operations Center (DDOC), a joint effort to nest a multi-modal, lethal, and trained distribution command and control structure into a theater of operations. This DDOC initiative will enable us to synchronize cargo and personnel movement in the theater, dramatically improving support to the warfighter. With the approval and coordination of CENTCOM, we plan to test the concept in the Southwest Asia theater no later than the spring of 2004, with the ultimate goal of deploying this capability into every theater.

I truly appreciate the confidence you placed in the United States Transportation Command with this DOD Distribution Process Owner designation, and we will deliver improvements in rapid order.

Very respectfully

JOHN W. HANDY  
General, USAF  
Commander

cc:  
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff  
USD AT&L

Printed on recycled paper



December 17, 2003

580

TO: ADM Jim Ellis  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Log Book

Here is the evidence of your father's brilliance, good judgment and insight by giving me up-checks on my two check flights, C11 and C18.

Have a wonderful holiday!

Attach.  
March 1955 log book entries

DHR:dh  
121703-6

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

17 Dec 03





8:19 AM

TO: Gen. John Abizaid  
CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: December 19, 2003  
SUBJECT: **Sunni Engagement**

Do you know anything about this former general on Sunni Engagement? Is he someone we ought to be doing something with?

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
121903.06

*Attach: Unclas HQ CPA 0389 Cable Re: Sunni Engagement*

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_

*1/8/04*

*Iraq*

*19 Dec 03 -*

**U21055 / 03**

11-L-0559/OSD/18696

C12/17

QAAUZYUW RUEOMFE5893 3511221-UUUU--RUEKNMA.  
ZNR UUUUU ZUI RUEOMCE0010 3511222  
O 171210Z DEC 03  
FM HQ COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTH BAGHDAD  
TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC  
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC  
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC  
INFO IRAQ COLLECTIVE



UNCLAS HQ CPA 0389

E.O.: 12958: N/A  
TAGS: PGOV, IZ

SUBJECT: SUNNI ENGAGEMENT: A CONVERSATION WITH A FORMER GENERAL -  
"WHO REPRESENTS ME?"

1. (SBU) SUMMARY. CPA TEAM MOSUL MET RECENTLY MAJOR GENERAL ABDULRAZAQ SULTAN AL JIBURI, A GENERAL WHO WAS EXILED FROM IRAQ FOR TWELVE YEARS FOR REFUSING SADDAM'S ORDER TO KILL SHIA IN KARBALA IN 1991. THIS OPEN-MINDED YET SELF-PROMOTING GENERAL IS WORKING TO LAUNCH A COUNCIL THAT WILL REPRESENT ALL JIBURI TRIBE MEMBERS IN IRAQ. HE REPORTS THAT THE PURPOSE OF THE COUNCIL IS TO PREPARE THE JIBUR FOR THE 2005 ELECTIONS AND TO INSURE THEIR PROPER REPRESENTATION IN A NATIONAL GOVERNMENT. MOSUL, THE JIBURI TRIBE AND ARAB SUNNIS ARE ALL, ACCORDING TO ABDULRAZAQ, UNDERREPRESENTED IN BAGHDAD. HE CLAIMS IRAQIS HAVE LEARNED TO FOCUS ON THEIR SEPARATE TRIBAL, RELIGIOUS AND ETHNIC IDENTITIES BECAUSE "THE COALITION ITSELF CONCENTRATED ON THESE CATEGORIES AFTER LIBERATION."  
END SUMMARY.

UNITING THE JIBURS

2. (SBU) AFTER REFUSING SADDAM'S ORDER TO SHOOT SHIA IN KARBALA IN 1991, MAJOR GENERAL ABDULRAZAQ SULTAN AL JIBURI PLED IRAQ TO EUROPE AND THE U.S., FEARING RETALIATION FROM THE FORMER REGIME. HE PARTICIPATED FROM ABROAD IN A FAILED 1994 COUP ATTEMPT AGAINST SADDAM AND RETURNED TO IRAQ AFTER THE LIBERATION. CPA TEAM MOSUL MET WITH THE FORMER GENERAL ON DECEMBER 8.

3. (SBU) THE GENERAL HOPES TO LAUNCH A COUNCIL REPRESENTING THE JIBURI TRIBAL CONFEDERATION, CONSISTING OF FIFTY AFFILIATED TRIBES AND, ACCORDING TO HIM, 250 MEMBERS REPRESENTING 4 MILLION PEOPLE IN IRAQ. (NOTE: TRANSLITERATED ENGLISH VARIANTS OF THE TRIBE NAME INCLUDE JIBEUR, JABUR, JUBUR, AND JABBUR. END NOTE.) HE CLAIMS HE DOES NOT WEAR THE TRADITIONAL GARB OF A SHEIK BECAUSE HE WANTS THE

OSD - SECDEF CABLE DISTRIBUTION:

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USDP:   /   DIA:   /   OTHER:   /  CPA Team    
USDI:   /   PER SEC:   /   COMM:   /

COUNCIL TO BE COMPRISED OF THE "EDUCATED AND FORWARD THINKING," STAFFED BY TECHNOCRATS. THE GOAL OF THE COUNCIL IS TO HAVE ONE VOICE AND OPINION FOR THE JIBUR AND TO PREPARE THEM FOR THE UPCOMING NATIONAL ELECTIONS. ACCORDING TO THE GENERAL, THE JIBUR NEED TO FORM THIS COUNCIL BECAUSE CURRENTLY THE JIBUR, THE SUNNIS, AND THE PEOPLE OF MOSUL ARE NOT PROPERLY REPRESENTED IN BAGHDAD. GENERAL ABDULRAZAK PROUDLY CLAIMS THAT SUNNI ARE TWO-THIRDS OF THE POPULATION OF IRAQ AND SHIA ONLY ONE-THIRD. HE REVIEWED THE COMPOSITION OF THE GOVERNING COUNCIL AND NOTED THAT MOSUL'S SOLE REPRESENTATIVE WAS A SHEIKH FROM THE SHAMUR TRIBE, GHAZI MISHAL AJIL AL YAWAR AL SHAMMAR, WHO "HAD NOT DONE ANYTHING." GIVEN ALL THIS, HE ASKED, "WHO REPRESENTS ME?"

TRIBAL ALLEGIANCE CAUSED BY CPA

-----  
4. (SBU) THE GENERAL ALLEGES THAT SADDAM WAS AFRAID OF THE JIBUR AND TRIED TO DIVIDE THEM. ABDULRAZAK'S MOVEMENT AIMS TO UNITE THEM AND INSURE THEIR PROPER PARTICIPATION AND REPRESENTATION IN THE NEW IRAQ. HE INSISTS THAT THE JIBUR COUNCIL IS NOT MEANT TO DIVIDE THE COUNTRY BUT TO GUARANTEE THAT THE TRIBES HAVE SOME REPRESENTATION ON THE NATIONAL COUNCIL. "I WEAR MY TRIBAL IDENTITY BECAUSE I'M FORCED TO," HE SAID. HE CLAIMS HE WOULD HAVE PREFERRED FOR THE IRAQI GOVERNING COUNCIL (IGC) TO HAVE BEEN FORMED ON MERIT RATHER THAN "ETHNIC, RELIGIOUS, AND POLITICAL QUOTAS."

5. (SBU) "WE FOUGHT AGAINST SADDAM TOGETHER," SAID THE GENERAL, BUT THE IGC NOW "IGNORES" HIS WORK, AND THE INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS ARE PAROCHIAL IN THEIR OUTLOOK. THOUGH TRIBES ARE IMPORTANT NOW, HE DOES NOT PROMOTE DEPENDING ON THEM IN THE FUTURE BECAUSE "THEIR TIME IS OVER." IRAQ IS AT A TRANSITION POINT, AND THE TRIBES NEEDED TO BE EDUCATED ABOUT DEMOCRACY AND THE NEW SITUATION. HE ASSERTED THAT EITHER IRAQ MOVES FORWARD OR REVERTS TO THE FORMER REGIME. WHEN PRESSED TO NAME THE MOST RESPECTED JIBUR LEADER, THE GENERAL HESITATED TO NAME ANYONE OTHER THAN HIMSELF, BUT FINALLY OFFERED SHEIKH YUNUS ABDUL AZIZ ABDUL RAHMAN. FOR THE SHAMUR, HE MORE READILY OFFERED SHEIKH MUHSIN AGIEL.

APPEASE THE FORMER MILITARY

-----  
6. (SBU) GENERAL ABDULRAZAK SAID HE WAS SURPRISED WHEN THE ARMY, WHICH HE CLAIMED COULD HAVE BEEN CONTROLLED, WAS DISBANDED. HE DID NOT BLAME CPA FOR THE DECISION, BUT THE IGC, PARTICULARLY THE KURDISH AND SHIA LEADERS WHO HE ALLEGED HAD THEIR OWN AGENDAS - THE SHIA WERE LOYAL TO IRAN AND THE KURDS WANTED AN INDEPENDENT KURDISTAN. TO AMELIORATE THE CURRENT SITUATION, THE GENERAL RECOMMENDS THAT ANYONE WITH MORE THAN FIFTEEN YEARS MILITARY SERVICE BE GIVEN A PENSION, AND ANYONE WITH LESS THAN FIFTEEN YEARS BE GIVEN A ONE-TIME PAYMENT OF \$1000. HE MAINTAINED THERE WERE MORE THAN 2,000 GENERALS FROM THE FORMER REGIME IN NINAWA, AND WITHOUT SALARIES, THEY WOULD CAUSE PROBLEMS FOR COALITION FORCES.

COMMENT

\*\*\* UNCLASSIFIED \*\*\*  
\*\*\*\*\* This Message Has Been Altered \*\*\*\*\*

Page 3 of 3

7. (SBU) GENERAL ABDULRAZAK COULD BE AN IMPORTANT PLAYER - AT LEAST ON A REGIONAL LEVEL - IN FUTURE IRAQI POLITICS. HIS BELIEFS ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE GENERAL SUNNI ARAB DISCONTENT IN NINEWA AT A LACK OF NATIONAL REPRESENTATION. HOWEVER, THE JIBUR TRIBE DOES NOT CONSIDER HIM EITHER THEIR "LEADER" OR A TRUE SHEIKH.

8. (SBU) THE GENERAL'S EFFORTS AND THE JIBUR COUNCIL ANTICIPATE ANOTHER NEW TREND - THE RISE OF TRIBAL POLITICAL PARTIES. CPA MOSUL HAS BEEN INUNDATED OVER THE PAST WEEK WITH MEETING REQUESTS FROM VARIOUS TRIBAL LEADERS IN THE PROVINCE. EACH LEADER CRITICIZES THE CURRENT COMPOSITION OF THE IGC AND ASKS FOR SOME FORM OF EMPOWERMENT, AT LEAST WITHIN THE REGION. THE SAVVY LEADERS AMONG THE TRIBES ARTICULATE THE NEED FOR MORE NATIONAL REPRESENTATION; HOWEVER, THE MAJORITY SIMPLY WANTS GREATER RESPECT OR ECONOMIC GAIN WITHIN THEIR INDIVIDUAL REGIONS OF CONTROL.

BREMER  
0389

SECDEF V2

1

ACTION

(U)

INFO CHAIRS(\*) CHAIRS TESTBED(\*) SECDEF-C(1)  
SECDEF-C(\*) CBI-DASD-DCIO(\*) USDAT:STS(\*)  
ASD:PA-SMTP(\*) ESC-SMTP(\*) OSDONNIPRDA(\*)  
OSDONNIPRDA(\*)  
+JCP EMAIL CUSTOMER//CHAIRS//  
+USDP:ESC

TOTAL COPIES REQUIRED 1

#5893  
NNNN

\*\*\* UNCLASSIFIED \*\*\*

11-L-0559/OSD/18699

7

8:19 AM

TO: George Tenet  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *TR*  
DATE: December 19, 2003  
SUBJECT:

That draft I gave you should not be circulated around. It is the working paper that I have not given to anyone else, and it is still in it's discussion stage with Condi.

Thanks.

DHR/ozn  
120103.10

312

19 Dec 03

U21056 / 03



COMPTROLLER

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

SECRET

2003 DEC 19 01:51:23

INFO MEMO

December 19, 2003, 3:30 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim

SUBJECT: Weekly Report 12/19/03

- **FY 2005 Budget.** As you are aware, the Deputy and I met with the Budget Review Board. We are preparing the information you requested. Additionally, we have been meeting with the Services to address their major budget issues:

- The Air Force notes that the Joint Strike Fighter program is being significantly restructured. There are serious technical issues with the aircraft. The budget impact will be to delay procurement and increase research and development problems. The Navy and Air Force both agree that all the funding should stay in the program to address the developmental problems. The Air Force's budget complaint is with the military to civilian conversion effort. The Air Force asks to tailor the program to their needs while using the authorities the new National Security Personnel System provides. The Deputy found their approach to be acceptable. The Air Force continues to oppose accelerating (and adding money to) the Joint Unmanned Combat Air System (J-UCAS) and has serious concerns with the management of the Defense Health Program.

- The Navy's major concern is with the amount of offsets they must find to cover "must pay" bills and Departmental initiatives. The Navy must fund pay raises, health care cost growth and other mandatory bills. High priority Department-wide efforts include computer network defense, financial management improvement, information operations, domestic violence prevention initiatives, military/civilian conversion and other like programs. The Navy has a great deal of trouble reconciling their priorities with the Department's priorities.

- At this point there are no major Army issues.

We are near the end of preparing this budget. Once we have final resolution of the topline and the Services sort out the remainder of their bills, the budget will be ready to transmit to OMB. We are now turning our attention toward preparing you for the budget rollout on February 2.

- **Cooperation with Jordan.** I met with Jordan's Ambassador to the U.S., Karim Kawar, on December 18. I informed him that Jordan would soon receive the reimbursement for its military support in the war on terrorism. I also emphasized the importance of cooperating on the return of Iraqi frozen assets held in Jordanian banks. The Jordanian government has promised to transfer at least \$100 million in January.

11-L-0559/OSD/18701

U21057 / 03

- **Expansion of International Core Group on Iraq Reconstruction.** As reported previously, the Core Group has been expanded to include additional member nations, including Kuwait, UK, Canada, and South Korea, all who pledged at least \$150 million (USD) in grant assistance for Iraq during the Madrid Donors' Conference. Under discussion is whether Italy should be continued as a member of the expanded group once it relinquishes the EC presidency on January 1, 2004. We are pressing Italy to clarify its Madrid pledge to ensure it meets the criteria for the expanded Core Group.
- **Multi-Donor Trust Fund Facility for Iraq.** The United Nations Development Fund has announced that the International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq (IRFFI) is ready to receive contributions. Contributions are subject to a \$200,000 minimum.
- **CPA:** The sixth shipment of DFI funds arrived in Baghdad Saturday morning, December 13<sup>th</sup>. A total of \$1.5 billion in \$100 bills weighing 18 tons was shipped by C-17. The DFI cash will be used for Iraq ministries' budgets for the remainder of December and the month of January. The total DFI assets shipped from the New York account to the Baghdad account now total \$3,020,800,000.
- **DCAA.** Mr. Bill Reed, Director, Defense Contract Audit Agency reports:
  - On December 16, 2003, I briefed OMB staff members on the Halliburton, Kellogg, Brown & Root audit issues. Robin Cleveland asked for the briefing after last Thursday's DoD press briefing. OMB attendees were supportive of the Department's aggressive action to resolve these matters.
  - Later that same day, key DCAA personnel and I met with a KBR contingent led by Ed Lopez, Sr. Vice President, Government Operations. KBR agreed their business processes needed improvement and laid out several actions they are taking to add expert staff, field new systems, and reorganize to address DCAA concerns in a more timely fashion.
  - On December 17, 2003, Deputy Director Mike Thibault accompanied Dee Lee, PMO Procurement Chief, CPA, in briefings on Iraq contracting plans to House Government Reform and Senate Governmental Affairs Committee staff. While KBR was not the sole focus of the briefings, there was considerable interest and questions on DCAA's audit concerns.
- **COORDINATION: NONE**



SECRET  
 2003 DEC 19 11 5  
 UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
 1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
 WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100



INFO MEMO

COMPTROLLER

December 19, 2003, 10:00 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
 DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim 

SUBJECT: Increase in End Strength

- Members of Congress (135) are recommending that the Services' end strength levels be increased by 8 percent (TAB A).
- We estimate that the costs would be, at minimum, \$6.6 billion per year as follows:

	(\$ in Billions)	(End Strength)
Army	2.1	38,400
Navy	1.5	29,900
Marine Corp	0.6	14,000
Air Force	1.5	28,700
Def-Wide*	.9	-
Total DoD	6.6	111,000

\*Includes healthcare costs and Department of Defense Education Activity.

- This estimate assumes:
  - Growth is only in the Active Forces,
  - Growth is via accessions (rather than retention),
  - There is also 8 percent growth in issued equipment, readiness training, school house training, and recruiting.
- The estimate does not include cost that would be incurred for Family Housing/barracks, Defense Health or retirement costs.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Prepared By: John M. Evans, (b)(6)

U21058 /03

December 10, 2003

TO: David Chu  
Dov Zakheim  
Powell Moore

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Increase in End Strength

Apparently there are close to 100 Congressmen who have asked for an increase in end strength. I think they said 8 percent for all the Services, but someone ought to look at the proposal. We ought to find out what it is going to cost.

Please let me know.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
121003-3

.....  
Please respond by 1/9/04

11-L-0559/OSD/18704

**TAB**

**A**

Congress of the United States  
Washington, DC 20515

November 21, 2003

President George W. Bush  
The White House  
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue  
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President,

We are concerned that our Armed Forces are over-extended and that we are relying too heavily upon members of the Guard and Reserve in the continuing war on terrorism.

You will be making decisions over the coming months that will be reflected in your FY05 budget request to the Congress. We believe that we must significantly increase the number of people on active duty in the military and revise the missions given to the National Guard and Reserve during the up-coming budget year. We encourage you to incorporate proposals to address these challenges in your budget. Making these changes would be met with broad, bipartisan support in the Congress.

The operational tempo required to maintain forward-deployed forces in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Balkans, Korea, and elsewhere is unprecedented. Not since the Vietnam War has the U.S. Army had such a large fraction of its active-duty forces deployed.

While we understand that the administration will seek to reduce U.S. forces in Iraq as Iraqi security forces are trained, we must expect that the Iraq deployment will continue at substantial levels for a considerable time. Moreover, the war on terrorism is not a crisis for which the military can surge and then recover. This will be a lengthy war that will define entire careers. We must size and structure our forces to prevail over the long haul.

We are also concerned about the mix of Active, Reserve and Guard units needed to sustain the war on terrorism. We are asking more from our reservist citizen-soldiers than ever before. While they have served admirably, we believe that we need to review and adjust the missions and specialties in the reserve components so that we can protect the homeland and prevail against terrorists without over-reliance on citizen soldiers for long periods of time.

The men and women of our Guard and Reserve can and should be called upon to assist our country in times of crisis on a temporary basis. Many of the units currently serving in Iraq will have served for nearly 15 months, in some cases longer, by the time their tours are finished. When they come home, the nature of this war is such that they know they are quite likely to be called up again sometime in the near future.

FORN RELEASE ONLY

11-L-0559/OSD/18706

Mr. President, every day we read stories about the potential impending loss we could suffer to our Guard and Reserve forces if the current situation is not fixed. The Army Guard is not going to meet its recruitment targets this year. Many of us have served, currently serve or have family and personal friends that serve in the Guard and Reserve. All of us have constituents who serve. Unless these burdens are reduced we may find ourselves in the midst of a recruiting and retention crisis in the reserve components. We need to send a clear message in the coming budget to members of the Guard and Reserve that help is on the way.

Repeated, long-term deployments will clearly take a toll on spouses and children of our men and women in the military here at home. Military service always entails time away from home, but we think that the active services – and particularly the Army – must find a way to better balance the demands of overseas deployments with the needs of troops' families back home. Otherwise, we may face a mid-grade retention problem in the coming years that will be devastating to our forces.


We are particularly concerned about the size of the active duty Army. While we will certainly work with you and your administration, we feel that your budget should include a build up to two more combat divisions so that we can reduce the pressure on the reserve components and sustain the war on terrorism for the long term without losing expertise that will "hollow-out" the Army.

The size of the current Army—and the Army budgets that pay for it—are predicated upon an early-1990s strategy that did not foresee the tempo of today's operations or the long-term war on global terrorism. During the decade of the 1990s, the Army shrank from 18 divisions to 10. The Cold War was over and the war on terrorism had not yet begun. We must now make the decisions needed to structure our forces so that we prevail in this new war that is likely to continue for some time. Increasing the size of the force is no panacea for meeting all of the challenges we face, but we believe it is a critical element of any plan to address the needs of our nation's security.

Mr. President, our military needs help now. We ask that you show strong leadership and take the necessary steps to increase the end strength of our Armed Forces and adjust the mix of active and reserve component forces in the upcoming budget year.

We stand with you ready to confront any and all challenges to our great nation.

Sincerely,

The block contains four handwritten signatures in black ink, arranged in two rows. The top row has two signatures, and the bottom row has two. The signatures are written over horizontal lines, likely representing the names of the signatories. The handwriting is cursive and somewhat stylized.

E. Snow

Laura A. Davis

John Davis

Marty Meel

Joe Wilson

Gene Taylor

Frank Stranks

[Signature]

Carole S. Miller

John M. Spang Jr.

John Kline

Paul Simmons, A/2  
(COL, USAF, RET)

[Signature]

Julia Sanchez

Richard Lasser

John W. McHugh

Medicine J. Scudello

J. P. Mertes

Art Hill

Art Abernethy

Walter Jones

Max Fin

Phil Fittkau

Walter

Franklin

Paul Kelly

Shelley Moore Capito

Ken Albert

John Sullivan

Jim Ryan

Ron Lewis

Jim Gibbons

Hal Rogers

John Hostetter

Howard "Buck" McKeon

Ray Lujan

McLannan

Carl Carbo

J. Redy Hales

Cliff Edwards

Sam Adams

Walter Hill

Tom Osborne

Gene Smith

Ralph W. Hall

Mary Kaptur

DeLoe

Rich Ows

John Adams

Walter Long

F. B. [unclear]

Carl [unclear]

Sam Johnson

Robert E. [unclear]

Robin Hayes

Mike Poyer (AL)

Bartlett

Lane Evans

D. Carly

Phil English

Lee Han

John Boyer

John Evans

Mark Foley

Butch Fry

Ed Fanning

Jim Dargewin

Zell Wap

Klara Les-Lettinen

George Ketterer

Barbara Alesini

Gil Galkrecht

Alma Marshall. MC

Ed Wharf

Barbara K. Cunningham

[Signature]

Bob Brown

[Signature]

Paul Beatt

Sam Cole

Jim Hill

Pat Brown

Steve Seaver

Wayne T. Gilbert

[Signature]

[Signature]

Dee Walden

Judy Buggert

William J. Kubini

Nathan Dale

W. Goddard

Wally Harger

Tom Osborne

Tom Bennett

E. Slack

Tom Starnes

Tim Muegler

Bert Goble

Jim Mathews

Red Gb

Phil King

June Harman

Chris Cox

Ed Bradley

Art Jones

P. C. Lopez

W. V. Anderson

Jim Moran

Marion Barry

Rick Backus

Archie J. Cooney

Jim McDermott

Carolee L. Karpis

Tom J. Blanton

Cliff Stenness

Steve Israel

Jim Jaramila

Mal Wald

John A. Costello

John L. ...

Frank Ballough

Tom Lantos

John A. ...

John E. ...

Tim Ryan

...

*Anthony*

*Ellen Traucher*

*Michael Quinn*

*John B. Lamm*

*John B. Schiff*

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**TAB**

**B**

COORDINATION PAGE

USD (P&R)	Dr. David Chu	Dec. 15, 2003
PDASD( LA)	Mr. Stanley	Dec. 15, 2003
TJS (J-8)	LtGen James E. Cartwright	Dec. 15, 2003

EF-7266  
I-03/014660

October 20<sup>22</sup>, 2003

TO: Doug Feith  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Afghan Army

I would like to see a proposal for accelerating the Afghan National Army. It should include the beginning of charts showing the number of Afghans providing for their own security—police, border guards, Afghan National Army, and any other security forces that exist. We ought to begin looking at the idea of a civil defense corps for Afghanistan.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
102003-39

.....  
Please respond by 11/14/03

*Afghanistan*

*Sir,*  
*Response attached.*  
*CDR Nosenko*  
*12/17*  
*12/18*  
*12/17*

*22 OCT 03*

U21065 /03

22-10-03 15:09 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/18718

11/5/03  
1139

Snowflake

11/3  
October 30, 2003

TO: David Chu  
CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
Powell Moore  
Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Hearings on Active/Reserve Forces

Unless there is a good reason not to, I am inclined to ask Congress for hearings this year on the issue of the Active/Reserve mix, stress on the Reserve component and the like. We have a lot of members who want to help, and we want these issues examined in a systematic way.

Please get back to me quickly with a proposal after you have discussed it with Larry Di Rita and Powell Moore.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
103003-18

.....  
Please respond by 11/7/03

U21069 / 03

10/24/03

October 23, 2003

TO: Powell Moore  
CC: David Chu  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Guard and Reserve

I told Senator Sessions that I thought the best thing to do on helping the Guard and Reserve was to have hearings, as opposed to reaching in and trying to do a quick fix.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
102303-8

.....  
*Please respond by* 11/7/03

U21074- / 03

11/5/03

November 3, 2003

TO: David Chu  
CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Hearings

I think we ought to prepare for Congressional hearings on managing the force. It is important that we show the Congress the current cost and projected cost of all the Congressional add-ons for pay and benefits for active, Reserve and retired personnel that have been added to the DoD budget—often without hearings, without study or analysis, without justification and/or without determining the inequities or perceived inequities that would result.

We need to point out that, because it is done without hearings, it creates inequities and imbalances, which then need to be corrected, which add still additional costs.

We need an understanding with Congress so that the committees of the House and Senate can test their ideas for added benefits against a template, one that will show what the effects of a proposal will be before they add billions of cost.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
110303-1

.....  
Please respond by 11/14/03

U21077 / 03

12:48 PM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz

CC: Gen. John Abizaid  
Gen. Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: December 19, 2003

SUBJECT:

John Abizaid has three times raised the question of taking a small group of people and offering US citizenship if they help successfully on counter-terrorism. Please get somebody working that with his office so that we put some structure into this issue. It keeps coming up and nothing ever happens.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
121903A.06tscom

Please respond by: 12/27

*014.33*

*19 Dec 03*

SECRET  
2003 11 10 12:22

November 10, 2003

TO: Gordon England  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Navy Safety Record

ASN  
EA  
SAFETY

*Y* *(A)*

I find the safety record for the Department of the Navy worrisome. Aren't you concerned about it?

Thanks.

Attach.

10/21/03 SecNav memo to SecDef re. Fourth Quarter Safety Report (U18122/03)

DHR:dh  
(11/03)

Please respond by

11/28/03

729

10 NOV 03

U21101 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18723

TAB (A)



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY  
 1000 NAVY PENTAGON  
 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350-1000  
**INFO MEMO**

*Not Good*

*✓ 11/10*

2003 OCT 21 10:11:52

October 21, 2003, 4:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Gordon R. England, Secretary of the Navy *[Signature]* October 30, 2003

SUBJECT: Fourth Quarter Fiscal Year (FY) 2003 Safety Report

*Copy Di Rita*  
*11/7*

- The Department of the Navy (DON) aviation mishap rates decreased for the Marine Corps and increased for the Navy in fourth quarter FY 03. (TAB A)
- DON continues to lower its lost workday rate for civilian employees. (TAB B)
- Marine Corps achieved a 19 percent reduction this quarter, cutting lost workdays from 68 to 55 per 100 employees per year. (TAB B)
- Navy achieved an 8 percent reduction this quarter, cutting lost workdays from 39 to 36 per 100 employees. (TAB B)
- FY 03 workers' compensation costs decreased from FY 02 for DON, the only branch of the Department of Defense achieving this distinction, a three million dollar cost avoidance.
- FY 03 DON Private Motor Vehicle Fatality, Navy Class A Operational Afloat, and Ashore mishap rates decreased. (TAB C)
- The Marine Corps Class A Operational mishap rates increased in FY 03 due to Operation Iraqi Freedom. (TAB C)

COORDINATION: TAB D

Attachments:  
As stated

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	11/6
GR MA CRADOCK	11/7
MA BUCCI	11/7
EXECSEC MARRIOTT	10/31

Prepared by: Connie K. DeWitte, (b)(6)

U18122 \* /03

ALNAV 086/03 SECNAV WASHINGTON DC/ SUBJ/SECNAV SAFETY POLICY//  
REF/A/MSG/SECNAV/151652ZJUL2003// AMPN/REF A IS SECNAV ALNAV 057/03//  
RMKS/1. AS YOUR SECRETARY AND CHIEF SAFETY OFFICER, I WANT TO  
REEMPHASIZE THE PRIORITY WE MUST PLACE ON PROTECTING THE SAFETY OF  
OUR MOST PRECIOUS ASSET - EVERY SAILOR, MARINE AND CIVILIAN EMPLOYEE  
WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY.

2. IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE DEFENSE SECRETARY RUMSFELD'S TWO-YEAR, 50  
PERCENT MISHAP REDUCTION GOAL, A THREE-TIERED APPROACH WAS OUTLINED  
THREE MONTHS AGO TO DRAMATICALLY IMPROVE THE SAFETY CULTURE WITHIN  
THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY (REF A). SINCE THEN, WE HAVE SEEN LITTLE  
IMPROVEMENT.

3. MY MESSAGE TODAY IS DIRECTED AT EVERY LEADER WITHIN THE  
DEPARTMENT - NOT JUST COMMANDING OFFICERS, BUT EVERYONE WHO  
SUPERVISES THE ACTIONS OF ANOTHER. WE MUST CHANGE THE VALUE WE PLACE  
ON SAFETY AND TOGETHER TURN THE TIDE. FOR THE MOST PART, WE HAVE  
EXPERTLY MANAGED THE MECHANISMS AND PROCESSES OF OUR SAFETY  
PROGRAMS, BUT TODAY I NEED YOUR HELP. TODAY EACH OF US MUST BEGIN  
TO LEAD A DRAMATIC CHANGE IN OUR SAFETY CULTURE, INCORPORATING  
SAFETY AND HEALTH CONSIDERATIONS INTO ALL JOB DUTIES AND OPERATIONAL  
DECISIONS.

4. MY SAFETY POLICY FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY IS QUITE SIMPLE.  
EVERY COMMAND, EVERY WORK CENTER, EVERY UNIT WILL HAVE A SAFETY  
CULTURE BUILT ON THREE PRINCIPLES: LEADERSHIP COMMITMENT,  
LEADERSHIP COURAGE AND LEADERSHIP INTEGRITY. TODAY'S LEADERS FOR  
SAFETY MUST EXHIBIT A SOLID COMMITMENT TO COMMUNICATE SAFETY POLICY  
AND TO PERSONALLY ABIDE BY IT. THEY MUST VERBALIZE A BELIEF IN THE  
VALUE OF SAFETY AND CREATE AN ENVIRONMENT THAT ENCOURAGES OPEN,  
FRANK COMMUNICATION. THEY MUST HAVE THE COURAGE TO SET AND ENFORCE  
TOUGH AND SOMETIMES-UNPOPULAR STANDARDS, TO ALLOCATE SAFETY  
RESOURCES (THE RIGHT PEOPLE AND SUFFICIENT FUNDING), AND TO PROVIDE  
QUALITY TRAINING TO ENSURE THEIR PERSONNEL LEARN CORRECT SAFETY  
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# Department of the Navy



## Navy and Marine Corps Safety Council Charter

2003

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

<u>Section</u>	<u>Page</u>
I. ESTABLISHMENT, PURPOSE AND SCOPE.....	1
II. ORGANIZATION .....	2
III. PROCEDURES.....	3
IV. DELIVERABLES.....	4
V. DURATION OF COUNCIL.....	4

## NAVY AND MARINE CORPS SAFETY COUNCIL CHARTER

### I. ESTABLISHMENT, PURPOSE AND SCOPE

#### A. ESTABLISHMENT

The Secretary of the Navy hereby establishes the Navy and Marine Corps Safety Council, herein referred to as the Council. The Charter delineates the Council's membership, and specifies the scope of activities.

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8. Promote risk management as an intrinsic part of every decision made and every action taken by every Sailor, Marine, and DON Civilian employee.

9. Promote the preservation of human and physical resources throughout the Department of the Navy.

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- Afloat Safety Committee
- Air Safety Committee
- Ground Tactical Safety Committee
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### Afloat Safety Committee

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- Commander, Naval Submarine Forces – co-chair
- Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command (SEA 04R and SEA 00C for Diving Safety)
- Commander, Marine Forces Atlantic
- Commander, Marine Forces Pacific
- Commander, Naval Air Forces
- Commander, Naval Surface Forces, U.S. Atlantic Fleet
- Commander, Submarine Forces, U.S. Pacific Fleet
- Commander, Naval Safety Center (Code 30)
- Commander, Military Sealift Command
- President, Board of Inspection and Survey (Surface Ship and Submarine Boards)
- Commanding Officer, Surface Warfare Officers School Command

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Commander, 2<sup>nd</sup> or 3<sup>rd</sup> Marine Aircraft Wing – co-chair  
Headquarters Marine Corps (Safety Division)  
Commander, Naval Air Systems Command  
Commander, Naval Air Forces, U.S. Atlantic Fleet  
Commander, Naval Air Training Activity  
Commander, Naval Safety Center (Code 10)  
Commander, Naval Air Reserve Forces  
President, Board of Inspection and Survey (aviation rep)  
Director, Aviation Safety School

**Ground Tactical Safety Committee**

Commander, Marine Corps Combat Development Command - chair  
Commanding General, Marine Corps System Command

**Commanding General, Marine Corps Logistics Command**

Commander, Naval Safety Center (Code 40)  
Commander, Marine Forces Atlantic  
Commander, Marine Forces Pacific  
Commander, Marine Forces Reserve  
Commander, Marine Forces Europe  
Commander, Special Warfare Command  
Headquarters Marine Corps (Safety Division)  
Inspector General of the Marine Corps

**Shore Safety Committee**

Commander, Naval Installations - chair  
Chief, Bureau of Medicine and Surgery  
Commander, Naval Safety Center (Codes 40 and 90)  
Commander, Naval Personnel Development Command  
Commander, Naval Air Reserve Forces  
Commander, Marine Forces Atlantic  
Commander, Marine Forces Pacific  
Commander, U.S. Atlantic Fleet  
Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet  
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Navy and Marine Corps Safety School  
Navy Inspector General/Safety Oversight Inspection Unit  
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Europe

D. The Council and Committees may also have Associate Members and Advisory Members as required to carry out this charter.

E. The Council may designate the formation of working groups, as appropriate, made up of various Committee, associate, or advisory members.

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C. The Council co-chairs will coordinate meeting-associated budgetary requirements and administrative support for the Council and Safety Committees.

D. A secretary shall be appointed by the co-chairs to maintain historical documentation of accomplishments and recommendations. Minutes, the Strategic Plan, annual accomplishments, and associated documentation for the Council and Safety Committees will be posted on the secure section of the Commander, Naval Safety Center and HQMC Safety Division web sites.


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### IV. DELIVERABLES

The Council will identify beneficial safety initiatives on a prioritized basis, recommend associated policies and programs for DON, and develop, for SECNAV, CNO and CMC approval, a Navy and Marine Corps Safety Strategic Plan.

### V. DURATION OF COUNCIL

The Charter will be reviewed every two years.



(SECNAV signature line)

November 14, 2003

To lead 50 per cent mishap reduction effort,  
recommend SECNAV:

- Require Class A mishaps be briefed up the chain-of-command – details to be determined
- Re-institute SECNAV safety meetings with CNO and CMC bi-monthly or quarterly
- Send memo to CNO/CMC requesting their personal attention to safety staffing and safety resources as positive return-on-investment
- Personally advocate and lead a change in the way the Department values safety
- In the future safety initiatives currently in pilot projects to reduce mishaps by 50 percent may need further support



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY  
1000 NAVY PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D C 20350-1000

11-01-03 09:27

INFO MEMO

December 19, 2003

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: GORDON R. ENGLAND, Secretary of the Navy

SUBJECT: Navy Safety Record

- You expressed concern, in your 10 Nov 2003 memorandum, regarding the Department of the Navy's safety record (TAB A).
- I am equally concerned about the record, and am also committed to achieving your challenge to reduce mishaps by 50% over the next two years.
- Safety is a deckplate-level function. We must influence our Sailors and Marines for them to truly think and act in a "safety first" manner. To accomplish this I have taken three initial steps:
  - Signed a SECNAV Safety Policy ALNAV (TAB B), which emphasizes my commitment to safety and challenges all hands to build a safety culture.
  - Created a Navy and Marine Corps Safety Council (TAB C), to provide a forum for safety leaders to advise the Chief of Naval Operations and Commandant of the Marine Corps on safety performance improvements.
  - Tracking mishaps and following up with individual commands.

COORDINATION: TAB D

Attachments  
As stated

Prepared by: Ms. Connie DeWitte, DASN (Safety),

(b)(6)

U21102 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18733

**TAB**

**A**

November 10, 2003

Snowflake

TO: Gordon England

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Navy Safety Record

ASW	
EA	<i>4/1/12</i>
SAFETY	

*→ (A)*

I find the safety record for the Department of the Navy worrisome. Aren't you concerned about it?

Thanks.

Attach.

10/21/03 SecNav memo to SecDef re. Fourth Quarter Safety Report (U18122/03)

DHR dh  
111003-3

Please respond by

*11/28/03*

U21101 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18735

TAB (A)

**TAB**

**B**

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY  
1000 NAVY PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350-1000

INFO MEMO

203 OCT 21 11:52

October 21, 2003, 4:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Gordon R. England, Secretary of the Navy *[Signature]* October 30, 2003

SUBJECT: Fourth Quarter Fiscal Year (FY) 2003 Safety Report

*LOU DI PA...*

*0/1*

- The Department of the Navy (DON) aviation mishap rates decreased for the Marine Corps and increased for the Navy in fourth quarter FY 03. (TAB A)
- DON continues to lower its lost workday rate for civilian employees. (TAB B)
- Marine Corps achieved a 19 percent reduction this quarter, cutting lost workdays from 68 to 55 per 100 employees per year. (TAB B)
- Navy achieved an 8 percent reduction this quarter, cutting lost workdays from 39 to 36 per 100 employees. (TAB B)
- FY 03 workers' compensation costs decreased from FY 02 for DON, the only branch of the Department of Defense achieving this distinction, a three million dollar cost avoidance.
- FY 03 DON Private Motor Vehicle Fatality, Navy Class A Operational Afloat, and Ashore mishap rates decreased. (TAB C)
- The Marine Corps Class A Operational mishap rates increased in FY 03 due to Operation Iraqi Freedom. (TAB C)

COORDINATION: TAB D

Attachments:  
As stated

SPL ASSISTANT DI NITA	11/6
BR MA CRADDOCK	11/7
MA BUCCI	11/7
EXECSEC MARRIOTT	10/31

Prepared by: Connie K. DeWitte, (b)(6)

U18122 1/03

ALNAV 086/03 SECNAV WASHINGTON DC/ SUBJ/SECNAV SAFETY POLICY//  
REF/A/MSG/SECNAV/151652ZJUL2003// AMPN/REF A IS SECNAV ALNAV 057/03//  
RMKS/1. AS YOUR SECRETARY AND CHIEF SAFETY OFFICER, I WANT TO  
REEMPHASIZE THE PRIORITY WE MUST PLACE ON PROTECTING THE SAFETY OF  
OUR MOST PRECIOUS ASSET - EVERY SAILOR, MARINE AND CIVILIAN EMPLOYEE  
WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY.

2. IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE DEFENSE SECRETARY RUMSFELD'S TWO-YEAR, 50  
PERCENT MISHAP REDUCTION GOAL, A THREE-TIERED APPROACH WAS OUTLINED  
THREE MONTHS AGO TO DRAMATICALLY IMPROVE THE SAFETY CULTURE WITHIN  
THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY (REF A). SINCE THEN, WE HAVE SEEN LITTLE  
IMPROVEMENT.

3. MY MESSAGE TODAY IS DIRECTED AT EVERY LEADER WITHIN THE  
DEPARTMENT - NOT JUST COMMANDING OFFICERS, BUT EVERYONE WHO  
SUPERVISES THE ACTIONS OF ANOTHER. WE MUST CHANGE THE VALUE WE PLACE  
ON SAFETY AND TOGETHER TURN THE TIDE. FOR THE MOST PART, WE HAVE  
EXPERTLY MANAGED THE MECHANISMS AND PROCESSES OF OUR SAFETY  
PROGRAMS, BUT TODAY I NEED YOUR HELP. TODAY EACH OF US MUST BEGIN  
TO LEAD A DRAMATIC CHANGE IN OUR SAFETY CULTURE, INCORPORATING  
SAFETY AND HEALTH CONSIDERATIONS INTO ALL JOB DUTIES AND OPERATIONAL  
DECISIONS.

4. MY SAFETY POLICY FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY IS QUITE SIMPLE.  
EVERY COMMAND, EVERY WORK CENTER, EVERY UNIT WILL HAVE A SAFETY  
CULTURE BUILT ON THREE PRINCIPLES: LEADERSHIP COMMITMENT,  
LEADERSHIP COURAGE AND LEADERSHIP INTEGRITY. TODAY'S LEADERS FOR  
SAFETY MUST EXHIBIT A SOLID COMMITMENT TO COMMUNICATE SAFETY POLICY  
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11-L-0559/OSD/18738

**TAB**

**C**

# Department of the Navy



## Navy and Marine Corps Safety Council Charter

2003

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<u>Section</u>	<u>Page</u>
I. ESTABLISHMENT, PURPOSE AND SCOPE.....	1
II. ORGANIZATION .....	2
III. PROCEDURES.....	3
IV. DELIVERABLES.....	4
V. DURATION OF COUNCIL.....	4

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Commander, Marine Forces Reserve  
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Headquarters Marine Corps (Safety Division)  
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
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(SECNAV signature line)

November 14, 2003

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- In the future safety initiatives currently in pilot projects to reduce mishaps by 50 percent may need further support

**TAB**

**D**

Coordination Page

HQ USMC (Safety Division)

LTC Moody

November 21, 2003

CNO (Naval Safety Center Liaison)

CAPT Noulis

November 19, 2003

12/22/2003 12:02

(b)(6)

MACEDONIA EMB - WASH

PAGE 05

22/12 2003 14:47 FAX CC

(b)(6)

MPA OF R. MACEDONIA

COURTESY TRANSLATION

Skopje, December 18 2003

Dear Friend,

On this occasion allow me to recall with appreciation the opportunity to meet You in Brussels.

Further to our conversation, I would like to kindly ask You to propose a date for Your participation at the defence ministers' meeting of the countries of the Adriatic Charter which is due to be realized in June, 2004 in the Republic of Macedonia, immediately before the holding of the NATO Summit in Istanbul.

I avail myself of this opportunity to extend to you the assurances of my highest consideration and kindest regards.

Yours Sincerely,

Minister of Defence  
Vlado BUCHKOVSKI, PhD

H.E. Mr. Donald Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defence  
United States of America  
Washington D.C.

11-L-0559/OSD/18749

U21107 / 03



МИНИСТЕРСТВО ЗА ОДБРАНА  
РЕПУБЛИКА МАКЕДОНИЈА

Кабинет на Министерот

Скопје, 18 декември 2003

Господине,

Дозволете ми во оваа прилика пред се да го изразам моето задоволство од нашата неодамнешна средба во Брисел.

Во врска со нашиот разговор, би сакал да Ве замолам да предложите термин за Вашето учество на средбата на министрите за одбрана на земјите од Јадранската повелба кој би се реализирала во јуни 2004 година во Република Македонија, непосредно пред одржувањето на Самитот на НАТО во Истанбул.

Уште еднаш ја користам оваа прилика да Ви ги упатам изразите на моето високо почитување и најискрени желби.

Министер за одбрана  
д-р Владо Бучковски

ВБ  
/

Н.Е. г-дин Доналд Рамсфелд  
Секретар за одбрана  
на Соединетите Америкаски Држави  
Вашингтон



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000



JAN 21 2004

His Excellency Vlado Buchkovski  
Minister of Defense  
The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

Dear Minister Buchkovski:

Thank you very much for your recent letter. I enjoyed meeting you in Brussels and appreciate the invitation to attend an Adriatic Charter Ministerial in June. We will get back to you soon on it.

Best wishes,

Sincerely,

092.3

21 JAN 04

U21793 /03

11-L-05594 SD/18751

SARAH DISKETTE TABLE OF CONTENTS  
RELEASING DOCUMENT

CREATION DATE: 080104  
CREATION TIME: 14510000  
SARAH VERSION NUMBER: 3.03  
MAXIMUM CLASSIFICATION OF THIS DISKETTE: UUUU  
HIGHEST CLASSIFICATION ON THIS DISKETTE: UUUU  
DISKETTE RELEASING OFFICIAL'S NAME: DONALD RUMSFELD  
ORG: OSD OFFICE: SECDEF PHONE: (b)(6)  
TOC FILE CRC: 14786

FILENAME	MSG PREC ACTION		DATE/TIME	FILETIME	TOT/	SPECAT	
	TYPE	CLASS	GROUP	SSN	TOR	CIC	CRC
MKLETT	DD173	RR UU	RE DY	1314522	JAN04	ZYUW N	14745

OSD SECDEF (b)(6)  
ORGANIZATION/OFFICE SYMBOL/PHONE NUMBER

  
DONALD RUMSFELD

JAN 21 2004

U21793 103

11-L-0559/OSD/18752

UNCLASSIFIED

DTG: 131452Z JAN 04

PAGE 01 of 01

Drafter's Name : DANIEL ROH, ADMIN OFFICE  
Office/Phone : ISP/EURAS, (b)(6)

Releaser's Info : DONALD RUMSFELD, SECDEF

Action Prec : ROUTINE  
Info Prec : ROUTINE  
Specat :

From: SECDEF WASHINGTON DC  
To: USDAO SKOPJE MK  
Info: SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//CHAIRS//  
SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC

TEXT FOLLOWS  
-----

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: SECDEF LETTER TO MACEDONIAN DEFENSE MINISTER

1. SECRETARY RUMSFELD HAS SIGNED THE FOLLOWING LETTER TO MOD BUCHKOVSKI. REQUEST THAT AMEMBASSY FORWARD THE TEXT OF THE LETTER TO MINISTER BUCHKOVSKI AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. ORIGINAL SIGNED LETTER TO FOLLOW.

2. BEGIN TEXT:

HIS EXCELLENCY VLADO BUCHKOVSKI  
MINISTER OF DEFENSE  
THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

DEAR MINISTER BUCHKOVSKI:

(PARA) THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR RECENT LETTER. I ENJOYED MEETING YOU IN BRUSSELS AND APPRECIATE THE INVITATION TO ATTEND AN ADRIATIC CHARTER MINISTERIAL IN JUNE. WE WILL GET BACK TO YOU SOON ON IT.

(PARA) BEST WISHES,

SINCERELY,  
//DONALD RUMSFELD//

3. END TEXT.

UNCLASSIFIED

U21793 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18753

12/22/2003 12:02

(b)(6)

MACEDONIA EMB - WASH

PAGE 03

22/12 2003 14:46 FAX

(b)(6)

MFA OF R. MACEDONIA

0003

2003 010 01 AM 14:36

COURTESY TRANSLATION

Skopje, December 18 2003

Dear Friend,

Allow me to express my satisfaction and to congratulate You on the successful action of capturing Saddam Hussein.

I am deeply convinced that arresting Saddam Hussein and bringing him to justice is an important step forward in our joint efforts to bring freedom and democracy to the Iraqi people.

The symbolism of this act reiterates the determination of our nations to endure in the joint fight for eradication of tyranny and to advance the human rights in the world.

I expect that our partnership will continue to be successful in achieving these goals.

Yours Sincerely,

Minister of Defence  
Vlado BUCHKOVSKI, PhD

H.E. Mr. Donald Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defence  
United States of America  
Washington D.C.

U21108 / 03

11-L-05597OSD/18754



МИНИСТЕРСТВО ЗА ОДБРАНА  
РЕПУБЛИКА МАКЕДОНИЈА

Кабинет на Министерот

Скопје, 18 декември 2003

*Тошиџбан Пријатинска*

Дозволете ми да Ви го пренесам моето особено задоволство и да Ви го честитам успехот во акцијата за приведување на Садам Хусеин.

Длабоко сум уверен дека апсењето на Садам Хусеин и неговото изведување пред лицето на правдата претставува значајен чекор напред во нашите заеднички напори да ја донесеме слободата и демократијата на Ирачкиот народ.

Самболиката на овој чин е потврда на непоколебливата определба на вашите народи заедно да истрајат во борбата за искоренување на тиранијата и унапредување на човековите права во Светот.

Очекувам нашето партнерство во достигнувањето на овие цели да продолжи со успех.

Искрено,

д-р. Владо Бучковски  
Министер за одбрана

*Handwritten signature and initials*

До: Н.Е. Доналд Раисфелд  
Секретар за одбрана  
на Соединетите Американски Држави  
Вашингтон

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

SECRET

INFO MEMO

2003 DEC 22 11:13:50

December 15, 2003

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THRU: ACTING SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

FROM: GEN PETER J. SCHOOMAKER, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMY

*Broughton*  
*Dec 19, 2003*  
*Schoomaker*  
*16.12.02*

SUBJECT: CID Protective Services Unit (PSU) Management and Receipt of Threat Intelligence

- Your memo's of 5 Oct and 3 Nov 03 questioned CID's threat intelligence capability and recommended a review of their capabilities from an outside agency.
- CID has inadequate criminal intelligence analyst capability; however, G2, CID and the USD(I) have initiated interim fixes and procedures to collect, analyze and push intelligence threats products to PSU as follows:
  - 10 Nov 03, CID assigned agents to DoD's Counterintelligence Field Activity's Counterintelligence/law enforcement Center. The Center has a 24/7 watch.
  - 15 Dec 03, Army G-2 and CID populated a 24/7 PSU intelligence cell within the Anti-Terrorism Operations Intelligence Center in the Army Operations Center to improve specific threat collection and analysis.
  - CID will submit a concept plan to the Army staff to permanently improve and increase its intelligence collection and analysis capabilities.
- CID PSU has 55 AC and 99 mobilized RC agents protecting senior officials. Heavy use of RC after 9/11 accounted for high personnel turnover and impacted quality of support. Plan to increase AC authorizations to 156 was approved for resourcing on 18 Nov 03. Bonuses will be used to encourage reenlistment.
- Secret Service will conduct an evaluation of PSU operations and intelligence procedures within 90 days. Recommended changes will be acted upon. A copy of the evaluation and proposed corrective actions will be provided to me.

Prepared by: COL Kevin J. Palgutt, (b)(6)

U21190 / 03

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

11-L-0559/OSD/18756

TO: Pete Schoemaker  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*  
 DATE: October 15, 2003  
 SUBJECT:

When you are looking at CID on the issue I raised with you on the phone, you might look at it more broadly.

I have an impression that they might need some attention. A lot of these folks are moved frequently and a number seem to leave the service. You might look into whether we are managing that talent in the best way possible.

Thanks.

DER/azn  
 101503.08

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_

VCSA -  
DAS

Please take an in-depth look at our CID, specifically -

- ✓ - How well they are connected to the entire threat warning/intel community... How timely/quality
- ✓ - Have they made the "culture" shift to COE
- ✓ - How well led / assignment policies etc. Special look @ PSU. *(PS)*

U21193 / 03

Snowflake

TO: Les Brownlee  
Gen. Pete Schoomaker

CC: Gen. Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*

SUBJECT: CID

Gentlemen—

Please give some thought to whether there are ways to improve the quality of the personal security activities of the Army's Criminal Investigation Division.

You might want to get an outside organization to take a look at CID, see how they do, and benchmark them against the Secret Service and possibly some other service.

Please see if there aren't some changes and adjustments that might be made to improve the quality of their service.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
103003-30

.....  
Please respond by 12/12/03

U21194 / 03

TO: Pete Schoomaker  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
 DATE: October 15, 2003  
 SUBJECT:

When you are looking at CID on the issue I raised with you on the phone, you might look at it more broadly.

I have an impression that they might need some attention. A lot of these folks are moved frequently and a number seem to leave the service. You might look into whether we are managing that talent in the best way possible.

Thanks.

DER/azn  
 101503.08

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_

*VCSA -  
 DAS*

*Please take an in-depth look at our CID, specifically -*

- ✓ - How well they are connected to the entire threat warning / int community ... How timely / quality*
- ✓ - Have they made the "culture" shift to COE*
- ✓ - How well led / assignment policies etc. Special look @ PSU.*

*U21193 / 03*

*(PS)*

11/3  
~~October 30~~, 2003

TO: Les Brownlee  
Gen. Pete Schoomaker

CC: Gen. Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*

SUBJECT: CID

Gentlemen—

Please give some thought to whether there are ways to improve the quality of the personal security activities of the Army's Criminal Investigation Division.

You might want to get an outside organization to take a look at CID, see how they do, and benchmark them against the Secret Service and possibly some other service.

Please see if there aren't some changes and adjustments that might be made to improve the quality of their service.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
103003-30

.....  
Please respond by 12/12/03

U21194 / 03



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

DEC 23 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR AMBASSADOR BREMER  
GENERAL ABIZAID

SUBJECT: Internet in Iraq

- We recently spoke about the critical importance of developing an internet capability in Iraq.
- As telephone service increases, more Iraqis will subscribe to the internet, and create their own web sites and chat rooms.
  - In September, there were only 4,900 dial-up Internet subscribers in Iraq.
  - Our understanding is that private companies are setting up wireless internet connections that will provide Iraqis internet service even faster.
- The best way for the US Government to communicate on the internet with the Iraqi people may be via an "Arab-friendly" website -- one without US photos and symbols.
- In order to accomplish this, you might want to begin working toward:
  - Putting an Iraqi face on the CPA website.
  - Making CPA, CENTCOM, and CJTF-7 web sites available entirely in Arabic.
  - Begin providing the tools and training for an Iraqi-directed web permanent presence, designed to provide information and transparency to the Iraqi people.

Iraq

23 Dec 03



DEC 22 2003

✓  
m/r

ACTION MEMO

TO: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, Near East/South Asia,  
William J. Luti, (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Internet in Iraq

- Attached is a memo you may want to send to Ambassador Bremer and General Abizaid on building internet capability in Iraq.



*DRAFT*  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

MEMORANDUM FOR AMBASSADOR BREMER  
GENERAL AB ~~Z~~ ZAID

~~FROM: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE~~

SUBJECT: Internet in Iraq

- We recently spoke about the critical importance of developing an internet capability in Iraq.
- As telephone service increases, more Iraqis will subscribe to the internet, and create their own web sites and chat rooms.
  - In September, there were only 4,900 dial-up Internet subscribers in Iraq.
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- In order to accomplish this, you might want to begin working toward:
  - Putting an Iraqi face on the CPA website.
  - Making CPA, CENTCOM, and CJTF-7 web sites entirely available <sup>^</sup> in Arabic.
  - Begin providing the tools and training for an Iraqi-directed web permanent presence <sup>^</sup> designed to provide information and transparency to the Iraqi people.

*DRAFT*



11-L-0559/OSD/18763

EF-7555  
I-03/015817

17

November 12, 2003

TO: Doug Feith  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Internet in Iraq

*Approved  
to send*

I talked to Jerry Bremer about getting going on developing an internet capability in Iraq. I doubt that it would be very important now, but in six to twelve months it could be critically important. We need an Arabic internet way to communicate and chat rooms to address the Iraqi people.

Please monitor that and see that it gets going.

Thanks.

DHR.dh  
111203-12

.....  
Please respond by 12/12/03

*✓  
12/22*

*Response attached  
C 12/22*

17-11-03 08:07 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/18764

December 22, 2003

TO: Gen. John Abizaid

CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Numbers

Attached is an article from the *Wall Street Journal* that is worth reading.

Regards,

Attach.

Kaplan, Robert D. "Think Global, Fight Local," *Wall Street Journal*, December 19, 2003, p. 14.

DHR:dh  
122203-5

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

Afghanistan

22 Dec 03

✓  
1422

insisted that "the capture of Saddam has not made America safer." A landslide's worth of Americans really don't agree.

*The writer, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment, writes a monthly column for The Post.*

New York Times  
December 19, 2003

### 45. Learning To Break The Rules

By Bruce Berkowitz

WASHINGTON -- The capture of Saddam Hussein was a much-needed shot in the arm for American intelligence services. President Bush made special mention of our intelligence analysts in his address after the capture. Yet, as a onetime C.I.A. analyst, I think it's important to examine why this mission was so successful. In large part, it was because analysts were allowed to ignore many long-held beliefs about how intelligence is "supposed" to work.

For example, over the past weeks analysts worked alongside the military planners and special operations forces who seized Mr. Hussein. This is a break with the tradition of analysts keeping their distance from the players in the field so they maintain their objectivity. (Recall the brouhaha when Vice President Dick Cheney was accused of intimidating analysts by meeting with them face to face to discuss Iraqi weapons programs.)

Similarly, intelligence workers developed new methods on the fly in their efforts to uncover Mr. Hussein's support network. In trying to depict the links between members of Mr. Hussein's enormous extended family, some analysts used a commercial software package that law-enforcement agents have long used to analyze crime rings. The software helped them visualize non-obvious family relationships, and eventually pinpoint the families in Tikrit who were hiding Mr. Hussein.

Usually, organizations have to wait months or even years to develop or adapt a new tool or methodology -- this time they were able to adapt an off-the-shelf product in just a few weeks.

Need more bodies to study a problem? No problem for the team hunting Saddam Hussein. To the public, this might seem only natural in such a high-priority mission. But according to the Congressional inquiry into the 9/11 intelligence failure, the inability of the C.I.A. to promptly reassign analysts to major new cases played a big role in Al Qaeda's effectiveness.

And those hunting for Mr. Hussein, overcame another problem that played a role in 9/11: the failure of intelligence organizations -- C.I.A., National Security Council, F.B.I. and military intelligence -- to share information, because security rules prevented analysts from talking to one another. In this case, the agencies were on the same page, and press accounts suggest that the usual concerns about interagency turf and excessive preoccupation with secrecy were set aside.

In short, the hunt for Saddam Hussein was so important that it forced everyone to cut the red tape and adapt the rules to let our analysts show just how good they really are. If only the system always worked so well. In our new age of terrorism, nuclear proliferation and rogue states, we will need the agility to redirect an intelligence organization before an attack.

At the same time, the hunt for Mr. Hussein highlights some of our weaknesses. The search was conducted more like a police dragnet than a traditional intelligence investigation. Because our military controls Iraq, our personnel could roam the countryside freely, cordon off areas and interrogate sources repeatedly, and no one really had to be concerned about

exposing his identity as an American.

However, in most countries that concern us today, we cannot operate this way. Iran and North Korea resemble the Iraq of a year ago -- we have no official presence there. Because our intelligence officers rely mainly on official cover, and get much of their information from cooperative foreign intelligence services, our network is weakest in countries where the American flag does not fly.

Meanwhile, our determination to focus so effectively on Mr. Hussein leads one to wonder about our efforts in other hotspots like Pakistan. Do we have sufficient analysts on the job? Are we balancing the risks of losing an intelligence source with the benefits of sharing information?

Everyone involved in finding Saddam Hussein should pay close attention to the changes in strategy that allowed the achievement -- such practices should be the routine, not the exception.

*Bruce Berkowitz, a research fellow at the Hoover Institution and senior analyst at the RAND Corporation, is author of "The New Face of War."*

Wall Street Journal  
December 19, 2003

Pg. 14

### 46. Think Global, Fight Local

By Robert D. Kaplan

Two years ago this month, fewer than 100 men of the Army's 5th Special Forces Group, based out of Fort Campbell, Ky. -- almost all of them non-commissioned officers -- essentially took down the Taliban regime on their own. Along with a handful of Air Force Special Ops embeds, they succeeded where the British and the Soviets before them in Afghanistan had failed, because they had been given no specific instructions. The

bureaucratic layers between the U.S. forces and the secretary of defense were severed. They were told merely to link up with the "indigs" (indigenous Northern Alliance and friendly Pushtun elements) and make it happen.

The result was that they grew beards and rode horses from one redoubt to the next, even as their team sergeants called in air strikes without first seeking written approval. Because 5th Group was allowed to operate independently of the vertical, Industrial Age hierarchy of the Pentagon, and because it combined 19th-century warfare with 21st-century close air support (CAS), 5th Group achieved the very post-industrial military "transformation" that elites in Washington are incessantly talking about, but don't seem to understand -- because real transformation, which involves the dilution of central control, would make many of these elites themselves redundant.

But now, military transformation is receding behind us in Afghanistan. With Saddam Hussein in custody, the Pentagon is focusing on the capture of Osama bin Laden, who may be in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border area. Yet success against bin Laden means going back to what we did right two years ago.

Of the roughly 10,000 American troops in Afghanistan, only a fraction of them are doing anything directly pivotal to the stabilization of the country. The rest are either part of a long support tail or part of newly-created layers of command at Bagram Air Base, north of Kabul, which micro-manage and complicate the work of a relatively small number of Army SF troops (Green Berets) located at various "fire bases."

Instead of powering-down to a flattened hierarchy of small, autonomous units dispersed over a wide area --

what the 1940 Marine "Small Wars Manual" recommends for fighting a guerrilla insurgency -- we have barricaded ourselves into a mammoth, Cold War-style base at Bagram that drains resources from the fire bases. It is ironic that just as the Pentagon is proposing a more light and lethal worldwide basing posture (with many smaller footprints rather than a few large ones in Korea and Europe), in Afghanistan, whose mountains and tribes make it the most unconventional of battlefields, we have reverted to such an antiquated arrangement.

Half of the U.S. soldiery in Afghanistan is garrisoned at Bagram, creating a footprint so large, so vulnerable, and so beside the point of why we are there in the first place, that terms like "Westmorelandization," "Sovietization" and the "self-licking ice cream cone" come to mind when describing the place and what it represents. I make these harsh statements after a month embedded at various SF fire bases in Afghanistan, speaking to dozens of non-commissioned and middle level officers, and drawing upon my own experience of covering the mujahideen insurgency against the Soviets in the 1980s.

Because of the present U.S. force structure in Afghanistan -- with its emphasis on conventional military and support personnel as opposed to small detachments of Green Berets, civil affairs units and other Special Ops teams -- I met no one on the ground doing the fighting who believed that merely increasing the number of troops in the country would accomplish anything except make these problems worse.

Surprise searches of suspect mud-walled fortresses and "presence patrols" over the Afghan countryside require the approval of a CON-OP, a written "Concept of Operation" proposal. Two years ago -- in

the immediate aftermath of 9/11, when the emphasis was on results rather than on regulations -- CON-Ops were de-emphasized. Indeed, again as recommended in the Marine "Small Wars Manual," verbal orders had replaced written ones. But now it can take days for commanders in far-flung parts of Afghanistan to get CON-Ops approved; and even then often in diluted, risk-averse form. The result is that suspicious compounds are assaulted hours and days after they should have been, so they that they turn up to be "dry holes" rather than "gold mines" of weapons and MVTs (middle value targets), the al Qaeda and Taliban sub-commanders who exist between the terrorist leadership and the foot soldiers.

The search for HVTs (high value targets) such as bin Laden has not been similarly compromised. That is because the various "Delta" and other "black" Special Ops elements hunting down the HVTs have air support at near the battalion level. These commandos operate more like 5th Group did in 2001, cut loose from Bagram's and the Pentagon's dinosaurian organizational structure -- in the manner of the most innovative corporations, which are deliberately kept weak at the center.

But even the search for HVTs is hurt by the overly regulated approach of hunting down the MVTs and LVTs (Low Value Targets). For it is the hunt for MVTs that constitutes the real bread and butter in the War on Terrorism. If the hunt for MVTs remains snarled in bureaucracy, the MVTs will fill the positions of any HVTs who happen to be killed or apprehended. More importantly, MVTs hold the key to capturing the HVTs. It's the subway turnstile phenomenon. When New York Mayor Rudolph Giuliani began arresting kids for jumping turnstiles, a percentage of them turned out to be wanted for

more serious crimes, or they had information on those who were. To wit, it was MVTs who proved crucial in the capture of Saddam. Thus, we need to be capturing more MVTs. We can only do that by giving Army SF the same autonomy and air support that Delta has.

Demanding more troops without a thorough consideration of these issues is irresponsible: It would only encourage a longer support tail and more bureaucracy (A similar caveat applies to calls for more NATO stabilization troops to help provide basic security to the population, an increase that would be appropriate if NATO is prepared to decentralize its forces and its command structure in Afghanistan.)

Some in the field recommend scaling back Bagram, and moving some functions over the border to Khanabad-Kharshi (K2) in Uzbekistan. As Bagram contracts, the number of fire bases should proliferate, even as they become more independent. In particular, we need more and smaller Advanced Operating Bases in southwestern Afghanistan close to the Iran border. At the moment, fewer than 100 Green Berets are covering southern Afghanistan in armed convoys: the addition of just another 100 or so of them would have a substantial force-multiplier effect.

We also need more Provincial Reconstruction Teams -- mobile civil affairs units working the soft, humanitarian side of Unconventional War. As with the Green Berets, the addition of a relatively small number of these personnel will have dramatically positive consequences.

Like the Soviets, we face dispersed, small groupings of insurgents attacking us from rear bases over the border in Pakistan. Thus, we have to make the Pakistani tribal agencies the next laboratory of

Unconventional War. The model to be used should be that of the southern Philippines in 2002, when the 1st Special Forces Group -- based out of Okinawa, Japan and Fort Lewis, Washington -- flushed Abu Sayyaf insurgents off the island of Basilan without firing a shot. The Green Berets built schools, dug wells and provided medical assistance to a downtrodden Muslim population, while giving the credit for this humanitarian work to the Philippine Army. In this way, the Green Berets severed the link between the insurgents and the indigenous inhabitants. We need to do something similar with the Pakistani military inside the tribal agencies.

We are fighting a world-wide counterinsurgency, and you don't hunt down pockets of insurgents over vast swaths of the earth with large bases, large infantry columns, and central control. Operation Iraqi Freedom only shaped the battlefield for the war in Iraq, which is of a small, unconventional kind. Because insurgencies vary from country to country, and even within countries, it is necessary to divest power from places like Washington and Bagram to the edges of the command structure, where non-comms at Advanced Operating Bases constitute the sensitive, finger-tip points of defense policy -- tailored to the particular situation in their respective micro-regions. For example, while the U.S. seeks to fold the Afghan Militia Forces into the newly created Afghan National Army, in some provinces these same militias are vital to the security of our SF fire bases. Therefore, decisions about integrating these forces must be left to individual base commanders, who are familiar with local personalities.

The U. S. military is the world's best because its sergeants and warrant officers are without equal. It is a matter of better utilizing them.

Mistakes will occur, like the children killed recently near Gardez, but remember that Green Berets have been regularly saving the lives of young mine victims in rural Afghanistan.

In El Salvador in the 1980s, 55 SF troops beat back a guerrilla insurgency while gradually integrating renegade militias into a newly professionalized national army. They had advantages, though. A force cap kept the number of uniformed Americans in the country from mushrooming, and except for some basic guidelines they were given relatively limited instructions. So the question is: Can we find our way back to 2001 in Afghanistan and to 2002 in the Philippines, when the 5th and 1st SF Groups led the way to military transformation?

*Mr. Kaplan, a correspondent for Atlantic Monthly, is the author of "Soldiers of God" (Vintage, 2001).*

Miami Herald  
December 19, 2003

#### **47. Extend A Warm Welcome To Our Wounded**

By Robert L. Bateman

A few minutes ago, the call went out through my office, and we all filed out the door into the corridor. When we got out there, the long hallway reaching from the front of my building to the back was packed. The passage was jammed along the entire length, with a narrow walkway down the center. Then the clapping started, and the parade went past. But this was no ordinary parade, even though it was taking place right here inside the Pentagon.

Not all those moving down the center were walking. Almost half of them were recent amputees. Some single, some double, some missing a hand or an arm, one leg or two. Others, moving slowly in this procession, visibly guarded the

parts on their bodies where hot jagged metal recently tore holes. These were our wounded, our brothers and sisters, and we were welcoming them home. This was just a small group, released for a few hours from their wards at Walter Reed who had come to have chow here in the building.

A few times during their brief three-minute passage there was a faint beginning of a chant, "USA, USA, USA." That happened twice, I think. Both times it died out almost immediately. It was coming from the civilian employees from one of the many administrative offices, but not from us soldiers. We just clapped and said, "Welcome home," and looked into knowing eyes with a nod. Chants make us uncomfortable.

I suppose that by now they've made it across the building, up to the executive dining room, where men with stars on their collars will meet with them for lunch. The tab will be picked up by the generals, of course, but that's beside the point. What matters is that they know, in these uncertain times, that their family will not forget them. Sometimes men who've been wounded had, forget that. Or, more accurately, sometimes we, the family, forget to remind them. They are, now and forever, part of the family. Wound or no wound.

It's never easy for them.

After the American Civil War, veterans, both North and South, banded together. It took a while, about 10 years, for the memories and the pain of combat to fade enough, but eventually these men realized that in some ways they were different. They were members of a brotherhood, and they missed their siblings. They missed having people around them who understood, who "got it." It had nothing to do with politics.

No, these men got together because they had things they needed to talk about in order to

heal, though they would never have put it in those terms. They needed their brothers, the men who knew what it was like to march in unison on a smoke-filled field and feel the heights and depths that come with absolute stark terror and the complete elation one feels at actually surviving another day. They needed somebody to gripe with about the pain in their stumps and how annoying it was to deal with the small pieces of steel that continued to work their ways to the surface of their skin 10 and 20 years later. So they banded together. In the North, it was the "Grand Army of the Republic," and in the South, there were numerous groups, usually regional, until the "United Confederate Veterans" got organized in 1892.

After the Spanish-American War, there was that same old need again. But, barred from the Civil War organizations, this new crop of men created their own organization and called themselves the "Veterans of Foreign Wars." In 1919, another war created another, almost parallel organization, the American Legion.

Now we welcome home our wounded, because our dead are beyond any hail we may give them. We greet our living and try to let them know that they are still among us and that we are bound by our common service forever more. It's a message they need to hear, often, because they will be missing those parts of their bodies forever, and sometimes that is a lot more "real" than anything else. It can get a man down.

So, do some small thing to remind a soldier, wounded or unwounded, that he is not forgotten. It doesn't take much, and though at most you'll get a semi-uncomfortable nod in acknowledgement, know this: Even if that soldier does not thank you out-loud, he appreciates it. We who remain on the walls appreciate it as well because we all serve

knowing that, but for the grace of God, that amputee you just thanked could be one of us, because he is one of us.

*Major Robert L. Bateman, an infantry officer in the U.S. Army assigned to the Pentagon, is the author of No Gun Ri, A Military History.*

International Herald Tribune  
December 19, 2003

#### **48. Europe And Beyond: A Broader Mission For NATO**

By R. Nicholas Burns

BRUSSELS - This month at NATO's Defense and Foreign Ministers' meetings in Brussels, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Secretary of State Colin Powell challenged the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to assume a more prominent role in the peacekeeping forces in Afghanistan and Iraq. They proposed some of the most ambitious initiatives in Alliance history, reflecting U.S. interest in using NATO for the most vital security operations of the day.

With more troops committed to more missions at greater distances from Europe than ever before, NATO notched impressive accomplishments in 2003.

Most notable is the mission in Afghanistan, NATO's first ever operation beyond the treaty area. Assuming command of the International Security and Assistance Force in Kabul in August put the alliance on the front lines of the war on terrorism.

In addition, NATO ministers agreed to expand the force beyond Kabul to enlarge the sphere of security in the country and speed reconstruction. Rumsfeld and Powell proposed that NATO take over most, and eventually all, of the "provincial reconstruction teams" that provide security and assistance to far-flung provinces of Afghanistan. They also issued

EF-7555  
I-03/015817

17

November 12, 2003

*Approved  
to send*

TO: Doug Feith  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Internet in Iraq

I talked to Jerry Bremer about getting going on developing an internet capability in Iraq. I doubt that it would be very important now, but in six to twelve months it could be critically important. We need an Arabic internet way to communicate and chat rooms to address the Iraqi people.

*IT & B*

Please monitor that and see that it gets going.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
111203-12

.....  
Please respond by 12/12/03

*✓  
12/22*

*Response attached  
C 12/22  
17 Nov 03*

U21265 /03

17-11-03 08:07 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/18769



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000



INFO MEMO

DEC 23 2003 12:49

December 23, 2003

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: W.J. Haynes II, General Counsel, DoD *W. Haynes II*  
David S.C. Chu, USD(P&R) *David S.C. Chu 23 Dec 03*

SUBJECT: Preliminary Injunction Against Anthrax Vaccination Program

- On December 22, 2003, Judge Emmet Sullivan entered a preliminary injunction: in the absence of a Presidential waiver of informed consent for the use of an investigational drug on military personnel, DoD is "enjoined from inoculating service members without their consent." The Judge concluded that the FDA has never clearly determined that the vaccine is approved for protection against inhalation exposure and that the scientific data supporting this use are inadequate.
- We are proceeding to prepare a motion to the Court to clarify that the preliminary injunction should be limited to the six plaintiffs in the case, not the entire program, or in the alternative, a stay of the injunction. We are working to file this motion today. If Judge Sullivan denies it, we will then pursue a similar motion to the Court of Appeals.
- Beyond the immediate litigation action, we will initiate discussions with the FDA aimed at obtaining an "Emergency Use Authorization" under a new authority contained in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (section 1603). Unlike "investigational drug" uses, this new type of authorization does not have the attributes of a clinical research trial, but it does generally call for an "option to refuse." However, this option to refuse may be waived for military personnel by the President.
- While we seek clarification or a stay from Judge Sullivan and potentially the Court of Appeals, there remains the question of whether we pause the vaccination program for a period (perhaps 30 days) in anticipation of judicial relief or FDA authorization under the new authority. The preliminary Justice Department view is that our prompt action seeking clarification or stay would show a good faith effort to respond to the Court.
- We would be glad to discuss this with you at your earliest convenience.

720

23 Dec 03





OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

INFO MEMO



December 23, 2003

FOR: DEPARTMENT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: W.J. Haynes II, General Counsel, DoD *W. J. Haynes II*  
David S.C. Chu, USD(P&R) *David S.C. Chu 23 Dec 03*

SUBJECT: Preliminary Injunction Against Anthrax Vaccination Program

- On December 22, 2003, Judge Emmet Sullivan entered a preliminary injunction: in the absence of a Presidential waiver of informed consent for the use of an investigational drug on military personnel, DoD is "enjoined from inoculating service members without their consent." The Judge concluded that the FDA has never clearly determined that the vaccine is approved for protection against inhalation exposure and that the scientific data supporting this use are inadequate.
- We are proceeding to prepare a motion to the Court to clarify that the preliminary injunction should be limited to the six plaintiffs in the case, not the entire program, or in the alternative, a stay of the injunction. We are working to file this motion today. If Judge Sullivan denies it, we will then pursue a similar motion to the Court of Appeals.
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- While we seek clarification or a stay from Judge Sullivan and potentially the Court of Appeals, there remains the question of whether we pause the vaccination program for a period (perhaps 30 days) in anticipation of judicial relief or FDA authorization under the new authority. The preliminary Justice Department view is that our prompt action seeking clarification or stay would show a good faith effort to respond to the Court.
- We would be glad to discuss this with you at your earliest convenience.

September 17, 2003

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.*  
SUBJECT: Colombia and the Supplemental

Here are your talking points on Colombia. The basic decision was made to keep the Supplemental totally limited to Iraq and Afghanistan. It was the right decision. You cannot add Colombia. That will have to be something in FY05. It's too bad, but that's life.

*Colombia*

Thanks.

Attach.  
9/17/03 Talking Points on Colombia for VP/C/C lunch

DHR:dh  
091703-24

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

*17 Sep 03*

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

OUSD(P)  
17 Sept 2003

**Talking Points for Cheney, Rice and Powell Lunch  
on FY04 Supplemental Funding to Support Colombia Initiatives**

- (FOUO) Colombia is a critical partner in the Global War on Terrorism.
- (FOUO) We included \$90 million in our FY04 Supplemental request to pay for additional assistance that the Principals believe is necessary to help Colombia in its War on Terror.
- (FOUO) OMB rejected our \$90 million request.
- (FOUO) It is extremely important to continue assisting Colombia in its fight against narcoterrorists.
- (FOUO) President Uribe's aggressive leadership and Colombia's recent military successes provide a window of opportunity to deal a crippling blow to the narcoterrorists.
- (FOUO) President Uribe only has a few years left to complete this task.
- (FOUO) Maintaining US support to Colombia is consistent with the administration's position on Colombia and the war against terrorism.
- (FOUO) I request your help in influencing OMB to restore the \$90 million to the President's Supplemental request.

Keep clear -  
10.6 at 10-05

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

11-L-0559/OSD/18773

August 6, 2003

EF-6455  
03/01/03-ES

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Iceland

You were on the phone with Condi on the Iceland matter. Let's prepare a memo teeing up the issue and explaining the situation. Let's get it to her soon.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080603-5



Please respond by 8/13

**COMPLETE**  
6 Aug 03  
See attached

Sir,  
Response attached.  
vr  
CDR Nosenzo  
8/7

U21287 / 03

complete  
8/7

August 6, 2003

Snowflake

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld EA  
SUBJECT: Iceland

OB  
10/15

You were on the phone with Condi on the Iceland matter. Let's prepare a memo teeing up the issue and explaining the situation. Let's get it to her soon.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080603-5

.....  
Please respond by 8/15/03

11-L-0559/OSD/18775

Wish to see you  
Phone call with Dr. Rice  
As int. plan  
for the  
Dalt

Dalt

Phone Call with Dr. Rice

SUBJECT: Iceland

Project Budget Exp -  
± 6.0m A yr -  
Train program - strike correct  
for train.  
New work + -

- Our proposals for the defense of Iceland are robust and credible.
- Our handling of the Iceland situation affects the global realignment effort.
- Putting NATO in the middle further delays withdrawal of F-15s & helicopters.
- Defense relationship must be grounded in rational threat assessment.

US - 6m. ± 250mil / yr.

Af - Broken is ± 50 cost - 4 F-15 - 5 SAR Keli  
2700  
600 per yr

NAVY - 200 mil.  
1200 per plus dep.  
4-P-3.

At that point would be NATO net.  
run by NATO

UNCLASSIFIED

TAB A

SECRET

203 OCT 24 11 09 34

11/3  
October 30, 2003

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Discussion on Consolidation of Intelligence Activities

At the next combatant commanders conference I think I would like to participate in, chair, or lead a discussion on the subject of the Scowcroft report and the post-9/11 tendency to think that it may be desirable to consolidate intelligence activities out of this Department.

I think it is an enormously important subject, and I would like to discuss it. I don't think it is something that ought to go into the tank unless I go into the tank with you and talk about it, because I have very strong views on the subject.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
103003-32

.....  
Please respond by 11/12/03

350.09

3 Nov 03

U212997/03

Tab A

For Your INFORMATION —  
WORKING DRAFT C/12/23

INFO MEMO

December 23, 2003

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: W.J. Haynes II, General Counsel, DoD  
David S.C. Chu, USD(P&R)

SUBJECT: Preliminary Injunction Against Anthrax Vaccination Program

- On December 22, 2003, Judge Emmet Sullivan entered a preliminary injunction: in the absence of a Presidential waiver of informed consent for the use of an investigational drug on military personnel, DoD is "enjoined from inoculating service members without their consent." The primary basis for the decision is the Judge's conclusion (with which we strongly disagree) that the FDA has never clearly determined that the vaccine is approved for protection against inhalation exposure and the Judge's view that the scientific data supporting this use are weak.
- We are proceeding to prepare a motion to the Court to: a) clarify that the preliminary injunction should be limited to the six plaintiffs in the case, not the entire program; b) in the alternative, a stay of the injunction pending appeal; or c) in the alternative, a brief stay for 30-45 days to give DoD and FDA an opportunity to resolve the matter. We are working to file this motion today. If Judge Sullivan denies this motion, we will then pursue a similar motion to the Court of Appeals.
- Beyond the immediate litigation action, we will initiate discussions with the FDA aimed at obtaining an "Emergency Use Authorization" under a new authority contained in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (section 1603). Unlike "investigational drug" uses, this new type of authorization does not have the attributes of a clinical research trial, but it does generally call for an "option to refuse." However, this option to refuse may be waived for military personnel by the President.
- While we seek clarification or a stay from Judge Sullivan and potentially the Court of Appeals, there remains the question of whether we pause the vaccination program for a period (perhaps 30 days) in anticipation of judicial relief or FDA authorization under the new authority. The preliminary Justice Department view is that our prompt action seeking clarification or stay would show a good faith effort to respond to the Court.

U213094/03

11-L-0559/OSD/18778

- We will be glad to discuss this with you at your earliest convenience.



HEALTH AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1200

INFO MEMO

273 070 04 11 11:00

DEC 01 2003

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: *W. Winkenwerder*  
William Winkenwerder, Jr., MD, ASD (Health Affairs)

SUBJECT: Depression and Suicide Prevention in the Department of Defense

- Senator Pete Domenici called you to discuss depression as a possible cause of suicide in military personnel. (TAB A)
- Depression is one of a number of risk factors for suicide, and treating depression is an effective way of reducing suicide risk.
- There are a number of criteria for diagnosing depression, among which are sleep disturbance, poor concentration and memory, lack of interest in normal activities, and suicidal thoughts or behaviors.
- The Military Health System has a behavioral health component (psychiatrists, psychologists, social workers, nurses and mental health technicians) which is world class in the diagnosis and treatment of depression using all of the methods available to medical science, including the most current medications.
- Department of Defense senior leaders recognize the seriousness of the issue of suicide, and each military Service has implemented a Suicide Prevention Program tailored to its organizational structure. These programs teach soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and their commanders to recognize symptoms of depression, including suicidal thoughts, in themselves or others and to take immediate action to get life-saving treatment.
- In all of the programs, mental health support and suicide prevention are available to the Service members before, during and after deployment. The Army utilizes a Deployment Cycle Support Plan to provide mental health prevention and treatment throughout the deployment cycle.
- The suicide rate in the Iraqi theater of operations is consistent with the annual suicide rates for the period 1990-2002 for all of the Services. The suicide rate for military personnel averages about 12 per 100,000 persons per year. The rate for a civilian population of the same age, gender, and race averages about 20 per 100,000 persons per year.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared by: COL Burke, C&PP, (b)(6) PCDOCS 56251, 57289, 56761

U213107/03

11-L-0559/OSD/18780



October 16, 2003

TO: Bill Winkenwerder  
CC: Powell Moore  
David Chu  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Depression

Senator Pete Domenici called me yesterday.

He noticed articles about suicides in the Army. He said something like the following: Suicide is frequently caused by depression, which can be a matter of the inability to sleep or indecisiveness. He wonders if the Army is doing a good job of looking into the possibility of depression in the military. He said a high percentage of certain age groups have some sort of depression, and that there is a relatively high teenage suicide rate now from depression.

His recommendation is that we get some psychiatrists or psychologists to take a look at the issue of depression. He is convinced a lot of it can be fixed with modern medicines.

Please tell me what you think. Also, please get with Powell Moore and go back to Senator Domenici to tell him what we know and are doing.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
101503-32

.....  
Please respond by 11/21/03

U21311 /03



SUICIDE AND DEPRESSION

COORDINATIONS

Dir, C&PPI	CAPT Jack Smith	11/10/03
DASD, C&PP	Dr. David Tornberg	11/13/03
CoS, HA	Ms. Diana Tabler	
PDASD, HA	Mr. Ed Wyatt	
ASD, LA	Mr. Powell Moore	
USD, P&R	Dr. David S. C. Chu	

*[Handwritten signature: P. A. Moore - 12/11/03]*  
*[Handwritten signature: David S. C. Chu]*  
*[Date: 11/02/03]*

*We are looking carefully at the suicides possible - suicides in CENTCOM. Nothing to report - yet.*  
I have talked with Senator Domenici's chief of staff and offered to have Dr. Winkewerder brief the Senator. Senator Domenici is out of town until 12/19/03. P. A. Moore

October 16, 2003

TO: Bill Winkenwerder

CC: Powell Moore  
David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Depression

Senator Pete Domenici called me yesterday.

He noticed articles about suicides in the Army. He said something like the following: Suicide is frequently caused by depression, which can be a matter of the inability to sleep or indecisiveness. He wonders if the Army is doing a good job of looking into the possibility of depression in the military. He said a high percentage of certain age groups have some sort of depression, and that there is a relatively high teenage suicide rate now from depression.

His recommendation is that we get some psychiatrists or psychologists to take a look at the issue of depression. He is convinced a lot of it can be fixed with modern medicines.

Please tell me what you think. Also, please get with Powell Moore and go back to Senator Domenici to tell him what we know and are doing.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
101503-32

.....  
Please respond by 11/21/03

U21311<sup>0</sup>/03

**SECRET**

August 4, 2003

TO: Powell Moore  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Response to Senator Stevens

Please make sure you get a response up to Ted Stevens on the information on the number of rewards. He asked that question, and he deserves an answer.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080403-22

.....  
Please respond by 8/15/03

*000.5*

*4 Aug 03*

U21348 /03

**SECRET**

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT(S)  
DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/18786



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

DEC 29 2003

Honorable Thomas H. Kean  
Chairman  
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks  
upon the United States  
301 Seventh Street, NW  
Room 5125  
Washington, DC 20407

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The New York Daily News (December 19, 2003) attributes to you the assertion that the attacks on the World Trade Center could have been prevented, "but officials in Washington 'simply failed' in their vigilance." The article quoted you as saying, "This was not something that had to happen." You are also cited to the effect that some of the people who failed in their vigilance before September 11 continue to hold their jobs today.

If you believe any current officials - civilian or military - anywhere in the U.S. Department of Defense failed to discharge their duties properly on or before September 11, 2001, please provide their names to me so that I can look into it promptly. Also, please provide me the information that led you to conclude that these individuals failed in their duties.

As you know, the enemies who attacked our country on September 11, 2001, continue to threaten us. As I am sure you can well understand, in my position I have a responsibility to take all appropriate steps to ensure that we correct any possible deficiencies. The information you have indicated could be helpful.

I look forward to hearing from you.

Sincerely,

U21356-03

11-L-0559/OSD/18787

000.5

29 Dec 03



12/29  
7:30pm MT

TO: LTG CRADDOCK / LARRY DI RITA

FROM: (b)(6)

RE: LTR TO CHAIRMAN KEAN

ATTACHED IS FINAL VERSION, PLUS  
DRAFT FROM HAYNES AND SD EDITS  
ON THAT DRAFT. I CANNOT SEND ELECTRONIC  
BECAUSE I TYPED IT ON TS COMPUTER.

EXECSEC COULD WORK W/ GC OFFICE  
(OR START OVER IN OUR OFFICE) TO RETYPE, GET IT  
SOM'D AND SENT.

Thanks,

(b)(6)

# OF PAGES

6

FINAL

OK TO RETYPE,  
SEM AND  
SEND

Honorable Thomas H. Kean  
Chairman  
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States  
301 Seventh Street, NW  
Room 5125  
Washington, DC 20407

Dear Mr. Chairman:

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As you know, the enemies who attacked our country on September 11, 2001, continue to threaten us. As I am sure you can well understand, in my position I have a responsibility to take all appropriate steps to ensure that we correct any possible deficiencies. The information you have indicated you have could be helpful.

I look forward to hearing from you.

Sincerely,

11-L-0559/OSD/18790

Feb in  
final - of well  
Som. 10/11  
& send it  
from DC

DRAFT

Honorable Thomas H. Kean  
Chairman  
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States  
301 Seventh Street, NW  
Room 5125  
Washington, DC 20407

Dear Mr. Chairman:

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If you believe any current officials - civilian or military - <sup>anywhere</sup> ~~within~~ the U.S. Department of Defense failed to discharge their duties properly on or before September 11, 2001, please provide their names to me so that I can look into it promptly. Also, please provide me the information that led you to conclude that these individuals failed in their duties. <sup>As you know,</sup> the enemies who attacked our country on September 11, 2001, continue to threaten us. As I am sure you

can ~~well~~ understand, in my position I ~~want~~ <sup>have a responsibility</sup> to take all appropriate steps to ensure  
that we correct any possible deficiencies. <sup>The information you have indicated</sup>

I look forward to hearing from you.

Sincerely,

<sup>you have could be</sup>  
<sup>helpful</sup>

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
Jim Haynes

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: December <sup>23</sup> 19, 2003

SUBJECT:

I think we ought to get a letter off to Chairman Keane of the 9/11 Commission. If he knows of anyone in the Defense Department who failed to do their job and contributed to September 11<sup>th</sup>, or who is currently failing to do their job, he should tell us promptly so we can do something about it.

Thanks.

DHR/czm  
121903A.03tscom

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_

1/8/04

*Response attached  
C 12/26*

2



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

*Det*

Honorable Thomas H. Kean  
Chairman  
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States  
301 Seventh Street, N.W.  
Room 5125  
Washington, D.C. 20407

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The New York Daily News (December 19, 2003) attributes to you the assertion that the attacks on the World Trade Center could have been prevented, "but officials in Washington 'simply failed' in their vigilance." The article quoted you as saying: "This was not something that had to happen." You are also cited to the effect that some of the people who failed in their vigilance before September 11 continue to hold their jobs today.

If you believe any <sup>current</sup> specific officials - ~~either~~ civilian or military - within the Department of Defense failed to discharge their duties properly on or before September 11, 2001, please provide their names to me ~~immediately~~. <sup>So that I can look into it, please</sup> Also, ask that you provide me the information that led you to conclude that these individuals failed in their duties. As you ~~must~~ know, the enemies that attacked our country so ~~treacherously~~ on September 11, 2001, continue to threaten us. Making such charges without further information is not just unhelpful, it is also potentially quite harmful. It prevents or delays those of us <sup>any possible</sup> responsible for defending the country from ensuring that we can correct the deficiencies you allege. It also threatens to undermine ~~immediately~~ the public's confidence in its government.

I look forward to hearing from you.

Sincerely,

*As I am (in the way) well understood,  
In my position,  
I want to talk all  
Appropriate steps to*



SECRET

EF-6469

I-03/011182

August 7, 2003

C 9/3  
✓ 9/8

TO: J.D. Crouch  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Memo on France

Is there any way to declassify the memo you fashioned on France I sent to the President pointing out how they were damaging us?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080703-5

France

.....  
Please respond by 8/22/03

Sir,  
Response attached.  
vr/CDR Nosenzo  
9-3

7 AUG 03

U21360 /03

SECRET

11-L-0559/OSD/18795

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT(S)  
DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED

D  
AW Pro is Intergral

8/18

August 4, 2003

EF-641

1-03/010926

TO: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Eritrea

Please figure out something we can do that is positive for Eritrea—maybe a letter from me to the senior folks, maybe a senior visit by somebody. I am worried about that relationship souring.

Eritrea

Let's get it fixed. It sounds like the relationship is in disrepair.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080103-6



Please respond by 8/15/03 /

4 Aug 03

U21361 / 03

**SECRET/NOFORN**

UNCLASSIFIED UPON  
REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENTS

519

7:26 PM

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: August 25, 2003  
SUBJECT: *Backfill of US Forces*

Why don't we pull together a list of places where we could pull U.S. forces out if we could get allies and friends to back-fill us. For example, the Sinai, Iceland, the Balkans, Kosovo, Bosnia, Macedonia, Korea, Europe and other places.

We have a good list of them and if we come up with some proposal of numbers and then some idea of what countries might be appropriate, then we could move that in the interagency with the thought that we could get others thinking along that line which they obviously currently are not. We keep getting resistance instead of help.

Thanks.

DHR/wm  
082503.26

Please respond by: 9/8

*✓ 9/19*

*c 9/18 25 Aug 03*

*Sir,  
Response attached.  
vt CDR NOSENZO  
9/18*

U21363 /03

**SECRET/NOFORN**

UNCLASSIFIED UPON  
REMOVAL OF ENCLOSURES

11-L-0559/OSD/18797

*320.2*

In reply refer to EF and I numbers

EF-6468  
I-03/011183

August 7, 2003

TO: Doug Feith

SUBJECT: Uzbekistan

It looks like Uzbekistan has some economic troubles. I wonder what we could do to be helpful to them.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080703-13

.....  
Please respond by 8/22/03

AUG 8 2003  
1030 RECEIVED IN ISP

UZBEKISTAN

8/26

7 Aug 03

U21364 / 03

V9-19

August 9, 2003

EP-6486

03/01 296-85

TO: Doug Feith

FROM:

SUBJECT: German Police Training

This isn't good enough—the status of German police training in Afghanistan.

Please come up with a proposal as to how we get the State Department, the Defense Department and everyone pushing to get them to do a better, faster job and put more money and beef behind it.

Thanks.

Attach.

8/1/03 ASD(ISP) memo to SecDef re: Getting the Germans to Move on Afghan Police Training

DHR:dh  
080903-6

...

Please respond by 8/29/03

Afghanistan

Sir,  
Response attached.  
vr/CDR Nosenzo

@ 8/29

9 Aug 03

U21365 M/03

9273  
2/28

August 4, 2003

DS  
C 8/18

EF-6423

03/ 010949

TO: Doug Feith

SUBJECT: Haifa as a Port

Netanyahu suggested we use Haifa as a port and go through Jordan to supply Iraq.  
Any thoughts?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
060403-36

ISRAEL

.....  
Please respond by 8/15/03

Distro To DS, JA, DM, FW, BC, FIA

Date 8/15/03

Time \_\_\_\_\_

✓  
8/19  
Aug 03

Sir,  
Response attached.  
w/ CDR Nesnes  
8/18

August 4, 2003

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: General Dayton and Counterterrorism

I met with General Dayton and we agreed that he needs a team to focus not just on WMD, Speicher or the security organizations, but also terrorism. He doesn't currently have that. He thought he would have to add three subject matter experts and two analysts who are counterterrorism experts.

*000.5*

Why don't you talk to him, figure out what he needs and let's make sure DIA gets it out to him, so he ends up with a terrorism cell that has an equal priority up there.

If you have questions, please let me know. In any event, please report back to me.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080403-27

.....  
Please respond by 7/15/03

*✓ 8/7*

*8/6  
4 Aug 03*

*Sir,  
Response attached.  
v/r  
CDR Nosenzo  
8/6*

**U21367 /03**

6 506  
August 6, 2003

TO: Gen. Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Law of the Sea

I am told that the Joint Staff is reviewing the Law of the Sea. Before you get too far on that, please come and visit with me about it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080403.54

.....

Please respond by 8/15/03

8012

6 AUG 03

U21368 /03  
Done/SD  
TEN 8/11

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

✓

August 13, 2003

EF-6520

03/011436-ES

TO: J.D. Crouch  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: NATO and Iraq

On this Paul Bremer NATO issue, I kind of like the idea. Why don't you see what you can do about it at the appropriate time. Use your judgment.

Iraq

Thanks.

Attach.  
8/1/03 SecDef memo to Feith  
8/9/03 Crouch memo to SecDef  
7/30/03 Bremer memo to SecDef

DHR:dh  
081303-17

.....  
Please respond by 1/12/03

*C 9/25*

*Sir,  
Response attached. Original  
Bremer memo included behind.*

*vjr  
CDR Nosenko  
9-25*

*13 AUG 03*

U213694/03

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT(S)  
DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED

11-CONFIDENTIAL-18803  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

V  
7/30

30 July 2003

**MEMORANDUM**

TO: Secretary Rumsfeld  
FROM: L. Paul Bremer, III  
RE: CPA Issues

**MEK**

- Need to resolve broader strategy as soon as possible.

**NATO**

- Should we consider issuing invitation to NATO to 1) establish small presence in Iraq of commanders/ advisors or 2) make a statement in support of international troop contributions?
- Endorsement, even in the absence of large troop deployment, could help provide political cover to member countries.

**IRAQI GOVERNANCE COUNCIL**

- GC elected a new nine-member leadership body to chair the Council on a rotational basis.
- Nine members elected were Ja'afari; Chalabi; Allawi; Talabani; Hakim; Pachachi; Hamid; Bahr al-Uloum; Barzani.

12/19  
1030

2:31 PM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
DATE: December 17, 2003  
SUBJECT: **Iraq**

Why don't you think through the idea of having people come in and register if they belong to the intelligence service or something and they will be treated differently and maybe possibly announcing something like a 20-30 year jail service if someone was in the IIS or Special Republican Guard, and has not registered and is caught having done anything adverse to the Coalition over the Iraqis.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
121703.02

Iraq

Please respond by: 12/04

17 Dec 03

December 27, 2003

TO: Ambassador Zal Khalilzad  
(PLEASE SEND VIA MESSAGE CABLE)  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Congratulations

I am keeping posted on your activities. It sounds to me like you are doing a first-rate job and that it is going well. Congratulations in advance!

DHR:dh  
122703-11 (is computer)

335 SD

27 DEC 03

December 27, 2003

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

Mr. Vice President—

I just read your interview with John McWethy of ABC for the special they are going to do.

Thank you so much for those generous comments. They are appreciated.

000.775D

DHR:dh  
122703-17 (to computer)

27 Dec 03

Snowflake

October 15, 2003

TO: Jim Haynes

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Closure of Government

Attached is a memo I am thinking about sending to Andy Card. I have not sent it. Also attached is Ray DuBois' memo. What are the actual facts and what do you think we ought to do about the concern I have?

Thanks.

Attach.  
10/15/03 Draft SecDef memo to Mr. Card (101503-38)

DHR:dh  
101503-38

.....  
Please respond by 11/14/03

200.1

15 Oct 03

TAB B

U21428 / 03



2003 OCT -6 AM 8:36



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

ADMINISTRATION AND  
MANAGEMENT

**ACTION MEMO**

October 3, 2003 10:45 a.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Raymond F. DuBois, Director, Administration and Management

SUBJECT: Essential Personnel During Emergency

*Lady Duffin*  
*10/14*

*Ray DuBois* 10.3.03

- You asked for information regarding the Government's closure on September 18 and 19, 2003, due to Hurricane Isabel.
- The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) has the authority to curtail Federal operations in the event of an emergency. The OPM consulted with the General Services Administration, Federal Emergency Management Agency, and White House Chief of Staff, prior to making the decision to close the Government on September 18 and 19.
- During a Government closure, you may determine whom you consider essential. Any military member or civilian employee you determine essential will be required to report for work or remain at work when operations are disrupted, consistent with their personal safety.
- There may be instances when an emergency employee is not required to report to work during an emergency. Who you consider essential for this purpose may be scenario-driven.
- ~~The memorandum at Tab A designates all Presidentally appointed, Senate confirmed officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Military Departments, as well as other DoD civilian officials in the Pentagon that report directly to you, to be essential personnel during an emergency.~~

RECOMMENDATION: SecDef sign the memorandum at Tab A.


COORDINATION: DoD GC

Attachment: As stated

Prepared by: Howard Becker, (b)(6)

SPL ASSISTANT CI RITA	10/14
SI MA GRADDOCK	10/14
MA BUCCI 10/14	
EXCESSO MANNOTT	10/16

U16393 /03



You are here: Home > oca > COMPMEMO

## WASHINGTON, DC, AREA DISMISSAL OR CLOSURE PROCEDURES

### Introduction

The following guidelines apply to situations that prevent significant numbers of employees in the Washington, DC, area from reporting for work on time or which require agencies to close all or part of their activities, including adverse weather conditions (snow emergencies, severe icing conditions, floods, earthquakes, and hurricanes) and other disruptions of Government operations (air pollution, disruption of power and/or water, interruption of public transportation, etc.):

These procedures apply to employees (including employees telecommuting from an alternative worksite) in all executive agencies located inside the Washington Capital Beltway. These procedures do not apply to employees of the U.S. Postal Service, the government of the District of Columbia, or private sector entities, including contractors. Facilities outside the Beltway may prefer to develop their own plans, since they are subject to different weather and traffic conditions than those inside the Beltway. In unusual situations, however, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) may issue guidelines affecting facilities outside the Beltway, as well.

It is essential that Federal agencies in the metropolitan area comply with this area-wide plan and the announced decisions on dismissal or closure. Agencies should avoid independent action because any change in the work hour of Federal workers in the Washington, DC, area requires careful coordination with municipal and regional officials to minimize disruption of the highway and transit systems.

Agencies that find it necessary to exclude certain offices or activities from this plan should notify OPM of such exemptions and update such notices when necessary. Application of this guidance must be consistent with the provision of applicable collective bargaining agreements or other controlling policies, authorities, and instructions.

### OPM'S RESPONSIBILITIES

Information will be available on our web site at <http://www.opm.gov/status>. We request that all agencies making a different decision notify us by calling (202) 606-2166, email [http://www.opm.gov/oca/COMPMEMO/mailto](mailto:oca/COMPMEMO@mailto), or fax to (202) 606-2340.

### AGENCIES' RESPONSIBILITIES

1. At least annually, agencies should provide written procedures for dismissal or closure to employees working in the Washington, DC, area. The notice should tell employees how they will be notified and include the text of the memo announcements to be used and a detailed explanation of their meaning.
2. Agencies should notify their employees of the procedures for requesting leave when an "unscheduled leave" policy is announced. When an "unscheduled leave" policy is announced, employees should contact their agencies to request annual leave, leave without pay, and/or the use of previously earned compensatory time off credit hours under an alternative work schedule.
3. At least annually, agencies should identify personnel who must report for work and continue Government

file://C:\Documents%20and%20Settings\sullivan\Mv%20Documents\Office%20-%20%20... 10/29/2003

operations during a disruption of operations and notify them in writing that they are designated as "emergency employees." The notice should include the requirement that emergency employees report for or remain at work when operations are disrupted and an explanation that dismissal or closure announcements do not apply to them unless they are instructed otherwise. (Agencies may designate employees who telework from an alternative work site as "emergency employees.") If an agency determines that a situation requires employees not designated as "emergency employees" to report for or remain at work when operations are disrupted, the agency should establish a procedure for notifying them individually.

4. Agencies are responsible for determining closure, dismissal, and leave policies for employees on shift work and alternative work schedules (i.e., flexible or compressed work schedules) and for informing employees of these policies.

**Excused Absence**

Agencies are encouraged to follow these procedures. However, agencies will continue to have discretionary authority to grant a reasonable amount of excused absence for individual hardships or circumstances unique to an employee. For example, factors such as distance, availability of transportation, or available alternatives to childcare or eldercare may be considered.

Agencies generally look to OPM to coordinate any decisions to dismiss Federal employees from work with local and Federal agencies, transportation authorities, and the media so as to reduce traffic congestion and ensure that affected employees are treated as consistently as possible. Therefore, all employees are expected to report for work or remain at work unless specifically excused by their supervisors.

**DISRUPTIONS BEFORE THE WORKDAY BEGINS**

The Office of Personnel Management will provide one of the following five announcements to the media when a disruption occurs before the workday begins. These announcements do NOT apply to individuals who are designated as "emergency employees." Emergency employees are expected to report for work on time unless excused by their supervisors.

Announcement	What Announcement Means
1. "Federal agencies in the Washington, DC, area are OPEN; employees are expected to report for work on time."	Employees are expected to report for work on time.
2. "Federal agencies in the Washington, DC, area are OPEN under an UNSCHEDULED LEAVE policy."	Employees who cannot report for work may take unscheduled leave for their entire scheduled workday.  Emergency employees are expected to report for work on time.
3. "Federal agencies in the Washington, DC, area are OPEN under a DELAYED ARRIVAL policy."	Employees should plan their commutes so that they arrive for work no more than xx hours later than they would normally arrive. Employees who arrive for work more than xx hours later than their normal arrival time will be charged annual leave or leave without pay for the additional period of absence from work.  Emergency employees are expected to report for work on time.
4. "Federal agencies in the Washington, DC, area are OPEN under a DELAYED ARRIVAL/UNSCHEDULED LEAVE policy. Employees should plan to arrive for work no more than xx hours later than they would normally arrive, and employees who cannot report for work may take unscheduled leave."	Employees should plan their commutes so that they arrive for work no more than xx hours later than they would normally arrive. Employees who arrive for work more than xx hours later than their normal arrival time will be charged annual leave or leave without pay for the additional period of absence from work.

	<p>Employees who cannot report for work may take unscheduled leave for their entire scheduled workday.</p> <p>Emergency employees are expected to report for work on time.</p>
5. "Federal agencies are CLOSED."	Federal agencies are closed. Emergency employees are expected to report for work on time.

## DISRUPTIONS AFTER THE WORKDAY BEGINS

The Office of Personnel Management will provide the following announcement to the media when a disruption occurs after the workday begins. This announcement does not apply to individuals who are designated as "emergency employees." Emergency employees are expected to remain at work unless excused by their supervisors.

Announcement	What Announcement Means
<p>"Federal agencies in the Washington, DC, area are operating under an EARLY DISMISSAL policy. Employees should be dismissed by their agencies xx hours earlier than their normal departure time from work."</p>	<p>Employees should be dismissed by their agencies relative to their normal departure times from work. For example, if a 3-hour "early dismissal" policy is announced, workers who normally leave their offices at 4:00 p.m. should leave at 1:00 p.m. Employees who must leave work earlier than their official dismissal time will be charged annual leave or leave without pay from the time of their departure through the remainder of their scheduled workday.</p> <p>Employees on pre-approved leave for the entire day should be charged leave for the entire day.</p> <p>Emergency employees are expected to remain at work.</p>

Compensation Policy Memoranda

Office of Personnel Management  
 1900 E Street NW, Washington, DC 20415-1000 | (b)(6)

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
# Office of Personnel Management

The Federal Government's Human Resources Agency

Strategic Management of Human Capital

Employment and Benefits

Career Opportunities



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September 18, 2003

## MEMORANDUM FOR HEADS OF EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES, AND CHIEF HUMAN CAPITAL OFFICERS


**FROM:** KAY COLES JAMES  
Director

**SUBJECT:** Designation of Emergency Personnel

As you know, the President has stressed the need for all Federal agencies to plan and be prepared for any emergency - including the sort we are experiencing today with Hurricane Isabel. However, our decision yesterday to close Government offices in the Washington, DC metropolitan area because of Isabel has prompted a number of inquiries regarding subject designations.

This memorandum is to remind you that each agency head has the discretion to identify and designate those personnel that he or she judges to be critical to agency operations in any given emergency situation. There are no standard definitions or categories in this regard, and agency heads (or their designees, as applicable) are free to make such determinations based on the agency's unique mission requirements and/or circumstances; such designations may even vary according to the particular nature of an exigency. Such designations should be part of your emergency response/continuity of operations plans and should be communicated (preferably in advance) to those so designated, so that they can be prepared to support and sustain agency operations in an emergency.

Please let me know if you have any additional questions. OPM is here to support you and your agency's mission, and I am confident that we can do so without compromising the safety of our employees.



Office of Personnel Management  
1900 E Street NW, Washington, DC 20415-1000 | (202) 606-1800 | TTY (202) 606-2532

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Last Modified: 9:38:40 AM on Tuesday, September 23, 2003

3:25 PM

616

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: November 18, 2003  
RE: NE Asia

I am worried that we are proceeding too fast with the Northeast Asia base structure proposals and we have not completed the contingency planning. The briefings I get from people indicate to me that they are focusing totally on existing plans, all of which are going to be changed in a relatively short period of time. We ought to keep our eye on that risk.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
11/18/03

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_ 11/30

Tab A

December 30, 2003

TO: Newt Gingrich  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Your Trip

Paul Wolfowitz will get in touch with you and give you some suggestions on your trip.

Regards,

DHR:dh  
122903-3 (to computer)

333

30 Dec 03

U21481 / 03

(b)(6)

CIV, OSD

**From:** Thirddwave2@aol.com

**Sent:** Thursday, December 25, 2003 8:56 AM

**To:** (b)(6)@pentagon.mil; Larry.DiRita@osd.pentagon.mil;  
John.Craddock@OSD.Pentagon.mil; Shep3804@aol.com; Jack.patterson@osd.mil

**Subject:** bremer invitation to visit Iraq-newt

forsecdef, depsecdef  
from newt 12/25/03  
Bremer invitation to visit Iraq

Bremer has invited me to Iraq and I can go for about a week in late January

Abizaid indicated he would help plan the itinerary and would like to see me while there

I would like your thoughts on where I should go and who I should see

I would like to take Lt. commander Mark Kester with me (he is an intell officer in the Navy doing a year's fellowship at AEI and is quite good)

I may need DoD help on funding the travel and arrangements in country

when I went in March I was supported by the defense policy board but I think I went as a guest of CentCom.

thanks

12/29/2003

A-261-2

11-L-0559/OSD/18817

December 30, 2003

TO: Newt Gingrich  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Your Trip

Paul Wolfowitz will get in touch with you and give you some suggestions on your trip.

Regards,

DHR:dh  
122903-3 (ts computer)

333

30 Dec 03

U21491 / 03

(b)(6) CIV, OSD

**From:** Thirdwave2@aol.com  
**Sent:** Thursday, December 25, 2003 8:56 AM  
**To:** (b)(6)@pentagon.mil; Larry.DiRita@osd.pentagon.mil;  
John.Craddock@OSD.Pentagon.mil; Shep3804@aol.com; Jack.patterson@osd.mil  
**Subject:** bremer invitation to visit Iraq-newt

forsecdef, depsecdef  
from newt 12/25/03  
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when I went in March I was supported by the defense policy board but I think I went as a guest of centcom.

thanks

12/29/2003

A-261-2

UNCLASSIFIED

TAB

December 11, 2003

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
 CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
 SUBJECT: Information Operations

You might want to think about have an information operations discussion at the combatant commanders' conference. I don't know if it fits with the calendar, but it is a thought. It certainly is an important subject that we need to keep getting better at.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
120903-1

.....  
 Please respond by *11/10/03*

*413.51*

*11 Dec 03*

C10/3

September 23, 2003

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.*  
SUBJECT: Mosques

Talk to me about the possibility that things are buried underneath all the new mosques that have been built in Iraq.

Thanks.

Iraq

DHR:dh  
092203-53

.....  
Please respond by 10/10/03

OCT 3 2003

✓  
10/4

Sir -

Attached is a reply from Adm. Jacoby.  
Bottom line: The most obvious mosques  
have been examined.

I will ask Jacoby to assure the ISG  
remains attentive and that questions about  
mosques be added to the list used by  
the interrogators.

SL

23 Sep 03

TEN  
10.3

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~  
~~SECRET~~

3:17 PM

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: July 28, 2003  
SUBJECT: Pearl Harbor

Read this Red Cell on "Pearl Harbor" in Space and tell me what we are doing about it.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
072803.26

Attach: DIC Red Cell (S) NOFORN//X1 7/23/03 **NOT ATTACHED**

Please respond by: 8/10/03

*SD outbox  
8/6*

*Y 71.96*

*2850103*

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~  
~~SECRET~~

U21517 /03

08/17

July 18, 2003

EF-6203

03/010042

TO: Doug Feith

FROM:

SUBJECT: German Police Reform

Please take a look at how we get the German government to start boosting their work on police reform. See the attached cable.

Thanks.

Germany

Attach.

AMEMBASSY CABLE R131443Z JUL 03 re: Ambassador Reviews Security Sector Reform NOT ATTACHED

DHR:dh  
071503-4

.....

Please respond by 8/1/03

Sir,  
Response attached  
y/r  
CDR Nosenzo  
8/7

18 Jul 03

U21518 / 03



OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2900 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2900

EF-6207  
✓  
KR

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY  
POLICY

INFO MEMO

USDP *[Signature]*  
1-03-010042-EP

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: J.D. CROUCH II, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR  
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY (b)(6) *[Signature]* AUG 1 2003

SUBJECT: Getting the Germans to Move on Afghan Police Training

- German efforts to lead police training have been meager; claim to have trained 200+ police, but requirements are 30X higher. Germans have funding and security concerns. *THE requirements are 30X higher. is 6,000.*
- To improve, they are considering:
  - Creation of 8 police schools co-located with PRTs; no Berlin decision yet.
  - Sending a Special Coordinator for Security Sector Reforms to Kabul to boost effort.
- German Interior Ministry (vice Defense) is responsible for police training, so we need to engage Interior through Homeland Defense and State.
  - We have been pressing the Ministry of Defense representatives.
- State is preparing a donor-specific fundraising strategy for German and other major powers, including cabinet-level calls, to be executed in August.
  - As part of the donor strategy in rolling out US acceleration of assistance, Powell and Ridge should call their German counterparts to stress urgent need for reform.
    - Themes to be emphasized include:
      - We got \$7M to assist Germany in launching border police training (approx. \$2M from DOD and \$5M from State).
      - We will help raise support. Norway is considering a \$15M pledge and the UK has pledged \$5M.
      - Encouraging them to use PRTs as platforms for police and border police training. State is already moving on sending US-funded trainers to the PRTs.
      - Encouraging them to move ahead with concept of police schools in the regions.
  - State is executing these themes. We are working closely with them.

Prepared by: James Hirsch, ISP/EUR (b)(6) 1 Aug 03



11-L-0559/OSD/18824

COORDINATION

DASD (EUR/NATO)

Ian Brzezinski

*ABV 8/11*

DASD (Stability Ops)

Joe Collins

chopped 7/31/03

Afghan Policy Coordinator

Marin Strmecki

chopped 7/31/03

Director, European Policy

Jay Wilkins

Q/W 8/1/03

EF-6390  
I-03/010800  
July 31, 2003

11811

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Demarche

This NATO memo is important, and we need to get engaged with it. Is the demarche only going to be from the foreign ministry side, or should the DoD weigh in with the MoDs?

Thanks.

Attach.  
USMISSION USNATO 000832, O 291731Z JUL 03 NOT ATTACHED

DHR:dh  
073103-5

NATO 092

.....  
Please respond by 8/2/03

✓ 8/9

AUG 1 2003  
1410 RECEIVED IN ISP

3150103

U21519 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD/18826

EF-6120

July 14, 2003

I-03/009740

C 8/22

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Accomplishments in Iraq

You gave me a paper titled "Afghanistan: OEF Compendium of Accomplishments" in July 2002. Here is a copy of it.

Do you have a similar thing for Iraq?

Thanks.

Attach.

7/22/02 Afghanistan: OEF Compendium of Accomplishments (418700-05)

Afghanistan

DHR:dh  
071403-18

.....  
Please respond by 8/1/03

USDP-  
Luti for action.  
Suspense 7/29/03.

✓/R LA

8/1/03  
8/1/03  
8/1/03

145.103

U21520 /03

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: September 8, 2003

I have no visibility into who the bad guys are in Afghanistan or Iraq. I read all the intel from the community and it sounds as though we know a great deal but in fact, when you push at it, you find out we haven't got anything that is actionable. We are woefully deficient in human intelligence.

Let's discuss it.

DHR/azn  
090803.26b

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_

9/18

✓ 9/20

9/15

Response attached  
v/r CDR Nosenzo  
9/15

2  
59903

000.5

OS  
9.20

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: September <sup>12</sup> 8, 2003  
SUBJECT:

The lack of clarity as to who the enemies are, and what the problems are from an intelligence standpoint in Afghanistan and Iraq is serious.

I keep reading IC intel. It leaves one with the impression that we know a lot-who the people are, what they are doing, why they are doing it, where they are going, when they are meeting, and the like.

However, when one pushes on that information it is pretty clear we don't have actionable intelligence. Further, I wish we had better information about the enemies so we could design a better approach.

I don't feel I have good data on the people we have been capturing and interrogating in either country. I don't feel I am getting information from the interrogations that should be enabling us as to the answer to the questions I've posed.

What do we do about it? We need more visibility.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
090803.27a

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_

000.5

12 Sep 03

U21526 /03

September 15, 2003

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Iran

*Iran*

When I was at the World Wrestling Championships, a man stopped beside my seat, handed me this piece of paper with a phone number and his name, and offered to help on Iran. It didn't strike me as anything notable, but it might be worth someone talking to him and seeing who he is and what it is about.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
091503-28

.....  
Please respond by 10/10/03

(b)(6)

*✓*  
*10/17*

*15 Sep 03*

TEN 10/16

11-L-0559/OSD/18830

U21527 /03

TO: Honorable Colin Powell (*hand delivery*)

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: September 8, 2003

SUBJECT: *The Washington Post*

Attached is an article from *The Washington Post* about someone who they say is a consultant to the Department of State.

*Iraq*

DHR/azn  
090803 18a

*Attached:* *Washington Post*. "Ex-Envoy Criticizes Bush's Postwar Policy." Ricks  
9/5/03

*8 Sep 03*

the United Nations.

The Pentagon estimates that the military occupation has been costing nearly \$4 billion a month.

This week, international experts enlisted by the American-led occupation authorities estimated that the loss of oil revenues and cost of operating a civilian government in Iraq is projected at \$20 billion for 2004.

That figure was given to diplomats from potential donor nations in Brussels this week, and by all accounts they were stunned.

"Think of it this way," said an official familiar with the Brussels session. "You'd be putting more than a third of the world's development assistance in 2004 into a country with the second largest oil reserves in the world. Imagine what that does to the rest of the poor countries in the world. All of Africa doesn't get that much money."

This official said the United States would have to "dramatically trim" its requests and put up a huge sum to good other nations into donating.

But a senior administration official said: "We expect billions of dollars out of the rest of the world. Billions."

American officials recognize that in order to secure anything like those amounts, L. Paul Bremer III, the chief American administrator in Iraq, might either have to step aside or at least have to share his task of running Iraq with a successor to Sergio Vieira de Mello, the special envoy who was killed in the bombing of the United Nations headquarters in Baghdad on Aug. 19.

While the Iraq situation has unfolded, the administration has also made a big adjustment on North Korea.

China and to a lesser extent South Korea — and to an even lesser extent Japan — advocate a policy of some actions if North Korea seems headed toward the goal of

giving up its nuclear arms and programs.

"Everybody is realistic enough to know that you can't have a negotiation where one side does everything before the other side does anything," a senior official said. "I've never seen a negotiation like that. Even with the Japanese surrender after World War II, we said immediately that the emperor could stay."

Aerospace Daily  
September 5, 2003

### 31. Bush Nominates Wynne For ATL Undersecretary Post

President Bush has nominated Michael W. Wynne to be undersecretary of defense for acquisition, technology and logistics (ATL), the White House said Sept. 3. If confirmed by the Senate, Wynne would replace former undersecretary E.C. "Pete" Aldridge Jr., who retired in May. Wynne has served as the principal undersecretary for ATL and has been acting secretary since Aldridge's retirement.

Washington Times  
September 5, 2003  
Pg. 15

### 32. U.S., 10 Allies Plan Series Of Exercises To Stop Illegal Arms

By David R. Sands, The Washington Times

The United States and 10 allies yesterday announced plans for a series of land, air and sea exercises over the next six months to put teeth into an accord to halt the shipping of weapons of mass destruction by North Korea and other rogue nations.

U.S. officials said two days of talks that ended yesterday in Paris also produced a set of principles for intercepting illegal arms shipments on the high seas and for sharing intelligence and other information to halt weapons flows.

The first of 10 planned exercises, dubbed "Pacific Protector," will be held beginning next week in the Coral Sea off Australia's northeast coast and will include vessels from the United States, France, Australia and Japan. Exercises in the coming months will be held in the Mediterranean and Arabian Sea, among other locales, officials said.

President Bush proposed the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) in Krakow, Poland, in May, and Washington has led the drive to enlist more countries in the cooperative effort to shut down illegal weapons sales.

Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John R. Bolton told reporters in Paris that the agreement to hold a series of training exercises was "a very clear demonstration that what we're involved in here is not a diplomatic exercise."

Other nations involved in the PSI include Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain and Britain. The Bush administration is attempting to recruit more nations.

U.S. officials say the PSI is not targeted at any one nation, but Mr. Bolton, in a statement to the Paris conference yesterday, noted that North Korea and Iran have already been designated as states of "particular proliferation concern."

Taiwanese officials, acting on a tip from U.S. intelligence, seized 158 barrels of dual-use chemicals from a North Korean ship, and Australian forces earlier this year boarded another North Korean ship found to be carrying a huge cache of heroin.

But China, a neighbor of North Korea and host of last week's six-party talks on the Korean Peninsula nuclear standoff, yesterday voiced strong doubts about the PSI effort.

"We understand the concerns of some countries

about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction," said Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Kong Quan in a Beijing press briefing. "But many countries still question the efficiency and legitimacy of adopting this kind of measure."

China reportedly tried unsuccessfully to get the United States and its allies to postpone the Australian exercise as its North Korean diplomacy proceeded.

Mr. Bolton yesterday dismissed fears expressed by some that the PSI interdiction moves could violate international law, which sharply curtails the rights of individual nations to board ships in international waters.

In a celebrated case, Spanish naval forces — again acting on U.S. information — boarded an unflagged vessel last year in the Indian Ocean found to be carrying a shipment of North Korean Scud missiles bound for Yemen. Although such sales are a prime source of funds for the North Korean regime, U.S. officials concluded they had no legal grounds for halting the sale.

"What we intend to do is consistent with national and international authorities," Mr. Bolton said. "Where we think we may have gaps in that authority, we are willing to consider seeking additional authorization."

Washington Post  
September 5, 2003  
Pg. 16

### 33. Ex-Envoy Criticizes Bush's Postwar Policy

By Thomas E. Ricks, Washington Post Staff Writer

A former U.S. commander for the Middle East who still consults for the State Department yesterday blasted the Bush administration's handling of postwar Iraq, saying it lacked a coherent strategy, a serious plan and sufficient resources.

"There is no strategy or

mechanism for putting the pieces together," said retired Marine Gen. Anthony C. Zinni, and so, he said, "we're in danger of failing."

In an impassioned speech to several hundred Marine and Navy officers and others, Zinni invoked the U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War in the 1960s and '70s. "My contemporaries, our feelings and sensitivities were forged on the battlefields of Vietnam, where we heard the garbage and the lies, and we saw the sacrifice," said Zinni, who was severely wounded while serving as an infantry officer in that conflict. "I ask you, is it happening again?"

Zinni's comments were especially striking because he endorsed President Bush in the 2000 campaign, shortly after retiring from active duty, and serves as an adviser to the State Department on anti-terror initiatives in Indonesia and the Philippines. He preceded Army Gen. Tommy R. Franks as chief of the U.S. Central Command, the headquarters for U.S. military operations in Iraq and elsewhere in the Middle East.

This was not the first time he has broken with the administration. He was publicly skeptical last winter of the decision to attack Iraq.

Underscoring how much his views have changed since 2000, he implied that the Bush administration is now damaging the U.S. military in the way that Bush and Vice President Cheney during that campaign charged that the Clinton administration had done. "We can't go on breaking our military and doing things like we're doing now," he said.

He also questioned the Bush administration's decision in January to have the Pentagon oversee postwar efforts in Iraq. "Why the hell would the Department of Defense be the organization in our government that deals with the reconstruction of Iraq?" he asked. "Doesn't make sense."

In addition, he criticized

the administration for not working earlier and harder to win a U.N. resolution that several nations have indicated is a prerequisite to their contributing peacekeeping troops to help in Iraq. "We certainly blew past the U.N.," he said. "Why, I don't know. Now we're going back that in hand."

Zinni's comments to the joint meeting in Arlington of the U.S. Naval Institute and the Marine Corps Association, two professional groups for officers, were greeted warmly by his audience, with prolonged applause at the end. Some officers bought tapes and compact discs of the speech to give to others.

USA Today  
September 5, 2003  
Pg. 11

### 34. Bush To Lead 9/11 Moment Of Silence

President Bush will mark the second anniversary of the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in a low-key fashion.

A year ago, Bush shuttled to three televised, emotional ceremonies at the Pentagon, Ground Zero in New York City and the crash site of United Flight 93 in Shanksville, Pa.

This year, Bush will stay in Washington. He'll start the day at an early-morning prayer service at St. John's Episcopal Church near the White House. Then he'll join others on the South Lawn of the White House for a moment of silence at 8:46 a.m. ET, the time the first hijacked plane slammed into the World Trade Center in New York.

Bush will proclaim a national day of prayer and remembrance. He'll ask all Americans to participate in appropriate observances and to fly their flags at half-staff.

In the afternoon, Bush will go to Walter Reed Army Hospital in Washington to visit U.S. troops wounded in the war on terror.

Other observances:

\*Vice President Cheney

will attend a memorial service at Ground Zero.

\*Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld will participate in observances at Arlington National Cemetery and the Pentagon, where a stained-glass window honoring the 184 people killed there will be dedicated.

\*Interior Secretary Gale Norton will go to Shanksville for services honoring victims there.

By Richard Benedetto

Washington Post  
September 5, 2003  
Pg. 4

### 35. Alternative To Boeing Tanker Deal Proposed

Senate Panel Delays Vote on Air Force Plan, Suggests Leasing Only 25 Planes  
By Renae Merle, Washington Post Staff Writer

Committee Chairman Sen. John W. Warner (R-Va.) will ask Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld to study a proposal to lease up to 25 of the refueling tankers and purchase the remainder through the normal procurement process, said a committee spokesman. The committee will not make a decision on the Air Force's lease proposal until a review of the alternative is completed, the spokesman said.

The Air Force had proposed leasing all 100 planes and purchasing them as the leases expired. "I am concerned that if this matter is approved as submitted ... it will establish a precedent and we can see a reoccurrence of this type of end run -- I call it a Hail Mary pass -- around the budget process," said Warner.

Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.), the chief critic of the lease-buy strategy, yesterday called Warner's alternative proposal "a concept that I think we ought to pursue."

But Air Force officials said yesterday that a combination of leases and purchases would delay delivery

of the planes, which refuel fighter jets in flight and are intended to replace an aging fleet suffering from corrosion problems. Speedy delivery was one of the chief objectives of the lease proposal.

The current plan also includes price breaks tied to the number of planes leased, which could not be achieved with only 25 planes, said Marvin R. Sambur, the Air Force's chief weapons buyer. "If they reduce quantity, prices go up," he said.

The delay was a victory for critics of the plan, who had expected the Armed Services Committee to approve the proposal quickly in an executive meeting yesterday. Yesterday's action comes at a time when Boeing's core business -- commercial jets -- continues to suffer with the airline industry's slump.

"I think Boeing was really counting on getting congressional commitment on 100 tankers this year. If that doesn't happen it's going to be a big disappointment on top of the meltdown in commercial airliner demand and festering problems the company has on military space," said Loren Thompson, a defense analyst with the Lexington Institute.

Three of four committees with jurisdiction over the issue have already approved the tanker lease, leaving the Armed Services Committee as the lone holdout.

Among the questions that senators lobbied at Secretary of the Air Force James G. Roche and Michael Wynne, the Pentagon's chief weapons buyer, was why there was no formal analysis of alternatives to the tanker proposal. Committee members also questioned a \$5 billion contract that Boeing was awarded to maintain the planes. The contract was issued without competition or a study of what a fair price might be, one senator said.

During the hearing, the Office of Management and Budget acknowledged its

CONFIDENTIAL

EF-6389  
I-03/010799

July 31, 2003

In reply refer to:  
EF-6389 & I-03/010799

TO: Doug Feith

SUBJECT: Air Bridge Denial

What is the "air bridge denial program" about that is referenced in this cable?

Thanks.

Attach.

AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 007053, R 291919Z JUL 03 *Not ATTACHED*

DHR:dh  
073103-6

.....  
Please respond by 8/8/03

*Honduras*

*✓ 8/9*

*8/9*

*Sir,  
Response attached.*

*y/r  
CDR Nosenzo  
8-8*

*6 Aug 03*

U21529 / 03

COMPLETED

*8 Aug 03*

CONFIDENTIAL

11-L-0559/OSD/18834

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT(S)  
DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED

TAB A

✓  
11/10/03

August 14, 2003

383.6

TO: Jim Haynes  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Detainees

I just read this piece from the *London Daily Telegraph* on Guantanamo. I wonder if we have given any thought to going up and asking for legislation as to how we should treat the detainees, so we get off the hook legally.

Thanks.

Attach.

"The Guantanamo Solution," *London Daily Telegraph*, August 13, 2003

DHR:dh  
081403-12

.....  
Please respond by 9/5/03

Response Attached (TAB A)

VK, (cc TB)

14 Aug 03

Tab A

London Daily Telegraph  
August 13, 2003

## The Guantanamo Solution

President Bush and Donald Rumsfeld, the US Defence Secretary, have been unfairly maligned in this country for their decision to put terrorist suspects on trial in Guantanamo Bay.

Paradoxically, their difficulties stem not so much from their alleged illiberalism as from a desire to maintain some measure of due process in a time of a new and horrific kind of asymmetric warfare.

The Bush Administration has been wrestling with the problem - not dissimilar to that faced by Whitehall during the early years of the Troubles in Northern Ireland - about whether to treat suspects as prisoners of war or common criminals. His dilemma was understandable. Had he called them POWs, he would have been obliged by the Geneva Conventions to release them at the end of hostilities.

But when can a war against global terrorism be said to be at an end? With the fall of the Taliban? With the deposition of Saddam? Mr Bush had every reason to believe - he still has - that, if he were to release the prisoners in Camp Delta, a great many of them would return immediately to the war against the West, and plot a new atrocity like the destruction of the Twin Towers. That was something that no responsible leader could countenance.

But if he could not call his captives POWs, nor could he treat them quite like common criminals. Under the US Constitution, criminal suspects have to be put on trial, and judged according to the rules of evidence. Any competent defence lawyer would make short work of testimony gathered from secret sources or from prisoners held for many months, in harsh conditions, without access to lawyers.

Mr Bush's liberal instincts told him that it was wrong to hold possibly innocent men for long periods without trial. But, equally, he knew that no ordinarily conducted criminal trial could be expected to result in a conviction, no matter how guilty the defendant might be.

So it was that the President hit upon the idea of treating them neither as POWs nor as criminals, but as something in between. He decided to put them on trial by military tribunal, and instructed his Defence Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, to draft special rules of evidence and procedure that would make convictions more likely than in a civilian court. In so doing, he landed himself in the worst of all possible worlds.

Mr Rumsfeld's rules, drafted on March 21, 2002, are not nearly as illiberal as his critics maintain. They include many safeguards of the rights of the defendant. But the fact is that they fall well short of the standards of justice required by civilian courts in both Britain and America.

By being as liberal and fair-minded as he dared, Mr Bush succeeded only in making himself look more authoritarian than he appeared before he suggested trials of any sort. The British Government, which has never wanted responsibility for British prisoners held in Camp Delta, has been forced into the hypocritical position of defending the rights of its citizens against Mr Bush.

Only a fool would dispute that Mr Bush was right to hold and interrogate prisoners while they might still have useful information about planned terrorist atrocities. But the longer their detention goes on, in this limbo between POW and criminal status, the less justified it seems to many in this country.

Tab A

The answer, surely, lies not in subjecting the prisoners to military tribunals, but in regularising their status under the law. During the Second World War, many Germans and Italians were humanely interned in Britain, under a form of administrative detention that made no comment on their guilt or innocence of Nazi sympathies. The prisoners in Guantanamo Bay should be treated like that.

Tab A

EF-6571  
03/011617  
August 18, 2003

C9/12

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Security Policy

381

Here is the Democrat proposal. Is there anything we ought to do about it?

Thanks.

Attach.  
"An American Security Policy: Challenge, Opportunity, Commitment" National Security  
Advisory Group, July 2003.

DHR:dh  
081803-25

.....  
Please respond by 9/12/03

*Siv,*  
response attached.  
*vt/*CDR Nosenzo  
9/12

✓  
12/30

18 Aug 03



POLICY

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2000  
INFORMATION MEMO

✓  
12/30

I-03/012613-STRAT

PDUSD/P *R. Willett*

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THROUGH: Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

FROM: Andy Hoehn, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy,  
614-0421

SEP 11 2003

381

SUBJECT: Snowflake Re: An American Security Policy: Challenge, Opportunity,  
Commitment (U)

- (U) "An American Security Policy: Challenge, Opportunity, Commitment"—a product of the National Security Advisory Group chaired by former Secretary of Defense William Perry—is a collection of six short issue papers on regional and functional security issues. They are presented as both critiques of and alternatives to current foreign and security policies.
- (U) Many of the papers have objectives consistent with the current administration: countering WMD—particularly nuclear weapons; proactively fighting transnational terror groups; etc.
- (U) The main criticisms are focused on means more than ends. There are repeated charges of unilateralism, overdependence on the use of military force, and lack of appreciation of alliance relationships.
- (U) Rather than address these criticisms directly, and hence invite more criticism, we should find ways to refute these points in the course of our regular business.
- (U) Summaries of the six issue papers are attached.

Attachments: as stated

Prepared by: LTC Nate Freier, OUSD(P)/Strategy (b)(6)

11 SEP 2003



**Snowflake Response Re:**  
**“An American Security Policy: Challenge, Opportunity, Commitment”**  
8 September, 2003

- Below are the subject and major themes of each:
  - **“The Loose Nukes Crisis in North Korea”** argues North Korea with a substantial nuclear weapons production capability “would gravely imperil U.S. and international security.” It asserts that the administration is preoccupied with Iraq and thus has failed to confront the North Korean crisis effectively. It suggests undertaking “a new and aggressive diplomatic approach” of direct talks with North Korea backed by a spectrum of incentives—from positive to coercive. Their recommended objective for American policy is “a more comprehensive curb on North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs...backed by extensive verification.”
  - **“Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction”** posits that only a handful of nations pose a nuclear proliferation threat today due to a number of past U.S. and international initiatives. It continues by arguing that the U.S. needs to prevent proliferation by three groups: rogue proliferators, “in between states”—classified as past proliferators, and finally, potential proliferators currently disinclined to do so. It argues that the current administration focuses narrowly on only one potential proliferator—Iraq, and only one tool to counter proliferation—preemption. It concludes by arguing that the United States should abandon a single-minded “preemption approach” in favor of “an urgent, comprehensive overhaul” of all counter-proliferation policy.
  - **“Winning the War on Terrorism”** argues that the U.S. must simultaneously wage three closely coordinated campaigns: One against terrorists and their supporters where they reside; one in defense of the homeland; and finally, one leveraging the softer elements of power to create a “less bitter and divided world.” It asserts efforts to secure the homeland “have been slow, under-funded and woefully short of the mark.” Further, it asserts the current administration’s unilateralism “hobbles effective cooperation.” It argues, “If we use our power only for self-protection, it fuels the fires of resentment.” As a prescription to attack each issue, it suggests:
    - The “more effective application of every component of our nation’s power in collaboration with our coalition partners;”
    - A “more systematic approach to defining our homeland security needs;”
    - Increased “investment in priority areas across the spectrum of prevention, risk reduction and consequence management” in confronting the threat of WMD;
    - Doing “more to foster innovation in the homeland security domain;” and finally,
    - A program of “rigorous and principled global leadership and engagement” to ensure we “isolate the extremists and not ourselves.”
  - **“Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Iraq”** recommends staying the course in Iraq. However, it continues by arguing that the U.S. must “work with Iraqis and the

Prepared by: LTC Nate Freier, OUSD(P)/Strategy, (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/18840

international community to ensure costs and risks of reconstruction are shared widely.” Further, it implores decision makers to ensure that the U.S. is not “transformed...from liberator to occupier” in the eyes of the Iraqi people. Doing so, it suggests, requires:

- Committing the requisite time, resources and capital to achieving core objectives;
- Seeking the internationalization of the “costs and burdens” of Iraqi reconstruction;
- Putting Iraqis in charge of their own future as soon as possible, and finally,
- Developing “a more comprehensive strategy for peace and stability in the Middle East.”

The paper concludes that even as the U.S. focuses on the rebuilding of Iraq we must broaden efforts in other areas—the war on terrorism, North Korea, homeland security and Middle East peace.

- **“Strengthening U.S. Security Through Alliances and Partnerships”** asserts that alliance relationships are “at an all time low.” It continues, “(T)he United States is in danger of squandering the hard won admiration and support garnered” internationally since World War II. It suggests this is occurring as a result of perceived U.S. unilateralism as well as a failure to leverage the competencies of other nations and international organizations. The paper asserts that “ad hoc ‘Coalitions of the Willing’ are poor substitutes for alliances” and that alliances are “Enablers, not Encumbrances.” It asserts that alliance partnerships “must be reciprocal.” The authors conclude that though, the U.S. “has emerged victorious in military battle,” it is “paradoxically less secure” because it is out of step with many of its allies as well as important players in the international community.
- **“National Security Spending and Priorities”** indicates that are “enhancing our capabilities to win at war, but we are not making commensurate enhancements to our capabilities to win the peace.” It asserts that the challenges we face cannot be met by military force only. Further, it argues that no country can confront mounting security challenges alone. It asserts that the bulk of post-9/11 increases in security funding have gone to DoD and that this unbalanced allocation of resources undermines security. In their view a more balanced approach is in order.



POLICY

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2000  
INFORMATION MEMO

✓  
12/30

I-03/012613-STRAT

PDUSD/P *[Signature]*

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THROUGH: Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

FROM: Andy Hoehn, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, *[Signature]*

(b)(6)

SEP 11 2003

381

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Prepared by: LTC Nate Freier, OUSD(P)/Strategy, (b)(6)

11 SEP 2003



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    - Increased “investment in priority areas across the spectrum of prevention, risk reduction and consequence management” in confronting the threat of WMD;
    - Doing “more to foster innovation in the homeland security domain;” and finally,
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international community to ensure costs and risks of reconstruction are shared widely.” Further, it implores decision makers to ensure that the U.S. is not “transformed...from liberator to occupier” in the eyes of the Iraqi people. Doing so, it suggests, requires:

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- Putting Iraqis in charge of their own future as soon as possible, and finally,
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The paper concludes that even as the U.S. focuses on the rebuilding of Iraq we must broaden efforts in other areas—the war on terrorism, North Korea, homeland security and Middle East peace.

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EF-6571  
03/011617 C9  
August 18, 2003

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA  
SUBJECT: Security Policy

581

Here is the Democrat proposal. Is there anything we ought to do about it?

Thanks.

Attach.  
"An American Security Policy: Challenge, Opportunity, Commitment" National Security  
Advisory Group, July 2003.

DHR:dh  
081803-25



Please respond by 8/12/03

Sir,  
Response attached.  
Vr/  
CDR Noranzo  
9/12

✓  
12/30

18 Aug 03

August 7, 2003

Turkey

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Follow-Up w/Bremer

Please make sure you let Jerry Bremer know that both of these items in this memo I sent on Peshmerga and Turkey are being taken care of, according to what you said.

Thanks.

Attach.  
8/4/03 SecDef memo to Bremer re: Peshmerga and Turkey [080403-26]

DHR:dh  
080703-12

.....

Please respond by 8/15/03

✓  
12/17  
7 Aug 03

✓  
12/17  
Sent response at tabs  
to SD office Aug 22.

August 4, 2003

TO: Jerry Bremer  
Gen. Abizaid

CC: Gen. Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Peshmerga and Turkey

*Always Empty bin*  
*Alredo bin both*

Attached is a note from Jay Garner, which discussed two important points.

1. We ought to consider what to do about the Peshmerga, since we are paying the Iraqi troops.
2. The possible Turkish logistics tail in the north in the event that they come into the central or southern areas.

I agree with him that those are problems. I hope you are both focusing on it. If I can be helpful, please let me know.

Thanks.

Attach.  
8/1/03 Garner note to SecDef

DHR:dh  
080403-26

.....

Please respond by 8/15/03

✓  
8/4

Mr. Secretary,

Hope this finds you in good spirits. I have concerns on two issues dealing with Northern Iraq. I'm sure that you have already solved them; however, in case they are still active I want to bring them up to you. First, I understand that we are now paying stipends to the Iraqi military, which I strongly agree with. However, we are not paying the Peshmerga, who were our allies during the war and could still have great utility in specified security roles; e.g., border guards, static security, etc. Second, I have been told that we will use the Turks as part of the coalition stability force and that they will be used in the south rather than the north. I agree with this and think that this is extremely important that we have Muslims as part of our stability force. The problem I foresee is that the Turks will establish a huge logistics tail from their position in the south through the northern provinces and especially Kurdistan. I don't know how we control this, but unless we are prepared for it - it will cause significant issues with the Kurds. As you know, there are continual problems between the Kurds and the Turks in and around Kirkuk. If we don't control the Turkish access from north to south the problems will be exponentially worse. As I said I'm sure you have already solved these, but I just needed to get that burr from under my saddle.

Connie and I look forward to your BBQ on the 16<sup>th</sup>. Have a good wecker d.

Jay

BUNDEL

FILE

EF-6470

03/01184

August 7, 2003

EF-6470

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Follow-Up w/Bremer

Please make sure you let Jerry Bremer know that both of these items in this memo I sent on Peshmerga and Turkey are being taken care of, according to what you said.

Thanks.

Attach.

8/4/03 SecDef memo to Bremer re: Peshmerga and Turkey [080403-26]

DHR:dh  
080703-12

.....  
Please respond by 8/15/03

TO: SECDEF

FROM: Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy *for JEP 22 Aug 2003*

SUBJECT: Follow-Up w/ Bremer

Sir:

We informed Colonel Scott Norwood in Amb. Bremer's office in Baghdad that the issues you raised in the attached memo have been addressed.

COMPLETED

*22 Aug 03*  
11-L-0559/OSD/18849

1913.6  
1030  
10/11 10:30

10/2

September 25, 2003

IR-29

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: John Hamre

*DRY DI RITA*  
10/2

At the hearings, they said Hamre had said something in the press Wednesday.  
What did he say?

Thanks.

DHR:Jh  
092403-9

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*9/29*  
*12/30*  
*Col. [Signature]*

① Hearing at Foreign Relations  
committee

SECRET  
9/30

② Wash Post story about that hearing

③ Hamre Op-Ed

25 Sep 03

U21535/03

success, in my mind, have to be achieved if we are going to win the global war on terrorism.

I believe that there is no doubt that our military forces are up to the task.

There is no doubt that we must achieve success politically with Iraqis, but we also must show political will to stay the course, in my mind, in order to achieve success there, and I think it's possible that we can.

SEN. HOLLINGS: But, General, get my point. Deputy Secretary Hamre -- and we all have high respect, and I think you've got high respect for him -- he's just in the morning paper saying it's not you, it's the political entity, namely us -- the Congress, the State Department, AID and everything else ought to be doing what you're doing. That's my point. That's what I'm talking about politically. I don't see how in the world you're going to ever get really good security because two Republican Guard units folded back into the city of 5 million; you can't find them. You can't go door-to-door and deweaponize them and everything else of that kind. So we got a problem, a real problem on there. And the quicker we can get it over, as the secretary says, to the Iraqis, I agree with you on that.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. STEVENS: Senator Specter is recognized for eight minutes. Senator Domenici. Pardon me. (Laughter.) Senator Domenici.

SEN. PETE DOMENICI (R-NM): (Off mike) -- push my button. I'll tell you, my button's been pushed already today. The problem is, I'm not going to let it push me, I'm going to just forget about a few things I've heard today that would cause me to get off the path of what I came here today to do.

First, I would tell you, and tell Senator Byrd, I'm not a member of the Greatest Generation, I would like you to know, I'm a member of a much lesser generation than you, for I'm too young to be a member of the Great Generation. But I've been here 33 years, and I believe, I believe I'm entitled to my time, just as you're entitled to yours -- no more, and no less for both of us.

Now, let me say to you, we voted here October 12th -- 11th or 12th, late at night, and we gave the president authority to go to war, if war we had to have with Iraq. When did we invade? When did the bombardment start? Anybody remember?

GEN. MYERS: March 19th.

SEN. DOMENICI: March 19th. Both events, the voting by 77 senators, and the invasion of the country, are less than one year old, and we already have people here, and across this land, and media people, who see no success other than they don't want to say to the military, "You did a bad job," because they wouldn't dare do that because they did a tremendous job. But other than that, all of a sudden, from October the 11th and March to this date, a few months later, everything has gone wrong; we are doing everything wrong.

Well, to all four of you, and to anyone that's listening, I think those who say that are wrong. I believe we're doing a tremendous job.

**TAB**

**1**

September 23, 2003 Tuesday

**SECTION: CAPITOL HILL HEARING TESTIMONY**

**LENGTH: 1177 words**

**COMMITTEE: SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS**

**HEADLINE: REVIEW OF IRAQ POLICY AND ISSUES**

**TESTIMONY-BY: JOHN J. HAMRE, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER**

**AFFILIATION: CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES**

**BODY:**

Statement of **John J. Hamre** President and Chief Executive Officer Center for Strategic and International Studies

Before the Committee on Senate Foreign Relations

September 23, 2003

Chairman Lugar, Senator Biden, distinguished members of the Committee on Foreign Relations, it is an honor to be able to testify before you today on the issue of next steps in Iraq. This is a critical hearing. There must be next steps for Iraq. America is now a Middle East power. We cannot forsake our responsibilities or avoid our obligations. We must succeed in rebuilding Iraq in order to help create a government that is representative of its people, at peace with its neighbors, and offers a future of hope and promise for its citizens. CSIS post-conflict assessment trip to Iraq

This past July, I was privileged to be able to testify before this committee after my colleagues and I returned from our assessment trip to Iraq on behalf of Secretary Rumsfeld. We returned with two broad suggestions we need to dramatically irindiginizele the security program in Iraq and we need to expand the international base of support for the operation. At that time, we indicated that the Coalition Provisional Authority was rapidly running out of money and would soon need supplemental funds. We also stated that the security situation in Iraq remained problematic and, without dramatic improvements, the remainder of the rebuilding effort would be substantially impeded.

In the 10 weeks since we visited Iraq, I believe there have been some security improvements in areas that do not get coverage in the American media, especially in the northern and southern portions of the country. We receive reports from friends and acquaintances in Iraq that attest to this, despite the attacks on our forces. Even with these advances, the country is still far from having a secure environment. Just last week the major pipeline from the oil fields north to Turkey was attacked yet again. Assaults on our

10

11-L-0559/OSD/18853

**TAB**

**2**

troops have become more sophisticated and daring. The economic plundering of the country continues.

We continue to believe that the highest priority for enhancing security should rest with expanding the role of Iraqi security personnel. The Administration has launched new efforts to recruit security personnel, as contract security officers for specific installations, as policemen, and, increasingly, as border guards. These actions are a step in the right direction, even more so because it does not appear, at this point, that there will be significant contributions of foreign military personnel. We have to continue to build the Iraqis own capacity to bring security to the country.

#### President's request for supplemental funds for Iraq

President Bush has requested that Congress appropriate an additional \$87 billion for Iraq and Afghanistan. I know that there is a great deal of controversy associated with this request. Nonetheless, Mr. Chairman, it is critical that the Congress appropriate these funds. As I said at the outset, for better or worse, America is now a Middle East power.

We now own this problem. We cannot walk away from it; rather we must now shoulder it. The American people need to know that this investment is necessary, that the plans are well conceived, and the budget meets critical unmet needs. Here I believe the Administration has not followed through adequately.

To date, there has not been a satisfactory accounting of how funds are being spent or how these additional funds are being planned for. I used to be the Comptroller at the Defense Department and I know full well that we live in a world of estimates. The best, planned estimate will always be wrong. I know this from first hand experience. But I also know, from the same experience, that the sharpest critic would accept estimates so long as I offered a complete accounting of the facts upon which I based them and the assumptions I had to make to get there. Congress will accept estimates so long as they understand how they are made and if they can conclude that they are reasonable.

I have full confidence in the current DoD Comptroller, Dr. Dov Zakheim. I have worked with him for years and I know he is a thoroughly honest man. Unfortunately, over the past two years, a general level of distrust has developed between the Administration and the Congress on budget matters and on defense issues. The lack of trust is limiting the development of an enduring consensus to the long-term challenges we face.

Therefore, I strongly encourage the Defense Department to provide as complete and comprehensive an assessment as possible of the costs that they are incurring and are forecast to incur during the coming year on its Iraq operation. This assessment will enable the Congress to become more directly engaged in supporting the Administrations efforts to help bring security to the region and ultimately to America.

#### Assigning responsibility for next steps in Iraq

I continue to believe that we have too narrow an institutional base to support the reconstruction efforts in Iraq. I think it was an excellent idea for Ambassador Bremer to establish a liaison office here in Washington, headed up by Mr. Ruben Jeffries. But, I also believe Mr. Jeffries has too few people to support him and too little authority. In general, the efforts to enlist a wider base of support in the federal government for the reconstruction effort remain insufficient.

This raises the question whether or not the federal responsibilities for rebuilding Iraq should be assigned exclusively to the Defense Department. I understand and appreciate Secretary Rumsfelds view that the Defense Department would overwhelmingly field the assets required for reconstruction, and therefore the Department should have complete authority to undertake the task.

In theory I agree with this point. But, in practice it has not worked. The patterns of cooperation inside the government broke down during the past year. DoD now has to manage tasks for which it has no background or competence, and it has not been effective in inviting the support of others in the government who have that background and competence. Either DoD needs a new approach for collaboration with others, or the President needs to change the assignment of responsibilities. The challenge of rebuilding Iraq is enormous and our ability to be effective in this effort is being eroded by the bureaucratic struggles here in Washington.

#### Conclusion

Mr. Chairman, Senator Biden, distinguished Senators, we must succeed in our task to rebuild Iraq. This isnt a matter of Americas credibility. This is a question of our security. We will be substantially less secure as a nation if we fail. We have made important progress during the past four months. The task of rebuilding Iraq is challenging, but it is not hopeless. We have the capacity to succeed, and I join you in offering my full efforts to make this possible.

Thank you. I would be pleased to answer any questions you may have at the appropriate time.

**TAB**

**3**

Washington Post  
September 24, 2003  
Pg. 25

## U.S. Urged To Modify Approach To Postwar Iraq

### *Experts Favor Stripping Pentagon of Control*

By Peter Slevin, Washington Post Staff Writer

The Bush administration should end Defense Department control over Iraq's civilian reconstruction effort and rethink other aspects of the U.S. occupation, a panel of specialists told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee yesterday.

"Proceeding on the current path will mean throwing good money after bad," testified J. Brian Atwood, head of the U.S. Agency for International Development in the Clinton administration. "We already have wasted precious moments. The only way to overcome the very poor beginning we have made in Iraq is to fundamentally change our approach."

Atwood favors giving the United Nations responsibility for key civilian operations and transferring control over reconstruction from the Pentagon to the State Department and USAID. Reconstruction and political and economic development, he said, "are not part of the Pentagon's playbook."

John J. Hamre, a deputy defense secretary during the Clinton administration, agreed that the Pentagon is managing tasks "for which it has no background or competence." He said "cooperation inside the government broke down," and the Defense Department has not effectively invited support from agencies that have the necessary skills.

Citing Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld's argument for Pentagon authority over reconstruction, Hamre said, "In theory, I agree with this point. But in practice, it has not worked. . . . Either DOD needs a new approach for collaboration with others, or the president needs to change the assignment of responsibilities." 

President Bush in January gave the Defense Department control over the military and civilian aspects of war and reconstruction. The State Department has complained for months about being given too small a role in the civilian reconstruction effort and too little access to critical administration decision-making.

By many accounts, including some of its own senior officials, the civilian leadership of the Defense Department made a series of poor assumptions about conditions in postwar Iraq and what would be needed to secure and rebuild the country.

James Dobbins, a former U.S. emissary to Bosnia, Somalia and Afghanistan, called the Defense Department's responsibility for civilian efforts an "obstacle" to the international contributions the administration wants.

"On the civil side," Dobbins told the committee, "this is preeminently a job for the State Department, assisted by Treasury, AID, Justice and others."

The witnesses also echoed the views of a number of foreign leaders in New York yesterday who said

international support for the postwar mission would grow if the Bush administration shifted more influence to the United Nations and Iraqis.

The U.S. effort is plagued, Atwood said, by a lack of clarity. He accused the U.S.-led Coalition Provisional Authority of "constant shifts in position" that are confusing to Iraqis.

"No one knows whether we are building the nation from the top down or the bottom up," said Atwood, a dean at the University of Minnesota. "Is the United States really interested in creating an Iraqi democracy, or are we fearful that giving power to the Iraqi people will produce policies counter to our interests?"

Aviation Week & Space Technology  
September 22, 2003  
Pg. 66

## Intel Plus 'Group Think' Equaled Weapons Of Mass Destruction In Iraq

By John J. Hamre

As I reflect on my time as the deputy secretary of Defense, I am often reminded of how isolated I was in that position. I had a fabulous staff. I was never denied anything I requested. Organizations and individuals actively sought to get on my calendar to tell me of their work. Having said that, anyone who serves in these positions is very isolated. This is a product of several factors.

First, the volume of material that comes to the secretary or deputy secretary is enormous. It has to be channeled for efficiency. Someone who works for you is deciding if you need to see it and when you need to see it. This is not a bad thing. This is just a fact of life. Second, everyone who meets with you or sends you a piece of paper is trying to create a positive impression. This means that subconsciously, and even consciously, everyone who briefs you wants to be seen in the best light. Before they walk in the door, they ask their colleagues and themselves, "What is he interested in? What sets him off? How do we discuss this so as to get a constructive outcome from the meeting?"

I found that I had to be careful not to distort the intelligence I received by the ways I asked questions and reacted to information. If I reacted harshly when presented with bad news, future meetings could be tempered with overly optimistic perspectives. If I expressed interest in one subject, the briefer would take note and that aspect of a problem was always emphasized in future briefings. I do not believe it is intentional, but the information you get is affected by the attitude you adopt. I don't know that this shapes analysis, but it does affect the way it is presented to you.

Another observation I would make concerns what philosophers call epistemological questions: How do we know what we know, and how good is the information that comprises this knowledge? Is it reliable? Is it true? This is the core of the intelligence community's problem. The intelligence analyst is always working with fragmentary information. The question is a fragment of what? Is it a key fact that unlocks an understanding of a development, or is it unrelated to the hypothesis under consideration?

In relationship to this quest for certainty, I noticed that fragments of information gained greater certainty the farther away they were from the intelligence professional. The intelligence analyst is usually careful to note the reliability and timeliness of the intelligence "fact," but the qualifiers are often summarized and dropped as the intelligence briefing moves up the decision-making ladder. Alternative hypotheses are often omitted. A data element of questionable reliability can gain credibility as it rises through the intelligence hierarchy until it becomes authoritative evidence. This does not mean the intelligence fact was wrong. It does mean there is a tendency to bestow greater credibility to the data the more removed it becomes from the intelligence professional.

I also noticed that once a general proposition was accepted as valid, it was usually repeated without question in subsequent analyses. Group consciousness develops in the intelligence and policy world when basic propositions are accepted as true. As we saw recently, the entire intelligence community and the policy community--and I include myself here--were convinced we would find major stocks of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Iraq. We have not. This demonstrates that a group consciousness, and the

failure to adequately explore alternative hypotheses, can overcome the intelligence and policy world in the quest for certainty in what is inherently an uncertain enterprise.

In light of these phenomena, what should we do? How do we insulate ourselves from the problems that we confront as a consequence of these factors? One of the most important ways is to ensure competition among analysts. To accomplish this, we need redundant analytic capabilities in our intelligence community. We need competing organizations that report to different bosses in the federal government so we profit from the competition that is inherent in bureaucratic politics. This will not ensure that no mistakes will be made--witness the errors we made concerning WMD in Iraq. But, it is one of the important steps we can take to bring as much dispassionate analysis as possible to inherently uncertain questions.

Second, to counter the instinct toward "group think," we must augment the intelligence process through so-called open-source methods. We must, of course, have classified research. But, I believe open-source methods serve to broaden the perspectives of those who work within the confines of classification. The intellectual community advances through open competition of ideas. Analysts in the intelligence community need to interact with the wider ideas community, and the only feasible way to do that is for the intelligence community to create open-source disciplines to parallel classified work.

Third, all of us in the policy community have to realize we do shape the quality of ideas that come to us from the intelligence community by the way we interact with that group. This is not to say we should be passive consumers of intelligence product. Far from it. Intelligence analysts need to be asked to explicitly discuss the quality and depth of data that underlie their analysis. They should be explicit in identifying gaps and contra-proofs of their reasoning. These elements of introspection should be explicit annotations to the reports themselves, so policymakers are aware of analysts' constraints.

The years that lie ahead for America will be very challenging, and we will be very dependent on a healthy and vibrant intelligence community to chart these dangerous waters. We must take appropriate steps to ensure that this community remains healthy and vibrant.

*John J. Hamre, president and CEO of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, was deputy secretary of Defense from 1997-99. He recently testified before the Intelligence Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives.*

November 10, 2003

TO: David Chu  
CC: Ken Krieg  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Personnel Legislation

If we get this personnel legislation through, which it looks like we have, I need to see the plan as to how we are going to implement it in the Department.

Clearly, it is going to take some money to implement.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
110703-20

.....  
Please respond by 12/12/03

*032*

*18 Nov 03*

U21537 / 03

0110448

TO: Jim Haynes

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*

DATE: September <sup>12</sup> 6, 2003

SUBJECT: **DoD Acceptance of Services from Mrs. Donald Rumsfeld  
Memorandum of 9/2/03**

The first sentence of your memo you say, "You asked whether the Department may accept the services of Mrs. Rumsfeld to review family support programs and provide support and transportation while she is providing the services."

*250*

That is flat wrong. Not only did I not ask that the Department provide any support or transportation, I specifically told your office that we would not accept any support or transportation and that I personally would pay for any expenses related to any activities of my wife.

It bothers me greatly that you would put in writing something that is that factually incorrect.

I have not even bothered to read the rest of the memo.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
090603.01

*12 Sep 03*

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_



GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

INFO MEMO

*(Handwritten initials)*

September 2, 2003 (11:00am)

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel  
SUBJECT: DoD Acceptance of Services from Mrs. Donald Rumsfeld

- You asked whether the Department may accept the services of Mrs. Rumsfeld to review family support programs, and provide support and transportation while she is providing the services. Four options are discussed below. Because they are not mutually exclusive, it will be possible to apply one option to a certain set of circumstances and another option to a different occasion.
- Option 1: The Department may accept uncompensated, voluntary services for family support programs in accordance with 10 U.S.C. 1588 and DoDI 1100.21. Mrs. Rumsfeld would be considered a Federal employee for many purposes, including compensation for work-related injuries; claims for damages; and conflicts of interest; and because she would be performing a direct benefit to the agency, transportation. We recommend that the required description of duties and scope of responsibility be in writing to clarify her role and justify any support that is provided. She may also be reimbursed for incidental expenses
- Option 2: The Department may accept "gratuitous" services under Section 31 U.S.C. 1342 if there is a written agreement that there is no expectation of future payment and that the duties would not otherwise be performed by DoD personnel. This option does not have explicit statutory authority and is less preferable if the first Option is available. Because she would be performing a direct benefit to the agency, transportation, including invitational travel orders, could be provided.
- Option 3: Mrs. Rumsfeld could be hired as a consultant pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 3109 if there is a determination that her services are advantageous to the Government and cannot be adequately provided by DoD personnel. She could be uncompensated and serve intermittently. Department consultants are employed as special Government employees, which requires an appointment, filing of a financial disclosure report and adherence to the



Government and Department standards of conduct. Support and transportation may be provided to carry out official duties.

- Option 4: The Department may accept the services of Mrs. Rumsfeld in the traditional role of a spouse of a senior DoD official as a de facto representative of the families of military personnel. It does not have a statutory or regulatory basis. Spouses are not Federal employees, so support using appropriated funds is usually de minimis. If Mrs. Rumsfeld is participating in an official capacity and providing a direct benefit to the Department at an unquestionably official event, transportation, but not per diem, may be provided. Otherwise, she is considered an unofficial traveler and must accompany a DoD official who is performing the same service and must bear the cost of transportation.
- Pursuant to OMB Circular A-126 and DoDD 4500.56, regardless of which option, above, is selected, the use of military air is appropriate only if it is cheaper than commercial air, or if the schedules of the DoD employees who will accompany Mrs. Rumsfeld dictate that the mission cannot be accomplished using commercial air.
- I recommend Option 1 as our usual course of action, subject to your review.

COORDINATION: USD(P&R)

Prepared by Gail Mason (b)(6)

Coordination on InfoMemo:

Subject: DoD Acceptance of Services from Mrs. Donald Rumsfeld

USD(P&R): \_\_\_\_\_

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

C 9/5



GENERAL COUNSEL  
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

September 3, 2003

NOTE FOR SECDEF

- As explained more fully in the attached, this Department may accept Mrs. Rumsfeld's voluntary services to review family support programs.
- The Department may provide some support to her.
- I recommend we put down in writing exactly what we all want her to do.

William J. Haynes II

Attachment

December 11, 2003

2487

TO: ~~Inymie Dorian~~ Larry D. Rife

CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
David Chu  
Powell Moore

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Expenses for Soldiers to Get Home

At the President's Congressional Ball, one of these two Congressmen handed me the attached "Dear Colleague" letter on soldiers still paying their own way home.

Would you please read it, develop an appropriate answer, tell me if you think we ought to fix the law and then let's get back to them in an appropriate way.

Thanks.

Attach.  
 12/8/03 Congressional "Dear Colleague" letter signed by Ramstad and Moore  
 12/12/03 letter to SecDef

DHR:dh  
121103-16

.....  
Please respond by 1/9/04

*12/22*  
*Carrie Lane -*  
*Please draft response to just report what Dr. Chu is asking as cost is cumulative for additional info.*  
*ixcc Sec*  
*Please get info on this.*  
*12/15*  
*DR*  
*LARRY D. RIFE*  
*12/22*

11 Dec 03

11-L-0559/OSD/18868

*12/6*  
 Larry Di Rife  
 U21545 / 03

**Marriott, William P, CAPT, OSD**

---

**From:** Harrison, Richard A, CPT, OSD  
**Sent:** Thursday, December 18, 2003 1:26 PM  
**To:** Marriott, William P, CAPT, OSD  
**Subject:** FW: snowflake: expenses for soldiers to get home

Sir,  
Below is an update on the R&R travel snowflake from SD to Mr. DiRita. I'm still awaiting for a response on the policy memo that Mr. Abell will sign. More information to follow.

v/r  
Rich

Richard A. Harrison  
CPT, USA  
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Executive Secretariat  
Comm: (b)(6)  
Room 3D853

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Loo, Bradford G, CIV, OSD-P&R  
**Sent:** Wednesday, December 17, 2003 5:09 PM  
**To:** Harrison, Richard A, CPT, OSD  
**Cc:** Ellison, Lisa, CIV, OSD-P&R; Mack, Paris COL Army G1; Pendleton, Chris L., CDR, OSD-P&R; Darden-Ogbonnah, Chenetta Dr., CIV, OSD-P&R  
**Subject:** snowflake: expenses for soldiers to get home

cpt harrison, because my office has policy for leave and liberty, lisa ellison passed me the snowflake for action for payment r&r travel.

the short answer is the department of defense, iaw p.l. 108-106, will start paying service members air fare from the aerial port of debarkation (apod) to the airport nearest the service member's leave destination. the policy memorandum will be sent today or tomorrow to mr abell, pducd (p&r) for approval.

the army is executive agent for the centcom r&r leave program and to date, has not set the date for implementation -- but it will be sooner than later.

if you need something more let me know.

brad  
Acting Director, OEPM  
Room 2B265, the Pentagon  
(b)(6)

12-8-03

Mr. President -  
If you could make  
this happen, it would  
be a wonderful gift  
to our military  
personnel!

Very truly yours!  
Dennis Moore

Soldiers Are Still Paying their Own Way Home!

December 8, 2003

Dear Colleague:

We are sure you are as concerned as we are to find out that our soldiers are still paying their own way home from Iraq and Afghanistan. This is especially concerning after Congress amended the FY 2004 Iraqi supplemental appropriations bill (P.L. 108-106) to include \$55 million in funding to reimburse soldiers who qualify for rest and recuperation (R&R) leave for their U.S. domestic travel.

According to the Congressional Research Service (CRS) our "language is not law, and is permissive and not mandatory in nature." But it does allow the Department of Defense (DOD) to provide assistance for travel-related expenses (such as emergency hotel accommodation for service members or travel to their homes) not otherwise specifically authorized in law.

In a letter regarding R&R domestic travel Rep. Moore received November 4, 2003, from Bradford Loo, Acting Director for Officer and Enlisted Personnel Management at DOD, "the unprogrammed additional cost to the Army would be \$16 million." CRS, however, quoted an unnamed defense official as saying the R&R program total cost would be \$1 billion.

We need to make our intentions very clear to the Defense Department that we want our soldiers to be reimbursed for their domestic travel while on R&R. Please join us in sending the attached letter to Secretary Rumsfeld, respectfully requesting that our soldiers be reimbursed.

This is not a Democratic idea or a Republican idea; it is just the right thing to do for the men and women of the Armed Forces who put their lives on the line for our country and our freedom.

Very truly yours,

JIM RAMSTAD  
Member of Congress

DENNIS MOORE  
Member of Congress

Please join us -  
for our troops!  
PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER

# *U.S. House of Representatives*

December 12, 2003

THE HONORABLE DONALD H. RUMSFELD  
SECRETARY  
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
THE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON DC 20350-0001

Dear Mr. Secretary:

We are writing today to clarify Congress' intent with regard to funding domestic travel for soldiers returning to the U.S. on rest and recuperation (R&R) leave from Iraq or Afghanistan.

The intent of our recommendations in the FY 2004 Iraqi appropriations supplemental (P.L. 108-106) is to reimburse soldiers who qualify for R&R leave for their domestic travel. This R&R reimbursement should also include those soldiers who have already taken qualified R&R leave. The reimbursement includes air travel, bus, train, ferry, and vehicle rental expenses incurred in getting to and from the port-of-entry (Baltimore, Atlanta, Dallas, Frankfurt, or Los Angeles) to the soldier's choice of home-of-record or current military base of residence (i.e., wherever his or her spouse resides at this time). In addition, personal vehicle mileage may be paid for the distance between an airport, or a train or bus depot, and that home. If travel distance is longer than 50 miles and extends over meal times, reasonable per diem expenses should be reimbursed. If travel is overnight and requires a hotel stay, that should be reimbursed.

Given that all the forms, procedures, and staff are already in place to reimburse soldiers, we see no reason that this policy cannot be made effective immediately, and retroactive to October 1<sup>st</sup>. If the Department of Defense (DOD) wishes to create a procedure for directly buying plane tickets in the future, that is understandable.

We appreciate that the DOD may have concerns about this program due to its significant change in leave policy, but we feel that our troops should not have to bear any more burdens – financial or otherwise – than their extended service to our country already demands. It is our intention that the federal government covers all travel and transportation costs necessary to return military personnel to their homes and families. In a letter received on November 4, 2003, Bradford Loo, Acting Director for Officer and Enlisted Personnel Management wrote, "the unprogrammed additional cost to the Army would be \$16 million." Congress has provided \$55 million to assist soldiers in covering domestic travel expenses. We respectfully request that you to use those funds as we intended.

Thank you for your consideration.

Very truly yours,

cc: General Richard Meyer, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff  
cc: Army Chief of Staff  
cc: Admiral Vernon E. Clark, Chief of Naval Operations  
cc: John P. Jumper, USAF Chief of Staff  
cc: General Michael W. Hagee, Marine Corps Commandant

11-L-0559/OSD/18871

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: September 7, 2003

✓  
9/8  
Hrag

SUBJECT: Hodgkinson,

We ought to think about getting Sandy Hodgkinson to testify before Congress on the mass graves.

Thanks.

DIR/azn  
080902 02

Please respond by: 9/12/03

9/7  
Good idea. If she  
ever comes to DC, we'll  
do it. We try to arrange  
for Bremer's senior civilians  
to do the circuit (1st/11, 03  
press brief) when they are  
in town

U21552 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18872 *D. Rita*

12:41 PM

TO: Gen. John Abizaid

CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Amb. Jerry Bremer

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: August 30, 2003

RE: SADR

FAXED 30 AUG TO  
GEN ABIZAID. COPIES  
TO NMCC AND CPA

*Tracy*

If SADR is publicly calling the Coalition "the enemy," we really need to think through carefully where the red lines are, and what we are going to do if red lines are crossed. If people want to define themselves as our enemies, then I think they've crossed over a line.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
083003.03

Respond by: \_\_\_\_\_

*30 Aug 03*

U21553 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18873

12:37 PM

TO: Marc Thiessen  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: August 30, 2003  
RE: **Material for Speeches**

350.001 SD

I visit Bethesda and Walter Reed fairly regularly to meet the wounded from Iraq and Afghanistan. I also was just down at the Brook Army Medical Center in San Antonio. You might want to mention that in some of the remarks when I am in Iraq and Afghanistan, that I've seen their friends who were wounded and visited them, that they are getting great care, and their spirits are high.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
083003.02

Respond by: \_\_\_\_\_

30 Aug 03

U21554 /03

8/29  
1230  
Snowflake

9:56 AM

✓  
9/3  
248.7

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: August 29, 2003  
SUBJECT: Status

*DR*  
*8/29*

Let's get Torie Clarke on as a consultant so when she flies out here like she did the government can pay for it and she can get some sort of compensation. She's been very helpful. We talked about that before she ever left. How's it going?

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
082903.01

Please respond by: 9/3/03

*8/29*  
*to: DR*

*8/2*

Sir,  
Forwarded.  
*VR/Corr Nazario*  
*9/2*

She is a consultant and we did pay for her trip. At moment she is unpaid consultant, meaning we cover expenses only. We will evaluate that to determine if another status or category makes more sense.

*29 Aug 03*

U21555 /03  
11-L-05597OSD/18875

Larry Di Rita  
*8/29*

*D. Rita*

TO: Larry Di Rita  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
 DATE: August 28, 2003  
 SUBJECT: **Outreach**

337

Let's think about an outreach group that included Eileen O'Connor and Susan Molinari.

They are both impressive. I had a good visit with Susan Molinari. She was appreciative of the call and she is available to help you.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
082903.01

Please respond by: 9/7/03

*9/8*  
 Chris Wilcox -  
 file let.  
 discuss.

*D. Rita*  
 Larry Di Rita

28 Aug 03

U21556 /03 *9/9*

1:34 PM

OB  
9:29

Iraq

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: August 27, 2003  
SUBJECT: **Priorities in Iraq**

When I get back we probably ought to have a session on the Priorities in Iraq that we have been talking to Gen. Abizaid and Bremer about.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
082703.08

Please respond by:                     9/6                    

27 Aug 03

U21557 /03

TO: Secretary George Shultz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D. Rumsfeld*

DATE: August 27, 2003

SUBJECT: **Geophysical Techniques**

I just wanted to double back to you and let you know on that issue of various geophysical techniques, I've got the DIA working on it. They have come back to me and they are apparently focused on some of the techniques that were indicated in your memo.

Thanks so much again.

DHR/azn  
082703.01

*413.77*

*27 Aug 03*

**U215587/03**

8:58 PM

TO: Jerry Bremer  
Gen. John Abizaid

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: August 25, 2003

SUBJECT:

Attached is a letter I received from Retired Lt. Gen. James B. Vaught. I thought it had some interesting ideas, and you might be interested in reading it.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
082503.41

*Attach: Letter to SD from LTG Vaught 8/21/03*

*Iraq*

*25 Aug 03*

U21559 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18879

(b)(6)

Fax For LTG Craddock, OSG -  
Please pass to your leader. Thanks Jim

(b)(6)

LT. GENERAL JAMES B. VAUGHT  
(U.S. ARMY RETIRED)

(U.S.)

(b)(6)

3

21 August 2002

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld:

Thanks for your continuing, determined leadership in the Global War Against Terrorism (GWAT). Listed next are some thoughts, for your considerations, to help stabilize the situation in Iraq, a confrontation some now say is beginning to turn negative in the eyes of your former supporters. Without a lot of elaboration, I suggest the following:

- A. Impose a dusk to dawn curfew each night along all of Iraqi's international borders. Announce via all media that all person within 10,000 meters of the border who move around during curfew, will be shot by American Aircraft (AC-130's or other weapons platforms). During daylight hours, the borders will be surveilled by air and ground patrols. This action will stop the outsiders and Saddam sanctuary loyalists.
- B. Activate several thousand former Iraqi professional soldiers and place at least one (unarmed) in or on each American vehicle, positioned so they are visible while the vehicle is outside a secure base. General Patton did this with great success in the U.S. Zone of occupied Germany during 1945-46.
- C. Recall B/G Dave Grange to active duty, appoint him to the grade LTG. and make him the special security advisor to Ambassador Bremer (CIA and other advisory representation notwithstanding). His presence would not undercut Gen. Abizaid's authority. On the contrary, he would facilitate the CENTCOM liberation and security goals. (Note: I have not talked to Dave or Pete Schoolmaker. However, I am sure they both would concur) Dave knows what to do. He does not need a long list of guidance. There may be others who believe they are equally qualified, however, I don't know who they are and would like to compare their credentials with Dave Grange's. He has done it all, served at all levels, and still knows how to work as a member of a multi-discipline allied civilian/military team. He has served with me four times, (in peace and war) beginning when he was a Lieutenant.

Thanks again and press on with your VISION TO VICTORY!

*Jim Vaught*  
Jim Vaught

CC LTG Cody, B-3, US Army  
LTG (P) Doug Brown, US CENTCOM

3



8:38 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
Col. Bucci  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: August 26<sup>7</sup>, 2003  
SUBJECT: **Calendar**

000.71 SD

Someone please set me up with a meeting with Kreig and Di Rita the first week after I get back from the CENTCOM tour on this Annual Report. I want to talk to them about it.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
082503.39

*Ref: Draft 2003 Annual Report to the President and Congress (Not Attached)*

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_ 9/7/03

27 Aug 03

U21560 /03

3:09 PM

TO: President George W. Bush  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: August 27, 2003

*Iraq*

Mr. President:

Thanks again for your hospitality in Crawford. Our folks enjoyed being there and having an opportunity to brief their Commander in Chief.

You will recall that Admiral Giambastiani and Brigadier General Cone briefed on lessons learned in Iraq. After the meeting, I asked Ed Giambastiani to prepare a brief summary of some key lessons and insights from the Iraq war. Attached is the product. I think you will find it of interest.

Respectfully,

DHR/azn  
082503.40

*Attach: Operational Insights 8/22/03*

*27 Aug 03*

**U21561 /03**

(b)(6)

### Operational Insights

- **Every war is different . . . lessons from Operation Iraqi Freedom are not universally applicable**

Must account for the uniqueness of each experience: for Iraqi Freedom = our defeat of Iraq in 1991; operations over Iraq for 12 years; and, a less than capable enemy

- **Long term strategy creates the conditions for rapid and successful action**

In the case of Iraqi Freedom, the US was in region for 50 years, conducted 12 years of containment and conditioning of enemy, one year of selected interdiction and 12 years of shaping the region (intelligence, infrastructure, basing, access, over flight, etc.)

- **Leaving all options on the table creates opportunities for the U.S. and dilemmas for our enemies**

Breadth of US capabilities causes enemy to dissipate effort in too many directions . . . most enemies cannot be strong everywhere.

- **Top-down clarity of vision and common understanding of purpose empowers action, creates opportunity, generates trust and confidence, and creates unity of effort**

Political and diplomatic efforts create time and space to prepare for combat operations. Clear intent and consistent interaction create unity of purpose and freedom from distraction for the Combatant Commander

- **Operationally agile forces; flexible capabilities; and, access, basing and overflight are essential to make adaptive planning and execution a reality**

Adaptive plans need flexible and agile forces, but some things are constant: agility and flexibility are useless without a combination of access, basing, and/or overflight (examples = Turkey, Kuwait, Saudi airfields)

- **It's not the *plan*, it's the *planning* that provides the intellectual basis for adaptation**

Iterative planning creates profound knowledge that enables anticipation, tests assumptions, discovers unknowns and allows calculated risk taking

- ***Overmatching power* replaces the post cold-war construct of *overwhelming force***

Overmatching (relative to enemy at time and place of our choosing) & power (effect on the enemy) . . . reflects the focused power of networked military and government power rather than a mere preponderance of forces in an attrition based campaign.

- **The ability to act against leadership and combatants denies our enemies the ability to use the innocent as a shield**

The tools of this new American method of warfare allow action against thugs and tyrants once protected by the dilemma posed by war's indiscriminate destruction . Our ability to focus action against those who decide and those who fight reduces collateral impacts, enabling acceptable responses to enemies embedded among the innocent.

- **Knowing more than the enemy reduces risk and enables initiative**

We knew more than our opponents ever did. This created freedom to act (our actions with the 4th ID, the switching of air and ground days, etc.) and confused the enemy. The speed of our actions, enabled by our superior understanding of events, further precluded effective enemy action

- **Gain and maintain the initiative, whether on offense or defense**

Initiative is key - getting there "firstest with the mostest" is the key to victory. In Iraqi Freedom, our forces demonstrated initiative that denied the enemy success:

**Offensive:** rapid seizure of oil fields, speed of closure on Baghdad, and aggressive action against missile launch sites in western Iraq

**Defensive:** convoy security operations and Baath party headquarters strikes to dislocate the Fedayeen Saddam

- **Speed kills; reducing decision and execution cycles speeds the enemy's collapse**

Like being "first to market" with multiple products in multiple locations. The competition starts out behind and never catches up

- **Coherently joint forces create power that exceeds the sum of the individual parts**

To use a football metaphor, the running game creates opportunities to pass; the passing game opens holes for the running backs.

Via Facsimile (b)(6)

TO: Vin Weber  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
DATE: August 27, 2003  
SUBJECT: End Strength

320.2

Here's the memo we talked about. It is not for public consumption, and is in draft form. It answers the question you posed, I think.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
082703.03

Attach: End Strength MFR

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_

27 Aug 03

U21562 /03

## WORKING PAPER

Version #4

August 25, 2003

**SUBJECT:** “End Strength”—Are current U.S. military forces sufficient for the challenges facing our country? What are ways DoD can reduce the stress on the force, maintain recruiting and retention targets, and make the Department more efficient and cost effective?

**Summary:** The U.S. can afford whatever military force level (end strength) is determined to be necessary and appropriate for our nation’s security. The men and women in uniform are the Department’s most valuable asset. Our people—military and civilian—appreciate in value, while equipment decreases in value. It is our people who distinguish the U.S. military from other forces. For the present, analysis by the Joint Chiefs indicates that the U.S. military currently has sufficient active and reserve forces to execute its assigned missions. If at any time that is not the case, it would be DoD’s responsibility to recommend to the President appropriate adjustments. Absent analysis that indicates that U.S. forces are not able to meet their assigned missions, it would be an expensive mistake to increase the size of our forces. To the extent we increase our investment in end strength, we may likely increase risk in other key areas, such as readiness, procurement and research and development.

**Background:** The operational tempo of U.S. forces during the two years after September 11, 2001 has been significant. In the aftermath of Operation Iraqi Freedom, some have called for an increase in the end strength of the U.S. military. Although this may appear to be a straightforward solution, it is neither easy nor quick. Adding uniformed personnel to the defense establishment is expensive.

- The cost is substantial over the lifetime of a service member. A number of the most costly add-ons to military pay and benefits have been for retired, not active duty personnel.
- Increased end strength has second and third order effects. The more end strength, the more force protection that is required; the more end strength, the more infrastructure that is required; the more end strength, the more pensions and healthcare for life that are required.
- It takes time to recruit, train and integrate new personnel into the Armed Forces. As a result, there is a considerable lag between when the additional personnel are recruited and the costs begin, and when the added capability is received.

WORKING PAPER

11-L-0559/OSD/18886

## WORKING PAPER

- At present, all four Services' recruiting and retention goals are being met or exceeded. Whether these favorable results will continue as we move through the coming months and years remains to be seen. These key indicators must be closely watched.

The current stress on the force is very likely a "spike," and we hope it will not be permanent. In any event, that stress, as well as respect for the taxpayers' dollars, requires DoD to make every effort to achieve the most efficient use of the forces. That same respect for the taxpayers' dollars mandates that we aggressively address the alternative contractor and civilian employee cost impacts as well.

Following is, I am sure, an incomplete but illustrative list of activities DoD is currently executing and/or examining for implementation. As appropriate, we must exploit each of these areas to reduce stress on the force, both active and reserve. Though it may appear that some of these areas do not directly benefit end strength, nor assist in reducing stress on the force, in a variety of ways we believe they can have positive, indirect impact. To the extent we are successful in improving performance in these areas, it should relieve pressure on the force and likely reduce the current calls for end strength increases, or, at the minimum, reduce the size of any end strength increase that analysis might later indicate is necessary in the future.

### **I. Lessons Being Learned**

- **Contingency Plans.** DoD is currently reviewing and revising all contingency plans to take account of the lessons learned thus far in Afghanistan, Iraq and the Global War on Terror. Among the lessons is the need to take advantage of the tradeoffs between numbers of people and things—"mass"—versus the increased lethality from speed, agility, precision munitions and the leverage available in the information age. "Overmatching power" is replacing "overwhelming force."
- **Jointness.** DoD is achieving greater jointness worldwide, so combatant commanders should be able to tailor forces creatively among the Services to gain added synergy and lethality, as in the Iraq war. Coherently joint forces create power that exceeds the sum of individual military—U.S. and international—elements.
- **Training and Exercises.** Training matters; joint training matters more. It creates an asymmetric advantage for U.S. forces. Training and exercises need to take account of recent real world experience.
- **Global Force Management.** DoD is exploring methods of replacing the concept of "forces for a specific combatant commander" with a "Global

Force Management Availability System,” which should lead to more efficient management of the forces and the process by which they are provided to Combatant Commanders in support of their essential missions.

- Reserve/Active Force Balance. DoD is rebalancing the reserve components with the active components to achieve the appropriate mix for the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The task is to avoid having to call up certain specialties repeatedly for tasks we know DoD is and will continue to be called upon to execute regularly (civil affairs, etc.). The new active-Reserve mix must also be designed to enable more immediate action, as appropriate.
- Realignment of Manpower Levels and Skill Sets. DoD will review active and reserve components to determine how the Department can best allocate manpower levels and specific skill sets, within existing end strength limits, to best satisfy the demands of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.
- Time on Operational Duty. For Reserve Components, DoD will seek ways to increase the ratio of the number of months out of the total period of activation/mobilization a unit is actually performing the mission for which it was called up. We can improve on those instances where it is as low as 6 months out of a 12-month call-up.
- Precision Weapons. Our use of precision weapons, with greater accuracy, can maintain lethality while reducing both the operational footprint and the logistics tail, thereby reducing force requirements.
- Deployments. The old Industrial Age process is broken. An approach that permits only peace or war, with little or no nuance, is out of date. The process is currently being streamlined to take less time and permit more nuanced management of mobilization and demobilization, deployment and redeployment, and recovery operations.
- Relief-in-Place. The Services need to establish a common definition of “relief-in-place” and then implement measures to shorten the relief in place system from 45 – 60 days to a shorter period, as appropriate.
- Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters. The world is moving so fast that Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters are necessary. If it takes one to three months to staff up a headquarters, the wars of the future may be over before the staff is in place. Where appropriate, we must invest in and sustain surge capability.

2. **People**

- **Military Out of Non-Military Jobs.** DoD requires Congressional cooperation to pass the personnel reform legislation so it can get closure on the studies that suggest there are some 300,000 to 380,000 positions that military personnel are currently serving in that might be performed by civilians. Managers have to be freed up so they can make greater use of the civil service, rather than being forced to use military personnel or contractors because they cannot efficiently manage the DoD civilian workforce. If only one-sixth of those 300,000 positions were freed up for military duty, it would increase usable “end strength” by 50,000. We won’t know what can be achieved until the current analysis is completed.
- **Core Competencies.** OSD is aggressively working to move the military out of activities that are not core competencies or inherently governmental. For example, housing privatization has allowed DoD to get better value and speed modernization for the same expenditure of funds.
- **Contract Employees.** For shorter duration missions and missions that are not military core competencies, DoD will have to make more judicious use of contract employees. This will require that we organize so we have Congressional authority and the ability to properly engage contract assistance.
- **Education.** The Department is working to improve joint education to create a culture that empowers younger leaders to think beyond their parent Services for creative solutions to the challenges our nation faces.
- **Coalition Forces.** The U.S. must organize its alliances and relationships to increase the availability and readiness of coalition forces—the speed of their availability and the readiness of their equipment. This will require a diplomatic effort to substantially reduce the current restrictions and caveats many countries have that reduce the availability of their forces and also a long-term commitment from other countries to help finance less wealthy nations’ ability to recruit, train, deploy and sustain their forces.
- **Allies.** We must assist treaty partners, where appropriate, to assume greater responsibility for their defense more rapidly.
- **Backfill.** During a crisis, we need to arrange for other countries to backfill for U.S. troops in some of our long-term commitments, such as

the Sinai, Iceland, Bosnia, Kosovo, etc. Additionally, the U.S. will have to tackle the tough political challenge of ending some commitments.

- **Indigenous Forces.** The U.S. must organize and fund to be able to use more host nation security personnel in places like Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia, and Kosovo to ease the burden on coalition forces. This will require Congress approving DoD's proposed "train and equip" legislation.
- **Reserve Forces.** DoD has established a policy whereby it will, to the extent possible, first use Reserve forces that have not recently been mobilized.
- **Volunteers.** DoD will continue to use volunteers from the Reserve force, to the extent available.
- **Holidays.** To the extent possible, DoD force mobilizations will be respectful of major holidays.
- **Call-ups.** DoD is revising the process so as to protect the goal of 30 days' notice for mobilization of reserve units, if at all possible, and will consider a tiered arrangement whereby some reserve units might be compensated and trained to maintain a readiness level to be available and ready for prompt deployment with a shorter call-up.
- **Incentives.** DoD will consider offering incentives for extended deployments.
- **Peace Operations.** The USG is considering a "Peace Operations Initiative" with the goal of increasing the worldwide availability of peacekeepers, peacemakers, military police, constabulary, etc. for peacemaking and peacekeeping operations.
- **Intelligence.** DoD is working to strengthen actionable intelligence, and improve humint in key areas of interest, by prioritization of effort and by assuring seamless exchange of information among U.S. agencies.

### 3. **Technology**

- **Information Age.** DoD will accelerate use of new information technologies to reduce the need for forward deployed personnel and thereby reduce the rotation rate the Services require to support a deployed person.

- Logistics. DoD will continue to emphasize systems with smaller logistics requirements and footprint, simplified designs with fewer and more interchangeable parts.
- New Technologies. DoD will invest in technology to substitute for human force protection—sensors, intelligence, etc. Additionally, the Services will be encouraged to consider the approach the Navy is using to reduce personnel needed for ship manning (by as much as 50 percent in some cases) and invest in less manpower-intensive platforms (UAVs), and technologies and processes, in and out of the defense industry.
- Lethality. Services are working to lighten their footprint, while increasing lethality, to the extent possible.
- U.S. and Coalition Transformation. DoD will work to improve its interoperability with coalition partners through the Joint Forces Command.

#### 4. Efficiency

- Organization of Forces. In the 21<sup>st</sup> century one size doesn't fit all. DoD will modernize the Services' force organizations to achieve improved modularity, so combatant commanders can more readily organize units to task. This should allow commanders to build capability by adding modules and right-sizing the force to their missions. The goal is to achieve greater interchangeable and combined arms effects to increase flexibility. Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters are ideally suited to integrate and operate this approach. Interchangeable divisions could provide improvements in force allocation, force rotation, and employment flexibility.
- Global reach back. DoD will organize to conduct more non-spear point activities for deployed forces back in the U.S., thereby reducing both the number of forces deployed as well as the rotation base multiple needed to maintain that number of troops forward-deployed. Organizing the Reserve Components to optimize reach back opportunities may yield significant personnel tempo savings.
- Force Allocation. OSD and the Joint Forces Command will work to be able to provide combatant commanders the joint force capabilities they need to achieve desired "effects" and "outcomes," rather than simply responding to requests for numbers of things—troops or platforms.

## WORKING PAPER

- **Procurement.** DoD will continue to invest to achieve greater lethality per unit of force structure.
- **Strategic Lift.** DoD will continue investing in strategic lift to assure timely mobility, e.g., high speed transport. Leveraging new technologies in this area should also reduce the associated logistic footprint. Additionally, the Department must continue to support participation in the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) Act as a supplement to our national mobility capability.
- **Rotation Ratio.** The Services will work to find ways to reduce the rotation ratio and consider opportunities to transport crews to their equipment.
- **Headquarters Layering.** DoD components' reduction in the number of headquarters will free up some of the manpower currently staffing those organizations. The flattening of headquarters hierarchies is desirable and viable given existing and planned communications technology.
- **Best Practices.** DoD will work to move best practices from inside and outside DoD throughout the Department.
- **Planning Tools.** DoD is developing tools to enable it to plan more rapidly to produce more refined force requirements, both in terms of numbers and timing of their movement and arrival.
- **Operational Availability.** DoD will implement the appropriate JROC "operational availability" studies' recommendations.
- **Strategic Warning.** Intelligence capabilities will be tasked to see if it is possible and cost effective to increase strategic warning, thereby reducing the portion of the force that must be forward-deployed.
- **The Right Skills.** DoD will develop the ability to more rapidly adjust forces in the field, so as to put the right capabilities in the right places at the right time and to be able to make rapid adjustments as circumstances change.

### 5. **Policy**

- **U.S. Foreign Commitments.** DoD will continue to work to pare down long-term U.S. commitments such as the Sinai, Iceland, Bosnia, Kosovo, etc. We will advise nations at the outset that deployments are not forever and that the U.S. requires the ability to redeploy for other

contingencies and ease of transit. DoD will also use care in adding new commitments of forces.

- U.S. Non-Military Skills. The USG needs to strengthen the international capability to help countries establish and execute civil implementation tasks; only if we are successful will the U.S. and coalition forces be relieved of peace operations earlier than tends to be the case, such as in Bosnia.
- U.S. Worldwide Footprint. DoD will work to improve the flexibility and responsiveness of U.S. forces by adjusting U.S. forward-deployed forces in Europe and Asia, by repositioning and making greater use of pre-positioned equipment to improve our capabilities for rapid deployment from the U.S. and elsewhere, and by investing in necessary infrastructure where required. DoD will consolidate locations worldwide to reduce the number of troops required for support, including force protection and, in addition, will use host nation forces, where available, to provide protection for deployed U.S. forces.

### Conclusion.

In a war—in this case, the Global War on Terrorism—it cannot be “business as usual.” During a crisis, when there is an understandable spike demand on U.S. forces, DoD cannot behave as though it is “business as usual.” It isn’t. DoD needs to act promptly to reduce or stop activities such as exercises and other “business as usual” activities, as appropriate.

The task of DoD is to manage the force within acceptable levels of stress. Key measurements are recruiting and retention metrics. We must monitor all activities to see that we achieve solid progress on each of the above tasks, before taking the easy and more expensive course of increasing force levels. We owe the American people no less.

DHR:dh  
Current MFRs/ End Strength

7:32 PM

TO: Marc Thiessen  
Hedy Henderson

CC: (b)(6)

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: August 25, 2003

SUBJECT: **Speeches**

*350.001 SD*

When drafting speeches in the future, please leave two or three extra spaces between each sentence. When I lift my eyes up and then bring them back down to the page, there is no more distance between a sentence than there is between words in a sentence. That makes it difficult to find my place.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
082503.15

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_

*25 Aug 03*

U21563 /03

*(1)*

12:03 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld JA  
DATE: August 25, 2003  
SUBJECT: **Friedman Editorial**

✓  
320.2

In the editorial by Thomas Friedman (Sunday, August 24, 2003 – *The New York Times*), he says we are shrinking the Army. You ought to send him a letter and tell him it is flat wrong, and he shouldn't say things like that.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
082503.18

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_ 9/6

25 Aug 03

U21564 /03

②

12:04 PM

TO: Jim Haynes  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: August 25, 2003  
SUBJECT:



383.6

Are we getting down to a short list on who is going to do the hearings on GTMO?  
If so, who is on it?

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
082503.19

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_ *9/6*

25 Aug 03

U21565 /03







GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

✓  
10/24

②

INFO MEMO

August 29, 2003, 5:00 PM

UK

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel *WJ Haynes II*

SUBJECT: UK's Agreements with Afghanistan

- You asked whether the UK agreement with Afghanistan covers former as well as current government officials. It does not. It covers only International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and supporting personnel of the UK and of other nations participating in ISAF. It does not cover UK personnel in Afghanistan who are not part of ISAF.
- The UK entered into two international agreements when it took command of the ISAF.
  - The primary agreement is the Military Technical Agreement (MTA) between the ISAF and the Interim Administration of Afghanistan. Annex A of the MTA covers the status of members of the ISAF. It applies only to "ISAF and supporting personnel, including associated liaison personnel," and provides that
    - they shall "under all circumstances and at all times be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of their respective national elements," and
    - they "may not be surrendered to, or otherwise transferred to the custody of, an international tribunal or any other entity or State without the express consent of the contributing nation."
  - The UK also entered into a Memorandum of Understanding with the troop contributing nations to the ISAF. It adopts the same exclusive jurisdiction provisions as the MTA.
- The immunities contained in these two agreements are more like status of forces agreement (SOFA) protections that the US seeks for its personnel in similar SOFAs,

29 AUG 03



U21573-031

including protections against the ICC. These protections are limited to the personnel covered in the SOFA.

- While this is not an “Article 98” agreement, it is significant that the UK has obtained protections against the ICC and other international tribunals for its personnel in Afghanistan (and that it has used a formulation that is virtually identical to the text used by the U.S. in recent SOFAs such as the one we have with Uzbekistan).
- Conclusion of an Article 98 agreement with the UK would be pivotal for securing agreements elsewhere in Europe. While the UK should be pressed at every opportunity to conclude an Article 98 agreement, it may not be prudent to send a note to Geoff Hoon specifically citing the MTA protections because the MTA is not an Article 98 agreement.
  - Should UK officials rebuff or shrug off future approaches about an Article 98 agreement, it could be useful to remind the UK that it, too, seeks such protections for its personnel abroad.

COORDINATION: Office of ASD (ISP) (Guy Roberts)

Snowflake

In reply refer to EF and I #'s

EF-7000  
I-03/013535

September 29, 2003

331  
UEE

TO: Doug Feith  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
LTG John Craddock

SUBJECT: Camp David Tasking

Here is the action list from Camp David. We need to get some folks working on these items and brief me. Then I will give some guidance as to what I think ought to be done.

Thanks.

Attach.  
9/27/03 Camp David Action Checklist

DHR:dh  
092903-9

.....  
Please respond by 10/31/03

✓  
12/30  
C 10/30

Sir,  
Response attached.  
w/  
CDR Nosum  
10/30

29 JAN 03  
EACB

U21574-03

~~TOP SECRET~~

(UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENTS)

August 18, 2003

313  
9/18  
9/20

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Capturing Taliban

Please try to have someone figure out why we are doing so poorly on picking up these top Taliban people. We are doing much better on Al Qaeda. Why is that?

Thanks.

~~ATTACH~~  
Attach.

1 August Status [390700ID 8-03]

DHR:dh  
081603-30

.....  
Please respond by 9/10/03

Sir,  
Response attached.  
vr/  
CDR NOSENZO  
9/18

DDA.5

18 Aug 03

U21611-030

~~TOP SECRET~~

11-L-0559/OSD/18901

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF ENCLOSURE S

✓ 8/14

August 6, 2003

EF-6448

03/01/055-ES

Advanced  
copy sent

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: ~~Siris~~ <sup>CFIUS</sup> and Global Crossing

I have to get back to John Snow on this ~~Siris~~ <sup>CFIUS</sup> and Global Crossing issue. He is going to make a recommendation to the President.

John wants me to call him back and tell him who has the real story on the DoD position, so he will know precisely what we believe. You said there was a memo. If there is, I need to see it fast if we want to affect the decision.

004

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080603-17

Please respond by 8/7/03

Set MTG  
Thurs. adm. -

DDMS

6 AUG 03

U21612-03

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT(S)  
DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/18902

12:20 PM

TO: Rubin Jeffries  
 CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
 DATE: August 25, 2003  
 SUBJECT:

*✓*

*020CPA*

Please tell me how many of the top 10-15 senior people that Jerry Bremer has out there are from the State Department, and how many are from other locations? Also, let me know what locations are they from.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
 082503.22

*Please respond by:*                     9/6/03                    

U21615 /03

*25 AUG 03*

*Ⓟ*

(b)(6)

11:21 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
 FROM: Donald Rurnsfeld *DR*  
 DATE: August 25, 2003  
 SUBJECT:

I think I would like to do a speech in Chicago some time in the next three months.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
082503.04

Please respond by: 9/15/03

350.0015D

25 AUG 03

U21616 /03

(3)

TO: Larry Di Rita  
Col. Bucci

CC: (b)(6)

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: August 25, 2003

SUBJECT:

Jim Denny wants me to meet with the Board of Visitors of Georgetown Law School on September 17 or 18. He is going to be in town. See me on calendar.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
082503.08

Please respond by: 9/7

334

U21617 /03

25 AUG 03

10/23/03

TO: David Chu  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*  
DATE: October 22, 2003  
SUBJECT: Letter to Governor Rowland

33550

I just read your letter to Governor Rowland of September 9<sup>th</sup> and his response of September 17<sup>th</sup>. If you want me to weigh in with him, draft a letter from me to send on top of yours.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
102203.08

Please respond by: 10/31

22 OCT 03



PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2004 JAN 12 PM 9:13

INFO MEMO

December 12, 2003, 1:30PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DEPSEC Action \_\_\_\_\_

FROM: DR. DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

(PERSONNEL & READINESS) *David S. Chu*

SUBJECT: Governor of Connecticut and Family Day Care Licensing - Snowflake

- Following field hearings at Groton, CT, a concern surfaced that spouses who want to provide family day care are waiting an excessive amount of time to be licensed.
- Initial letter was sent in September 2003 to Governor Rowland requesting his assistance in facilitating discussion between the family day care staff at New London Naval Base and the licensing office for Connecticut.
- Connecticut licensing personnel, Director of OSD Office of Children and Youth, and Navy staff met on October 22, 2003. Since that time initiatives have been taken to reduce the length of time for processing background checks and to provide required training earlier in the process.
- Because this process appears to be improving at this time, we have not accepted your offer to help.
- Navy will provide regular updates to OSD reporting on the goal of reducing time for licensing providers from 9 months to 3 months.

RECOMMENDATION: None. For information only.

ATTACHMENTS:

None

COORDINATION: None.

PREPARED BY: Jan Witte, Director, Office of Children and Youth, ODUSD(MC&FP),

(b)(6)

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SR MA CRADDOCK	1/16
MA-BIAGGI NOSENZO	1/16
EXECSEC AMBROTTI	1/12

292

12 Dec 03

01/07/2000 07:12

(b)(6)

TADS GUEST HOUSE

PAGE 05

11:30 AM

TO: Jim Haynes

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

DATE: August 25, 2003

SUBJECT:

Whatever happened to the idea that you were going to use Judge (b)(6) for something?

Thanks.

DHR/aza  
082503.10

Please respond by: 9/5/03

020GC

25Aug03

U21619 /03

(S)

11:32 AM

TO: Jim Haynes  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
 DATE: August 25, 2003  
 SUBJECT:

I would like to use Jim Gaither on one of these legal activities that you are engaged with where we have an outside advisory board. Attached is his background sheet.

*See Me.*

Thanks.

DHR/axn  
 082503.11

**Attach: Gaither Background Sheet**

**Please respond by:** \_\_\_\_\_

*9/8/03*

*02060*

*25Aug03*

**U216205/03**

## Biographical Information

For

James C. Gaither

Jim Gaither became a Managing Director of Sutter Hill Ventures in July of 2000, after working with Sutter Hill for many years as advisor, lawyer, Special Limited Partner and fellow director of portfolio companies.

Jim has been a leading Silicon Valley lawyer and entrepreneur for many years, having helped build his firm, Cooley Godward LLP, into one of the top technology firms in the country. He has served on many corporate and philanthropic boards over the years and is currently serving on the boards of the following companies: Kineto Wireless, Inc., Levi Strauss, nVidia, Satmetrix and Siebel Systems. On the philanthropic side, Jim has served as Chairman of the Stanford Board of Trustees, as well as its investment committee, and as Chair of the Stanford Law School's Advisory Council and Capital Campaign. He also served on the Boards of the RAND Corporation and The James Irvine Foundation. He currently serves as Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and as Vice Chair of The William and Flora Hewlett Foundation.

Jim received his BA in Economics from Princeton and his JD from Stanford. Following graduation from Law School, he clerked for Earl Warren, Chief Justice of the United States, was a Special Assistant in the Justice Department and Staff Assistant to President Lyndon Johnson before returning to the Bay Area.

1.

11-L-0559/OSD/18910

(b)(6)

**JAMES C. GAITHER**

**CAREER SUMMARY**

**PERSONAL**

**Born:** September 3, 1937  
Oakland, California

**Marital Status:** (b)(6)

**EXPERIENCE**

**July 1, 2000-  
Present** Managing Director, Sutter Hill Ventures  
755 Page Mill Road, Suite A-200  
Palo Alto, CA 94305  
(b)(6)

**February 1969 -  
Present** Cooley Godward, LLP  
One Maritime Plaza, 20th Floor  
San Francisco, California 94111  
(b)(6)  
Senior Counsel 2000-Present  
Partner 1971-2000  
Managing Partner 1984 - 1990

**July 1966 -  
January 1969** Staff Assistant to Lyndon Johnson, President  
of the United States

**September 1965 -  
July 1966** Special Assistant to John W. Douglas  
Assistant Attorney General  
Civil Division, United States  
Department of Justice

**July 1964 -  
June 1965** Law Clerk to Earl Warren  
Chief Justice of the United States

**EDUCATION**

Stanford Law School  
Stanford, California  
(J.D., June 1964)

Princeton University  
Princeton, New Jersey  
(B.A. Economics, 1959)

**ACTIVITIES AND HONORS**

**Professional:** American Bar Association  
State Bar Association of California  
Bar Association of San Francisco

**Civic:** American Academy of Arts and Sciences  
Cambridge, Massachusetts  
Fellow  
The Fellows of the American Bar Foundation  
Member

**Current Activities:** Carnegie Endowment for International Peace  
Washington, D.C.  
Chairman, Board of Trustees  
Member, Executive Committee

nVidia Corporation  
Santa Clara, California  
Member, Board of Directors

The William and Flora Hewlett Foundation  
Vice Chairman, Board of Directors

Levi Strauss & Co.  
San Francisco, CA  
Member, Board of Directors

Siebel Systems, Inc.  
Menlo Park, California  
Member, Board of Directors

**Past Activities:** Amylin Pharmaceuticals, Inc.  
San Diego, California  
Member, Board of Directors

Basic American, Inc.  
San Francisco, California  
Member, Board of Directors

Blue Martini, Inc.  
San Mateo, California  
Member, Board of Directors

The Branson School  
Ross, California  
Chairman, Board of Trustees

Center for Biotechnology Research  
San Francisco, California  
Chairman, Board of Trustees

Family Service Agency of San Francisco  
Member, Board of Trustees

Evelyn and Walter Haas, Jr. Fund  
San Francisco, California  
Advisory Trustee

The James Irvine Foundation  
Chairman, Board of Directors

Marin Community Foundation  
Marin County, California  
Member, Board of Trustees  
(Former Chairman ProTem)

Marin Country Day School  
Corte Madera, California  
Member, Board of Trustees  
(Former President, Board of Trustees and Chairman: Capital  
Campaign, Development, Education, Nominating Committees)

Marin Educational Foundation  
Larkspur, California  
President, Board of Trustees

Psi Star  
Hayward, California  
Member, Board of Directors

RAND  
Santa Monica, California  
Member, Board of Trustees  
Member, Executive Committee

Rosenberg Foundation  
San Francisco, California  
Treasurer; Member, Board of Trustees

San Francisco Development Fund  
Corte Madera, California  
Vice President, Member, Board of Trustees

San Francisco Foundation  
Chairman, Steering Committee  
Marin County Scholarship Center

The Scripps Research Institute  
Member, Board of Trustees

Stanford University School of Law  
Stanford, California  
Member, Executive Committee,  
Board of Visitors  
Chairman, Campaign for Stanford Law School (1994-1999)  
Chairman, Dean's Advisory Council

St. Stephens Parish Day School  
Belvedere, California  
Member, Board of Trustees

Stanford University  
Stanford, California  
Member, Board of Trustees (former President and Vice President  
of the Board and former Chairman of the Finance and  
Administration, Academic Affairs and Development, Investment,  
and Investment Responsibility committees)

U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare  
Consultant to the Secretary  
January - March 1977  
Distinguished Public Service Award, 1977  
Chairman, Ethics Advisory Board, 1977-1980

Varian Associates, Inc.  
Palo Alto, California  
Member, Board of Directors

**Law School:**

Order of the Coif; Hiltner Oehlmann, Jr. Award; Chairman,  
Judicial Council; Phi Delta Phi (Province 12); Graduate of the  
Year, 1964; Note Editor *Stanford Law Review*.

**ADMITTED TO THE PRACTICE OF LAW**

United States District Courts for the District of Columbia and for the Northern District of California.

United States Courts of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, the Seventh Circuit and the Ninth Circuit.

United States Supreme Court.

Supreme Court of California.

11:33 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
 DATE: August 25, 2003  
 SUBJECT:

IRAQ

I would like a report on all the people I recommended to go to Iraq. Whatever happened. My impression is that I never hear back anything about it.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
082503.12

Please respond by:

9/7/03

U21621 /03

25 AUG 03

6

8:17 PM

OB  
9/12

IRAA

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith  
Gen. Dick Myers  
Gen. Pete Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: August 25, 2003

SUBJECT: **Editorial**

Attached is the *Wall Street Journal* article by Fouad Ajami. It is well worth reading.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
082503.13

**Attach: *Wall Street Journal* editorial, "Beirut, Baghdad" 8/25/03**

**Please respond by:** \_\_\_\_\_

U21622 /03

25 AUG 03

## Beirut, Baghdad

By Fouad Ajami

If the past is any guide, we may never know the name of the suicide bomber who drove the flabbed truck into the U.N. compound in Baghdad last week, for we still don't know the name of the boy who drove the Mercedes truck loaded with TNT into the Marine barracks in Beirut on the morning of Oct. 23, 1983. What we know of that seminal event two decades ago is the aftermath: the death of 241 U.S. servicemen, the proud initial assertion that Lebanon would not be left to the forces of radicalism, and then the scramble to pull America out of the hell of Lebanon. That country was abandoned to the tender mercies of Syria. There were no discernible American interests in that city by the Mediterranean. We quit Beirut under Arab eyes, to the impression that America is easily discouraged, that a band of plotters could dissuade us from larger goals.

\* \* \*


Once again, we are at a crossroads in an Arab land. And once again, a great and cruel struggle is playing out under watchful eyes.

Our staying power in Baghdad is the target of this latest assault, and it is our enemies' last throw of the dice. In Baghdad, we should know, we have overthrown not only a man but a religious and ethnic sect in Iraq, the Sunni Arabs, and this guerrilla war is their response to a loss of hegemony. We broke that minority's tenacious hold on the state: The oil is in the southern (predominately Shiite) zone and in the Kurdish lands in the north. That "Sunni triangle" lived off state terror, with the whip an instrument of enrichment. These "remnants" of the vanquished regime fight for what they had grown to see as their birthright: the state of terror and plunder that was Iraq under the Baath.

It is no surprise that jihadists on the run, and at the same time in search of a new field of battle, would converge on Iraq. We don't know for sure the veracity of recent reports that 3,000 Saudis have found their way to Iraq: The source is a London-based Saudi dissident with his own ax to grind. But were it to be confirmed, the purpose of the jihadists would further underline that the distinction between secular terror and the terror of religiously based movements was always a distinction without substance. It had always been a singular fight. Nor is it a mystery that Syria and Iran thirst for America's defeat in Iraq. The power that blew into Baghdad came bearing the promise of a new order. Woven into the awesome victory were hopes of reform, some perhaps extravagant. There would rise in Mesopotamia a state more democratic, more secular, no doubt more prosperous, than much of the neighborhood. That state would be weaned from the false temptations of Arab radicalism. With-

out quite fully appreciating it, we had announced nothing less than the obsolescence of the region's ruling order.

For our enemies, it is mightily important that we fail in Baghdad, and be forced to leave. Who would wish us well—strangers trumpeting new possibilities in lands made weary by cruelty and cynicism? As we had sacked the Tikriti-Sunni order, what assurance was there that the minority Alawite regime in Syria would survive? It is a trifle gentler than was the Tikriti dominion in Iraq, but it, too, is a state of plunder and terror, a regime that once spoke of a new Arab heaven only to turn into a petty inheritance. There is menace in the demonstration effect of our vic-



Barbara Keiley

tory: Embattled Arab and Iranian secularists and liberals are living off the nascent Iraq promise. That promise has to be snuffed out if the entrenched systems are to survive. If a moderate brand of Shiism takes hold in Iraq, on Shiism's holiest grounds, there would be reverberations for Iran's theocracy. It stood to reason that these ruthless rulers would fight back.

There are allies in Kuwait and Qatar who had bet on our victory in Iraq. But it was more treacherous in other neighboring lands. We pay dearly for an American presence in Cairo, but who there wishes us well? The street there had grieved for Saddam Hussein; it turned on him when he failed to give it an "Arab Stalingrad," an epic of resistance. It has drawn a measure of satisfaction from the rearguard action in Baghdad and Fallujah and Tikrit, for a virulent anti-Americanism has come to poison Egypt's political life. Nor has our man on the Nile, Hosni Mubarak, been supportive of our endeavor. He worries that a new forward base of American power will rise in Baghdad, close to the sealanes at the heart of the oil lands, and pose a serious challenge to Egypt's lucrative relationship with Washington. That relationship has been on Cairo's terms. A reasonably secular, representative model in Baghdad would steal a march on Cairo. That Sublime Porte in Washington—generous but naive and far away—could grow wiser after time on the ground in Baghdad.

The terrible secret of Egypt's retreat from modernism could be given away to the Americans.

A battle broader than the country itself, then, plays out in Iraq. We needn't apologize to the other Arabs about our presence there, and our aims for it. The custodians of Arab power, and the vast majority of the Arab political class, never saw or named the terrible cruelties of Saddam. A political culture that averts its gaze from mass graves and works itself into self-righteous hysteria over a foreign presence in an Arab country is a culture that has turned its back on political reason.

Yet this summer has tested the resolve of those of us who supported the war, and saw in it a chance to give Iraq and its neighbors a shot at political reform. There was a leap of faith, it must be conceded, in the argument that a land as brutalized as Iraq would manage to find its way out of its cruel past and, in the process, give other Arabs proof that a modicum of liberty could flourish in their midst.

Americans are strangers in Iraq. There is something both noble and heartbreaking about those embattled young soldiers standing sentry in what for them must be an incomprehensible place. The habits of empire are not innately American. It may have been unduly ambitious to think that America could pull off in Iraq what it did in Germany and Japan after World War II. The Islamic world is particularly raw about strangers and their gifts—and their presence. But the bloodletting should not deter America from the more limited, but still noteworthy, goal of an Iraq that bids farewell to political terror at home and to its rampaging ways in its neighborhood. The terror now unleashed seeks to drown the political question, to trump it with issues of physical security. The aim is to frighten the Iraqi people and to turn them away from this new order and its possibilities. Where people huddle in fear, more lofty goals of liberty and participatory politics die. The analogy is not perfect, but that is exactly what unfolded in Beirut.

For our part, America cannot—must not—do another Beirut. We must put Iran and Syria on notice that a terrible price will be paid by those who would aid and abet terror in Iraq. It was those regimes that drove us out of Lebanon. They had waged a war in the shadows. They must be told that a different America—driven by a sense of righteous violation after Sept. 11, 2001—has turned up in their midst. This was never destined to be an easy mission. As it plays out, we shall learn much about Iraq. And in no small measure, we shall learn about ourselves.

*Mr. Ajami, a professor at Johns Hopkins, is a contributing editor at U.S. News & World Report.*

In God Trust 18

the duties of elected officials under the state's motto: separation of God and state

TAB A

C9/23

11:18 AM

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
 DATE: August 25, 2003  
 SUBJECT:

France

I can't understand why the French could be connected to the U.S. Joint Forces Command. Are other countries connected to the U.S. Joint Forces Command as such? If so, what countries are they.

I am also interested in why France should be connected to the NATO Transformation Command at Joint Forces Command since they are not part of the Integrated Military Command.

Thanks.

082503.01

✓  
10/16

Sir,  
 Response attached.  
 U/CDR Nosenzo  
 9/23

25 AUG 03

U21623 /03



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

✓  
10/16

INFO MEMO

CM-1217-03  
23 September 2003

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS

*RBMyers 9/23*

SUBJECT: French Connection to the US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM)

- In response to your inquiry , enclosed is information on the French presence in Joint Forces Command and Allied Command Transformation (ACT).
- To summarize, French representation consists of 12 officers: 2 on visit requests to USJFCOM, a 6-person national liaison office at NATO's (ACT), and 4 officers on the ACT staff as voluntary national contributions.

COORDINATION: '

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared By: RADM W. D. Sullivan, USN; Vice Director, J-5 (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/18920

TAB B

5 September 2003

INFORMATION PAPER

Subject: French Connection to the US Joint Forces Command

1. Purpose. Answer questions posed in SecDef 25 August Memo

2. Key Points

- Q: Why the French could be connected to the U.S. Joint Forces Command?
  - A: The French have two officers on approved visit requests (valid until Jan 04) to USJFCOM. These officers coordinate transformational concept development efforts with USJFCOM.
- Q: Are other countries connected to the U.S. Joint Forces Command as such? If so, what countries are they?
  - A: The United Kingdom, Australia, Canada and Germany have, through bilateral agreements, established liaison offices with USJFCOM. Using recurring visits, Finland, Norway and Sweden are on-site for the purpose of coordinating concept development, experimentation and interoperability efforts.
- Q: I am also interested in why France should be connected to the NATO Transformation Command at Joint Forces Command since they are not part of the Integrated Military Command.
  - A: Since leaving the Integrated Military Command Structure, France has been allowed representation on NATO military staffs. The Alliance considers these French voluntary national contributions on a case-by-case basis. Currently, France has four officers serving, as voluntary national contributions, on the ACT staff (part of the interim Personnel Establishment).
  - All Allies have National Liaison Representatives (NLRs) to ACT. However, only France and Germany are represented on-site in Norfolk. All other NLRs are located in Washington, most dual-hatted as Defense Attaché. These officers represent national interests to the NATO Strategic Commander's Staff. The French NLR to ACT constitutes 6 personnel led by a Rear Admiral. They are not part of the integrated military staff at ACT.

11-L-0559/OSD/18921

- **French representation on NATO command structure staffs has not included flag officers. However, they have formally put forward a Vice Admiral as a candidate for a position within the ACT command group via a letter to the Chairman of the Military Committee. Our position remains that there should absolutely be no French GO/FO in any NATO command until they reenter the Integrated Military Structure.**

Prepared by: **RADM W. D. Sullivan, USN;**  
Vice Director, J-5; (b)(6)

TAB C

COORDINATION PAGE

USJFCOM

COL Odom

8 September 2003

11-L-0559/OSD/18923

01/07/2000 07:15

(b)(6)

TADS GUEST HOUSE

PAGE 01

7:52 PM 521

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
 CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
 DATE: August 25, 2003  
 SUBJECT:

IRAQ

Attached is a note from Doug Feith using Iraqi-Americans that you might want to be aware of.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
082503.29

Attach: Feith Memo

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_

U2162 / 03

165

(13)

25AUG03

11-L-0559/OSD/18924

(b)(6)



OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
FOR POLICY

5/16  
8/21

LTCG

August 21, 2003

NOTE FOR: SD

FROM: Douglas J. Feith DJF by (LTCG) 8/21/03

I pressed Walt Slocombe on how he would use Iraqi Americans if we gave them to him. Attached is his response. Bill Luti is going to work the idea with Reuben Jeffrey.

cc:

DSD

265 (14) [initials]

Walt Slocombe  
August 19, 2003

Potential Priorities for FIF and other Iraqi Americans  
(Besides assisting with ICDC)

The following are preliminary thoughts on areas where Iraqi-Americans (either citizens or resident aliens), especially those trained for the FIF, might make very useful contributions. In each case the ideas would have to be reviewed by the people in CJTF7 or CPA directly responsible, to insure that the IAs could in fact be used effectively, but with proper coordination and flexibility all round, (and recognizing the difficulty of accommodations, security, communications, transportation, and other support for people in Iraq, especially outside Baghdad, these sorts of approach and tasks might prove ways to use the IA/FIF community to advance our goals here in important ways.

Note: I have assumed that the IAs have native fluency in Iraqi Arabic (both spoken and written) but are not trained interpreters. I have also assumed that most have at least a high school education, and that they are prepared to accept living and working conditions no better than those of the US and other coalition military and civilian personnel in the field.

CMATT Support: "Community Relations Officers"/Contract Oversight/Administrative services

As the NIA training goes forward, CMATT will need to be able to deal with the usual range of personal issues that arise with trainees - family crises, financial problems, minor complaints about conditions, administrative screwups, etc. With minimal training, IA/FIF could handle most of these problems, referring serious issues to the CMATT military officers when necessary. Similarly, IA/FIF could also serve as "floor level" monitors of the performance of Iraqi contractors working on NIA projects, and supervise the Iraqis we will need to hire for such administrative functions for the NIA as ordering and accounting for supplies, keeping personnel records, managing transportation, keeping books of account, etc.

Serve on, or assist, CPA teams in the field.

A very high priority is getting more CPA civilian representation in the provinces - to supplement and gradually supplant the military as the link between the coalition and the local population authorities. Given the relative isolation and the need for the CPA reps to communicate comfortably with the local population, familiarity with the culture and Arabic language skills are very important for the people serving in these CPA field offices. State is scouring the FSO system for Arabic speakers. Even if only a few FIF/IAs, if any, would have the necessary qualifications to be lead CPA rep in a city or district, significant numbers might

365

(F) 5

Walt Siocombe  
August 19, 2003

will be properly qualified to handle specialized areas – e/g. teachers could serve as links to schools/local education authorities. And even those with few formal qualifications could, given the right personalities and guidance, be excellent eyes and ears (and, in the best sense, mouthpieces) for CPA in the community.

#### Preliminary document analysis

As time passes, the Coalition comes into possession of more and more documentation. Full exploitation requires extensive training and clearance to handle very sensitive information. However, a principal barrier to making use of documentation is simple sorting, organization, and identification of paper that could be of conceivable interest. Such work does not require extensive training, or entail access to sensitive, pre-sorted intelligence-interest archives, and there is no "sources and methods" issue because the documents have been collected more or less openly in Iraq. The screening service required is very much like what paralegals do in document review in big litigation operations – getting basic briefings on subject matter of interest, doing cursory review of masses of documents, organizing collections (aka filing stuff that shows up as disorganized piles, and setting up a system so documents can be retrieved easily and their original source confirmed) and passing the interesting bits on to senior professionals. FIF/AI could readily be trained to do this sort of work – which should not require full scale security clearance. (In fact, some of the work could be done in the US or elsewhere outside Iraq, thereby opening opportunities to FIF/LA who might be unwilling to work in Iraq for an extended period.

#### Assist CJTF7 in screening interrogations of detainees in the field

CJTF7 wants to increase its exploitation of detainees' information, both to get more timely information and to be able to make prompter judgments about who needs to be held, who is worth intensive interrogation, and who can safely be released (thereby simultaneously improving situational awareness, focusing follow up effort, and reducing the ill will – and moral and even legal impropriety – of holding people for long periods without justification). With minimal training, FIF/LAs should be able to be very useful in this connection. They could accompany units and conduct immediate initial screening interviews of detainees, to get immediate access to information the detainees were prepared to volunteer and do a rough triage of the detainees' potential intelligence/security significance. Nominally the jobs require a secret level clearance. Presumably many FIF/LAs would qualify for an interim clearance – and the requirement itself might be waived where the only function was asking routine, standardized screening questions.

4 of 5

(16)

Walt Slocombe  
August 19, 2003

Work in detainee information centers.

A significant, and growing, problem for both CJTF and CPA is dealing with detainees' families, who want information about family members who have been detained, or at any rate may be in coalition custody. Besides meeting an arguable legal/human rights requirement, Coalition community relations would benefit from a better system of recording the identities of detainees and prisoners, and conveying information to their families (except where imperative security considerations make it imprudent to reveal even the bare fact that the individual is in coalition custody). Language ability and cultural sensitivity will be essential in the staffers responding to family inquiries. FIF/IA people could help staff information centers, maintaining records and dealing with inquiries.

Searching females

There have been repeated complaints about male coalition soldiers performing physical searches of Iraqi women. (This does happen, because there are only a limited number of American women soldiers in the combat units that operate most of the checkpoints.) It is not prudent to have an absolute rule that Iraqi women (or persons dressed as women) are immune from search if no female searcher is available. Nonetheless, pat down searches of women by men create problems - and not just because this is a Muslim nation. Even when female searchers are available, language barriers made the searches awkward, unpleasant (for both parties) and potentially dangerous. It would be desirable to have Arabic-speaking female searchers available at as many check points as possible. (Women will be eligible for the ICDC, partly to fill this gap, but it is not clear how many will sign up - especially for work as searchers.) To the extent women IA are interested (FIF is presumably all-male), they could be very useful in this role.

19 August 2003

SJS # (P) 5

9:00 PM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR 10/31

DATE: August 25, 2003

SUBJECT:

UN

As I recall, either you or Gen. Myers are trying to figure out what happened at the U.N. compound in terms of the U.S. offer of security.

Today I was in the Brooks Medical Center and visited wounded Army Major Ward. He said he had personally talked to the Security Director for the U.N. and told them to close the alley, that the U.S. had offered to assist with security, and that the U.N. had told them that they didn't want to be connected with the U.S.

I think that somebody ought to call Major Ward, talk to him and find out precisely what he remembers about that, so we have the facts. The medical people at Brooks Medical Center will know how to reach him on the phone.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
082503.35

9/5/03

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_

25 AUG 03

U21625 /03

EF-6636  
I-03/011908  
8:20 PM

TO: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: August 25, 2003

SUBJECT:

Too much time is passing and I've not called Musharraf. We certainly ought to get a letter off to somebody in Pakistan from me, expressing our sorrow in the unfortunate loss of life.

Please have someone draft it to the right person.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
082503.37

Please respond by: 9/1/03

*Response Attached  
SFB  
8/28*

*293*

*25 AUG 03*

*(27)*

U21626-1/03



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2400

INTERNATIONAL  
SECURITY  
AFFAIRS

ACTION MEMO

416 27  
copy provided  
8/28/03  
LH  
USDP  
I-03/011955

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs  
(Peter W. Rodman, (b)(6))

416 27  
JMC

SUBJECT: Letter to Pakistan Secretary of Defense

- Enclosed (see Tab A) is a letter expressing regret over the deaths of three Pakistani soldiers from the mistaken encounter with U.S. Forces 11 August.
- Letter is drafted in response to your request (also attached).

RECOMMENDATION: Concur and sign the attached letter.

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared by: LTC Taylor, ISA-NESA, (b)(6)

DUSD(NESA) 8/27

PDASD(ISA) LV



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

AUG 29 2003

Lt. Gen (Ret.) Hamid Nawaz  
Secretary of Defense  
Ministry of Defense, Government of Pakistan  
Rawalpindi, Pakistan

Dear General Nawaz:

I am writing to express my sincere regret on the recent deaths of three Pakistani soldiers during an encounter with U.S. forces. Any loss of life is tragic, but especially so are the lives of our soldiers who together are fighting the terrorists that threaten our common interests in stability and peace.

I can assure you we are doing everything possible to ensure that such unfortunate incidents do not happen again.

I look forward to meeting with you in September when you will be here for the U.S.-Pakistan Defense Consultative Group meetings. Pakistan is a key ally in the War on Terror, and we place a high value on our continued collaboration.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "D. Rumsfeld".



11-L-0559/OSD/18932

U14604 /03

(b)(6)

8:22 PM

TO: Gen. John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: August 25, 2003

SUBJECT:

Do you have any idea why the Army had 34 losses per 100,000 OIF strength and the Marines had 3 losses per 100,000 OIF strengt in the post major conflict May 1 to date?

Please advise.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
082503.38

Please respond by:

*9/4/03*

*IRAQ*

*25 AUG 03*

U21627 /03

*(D)*

MEMO FOR: SECDEF

27 AUGUST 2003

FROM: LTG CRADDOCK

SUBJECT: QUESTION ON ATTACHED SNOWFLAKE

WITH REGARD TO THE DATA ON ARMY/MARINE CORPS LOSSES IN IRAQ, POST-1 MAY DATE FOR END OF MAJOR COMBAT OPERATIONS – WHY IS THE ARMY LOSS RATE OVER 10X THAT OF THE MARINES?

MY THOUGHTS:

- AT THE END OF MAJOR COMBAT OPERATIONS, ARMY FORCES WERE LOCATED IN THE HIGHEST THREAT AREAS. AS YOU RECALL, THE USMC MOVED SOUTH FROM TIKRIT AND BAQUBAH AND WERE REPLACED BY THE RECENTLY ARRIVED 4<sup>TH</sup> ID. THAT PUT ARMY UNITS IN THE “BAATHIST TRIANGLE”, AND ALSO IN MOSEL, KNOWN TO BE A RELATIVELY STRONG BAATHIST CITY.
- UPON MOVING SOUTH, USMC UNITS LOCATED IN HEAVILY SHIA AREAS ALONG THE 2 LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS, BETWEEN ARMY UNITS TO THE NORTH AND BRITISH FORCES TO THE SOUTH.
- U.S. FORCES FOUGHT THEIR WAY THROUGH THE SHIA COUNTRY SOUTH OF BAGHDAD. I WOULD THINK MANY OF THE RESIDENT BAATHIST “BAD GUYS” EITHER MOVED OUT OF THE AREA OR WERE KILLED.
- I NOTE THAT, EXCEPT FOR A SMALL PORTION OF THE IRANIAN BORDER, THE BORDERS WITH PROBLEM NEIGHBORS ( SYRIA AND IRAQ ) ARE IN THE ARMY AND BRITISH AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY. ADDITIONALLY, MAJOR LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS AND BORDER CROSSING POINTS ARE ALSO IN THE SAME AREAS.
- BATTLE CASUALTIES ARE GENERATED BY ENEMY CONTACT. THE ENEMY – WHETHER BAATHISTS, FORMER REGIME LEADERS, FOREIGNERS, ETC. – WILL TEND TO RESIDE IN FRIENDLY, SYMPATHETIC CITIES AND TOWNS. THEY WILL USE URBAN SPRAWL AND CONFUSION AS CAMOUFLAGE. THESE CONDITIONS ARE MORE PREVALENT WHERE THE ARMY IS LOCATED THAN THE MARINES – THUS MORE CONTACT.
- LASTLY – A THOUGHT. I WILL ASK THE ARMY TO PROFILE THEIR LOSSES BY UNIT – DIVISIONS, SEPARATE BRIGADES, AND REGIMENTS, TO SEE IF THERE IS ANY DISCRIMINATION BETWEEN HEAVY AND LIGHT UNIT LOSSES SINCE 1 MAY. IF THERE IS, THAT ALSO CAN CONTRIBUTE TO THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE ARMY AND THE MARINES, AS THE MARINES ARE A LIGHTER FORCE.

11-L-0559/OSD/18934

August 21, 2003

### MARINE CORPS / ARMY -- OIF LOSS ANALYSIS

Period	Total Army	Total Marine Corps	Army Losses/100K OIF Army Strength	Marine Corps Losses/100K OIF MC Strength
Combat Deaths 19 Mar thru 1 May	53	56	44.54	87.50
Non-Combat Deaths 19 Mar thru 1 May	14	9	11.76	14.06
Combat Deaths 2 May to Present	59	1	34.10	3.03
Non-Combat Deaths 2 May to Present	53	16	30.64	48.48

**Notes:**

Source of strength figures: JCS

Source of casualty data: Defense Casualty Information Processing System (DCIPS)

MC average strength = 64K combat operations; 33K post-combat operations

Army average strength = 119K combat operations; 173K post-combat operations

Rates of loss per 100,000 (for rates per 1000 divide by 100; e.g. 87.50=.8750)

Need source of 173K  
Need 5x8 in the am.

5 min answer from PRD

Casualty Numbers

J-1 please check and verify numbers. (Dr. Graddock)  
Try to find out originator of this document (and) originator of #'s.  
Gen. Graddock thought 173K # high.

01/07/2000 07:18

(b)(6)

TADS GUEST HOUSE

PAGE 01

9/2

7:57 PM

TO: Gen. John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: August 25, 2003

SUBJECT:

In this Joe Schmitz paper, he says that 89% of the alleged assailants were identified as other cadets. What were the other 11%?

Please find out.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
082503.13

Attach: Schmitz Memo 8/21/03 Re: US AF Academy

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_

9/6/03

*Response attached*  
C 9/2

250

25 AUG 03

169

(R)

U21628 /03

**Sexual Assault Survey Info Memo**  
**Statement of Clarification for the Secretary of Defense**  
Office of the Inspector General, DoD. August 29, 2003.

***NOTE: THIS INFORMATION IS PRE-DECISION.***

- Of the 579 cadet respondents (out of a total of 659 cadets), 177 individual incidents of sexual assault were reported.
- The offenders were identified for 166 of these incidents. For the remaining incidents (11), the respondents indicated "other" or did not respond to the question.
- Of the 166 incidents, the offenders were identified as follows:
  - Cadets - 149 (89.8%)
    - 65 were senior to the respondent, and 84 were not
  - Other offenders - 17 (10.2%)
    - Academy Faculty / Staff - 3 or less (0-1.8%)\*
    - Other Academy Military - 3 or less (0-1.8%)\*
    - Non-Academy Military - 4 (2.4%)
    - Academy Civilians - 3 or less (0-1.8%)\*
    - Non-Academy Civilians - 9 (5.4%)

\* The exact numbers have been removed in these instances in order to preserve the anonymity of the respondents, as numbers less than 3 are potentially traceable to individual respondents. To reveal the exact numbers would violate the promise of our office to the respondents that we would protect their identities, would create a possibility for reprisal or other adverse consequences for identifiable individuals, and would destroy the credibility of the OIG in the event of future surveys.



INSPECTOR GENERAL  
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE  
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202-4704

8/23  
**ADVANCE COPY**

**INFO MEMO**

August 22, 2003, 4:30 p.m.

**FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**

**FROM: Joseph E. Schmitz, Inspector General of the Department of Defense**

**SUBJECT: United States Air Force Academy Sexual Assault Survey (update)**

- As an update to my InfoMemo of yesterday (copy attached at Tab 1), today I provided to former Congresswoman Tillie Fowler, Chair of the Panel you appointed to review Sexual Misconduct Allegations at the United States Air Force Academy, the same attachments to my InfoMemo of yesterday.
- Today I also forwarded a related Memorandum with certain recommendations to Air Force Secretary Jim Roche (copy at Tab 2), in which I responded to issues he raised when I met with him on Tuesday, August 19, 2003.

**COORDINATION: None**

**Attachments:**  
As stated

**cc: USD (Personnel & Readiness)**  
**ASD (Public Affairs)**  
**GC DoD**

Prepared by: Joseph E. Schmitz, (b)(6)

269 (19)



INSPECTOR GENERAL  
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE  
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202-4704

## INFO MEMO

August 21, 2003, 5:50 p.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Joseph E. Schmitz, Inspector General of the Department of Defense

SUBJECT: United States Air Force Academy Sexual Assault Survey

- We are nearing completion of the analysis of our May 2003 initial survey of female cadets at the U.S. Air Force Academy, the results of which bear some similarity to earlier Academy surveys discussed in the Air Force's June 2003 report. However, if our results are not explained, they could be misinterpreted -- and reported in the press -- as significantly contradicting Air Force findings. The disparity can be explained, at least in part, by: (a) the fact that our survey includes both reported and unreported allegations; and (b) acknowledged problems with the Air Force Academy's definition of "sexual assault." Still, our results will likely result in headlines.
- Our May 2003 survey indicates that 15 of the most recent female graduates (11.7%) claim they had been the victim of rape or attempted rape while a cadet. The total number of female cadets alleging any kind of sexual assault, including rape and attempted rape, amounted to 109 of our 579 respondents (18.8%) from cadets in the classes of 2003-2006 (see attached Chart), with 89% of the alleged assailants identified as other cadets.
- The Air Force's "Report of the Working Group Concerning the Deterrence of and Response to Incidents of Sexual Assault at the U.S. Air Force Academy," issued in June 2003, reported the results of earlier Academy surveys results which are similar in some respects to our initial survey results. Those earlier surveys showed combined rape/sexual assault percentage rates claimed by women of 13%, 19% and 15% in 2000, 2001 and 2002, respectively (page 81). However, press reports have tended to focus on reported specific allegations or investigated cases, rather than survey results. See, e.g., "Records On Pentagon Role Requested: Congressional panel writing report about AFA scandal," *Colorado Springs Gazette*, p. 1 (August 19, 2003) ("This year's Air Force investigation reviewed 56 cases of sexual assault during the past 10 years.").
- Former Congresswoman Tillie Fowler, Chair of the Panel you appointed to Review Sexual Misconduct Allegations at the United States Air Force Academy, has requested survey results prior to August 22, 2003, so that her Panel can consider our data in its report. I briefed the Air Force Secretary and his IG on the attached Chart this week, and incorporated many of their comments (prior to releasing this Chart, and the attached Executive Summary to the Panel later this week).
- We plan to complete our full report on the Air Force Academy in late October. We also plan to conduct a more refined survey at all three Service Academies later this fall.

COORDINATION: None

cc: Secretary of the Air Force  
USD (Personnel & Readiness)  
ASD (Public Affairs)  
Air Force Inspector General

Prepared by: Joseph E. Schmitz, (b)(6)



INSPECTOR GENERAL  
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE  
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202-4704

AUG 22 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

SUBJECT: United States Air Force Academy

In response to issues you raised during our meeting on Tuesday, August 19, 2003, I would respectfully recommend the following:

(1) that you instruct your Air Force Inspector General forthwith to forward to the new Air Force Academy Superintendent the attached executive summary of the initial survey of female cadets my staff conducted at the Air Force Academy in May 2003, for the Superintendent's consideration as he defines the "scale and scope" of his leadership challenges (see AP, "Slow Change Seen at Air Force Academy," August 14, 2003);

(2) In your August 14, 2003, memorandum to Secretary Rumsfeld, you identified your "highest priority resulting from the Agenda for Change" as "to improve the sexual assault response process at the Academy." Your Agenda for Change itself focuses on the Academy's mission to commission leaders of character committed to Air Force core values, mandating that the "universal guiding principle for all cadets, officers, and NCOs will be honor, integrity, and mutual respect that is the hallmark of the Academy tradition." Accordingly, I recommend that you clarify your "highest priority" to focus not on any process but, above all, on improving moral choices made by each cadet and by each already commissioned "leader of character" at the Academy. Specifically, I recommend that you instruct your new Academy Superintendent, as he "review[s] all USAFA Instructions for compliance with the mission statement" (Agenda for Change, ¶10), (a) to ensure that USAFA has implemented the statutory leadership standard of "exemplary conduct" prescribed by Congress in 1997 in the aftermath of the Aberdeen Sex Scandal (10 U.S.C. §8583), and (b) to unambiguously prescribe sexual misconduct, whether or not criminal in nature, as grounds for separation from the Academy (cf. Army Regulation 210-26 ("United States Military Academy"), ¶6-8);

(3) Regarding your expressed concern about the "the equalization of religion with racial and sexual issues in the [draft Air Force Academy cadet wing] survey" by the new Superintendent, my staff and I have reviewed the Superintendent's proposed survey and have found nothing objectionable about its religious content. I respectfully recommend that you clarify your prior e-mail commentary so that neither your Superintendent nor anyone else interprets it as a requirement to remove all religious content from the proposed survey, and

(4) As indicated at our meeting Tuesday, I would be glad to accept your invitation to address the Corps of Cadets, which I presume would be part of what your Agenda for Change describes as a "lecture series sponsored by the Secretary of the Air Force [that] will emphasize the moral and ethical standards expected of Air Force officers." If you agree, I would be glad to present my "lecture" concurrently with my staff's administration of our refined multi-academy survey this fall.

Joseph E. Schmitz

Attachment: As stated

4 of 9

TAB 2  
(2)

**DoD IG May 2003 Initial Survey Partial Results<sup>1</sup>  
Breakdown of Alleged Sexual Assaults (or Attempted Sexual Assaults)  
and Rapes (or Attempted Rapes) Indicated by Graduation Year**

Class Year	Cadets who claim to be sexual assault/attempted sexual assault victims <sup>2</sup>	Percent of Respondents	Cadets who claim to be rape/attempted rape victims (included in sexual assault victims) <sup>3</sup>	Percent of Respondents
2003	31	24.2%	15	11.7%
2004	32	27.4%	10	8.5%
2005	27	17.5%	11	7.1%
2006	19	10.6%	7	3.9%
Total	109 <sup>4</sup>	18.8%	43	7.4%

1. DoD IG plans to conduct a more robust survey at all three Service Academies in fall 2003.

2. The survey questionnaire defines "sexual assault" as: "the touching of another without their consent in a sexual manner, including attempts, in order to arouse, appeal to, or gratify the lust or sexual desires of the accused, the victim, or both. Sexual assault includes, but is not limited to, rape, sodomy, fondling, unwanted touching of a sexual nature, and indecent sexual acts that the victim does not consent to, or is explicitly or implicitly forced into. It is immaterial whether the touching is directly upon the body of another or is committed through the person's clothing." This definition is verbatim, in part, from USAFA Instruction 51-201, p. 7. After administration of the DoD IG survey, the Air Force issued its "Report of the Working Group Concerning the Deterrence of and Response to Incidents of Sexual Assault at the U.S. Air Force Academy," which identifies concerns with this definition (at pp. 22-24) as:

"inconsistent with Air Force practice (and law) and is susceptible to creating inaccurate perceptions, expectations, and even inaccurate reports of assault. . . The area of greatest confusion in the Academy definition relates to the issue of consent. Even though the Academy's definition of sexual assault addresses consent, the explanation is, in part, inconsistent with law, and misleading. . . . To the extent that the definition implies that having consumed alcohol and being impaired to any degree negates consent, it is significantly misleading to cadets, and likely to result in allegations of sexual assault under circumstances that would not meet criminal requirements."

3. The survey defines "rape" as: "an act of sexual intercourse with a female, by force and/or without her consent (conscious or unconscious). Penetration, however slight, is sufficient to complete the offense." Cf. 10 U.S.C. § 920 (Art. 120, UCMJ). (Claimed rape responses were included in the overall claimed sexual assault responses; they are not additive.)

4. 109 of 579 usable responses from the 581 surveyed (which include neither sixty-six cadets who were not available to be surveyed nor twelve cadets with excused absences).

549

(2) (8)

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**OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL  
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE ACADEMY  
INITIAL SEXUAL ASSAULT SURVEY FINDINGS**

---

August 21, 2003, Draft

**The Initial Survey**

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- ◆ In May 2003, the Inspector General of the Department of Defense authorized and administered an initial survey of female cadets at the U.S. Air Force Academy (USAFA) designed to indicate the scope of recent sexual assault incidents and to assess the sexual assault climate at the Academy (including factors such as frequency of incidents, likelihood of reprisal/ostracism for reporting assault, personal safety on campus, cadet perceptions of the command's handling of sexual assault, reasons for non-reporting, and cadet perceptions of sexual assault support and training programs).
- ◆ The survey had 27 questions, for a total of 113 items (14 questions for a total of 50 items, were only applicable to those respondents who indicated sexual assault).
- ◆ These definitions were employed in the survey:
  - **Sexual assault** (adapted from USAFA Instruction 51-201, "Cadet Victim/Witness Assistance and Notification Procedures"): "the touching of another without their consent in a sexual manner, including attempts, in order to arouse, appeal to, or gratify the lust or sexual desires of the accused, the victim, or both. Sexual assault includes, but is not limited to, rape, sodomy, fondling, unwanted touching of a sexual nature, and indecent sexual acts that the victim does not consent to, or is explicitly or implicitly forced into. It is immaterial whether the touching is directly upon the body of another or is committed through the person's clothing.<sup>1</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> The definition of sexual assault employed presents a certain amount of difficulty. It is adapted from the definition in USAFA Instruction 51-201—a definition that the Air Force considers too broad (and thus may result in a higher count of sexual assault incidents than is actually warranted.) The OIG (DoD) acknowledges that there is a certain amount of difficulty present in the definition employed—however, two important things must be considered; first, the OIG (DoD) survey definition lacked one important clause found in the USAFA Instruction 51-201, which states that consent is not given when "the person is alcohol impaired; second, the definition supplied is not so broad as to suggest that the majority of incidents claimed were in fact improperly classified by the respondents as sexual assaults.

6 of 9 (23)

- **Rape** (adapted from UCMJ Art. 120): "an act of sexual intercourse with a female, by force and/or without her consent (conscious or unconscious). Penetration, however slight, is sufficient to complete the offense."<sup>2</sup>
- **Note:** The definition of sexual assault includes rape and attempted rape; consequently, the results for claimed sexual assault and the results for rape (and its attempt) are *not* additive.

## **The Data**

### **Survey Population**

- ◆ Of the total female cadet population of 659, 66 were unavailable, and of all available cadets, 12 had unexcused absences. The remaining 581 cadets took the survey. Of their responses, 2 were eliminated entirely—one was blank except for class year and a general comment, and the other was so internally inconsistent that it could not be used. This left usable responses from 579 female cadets (87.9% of the total female cadet population, and 97.6% of all available female cadets).

### **Scope of Recent Incidents**

Of these 579 cadets:

- ◆ 43 (7.4%)—including 15 members (11.7%) of the Class of 2003—indicated they had been victims of at least one rape or attempted rape in their time at the Academy.
- ◆ 109 (18.8%) indicated they had been victims of at least one instance of sexual assault in their time at the Academy. A total of 177 instances of sexual assault were described as reported. (The rape / attempted rape figure is included in these numbers.)
- ◆ 398 (68.7%) indicated they had experienced sexual harassment ("unwanted and uninvited sexual attention") in the form of "sexual teasing, jokes, remarks, or questions" while at the Academy. 262 (45.3%) indicated experiencing "sexually suggestive looks, gestures, or body language," and 225 (38.9%) indicated receiving "letters, telephone calls, emails, instant messaging or materials of a sexual nature." 204 (35.2%) indicated experiencing "leaning

<sup>2</sup> The definition of rape employed is essentially the same as Article 120 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).

7/19 (20) [Signature]

over, cornering, pinching or brushing against, unwanted touching," and 129 (22.3%) indicated experiencing "pressure for sexual favors."

- ◆ Only 33 of the 177 instances of assault (18.6%) were indicated as reported to the authorities; 143 (80.8%) were indicated as not reported.
- ◆ Of those who reported, 15 (45.5%) indicated experiencing reprisal of some kind. ("Reprisal" was not defined in the survey.)
- ◆ The respondents identified the offenders for 166 of the 177 incidents (by category, not by name); the list included cadets (both senior and non-senior to the respondents), a staff / faculty member, military personnel assigned to the academy and to other installations, a civilian assigned to the installation, and several civilians not affiliated with the installation. Of the 166 incidents with identified offenders, fellow cadets were identified as the principal offender group (in 149 incidents, i.e. 89.8% of all identified offenders); 65 of these were cadets who were senior to the victim while 84 were cadets who were not senior.
- ◆ The respondents also indicated incident location categories for 174 of the 177; 114 (64.4% of all incidents) occurred on the installation -- 65 in the dorms and 49 elsewhere. Another 11 (6.2%) occurred off the installation, but at Academy-sponsored events, and 49 (27.7%) occurred off the installation and not at an Academy-sponsored event.
- ◆ We have not yet attempted to compare these results to other institutions (either military or civilian).

#### *Sexual Assault Climate*

The sexual assault assessment requested cadet views on:

- ◆ **Previous command's handling of sexual assault incidents:** A slight majority - 310 (53.5% of all respondents) believed that the previous leadership did not handle sexual assault incidents appropriately, while 86 (14.9%) believed they did, and 182 (31.4%) did not know.
- ◆ **Previous command's efforts to curb sexual harassment:** Almost half - 267 (46.1%) believed that the previous command had made "honest and reasonable efforts to prevent or stop uninvited and unwanted sexual attention," while 310 (53.5%) believed it had not.

869 5/16

4

- ◆ **Current command's efforts to curb sexual harassment:** Almost all--556 (96.0%) reported that they believed the present command was making "honest and reasonable efforts to prevent or stop uninvited and unwanted sexual attention," while only 22 (3.8%) believed it was not.
- ◆ **Reasons for non-reporting:** The following reasons were given for not reporting incidents: 39 (27.3%)—fear of reprisal from upperclassmen not in chain of command; 35 (24.5%)—fear of reprisal from upperclassmen in chain of command; 36 (25.2%)—fear of reprisal from command officials (AOC, TAC, Company Commander); 69 (48.3%)—fear of ostracism by peers; 36 (25.2%)—fear of being punished for other infractions / violations committed; 64 (44.8%)—fear that nothing would be done about the incident; and 82 (57.3%)—embarrassment. (Percentages total above 100% because cadets were allowed to list multiple reasons; when required to indicate the single greatest reason, the two top reasons indicated were: fear of ostracism by peers and fear of being punished for other infractions.)
- **Cadet Safety:** Most - 365 (63.0%) expressed no fears about their personal safety, while 82 (14.2%) indicating their biggest fear was being hazed or unjustifiably harassed, 51 (8.8%) saying it was that they would be sexually assaulted, and 27 (4.7%) saying that they would be non-sexually assaulted. Cadets also indicated overwhelmingly (over 90%) that they felt "very safe" or "safe" in every location on campus, except when "alone on academy grounds during hours of darkness." (68.9% felt "very safe" or "safe"; 20% felt "somewhat safe"; and 10.9% felt "unsafe or "very unsafe.")

969 (26) #

11:44 AM

TO: Gen. John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: August 25, 2003

SUBJECT:

When you get that final End Strength memo finished, I want to send it to the President with the attached note.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
082503.13

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_ *8/26/03*

*320.2*

U21629 /03

*25 AUG 03*

*1.62 (2)*

TO: Larry Di Rita  
 Col. Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: August 23, 2003

SUBJECT: **Calendar**

*02050*

Try to set up a phone call with me and Vin Weber some time soon. Tuesday, I suppose. His office is in Minnesota. Clarke Weinstock knows his phone number up there if we don't.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
 082303.02

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_ *8/26*

*23 AUG 03*

**U21630 /03**

TO: Larry Di Rita  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
 DATE: August 23, 2003  
 SUBJECT:

I am surprised I accepted this VFW speech. Condi Rice is there speaking, getting an award. Dick Myers is there speaking that night, and John Kerry is speaking before I do. Kind of a strange decision.

What do you think?

Thanks.

DIR/azn  
 082303.01

Please respond by: 8/25/03

350.00158

23 AUG 03

U21631 /03

August 22, 2003

320.2

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
Gen. Pete Pace  
Steve Cambone  
Ryan Henry  
LTG George Casey

FROM: LTG John Craddock

SUBJECT: Version #4 of End Strength Paper

Please review the attached version of the Secretary's "End Strength" paper and return to me by noon tomorrow (Saturday) any input you may have—via telephone, e-mail or hard copy. The differences between Draft #3 and Version #4 are noted as line-in/line-out markings.

The Secretary would like to have the action items in this paper tasked out early next week, so your input will be greatly appreciated.

Thanks.

Attach.  
End Strength, Version #4, August 21, 2003

JC:dh  
082203-1

22 Aug 03

U216324/03

SUBJECT: "End Strength"—Are current U.S. military forces sufficient for the challenges facing our country? What are ways DoD can reduce the stress on the force, and maintain recruiting and retention targets, and make the Department more efficient and cost effective?

Summary: The U.S. can afford whatever military force level (end strength) is determined to be necessary and appropriate for our nation's security. The men and women in uniform are the Department's most valuable asset. Our people—military and civilian—appreciate in value, while equipment decreases in value. Our people are the principal characteristic that distinguishes the U.S. military from other forces. For the present, analysis by the ~~Department of Defense~~ Joint Chiefs indicates that the U.S. military currently has sufficient active and reserve forces to execute its assigned missions. If at any time that is not the case, it would be DoD's responsibility to recommend to the President appropriate adjustments. Absent analysis that indicates that U.S. forces are not able to meet their assigned missions, it would be an expensive mistake to increase the size of our forces. To the extent we increase our investment in end strength, we may likely increase risk in other key areas, such as readiness (O&M) and research and development.

Background: Adding uniformed personnel to the defense establishment is ~~among the most expensive investments DoD can make.~~

- The cost is substantial over the lifetime of a service member. A number of the most costly add-ons to military pay and benefits have been for retired, not active duty personnel.
- Increased end strength has second and third order effects. The more end strength, the more force protection and infrastructure that is required. The

WORKING PAPER

more end strength, the more force protection that is required; the more end strength, the more infrastructure that is required; the more end strength, the more pensions and healthcare for life that are required.

- It takes time to recruit, train and integrate new personnel into the Armed Forces. As a result, there is a considerable lag between when the additional personnel are recruited and the costs begin, and when the added capability is received.
- At present, all four Services' recruiting and retention goals are being met or exceeded. Whether these favorable results will continue as we move through the coming months and years remains to be seen. These key indicators must be closely watched.

The current stress on the force is very likely a "spike," and we hope it will not be permanent. In any event, that stress, as well as respect for the taxpayers' dollars, requires DoD to make every effort to achieve the most efficient use of the forces. That same respect for the taxpayers' dollars mandates that we aggressively address the alternative contractor and civilian employee cost impacts as well.

Following is, I am sure, an incomplete but illustrative list of activities DoD is currently executing and/or examining for implementation. As appropriate, we must exploit each of these areas to reduce stress on the force, both active and reserve. Though it may appear that some of these areas do not directly benefit end strength, nor assist in reducing stress on the force, in a variety of ways we believe they have positive, indirect impact. To the extent we are successful in improving performance in these areas, it should relieve pressure on the force and likely reduce the current calls for end strength increases, or, at the minimum, reduce the size of any end strength increase that analysis might later indicate is necessary in the future.

1. Lessons Being Learned

- Contingency Plans. DoD is currently reviewing and revising all contingency plans to take account of the lessons learned thus far in Afghanistan, Iraq and the Global War on Terror. Among the lessons is the need to take advantage of the tradeoffs between numbers of people and things—“mass”—versus the increased lethality from speed, agility, precision munitions and the leverage available in the information age. “Overmatching power” is replacing “overwhelming force.”
- Jointness. DoD is achieving greater jointness worldwide, so combatant commanders should be able to tailor forces creatively among the Services to gain added synergy and lethality, as in the Iraq war. Coherently joint forces create power that exceeds the sum of individual military—U.S. and international—elements.
- Training and Exercises. Training matters; joint training matters more. It creates an asymmetric advantage for U.S. forces. Training and exercises need to take account of recent real world experience.
- Global Force Management. DoD is exploring methods of replacing the concept of “forces for a specific combatant commander” with a “Global Force Management Availability System,” which should lead to more efficient management of the forces and the process.
- Reserve/Active Force Balance. DoD is rebalancing the reserve components with the active components to achieve the appropriate mix for the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The task is to avoid having to call up certain specialties repeatedly for tasks we know DoD is and will continue to be called upon to execute regularly (civil affairs, etc.). The new active-

## WORKING PAPER

Reserve mix must also be designed to enable more immediate action, as appropriate.

- Manpower Levels and Skill Sets. Review active and reserve components to determine the appropriate manpower levels for the total force and its elements, and the specific skill sets required in each for the 21<sup>st</sup> century.
- Time on Operational Duty. For Reserve Components, seek ways to increase the ratio of the number of months actually on operational duty out of the total period of activation/mobilization. We can improve on those instances where it is as low as 6 months out of a 12-month call-up.
- Precision Weapons. Use of precision weapons, with greater accuracy, can maintain lethality while reducing both the operational footprint and the logistics tail, thereby reducing force requirements.
- Prepo. DoD is exploring ways to make greater use of pre-positioned stocks.
- Deployments. The old Industrial Age process is broken. An approach that permits only peace or war, with little or no nuance, is out of date. The process is currently being streamlined to take less time and permit more nuanced management of mobilization and demobilization, deployment and redeployment, and recovery operations.
- Relief-in-Place. The Services need to establish a common definition of “relief-in-place” and then implement measures review how to shorten the relief in place system from 45 – 60 days to a shorter period, as appropriate.

- Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters. The world is moving so fast that Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters are necessary. If it takes one to three months to staff up a headquarters, the wars of the future may well be over before the staff is in place. Where appropriate, we must invest in and sustain surge capability.

## 2. People

- Military Out of Non-Military Jobs. DoD requires Congressional cooperation to pass the personnel reform legislation so it can get closure on the studies that suggest there are some 300,000 to ~~320,000~~380,000 positions that military personnel are currently serving in that might be performed by civilians. Managers have to be freed up so they can make greater use of the civil service, rather than feeling forced to use military personnel or contractors because they feel they cannot efficiently manage the DoD civilian workforce. If only one-sixth of those 300,000 positions were freed up for military duty, it would increase usable “end strength” by 50,000. We won’t know what can be achieved until the current analysis is completed.
- Core Competencies. OSD ~~will~~is aggressively working to move the military out of activities that are not core competencies or inherently governmental. For example, ~~the cost today is \$46,000 per prisoner in the Army prison system, versus the Kansas State Penitentiary system cost of \$12,100.~~housing privatization has allowed DoD to get better value and speed modernization for the same expenditure of funds.
- Contract Employees. For shorter duration missions and missions that are not military core competencies, DoD will have to make greater-more judicious use of contract employees. This will require that we organize

## WORKING PAPER

so we have Congressional authority and the ability to properly engage contract assistance.

- Education. The Department is working to improve joint education to create a culture that empowers younger leaders to think beyond their parent Services for creative solutions to the challenges our nation faces.
- Coalition Forces. The U.S. must organize its alliances and relationships to increase the availability and readiness of coalition forces—the speed of their availability and the readiness of their equipment. This will require a diplomatic effort to substantially reduce the current restrictions and caveats many countries have that reduce the availability of their forces and also a long-term commitment to help to finance less wealthy nations' ability to sustain their forces.
- Allies. We must assist treaty partners, where appropriate, to assume greater responsibility for their defense more rapidly.
- Backfill. During a crisis, we need to arrange for other countries to backfill for U.S. troops in some of our long-term commitments, such as the Sinai, Iceland, Bosnia, Kosovo, etc. Additionally, the U.S. will ~~want to end~~have to tackle the tough political challenge of ending some commitments.
- Indigenous Forces. The U.S. must organize and fund to be able to use more host nation security personnel in places like Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia, and Kosovo to ease ~~our~~the burden on coalition forces. This will require Congress approving DoD's proposed "train and equip" legislation.

## WORKING PAPER

- Reserve Forces. DoD ~~will has~~ established a policy a process whereby ~~we it~~ will first use Reserve forces that have not recently been mobilized, to the extent possible.
- Volunteers. DoD will continue to use volunteers from the Reserve force, to the extent available.
- Holidays. To the extent possible, DoD force mobilizations will be respectful of ~~Christmas, ete~~ major holidays.
- Call-ups. DoD ~~will revise~~ is revising the process so as to protect the goal of 30 days' notice for mobilization of reserve units, if at all possible, and will consider a tiered arrangement whereby some reserve units ~~will might~~ be compensated and trained to maintain a readiness level to be available and ready for prompt deployment with a shorter call-up.
- Incentives. ~~Offer~~ DoD will consider offering incentives for extended deployments incentives. e.g., up to \$500/month if deployments exceed XX months.
- Peace Operations. ~~Implement~~ The USG is considering a "Peace Operations Initiative" with the goal of increasing the worldwide availability of peacekeepers, peacemakers, military police, constabulary, etc. for peacemaking and peacekeeping operations.
- Intelligence. DoD is working to strengthen actionable intelligence, and improve humint in key areas of interest, by prioritization of effort and by assuring seamless exchange of information among U.S. agencies.

### 3. Technology

- Information Age. DoD will accelerate use of new information technologies to reduce the need for forward deployed personnel and thereby reduce the rotation rate the Services require to support a deployed person.
- Logistics. DoD will ~~develop improved~~ continue to emphasize systems with smaller logistics requirements and footprint (~~Comanche versus Apache and the Kiowa~~), simplified designs with fewer parts and more interchangeable parts (~~Joint Strike Fighter~~).
- New Technologies. DoD ~~must~~ will invest in technology to substitute for human force protection—sensors, intelligence, etc. Additionally, the Services will be encouraged to consider the approach the Navy is using to reduce personnel needed for ship manning (by as much as 40 ~~or~~ 50 percent in some cases) and invest in less manpower-intensive platforms (UAVs), and technologies and processes, in and out of the defense industry.
- Lethality. ~~The Army is~~ Services are working to lighten ~~the division~~ their footprint, while ~~retaining~~ increasing lethality, to the extent possible.
- U.S. and Coalition Transformation. DoD will work to improve its interoperability with coalition partners through the Joint Forces Command.

### 4. Efficiency

- Organization of Forces. In the 21<sup>st</sup> century one size doesn't fit all. DoD will modernize the Services' force organizations to achieve improved modularity, so combatant commanders can more readily organize units

## WORKING PAPER

to task. This should allow commanders to build capability by adding modules and right-sizing the force to their missions. The goal is to achieve greater interchangeable and combined arms effects to increase flexibility. Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters are ideally suited to integrate and operate this approach. Interchangeable divisions could provide improvements in force allocation, force rotation, and employment flexibility.

- Global reach back. DoD will organize to conduct more non-spear point activities for deployed forces back in the U.S., thereby reducing both the number of forces deployed as well as the rotation base multiple needed to maintain that number of troops forward-deployed. Organizing the Reserve Components to optimize reach back opportunities may yield significant personnel tempo savings.
- Force Allocation. OSD and the Joint Forces Command will work to be able to provide combatant commanders the joint force capabilities they need to achieve desired “effects” and “outcomes,” rather than simply responding to requests for numbers of things—troops or platforms.
- Procurement. DoD will continue to invest to achieve greater lethality per unit of force structure, ~~high speed transport, etc.~~
- Strategic Lift. Continue investing in strategic lift to assure timely mobility, e.g., high speed transport. Leveraging new technologies in this area should also reduce the associated logistic footprint.
- Rotation Ratio. The Services will work to find ways to ~~move down from the current 5 to 4~~ reduce the rotation ratio and consider opportunities to fly crews to their equipment.

- Headquarters Layering. ~~Combatant commands and Services~~DoD components' reduction in the number of headquarters will free up some of the manpower currently staffing those organizations. The flattening of headquarters hierarchies is desirable and viable given existing and planned communications technology.
- Best Practices. DoD will work to move best practices from inside and outside DoD ~~among the Services~~ throughout the Department.
- Planning Tools. DoD is developing ~~rapid-planning tool~~tools to enable it to plan more rapidly to produce more refined force requirements, both in terms of numbers and timing of their movement and arrival.
- Operational Availability. DoD will implement the appropriate JROC "operational availability" studies' recommendations.
- Strategic Warning. Intelligence capabilities will be tasked to see if it is possible and cost effective to increase strategic warning, thereby reducing the portion of the force that must be forward-deployed.
- The Right Skills. DoD will develop the ability to ~~promptly more~~ rapidly adjust forces in the field, so as to put the right capabilities in the right places at the right time and to be able to make rapid adjustments as circumstances change.

## 5. Policy

- U.S. Foreign Commitments. DoD will continue to work to pare down long-term U.S. commitments such as the Sinai, Iceland, Bosnia, Kosovo, etc. We will advise nations at the outset that deployments are not forever and that the U.S. requires the ability to redeploy for other

contingencies and ease of transit. DoD will also use care in adding new commitments of forces.

- U.S. Non-Military Skills. The USG ~~must needs to~~ strengthen ~~our~~ ability, in concert with coalition partners, the international capability to help countries establish a civil society and execute civil implementation tasks; only if we are successful will the U.S. and coalition forces be relieved of peace operations earlier than ~~has been~~ tends to be the case, such as in Bosnia.
- U.S. Worldwide Footprint. DoD will work to improve the flexibility and responsiveness of U.S. forces by adjusting U.S. forward-deployed forces in Europe and Asia, by repositioning pre-positioned equipment to improve our capabilities for rapid deployment from the U.S. and elsewhere, and by investing in necessary infrastructure where required. DoD will consolidate locations worldwide to reduce the number of troops required for support, including force protection and, in addition, will use host nation forces, where available, to provide protection for deployed U.S. forces.

### Conclusion.

- In a war—in this case, the Global War on Terrorism—it cannot be “business as usual.” During a crisis, when there is a ~~predictable~~ understandable spike demand on U.S. forces, DoD cannot behave as though it is “business as usual.” It isn’t. DoD needs to act promptly to reduce or stop ~~education, programs,~~ activities such as exercises and other “business as usual” activities, as appropriate.
- The task of DoD is to manage the force within acceptable levels of stress. Key measurements are recruiting and retention metrics. We must ~~continuously~~

WORKING PAPER

monitor all activities to see that we achieve solid progress on each of the above tasks, before taking the easy and ~~vastly~~-more expensive course of increasing force levels. We owe the American people no less.

DHR:dh  
Current MFRs/ End Strength

August 21, 2003

IRAQ

TO: Doug Feith  
CC: Reuben Jeffery  
Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Kevin Woelflein

Sometime back I recommended a man named Kevin Woelflein for consideration to go to Iraq. This is a person with banking experience. My recollection is he may even speak Arabic, but I am not sure of that. I sent the material on him to somebody.

I was told today that he was told that his services were not needed. I would be curious to have someone check into that and explain to me what in the world is going on. I thought we needed people out there.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
082103-2

.....

Please respond by 9/5/03

U21633 /03

21Aug03

BCC: PAUL WOLFOWITZ  
STEVE CAMERONE

August 21, 2003

TO: Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Security Assessment on Paul Bremer

I would appreciate it if you could arrange to have the Secret Service do a security assessment on Paul Bremer as soon as possible. It is a matter of concern to us. As soon as they can do it and give us some insights, we will get to work with you or whomever to see that the proper security is provided.

My guess is that since he is a Presidential Envoy, his security could very likely be within the charter of the Secret Service, but I am not sufficiently knowledgeable to know precisely.

I look forward to hearing from you.

Regards,

DHR:dh  
082103-3

380.01

21 AUG 03

U21634 /03

August 21, 2003

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*  
SUBJECT: Bremer's Security Situation

Please get back to me when you have some information on the security situation for Paul Bremer.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
082103-4

.....  
Please respond by 8/29/03

*C - 11-0559 + 350.01*

*21Aug03*

U21635 /03

August 21, 2003

350.00150

TO: Marc Thiessen  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Making Note of Q&As

In the future, if I am doing a troop talk and there are Q&As, please put on the speech "to be followed by Q&As" so I know how to do it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
082103-5

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

21AUG03

U21636 /03

August 21, 2003

TO: Marc Thiessen  
 CC: Col. Bucci (for trip coordinators)  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
 SUBJECT: Prep for Speeches, Troop Talks

350.00150

Please include a piece of paper for troop talks etc. with more information on the event. I don't have any visibility into these events.

I need to know:

- who is introducing me
- who else is there
- whether or not there will be Q&As

Please let your staff know how things should be sent to me.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
082103-6

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

31 AUG 03

U21637 /03

EF-6580

I-03/011769

SNOWFLAKE

TASKEE

August 20, 2003

WHA

Honduras

TO: Peter Rodman  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Settling Issues

I would like to press to solve those issues in Honduras on the radar and the helicopters.

It is better to get those kinds of things sorted out one way or another rather than let them linger, as though we are not interested or don't care. The facts seem to be quite different between what I was told on the plane and what the Air Force colonel was saying on the ground.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
082003-5 (is computer).doc

.....  
Please respond by 9/12/03

*✓*  
10/16

Sir,  
Response attached in two parts: 1) RADAR and 2) HELICOPTERS.  
Response on Helicopters was previously submitted, but included again to provide a complete package.

vr/CDR Nosezza  
10-1

20 Aug 03  
10/16

U21638. /03

11-L-0559/OSD/18967



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2400  
INFO MEMO

SEP 20  
Jr  
✓  
10/16

INTERNATIONAL  
SECURITY  
AFFAIRS

I-03/011769  
USDP [Signature]

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs 29 SEP 2003  
(Peter W. Rodman, (b)(6) [Signature])

SUBJECT: Honduras' Cerro la Mole Radar

During your recent visit to Honduras, you asked how we could resolve the impasse over the radar at Cerro la Mole.

- In December 1993, the U.S. and Honduras signed an agreement that committed the USG to provide spare parts and support up to \$400K per year for the Honduran-owned radar at Cerro La Mole.
- While DoD counternarcotics funds are used to support USAF-owned radar operations in the region, DoD counterdrug authorities cannot be used to support annual Operations and Maintenance (O&M) for non-U.S. owned radars outside of Colombia.
- The radar has not worked since 1999 due to damage and lack of funding. Repair estimates range from \$2.1 to \$4M.

**CURRENT STATUS:**

- The USAF is evaluating an Excess Defense Article (EDA) option of offering a US-owned radar from Venezuela if, as we expect, the Venezuelans do not exercise their option to purchase it by 31 Dec 03.
- At the end of the year, the USAF will offer the EDA radar to Honduras, unless Venezuela notifies us sooner that it does not intend to purchase the radar.
- We will continue coordination with State to terminate the 1993 Honduras agreement, as this is a low-priority surveillance radar in the Transit Zone.

COORDINATION: TAB A

Prepared by: LCDR Scott E. Organ, OSD/ISA/WHA (b)(6)

TAB A: COORDINATION

Department of Defense General Counsel Mr. Dan Dellórto	24 September 2003
SOLIC/CN Mr. Bob Newberry	12 September 2003
SAF/IAR Brig Gen Ronald Yaggi	12 September 2003
SOUTHCOM/J5 Brig Gen Griffin	15 September 2003
JCS/J5 Col Jan Ithier, LATAM Division Chief	12 September 2003



INTERNATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS

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2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2400

INFO MEMO

SEP 22 2003



EF-6913

In reply refer to:  
I-03/012161-ERASA

USDP

copy provided 9/23/03  
10/14

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs  
(Peter W. Rodman (b)(6))

SEP 22 2003

SUBJECT: Honduras UH-1 Helicopter Request

- You asked for clarification on two issues (helicopters and radar) discussed during your visit to Honduras. We will answer you separately on the radar. What you were briefed en route to Honduras regarding the UH-1s was correct.
- Honduras requested the USG refurbish six excess UH-1s, previously offered as a grant transfer, at either no cost or with a 15-year loan. Refurbishment is estimated to cost \$4.8M.
- Public law requires that maintenance and repair work for excess UH-1s shall be performed at no cost to DOD. Additionally, Honduras is not likely to qualify for a low cost loan due to a poor credit rating.
- Foreign Operations funding could be used for the refurbishment. Although State advises there are no funds currently available, we will work with State to address this requirement in next year's budget submission.

COORDINATION: TAB A

Prepared by: Lt Col Troy Edgell, DSCA/ERASA-ASA, (b)(6)  
DIR, DSCA Watt 9/22  
PDASD/ISA aur

### 2579. War booty: procedures for handling and retaining battlefield objects<sup>3</sup>

(a) **POLICY.**—The United States recognizes that battlefield souvenirs have traditionally provided military personnel with a valued memento of service in a national cause. At the same time, it is the policy and tradition of the United States that the desire for souvenirs in a combat theater not blemish the conduct of combat operations or result in the mistreatment of enemy personnel, the dishonoring of the dead, distraction from the conduct of operations, or other unbecoming activities.

(b) **REGULATIONS.**—(1) The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe regulations for the handling of battlefield objects that are consistent with the policies expressed in subsection (a) and the requirements of this section.

(2) When forces of the United States are operating in a theater of operations, enemy material captured or found abandoned shall be turned over to appropriate United States or allied military personnel except as otherwise provided in such regulations. A member of the armed forces (or other person under the authority of the armed forces in a theater of operations) may not (except in accordance with such regulations) take from a theater of operations as a souvenir an object formerly in the possession of the enemy.

(3) Such regulations shall provide that a member of the armed forces who wishes to retain as a souvenir an object covered by paragraph (2) may so request at the time the object is turned over pursuant to paragraph (2).

(4) Such regulations shall provide for an officer to be designated to review requests under paragraph (3). If the officer determines that the object may be appropriately retained as a war souvenir, the object shall be turned over to the member who requested the right to retain it.

(5) Such regulations shall provide for captured weaponry to be retained as souvenirs, as follows:

(A) The only weapons that may be retained are those in categories to be agreed upon jointly by the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Treasury.

(B) Before a weapon is turned over to a member, the weapon shall be rendered unserviceable.

(C) A charge may be assessed in connection with each weapon in an amount sufficient to cover the full cost of rendering the weapon unserviceable.

(Added P.L. 103-160, § 1171(a)(1), Nov. 30, 1993, 107 Stat. 1765.)

### 2580. Donation of excess chapel property

(a) **AUTHORITY TO DONATE.**—The Secretary of a military department may donate personal property specified in subsection (a) to an organization described in section 501(c)(3) of the Internal

<sup>3</sup>The Spoils of War Act of 1994 (50 U.S.C. 2201 et seq.), which generally provides that spoils of war in the possession, custody, or control of the United States may be transferred to any party only in the same manner, and subject to the same terms, conditions, and requirements, as apply to the transfer of property of the same type otherwise owned by the United States, includes in section 556(5) (50 U.S.C. 2203(5)) an exception in the case of "minor articles of personal property which have lawfully become the property of individual members of the armed forces as war trophies pursuant to public written authorization from the Department of Defense."

Revenue Code of 1986 that is a religious organization in order to assist the organization in restoring or replacing property of the organization that has been damaged or destroyed as a result of an act of arson or terrorism, as determined pursuant to procedures prescribed by the Secretary of Defense.

(b) **PROPERTY COVERED.**—(1) The property authorized to be donated under subsection (a) is furniture and other personal property that—

(A) is in, or was formerly in, a chapel under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of a military department and closed or being closed; and

(B) is determined by the Secretary to be excess to the requirements of the armed forces.

(2) No real property may be donated under this section.

(c) **DONEES NOT TO BE CHARGED.**—No charge may be imposed by the Secretary of a military department on a donee of property under this section in connection with the donation. However, the donee shall agree to defray any expense for shipping or other transportation of property donated under this section from the location of the property when donated to any other location.

(Added P.L. 105-85, § 1063(a), Nov. 18, 1997, 111 Stat. 1892.)

### 2581. Excess UH-1 Huey and AH-1 Cobra helicopters: requirements for transfer to foreign countries

(a) **REQUIREMENTS.**—(1) Before an excess UH-1 Huey helicopter or AH-1 Cobra helicopter is transferred on a grant or sales basis to a foreign country for the purpose of flight operations by that country, the Secretary of Defense shall make all reasonable efforts to ensure that the helicopter receives, to the extent necessary, maintenance and repair equivalent to the depot-level maintenance and repair (as defined in section 2460 of this title) that the helicopter would need were the helicopter to remain in operational use with the armed forces. Any such maintenance and repair work shall be performed at no cost to the Department of Defense.

(2) The Secretary shall make all reasonable efforts to ensure that maintenance and repair work described in paragraph (1) is performed in the United States.

(b) **EXCEPTION.**—Subsection (a) does not apply with respect to salvage helicopters provided to the foreign country solely as a source for spare parts.

(Added P.L. 105-281, § 1234, Oct. 17, 1998, 112 Stat. 2156.)

### 2582. Military equipment identified on United States munitions list: annual report of public sales

(a) **REPORT REQUIRED.**—The Secretary of Defense shall prepare an annual report identifying each public sale conducted by a military department or Defense Agency of military items that are—

(1) identified on the United States Munitions List maintained under section 121.1 of title 22, Code of Federal Regulations; and

(2) assigned a demilitarization code of "B" or its equivalent.

August 20, 2003

Honduras

TO: Peter Rodman

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Drug Runners Flying Over Honduras

I would like to solve the issue of why we are prohibiting the Hondurans from shooting down aircraft that are running drugs. Knowing that they are not allowed to shoot them down is like an invitation to having drug runners fly over Honduras. It is crazy.

Let's sort through that and see what we can do about it. Please don't let it drop. It is ridiculous. They are allowed to shoot people if they are on the ground. They are allowed to shoot people if they are in the sea. But they are not allowed to shoot people if they are in the air. I don't get it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
082003-7 (ts computer).doc



*Please respond by* 9/19/03

20 Aug 03

U21639 /03

August 20, 2003

Afghanistan

TO: Doug Feith

CC: Gen. John Abizaid  
Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Drug Eradication in Afghanistan

I just visited Colombia, as did the Chairman. They have done some impressive work on eradication of coca plants and opium poppies. I wonder if some of the expertise and experiences they have developed would be helpful to the Afghans. If so, we ought to think about getting some experts and then connecting the two.

Please let me know what you think we ought to do.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
082003-10 (ts computer).doc

.....

Please respond by 9/12/03

20 AUG 03

U21640 /03

August 20, 2003

337

TO: LTG John Craddock  
Larry Di Rita

CC: (b)(6)

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Imposition

When I go to these countries, I end up getting told that the embassy or the country I am visiting has spent hours, with people scouring the countryside, to find Diet Dr. Pepper, decaf coffee or something like that.

I do not want my personal preferences to be imposed on countries I visit or people I visit, whether in the United States or outside the country. I want our advance people to be prohibited from telling people what I like or want. I just think it is a terrible imposition and arrogant, and I don't like it. I want somebody to brief all of our advance people and get it stopped.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
082003-11 (ts computer).doc

.....

Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*George Rymedanes*

*9/14*

*George Rymedanes*

*Please del. discuss.  
Do not distribute this.*

20 AUG 03

U21641-103  
M-L-0559/GSD/18974

*Di Rita*  
Larry Di Rita *9/14*

August 20, 2003

TO: LTG John Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: General Hill

*Colombia*

Please tell me when General Hill's two years are up—what was his date of appointment?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
082003-1 (ts computer).doc

.....  
*Please respond by* 8/22/03 *✓ TBN 9/3*

*20 Aug 03*

U21642 /03

August 20, 2003

33350

TO: LTG John Craddock

CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Gen. Pete Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Coordinating Travel

In the future, I want to make sure we coordinate our calendars better. I think it is terrible for Dick Myers and me to be going to the same countries within a week. It looks like we don't know what we are doing.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
082003-2 (is computer).doc

.....

*Please respond by* 8/29/03

*M 9/3 ✓*

U21643 /03

20 Aug 03